פרשת משפטים תש"ו - אזהרות הדיין

כי תראה חמור שנאך וגו׳ IF THOU SEE THE ASS OF HIM THAT HATETH THEE etc. — כי here has the meaning of “possibly”, “perhaps”, which is one of the four meanings which the word כי serves to express. The sense of the verse is accordingly the following: Can you possibly see his ass crouching beneath his burden and forbear to help him? (The Hebrew word בתמיה in Rashi means “Say this in the intonation of a question”, and is nothing more than our question mark). עזב תעזב עמו — The root עזב has here the meaning of “helping”. It has a similar meaning in, (Deuteronomy 32:36) “assisted and helped (עזוב)”. Similar also is, (Nehemiah 3:8) “ויעזבו Jerusalem up to the wall” — i. e. they filled it up with earth in order to help and to support the strength of the wall. A similar use of כי is, (Deuteronomy 7:17, 18) כי תאמר בלבבך רביס הגוים האלה וגו׳ which means “Canst thou possibly (כי) speak thus? לא תירא מהם, Do not be afraid of them and speak thus”. Our Rabbis expounded it in a Halachic sense as follows: … כי תראה וחדלת “If thou seest etc. …וחדלת” — there are occasions when you may forbear and there are occasions when you must help. How so? If it is an old man who sees the ass in this condition and it is not compatible with his dignity to intervene, then וחדלת “thou mayest forbear” holds good; or if the animal belongs to a heathen and its burden to an Israelite then, also, וחדלת may be applied (cf. Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 23:5:3).

Thou shalt not wrest the judgment of thy poor in his cause.

(Exodus 22:1) "If the thief be found breaking in": This speaks of a doubt (in the owner's mind) as to whether he is breaking in to steal or to kill. You say this, but perhaps the doubt is as to whether he is breaking in to steal or not to steal. Would you say that? If he (broke in) to steal of a certainty and he killed him, he would be liable (for murder), how much more so if there is a doubt as to whether he came to steal! We must thus perforce accept not the second supposition, but the first. From here it follows that a doubt (i.e., a possibility) of saving a life overrides the Sabbath. For if (the sin of) killing, (in this instance, the thief,) (— killing,) which defiles the land and causes the Shechinah to depart (from Israel) — is overridden by the possibility (of saving one's life, how much more so does it follow that the possibility of saving life overrides the Sabbath.) (Exodus 22:2) "If the sun shone upon him": Now does the sun shine upon him alone? Does it not shine upon the whole world? But (the intent is) Just as the sun is peace for the world, so this one (the thief) — If he knows that he is at peace with him, and he killed him nonetheless, he is liable. Similarly (Devarim 22:17) "Then they shall spread out the garment" — They shall make things clear, as a (new) garment. Similarly, (Exodus 21:19) "on his cane" — on his own power. Here, too, (this figurative interpretation is the intent of) "If the sun shone upon him." R. Yishmael says: You say this, but perhaps the intent is (literally) to distinguish between day and night, viz.: If he killed him in the daytime, he is liable; if at night, he is not liable. It is, therefore, written (Devarim 22:26) "and to the maiden you shall do nothing; for as a man would rise up against his neighbor and murder him, so, is this thing" (raping a maiden). Now what do we learn (about raping) from (murdering)? But it (the instance of murdering) apparently comes to teach (something about that of raping), and ends up "learning" (something from it), viz.: Just as in the instance of raping, there is no difference between day and night, here, too, (in the instance of murdering,) no such distinction is to be made. Just as here, if he rose up (against the thief) and killed him, he is not liable, there, too, if she rose up against him and killed him, she is not liable. And just as there, if she had helpers against him and she killed him, she is liable (viz. Devarim, Ibid. 27), so, here, if he (the owner) had helpers against him and he killed him, he is liable. (Exodus, Ibid.) "If he (the thief) has blood, pay shall he pay": R. Eliezer b. Yaakov says: If there were before him (the thief) pitchers of wine and pitchers of oil and he broke them, so long as he (the owner) knows that he (the thief) is at peace with him, (as in the instance of a father coming to burglarize his son, where the son knows that if he resists his father he will not be killed, [so that he may not kill him]) then (even if) he does kill him, he is liable (retroactively for what he broke), it being written "If he (the thief) has blood (i.e., if it is forbidden to kill him), pay shall he pay." (Ibid.) "If he lacks it, he is to be sold for his theft": I might think, forever; it is, therefore, written (Ibid. 21:2) "Six years shall he serve, etc.", whence we are apprised that he serves for six years and goes out free on the seventh. "then he shall be sold for his theft": not for less (than the value of the theft) and not for more. R. Yehudah says: If he stole less than what he was worth, he is not sold; more than what he is worth, the owner of the stolen article has the option of selling him or writing him a writ of emancipation. R. Eliezer says: If he stole less than what he is worth, he is not sold; more than what he is worth, it suffices him to gain half and lose half (of the value of the stolen article). (Exodus 22:3) "If found will be found in his hand": in his possession. Even though there is no proof for this, there is support for it, viz. (Numbers 21:26) "and he took all his land from his hand", and (Genesis 24:10) "Then the servant took … and all the good of his master in his hand," — whence we find "in his hand" in all places to connote "in his possession." "from ox to ass, living": Let "living" ("chaim") not be mentioned. (It is mentioned) to include an animal ("chayah" [and not only a beast, like ox and ass.) "living, two shall he pay": and not (the value of) dead (animals). There are seven "thefts": "stealing men's minds" (i.e., deceiving them), importuning one's neighbor to be his guest when he has no intention of inviting him; proffering gifts that he knows will not be accepted; opening one's barrels (ostensibly "for him alone") when they have already been sold to the shopkeeper; cheating in measuring; falsifying weights; mixing (other) stalks among stalks of fenugrec, sand with beans, and vinegar with oil (even though they ruled that oil is not subject to defilement (me'ilah), wherefore kings are anointed with it.) And, what is more, they say about such a one that if he could "steal" the Higher Mind, he would do so. And thus do we find with Avshalom, that he "stole" three thefts: the heart of his father, the heart of beth-din and the heart of the house of Israel, as it is written (II Samuel 15:6) "And Avshalom stole the heart of the men of Israel." And who is the greater (thief)? The robber or the robbed? The robbed; for he knows that he is being robbed and remains silent. And thus do we find with our fathers, that when they stood on Mount Sinai, they sought to steal the Higher Mind, as it is written (Exodus 24:7) "Everything that the L rd has spoken, we will do and we will hear" — and it (the Higher Mind) was, as it were, "stolen" by them. As it is written (Devarim 5:26) "Would that this heart of theirs were in them to fear Me and to keep all of My mitzvoth all of the days, etc." And if you would say that not all is revealed and known to Him, it is written (Psalms 78:36-37) "And they beguiled Him (only) with their mouths, and (He knew that) their hearts were not constant with Him" — in spite of which (Ibid. 38) "And He was merciful, forgiving sin and not destroying, etc." And it is written (Mishlei 26:23) "As silver dross covering earthenware are lips running (with love) above an evil heart." Beyond these: If one stole things from which benefit may not be derived, he need not pay. (If he stole servants, land, and consecrated articles, he pays only the principal. (If he stole) garments, vessels, beasts, animals, or birds, he pays kefel (double payment). If he stole the first-born of an ass, he pays kefel, (for) even though benefit may not be derived from it now, it will be permitted later (when it is redeemed). For an ox he pays five-fold. For a sheep he pays four-fold, viz. "Five (head) of cattle, etc." Beyond these is a kidnapper, who pays his life. R. Shimon b. Yochai says: It is written (Mishlei 29:24) "One who divides with a thief hates his soul. (He hears the adjuration to swear and will not tell.") An analogy: One leaves his neighbor's house laden with (stolen) articles. His friend finds him and asks him "Where are you going?" The thief: "Take your share and don't tell anyone." Later, the robbed one comes and says to him "Swear to me that you did not see that man laden with articles leaving my house." The other: "I swear I know nothing." He is liable for his soul. Of him it is written "One who divides with a thief hates his soul." But if one steals away from his friend, (who asks to be paid for teaching him), and goes (and hides behind a fence) to learn Torah (i.e., to overhear the lesson that he is teaching), though he is called a "thief," he acquires merit for himself. Of him it is written (Mishlei 6:30) "they will not shame a thief for stealing (to fill his soul that is hungry" [for Torah].) In the end, he will be appointed (as a teacher) over the congregation (and he will return the "theft" in full.) As it is written (Ibid. 31) "In the end he will repay seven-fold. All the wealth of his house will he give" — "seven-fold" signifying Torah, viz. (Psalms 12:7) "The words of the L rd are pure words, silver purged in an earthen crucible, refined seven-fold." (Exodus 22:4) "If a man ravage a field or a vineyard, and he send his beast, etc.": Why is this written? (Even) if it were not written, it would follow a fortiori, viz.: If a pit is his property, and his (beast, that is) "sent" is his property, then if you have learned that he is liable for his pit, (which is stationary,) then should he not be liable for his beast, (which is sent)! If it is derivable a fortiori, why need the verse be stated? It comes to teach that the tooth is a mued (i.e., "confirmed") to eat what is appropriate for it, and a best is a mued to break (objects in its path) as it walks, (so that there is full liability even for the first instance of such damages). He is not liable unless the "damager" leaves his domain and causes damage, in which instance the damage is assessed (to be paid) from the best of his land — a fortiori (if the damage is) to consecrated property. "If a man ravage a field or a vineyard": each in itself. "a field or a vineyard": Just as a vineyard produces fruit, so "field" (here) is one which produces fruit. "and he send his beast": From here they ruled: If he gave his sheep to his son, his messenger, or his servant, he is not liable (for the damage it causes.) (If he gave it) to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, he is liable. "and it eat in another's field": R. Nathan says: If one were stacking grain in another's field without permission, and the owner's beast came out and damaged it, (I might think that) he is subsumed in "and he send his beast, etc." It is, therefore, written "and it eat in another's field." And this is not "another's." "the best of his field and the best of his vineyard": the best of the field of the nizak (the one damaged) and the best of the vineyard of the nizak. These are the words of R. Yishmael. R. Akiva says: Scripture (here) comes to apprise us that the damage is to be assessed (to be paid) from the best of his land — a fortiori (if the damage is) to consecrated property. (Exodus 22:5) "If fire go out and it find thorns … pay shall pay he that lights the fire": Why need this be written? It is derivable a fortiori, viz. If he is liable (if the fire proceeds) through thorns, how much more so if he himself lights it (directly)! If it is derivable a fortiori, why need the verse be stated? Scripture (thus) comes to equate (for liability) (damaging) perforce with (damaging) wilfully, (damaging) non-intentionally with (damaging) intentionally, and (to equate) a woman with a man for all the damaging in the Torah. "If fire go out and it find thorns": "thorns" are mentioned only to assign a limit (for his liability). If thorns are present (and carry the fire), there is a limit (for his liability). If they are not present (and he lights it directly) there is no limit. From here they ruled: If it crossed a river or a (public) way or a fence ten cubits high and caused damage, he is not liable. How is he perceived? He is perceived as standing in the midst of a beth-kor and damaging, (liability obtaining up to about 137 cubits on all sides.) R. Eliezer says: Sixteen cubits, as (the distance of) the public way. R. Akiva says: Fifty cubits. R. Shimon says: "Pay shall he pay, he that lights the fire" — all according to the fire (i.e., according to the height of the fire and its mass. The bigger it is, the farther it travels.) It once happened that a fire crossed the Jordan and caused damage because of its mass. When is this so? When it moves in spurts; but when it moves contiguously, even up to a mil, he is liable. "and there be consumed sheaves": All things are included: a pile of reeds and beams, a mound of stones, and of pebbles for the processing of lime. "or the standing corn": trees also are included. "or the field": even if it singed the ground. __ But perhaps even if there were vessels hidden in his stack and they were burned? It is, therefore, (to negate this) written "or the standing corn or the field." Just as the field is in the open, so must (what is found) in the standing corn be in the open (for liability to obtain). "Pay shall he pay, the lighter of the fire": Why is this written? From (22:4) "a man," I would know only of a man. Whence do I derive (the same for) a woman, a tumtum (one of indeterminate sex), and a hermaphrodite? From "Pay shall he pay, the lighter of the fire" — in any event. This tells me only of beast and fire. Whence do I derive the same for all of the other damagers in the Torah? It follows inductively from both. Beast is not like fire, and fire is not like beast. What is common to both is that it is their nature to damage, that they are your property, that it is your obligation to guard them, and that when they cause damage, you must pay for the damage with the best (produce) of the land. Four general rules were stated by R. Yishmael in the name of R. Meir in respect to damages. Wherever the mazik ("the damager") has permission (to be), but not the nizak ("the damaged"), he (the mazik) is not liable. Wherever the nizak has permission, but not the mazik, he (the mazik) is liable for everything. Where neither the nizak nor the mazik have permission (to be), such as property which belongs to neither of them, he (the mazik) is liable for (damage of) "tooth" and "foot," and, for the rest, mued pays full damages, and tam, half damages. Wherever both have permission (to be), such as property owned in common, open land, the public domain, and the like, for "tooth" and "foot" he is not liable and, for the rest, mued pays full damages, and tam, half damages. (Exodus 22:6) "If a man give to his neighbor money or vessels to watch": R. Yishmael says: He must deposit it with him, explicitly, saying "Here, watch this for me"; but if he just says "Keep an eye on it," he is not liable. "money or vessels": Just as money tends to be counted, so, vessels that tend to be counted — whence it was ruled: Any claim which is not susceptible of measurement, weighing and counting is not a claim. R. Nathan says: "money": to include money of (second-) tithe, (which, unlike first-tithe, reverts not to the Temple, but to the owner.) "vessels": to include any vessel. This tells me only of money and vessels. Whence do I derive (the same for) all things? From "to watch": to include any thing which requires watching. "and it be stolen from the house of the man": to exempt (from kefel) one who steals from the thief. __ But perhaps the meaning is "and it be stolen from the house of the man, he pays double," but if it be found in his (the watcher's) possession, then even though he swore (that it was stolen), he is not liable (for kefel). It is, therefore, written (22:3) "If the theft be found in his hand, double shall he pay" — in any event (i.e., even if it were found in the watcher's possession. It is not the second assumption, then, which is to be posited, but the first, viz.: "and it be stolen from the hand of the man" — to exempt (from kefel) one who steals from the thief. "if the thief is found, he pays double": A thief (one who steals by stealth) pays kefel, but not a robber (one who steals openly). Why did Scripture see fit to be more severe with a thief than with a robber? R. Yochanan says: A robber likens the honor of a servant to the honor of his Master, (not fearing both). A thief accords more honor to a servant than to His Master, (fearing the first, but not the second). A thief makes the Eye on high, unseeing, as it were, and the Ear, unhearing. As it is written (Isaiah 29:15) "Woe unto those who would probe deeper than the L rd, to conceal (their) counsel, doing their work in the dark; saying: 'Who sees us? Who notices us?'" And (Psalms 94:7) "They say 'The L rd does not see; the G d of Jacob does not understand.'" And (Ezekiel 9:9) "For they said 'The L rd has forsaken the land; the eye of the L rd does not see.'" (Exodus 22:7) "If the thief not be found": What is the intent of this? From "If the thief is found, he shall pay double," I understand that if the thief is found and he has (what to pay) the watcher is not liable for anything. Whence do I derive that if the thief is found and does not have what to pay, the owner of the stolen objects may not say to the watcher: "Come and swear to me that it did not enter your heart to sell them"? From "If the thief not be found," implying that if the thief were found, the watcher is not liable for anything (even if the thief does not have what to pay.) "then the master of the house shall draw near": I might think, to inquire of the urim vetumim (on the breast-plate of the high-priest.) It is, therefore, written (Ibid. 8) "whom elohim incriminate." Elohim who incriminate (i.e., judges) are intended. "then the master of the house (i.e., the watcher) shall draw near to the judges": For an oath. You say, for an oath. But, perhaps for an oath or not for an oath? It follows (that it is for an oath), viz.: "sending forth of the hand" is stated here, and it is stated elsewhere (viz. Ibid. 10). "Just as there, with an oath, so, here, with an oath. Just as there, with "Yod-Keh" (the Name of the L rd), so, here, with "Yod-Keh." Just as here, in beth-din, so, there, in beth-din. Just as there, (he must swear that he did not use it for) his own need, so, here, for his own need. Just as there, (Ibid. 8) "For every matter of offense," so, here, "for every matter of offense." (Ibid. 7) "that he did not send his hand against his neighbor's deposit": for his need. You say, for his need. But perhaps for his need or not for his need (but for the animal's)? It is, therefore, (to negate this) written "For every matter of offense." Variantly: "For every matter of offense": (As per the difference between Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel,) Beth Shammai saying: One is liable (even) for negative intent vis-à-vis "sending forth the hand." It being written "For every matter of offense," ("offense" subsuming negative intent). And Beth Hillel say: One is not liable until he actually sends forth his hand, this being the thrust of "that he did not send forth his hand." "For every matter of offense" — general. "for an ox, for an ass, for a lamb, for a garment" — particular. General-particular (The rule is:) There is subsumed in the general only what obtains in the particular. "for every lost object about which he will say" — reversion to the general. __ But perhaps (the idea is) to revert to the original generalization? Would you say that? We have here an instance of general-particular-general, (where the rule is:) The general is understood to be of the nature of the particular, viz. (In this instance,) Just as the particular are explicitly only movable, non-mortgaged possessions, so, the general (must be of that nature). Variantly: "for an ox, for an ass": Why is this stated? Because it is written (earlier [6]) "If a man give to his neighbor money or vessels, etc." and (later 9]) "If a man give to his neighbor an ox or a lamb, etc.", Scripture comes here [8] to discriminate between (the first) watcher, (an unpaid watcher), and the second, (a paid watcher). __ But perhaps Scripture comes to differentiate between [6] "money or vessels" and [9] "beast"? It is, therefore, written [8] "for an ox, for an ass," (indicating that this is not its purpose, but, rather to discriminate between watcher and watcher.) "about which he will say that it is this": i.e., the first says, it is this, and the second, it is not (exactly) this — whence they ruled: (The oath is administered) only where there is admission to part of the claim. (22:7) "then the master of the house shall draw near to elohim (judge) — one, (Ibid. 8) "until elohim shall come the matter of both" — two. (Ibid.) "Whom elohim shall incriminate" — three. From here they ruled: Monetary litigations are (judged) by three. These are the words of R. Yoshiyah. R. Yonathan says: The first was stated in the beginning, and "beginnings are not expounded." "until elohim shall come the matter of both" — one. "Whom elohim shall incriminate" — two. And "there is no evenly balanced beth-din," wherefore one is added to them — so that we have three. Rebbi says: "until elohim shall come the matter of both. Scripture speaks of two. You say this, but perhaps it speaks of one" __ It is not written "Whom elohim shall incriminate ("yarshiyen," with a vav, [which would signify two]), but "yarshian," (without the vav, which signifies one), so that, (all together) Scripture speaks of two. And "there is no equally balanced beth-din," wherefore one is added to them — so that we have three. From here they ruled: Monetary litigations are (judged) by three. R. Meir says: by five, so that the case be decided by (a majority of) three. "he shall pay double to his neighbor": R. Shimon says: I read here "he shall pay double to his neighbor," and elsewhere, (Leviticus 5:24) "and he shall pay it (the principal) at its head (and its fifth shall he add to it)!" How are these two verses to be reconciled? One who pays (only) the principal must pay the fifth, and one who pays kefel is exempt from the fifth. "to his neighbor," and not to the Temple; "to his neighbor," and not to others (i.e., idolators). (Exodus 22:9) "If a man give to his neighbor an ass or an ox or a lamb, etc." R. Yishmael says: He must deposit it with him, explicitly, saying "Here, watch this for me"; but if he just says "Keep an eye on it," he is not liable. "an ass or an ox or a lamb": This tells me only of these. Whence am I to derive all beasts (as included)? From all beasts to watch." For wherever the general adds to the particular, all are included. Then let only that (the general) be stated. Why need the others be specified? In that case I would say that he is not liable until he deposits all of them with him. It is, therefore, written "an ass or an ox or a lamb," to make him liable for each individually. "and it die": at the hands of Heaven. "or be broken": by an animal. "or be seized": by robbers. I might think "or be broken," "or be seized," (that he is not liable) whether or not he could rescue it; it is, therefore, written "and it die." Just as death is characterized by insusceptibility to rescue, so, (only) in all such instances he is not liable. These are the words of R. Eliezer. R. Akiva said to him: You are deriving what is possible from what is impossible. For it is impossible for (natural) death not to be at the hands of Heaven; but breaking and seizing may be either at the hands of Heaven or at the hands of man — whereupon R. Eliezer reversed himself and derived them from stealing (i.e., According to the parameters whereby he [a hired watcher] is liable for stealing, he is liable for them.) R. Shimon says: (Ibid. 12) "For the torn (beast) he shall not pay." There is a torn beast for which he does pay, and there is a torn (beast) for which he does not pay, as when it was torn by a lion.) (22:9) "no one seeing": Scripture here speaks of (the absence of) witnesses. "no one seeing, (10) the oath of the L rd shall be between the two of them (that he did not send his hand against the deposit of his neighbor.") But if there are witnesses (that he is speaking the truth), the watcher is exempt from all (payment). "the oath of the L rd (Yod-Keh) shall be between the two of them": by Yod-Keh. From here you derive the same for all "oaths" in the Torah. Since all the "oaths in the Torah are unqualified (as to the formula for the oath), and the Torah qualified an oath in one instance as being "Yod-Keh," so all the oaths in the Torah must be by "Yod-Keh." (22:10) ("The oath of the L rd shall be) between the two of them": to exclude the heirs. "between the two of them": to include an oath (obtaining) in an instance in which the other is suspect (i.e., if one is suspect, the other swears and takes.) "between the two of them": to exclude the judge — that he not make him swear against his will. R. Nathan says: "between the two of them": We are hereby apprised that the oath devolves upon the two of them. "that he did not send his hand against the deposit of his neighbor": (See Section 15) "and its owner shall accept, and he (the watcher) shall not pay": From here it is derived that all who swear (by Torah mandate), swear and do not pay. "and its owner shall take": From here they ruled: The owner of the carcass must attend to his carcass. (Exodus 22:11) "And if it were stolen from him, he shall pay its owner": This speaks of a hired watcher, and the above (Ibid. 9-10), of a non-paid watcher. __ But perhaps the reverse is the case? It follows (otherwise), viz.: A watcher (here) is liable (for theft) and a hirer (of a beast) is liable (viz. Ibid. 14). Just as a hirer (is liable) because he derives benefit (from the beast), so it is a hired watcher, who derives benefit (i.e., payment) — to exclude a non-paid watcher, who does not derive benefit. It is not the second assumption, then, which is to be posited, but the first — this speaks of a hired watcher, and the above, of a non-paid watcher. "And if stolen it shall be stolen from him": This tells me only of stealing. Whence do we derive the same for loss (of the beast)? It follows, viz.: Its being stolen involves a lapse in watching, and its being lost involves a lapse in watching. If you have learned that he is liable for the first, so, should he be liable for the second. "if stolen it shall be stolen": R. Yossi says: By this (redundancy) loss is included. "from him": to exclude (liability for the watcher if he, in turn, give it to) his shepherd-boy (from who it was stolen), and to include (such liability for) a grown shepherd (whom he hired as a keeper). (Exodus 22:12) "If it were torn (by a wild beast), let him bring ed." This ("ed") is its hide. These are the words of R. Yoshiyah. Even though there is no proof for this (interpretation), there is support for it in (Amos 3:12) "Just as a shepherd can rescue from the mouth of a lion (just) two legs or the cartilage of an ear, etc." R. Yochanan b. Yoshiyah says: "If it were torn, let him bring ed." — Let him bring witnesses ("edim") that it was torn, and he will be exempt from paying. R. Yonathan says: "let him bring him ad the torn (beast)": Let him lead the owner to ("ad" = until) the torn beast, and he will be exempt from paying. "For the torn beast he shall not pay": There is a torn beast for which he pays, and there is a torn beast for which he does not pay. Which is a torn beast for which he does pay? A beast torn by a cat, a fox, or a marten. Likewise, wherever it is possible for him to rescue (the beast, and he does not), he is liable to pay. And which is a torn beast for which he does not pay? A beast torn by a wolf, a lion, a bear, a tiger, a leopard, or a snake. Since the Torah writes (9) "and it die, just as he is not liable to pay in an instance of (natural) death, so, in all instances where he cannot rescue the beast, he is not liable to pay. Thus, "For the torn beast he shall not pay." (Exodus 22:13) "And if a man borrow from his neighbor": Scripture "cuts off" a borrower from the class of "watcher," and treats it (as a class) in itself. "from his neighbor": We are hereby taught that he (the borrower) is not liable until he removes it from the lender's domain. "and it be broken or die": This tells me only of (a borrower's liability for) breaking or death. Whence do I derive (the same for) seizure? "death" is written here, and it is written elsewhere (9). Just as seizure there is juxtaposed with death, so, here (seizure is understood to be juxtaposed with death.) Whence do I derive (the same for) theft and loss? It follows a fortiori, viz.: If a hired watcher, who is not liable for death, is liable for theft and loss, then a borrower, who is liable for death, how much more so should he be liable for theft and loss! (13) "if its owner were not with him, pay shall he pay. (14) If its owner were with him, he (the borrower) shall not pay": From the first (13), do I not know the second (14)? (Why, then, need it be written?) To teach that if it went from the domain of the lender to that of the borrower even for one moment, then (if the beast were) with the owner, he (the borrower) is not liable; if it were not with the owner, he is liable. "If it (the beast) were hired, it came by its hire (into the hands of the hirer"): I might think that if he swears (viz. Ibid. 10), he is exempt from all payment, you, therefore, reason: Since a paid watcher gives benefit (to the owner) and a hirer gives benefit, and we have learned about a paid watcher, who swears (to exempt himself from liability) for accident, that he pays for theft and loss — then a hirer, too, pays for theft and loss. __ But this is refuted by (the ordinance for) an unpaid watcher, who, though he gives benefit (to the owner), nonetheless is exempt from (all) payment. __ Would you say that? There is a crucial difference (between a paid and an unpaid watcher), viz.: Since a paid watcher both derives benefit and gives benefit, and a hirer derives benefit and gives benefit, then the second is to be compared to the first, who swears (for exemption from liability) for accident and pays for theft and loss, and this is not to be refuted by an unpaid watcher, who gives benefit but does not derive it. This is the intent of "If it were hired, it came by its hire" (i.e., it is to be compared to a hired watcher and not to an unhired one.) (Exodus 22:15) "And if a man entice a virgin, etc.": Scripture comes to teach about an enticed girl that knass (penalty [viz. 16]) is paid for her. (But why is the verse needed?) Can it not be derived by reason, viz. "A ravished girl is in her father's jurisdiction, and an enticed girl is in her father's jurisdiction. If we have learned that knass is paid for the first (viz. Devarim 22:28-29) then knass should also be paid for the second. __ No, this may be true of a ravished girl, where he violates her will and the will of her father, as opposed to an enticed girl, where he violates her father's will alone — wherefore he should not pay knass. Since it could not be derived by reason, the verse must be adduced. "who is not betrothed": to exclude one who was widowed or divorced in betrothal. These are the words of R. Yossi Haglili. R. Akiva says: Even one who was divorced or widowed. And this follows by reason, viz. Since he can annul her vows and he can accept her knass, then just as the first obtains if she were widowed or divorced, so, the second. __ If so, why is it written "who is not betrothed"? It is "extra" for purposes of comparison and towards the formulation of a gezeirah shavah (identity), viz.: It is written here "who is not betrothed" and there (Devarim 22:28) "who is not betrothed": Just as there, fifty, so, here, fifty. Just as here, shekalim, so, there shekalim. "mahor yimharenah to himself as a wife": What is the intent of this? From (Devarim 22:29) "then the man who lay with her shall give," I might think that just as when he ravishes her he gives (knass) immediately, so, when he entices her. We are, therefore, apprised that he (the father) imposes it (the fine) upon him as mohar," "mohar" being a kethubah, as in (Genesis 34:12) "Impose upon me much mohar and dower, and I will give it as you tell me, but give me the maiden as a wife." "mahor yimharenah to himself as a wife": a wife that is permitted to him — to exclude (from marriage, but not from knass) a widow to a high-priest; a divorcée and a chalutzah (one who had undergone the ceremony dissolving the levirate marriage obligation) to a regular priest; a mamzereth (a bastard [halachically] and a Nathinah (a descendent of the Givonites) to an Israelite, and the daughter of an Israelite to a Nathin or a mamzer. "mahor yimharenah to himself as a wife": I might think whether or not the father consents. It is, therefore, written (Ibid. 15) "If her father refuse, refuse, to give her to him, then money shall he pay according to the price of the virgins," whereby Scripture apprises us that if the father consents he may take her, and if he does not consent, he may not take her. This tells me only of one who was enticed. Whence do I derive (the same for) one who was ravished? It follows thus: Since a ravished one is under her father's jurisdiction and an enticed one is under her father's jurisdiction, then if we have learned about an enticed one that if the father consents, he may take her, and if not, not, the same obtains with a ravished one. Furthermore, it follows a fortiori, viz.: If with an enticed one, where he did not violate her father's will, the father may abrogate or sustain the marriage, then with a ravished one, where he violated both her will and that of her father, how much more so may the father abrogate or sustain as he wills! "if her father refuse, refuse": This tells me only of one who has a father. Whence do I derive the same for one who does not have a father (i.e., that she herself may refuse)? It is, therefore, written "If refuse, refuse" — in any event. "money shall he pay": R. Yossi Haglili says: We have not heard how much. I, therefore, reason as follows: It is written here "money," and elsewhere (re one who was ravished, Devarim 22:29), "money." Just as there, fifty, so, here, fifty. "according to the mohar of the virgins": What do we learn from "the mohar of the virgins." This (seemingly) comes to teach, but it emerges as learning, i.e., just as there, (Devarim 22:29) fifty silver, so, here, fifty silver. (Exodus 22:17) "A witch you shall not allow to live": Both a man and a woman. R. Yishmael says: It is written here "You shall not allow to live," and elsewhere (Devarim 20:16) "You shall not allow to live. Just as there, (the death is) by the sword, so, here, by the sword. R. Akiva says: It is written here "You shall not allow to live," and elsewhere (Exodus 19:13) "Whether beast or man it shall not live." Just as there (the death is) by stoning, so, here, by stoning. R. Yishmael rejoined: I derive "You shall not allow to live" from "You shall not allow to live," and you answer me from "You shall not allow to live" to "it shall not live!" R. Yossi Haglili says: It is written here "A witch you shall not allow to live," and (Ibid. 18) "Whoever lives with a beast shall be put to death." They are juxtaposed to teach that just as the second (is killed) by stoning, so, the first. R. Yehudah says: It is written (Leviticus 20:27) "And a man or a woman, if there be in them an ov or a yidoni" (shall be stoned). Now "ov" and "yidoni" are types of witchcraft. Why were they singled out for special mention? To teach that just as these are (killed) by stoning, so all (types of) witches are (killed) by stoning. We have heard the punishment. Whence do we derive the exhortation? From (Devarim 18:10) "There shall not be found among you one who passes his son or daughter through fire, a diviner, a soothsayer an enchanter or a witch." (Exodus 22:18) "Whoever lies with a beast shall be put to death": What is the intent of this? It is written (Leviticus 20:15) "And a man who cohabits with a beast shall be put to death" — by stoning. You say by stoning, but perhaps, by one of the other death penalties in Scripture? It is, therefore, written (Ibid.) "and the beast shall you kill." It is written here "kill," and elsewhere (Devarim 13:10) "kill." Just as there, stoning (is indicated), so, here, stoning. We have heard the penalty. Whence is the exhortation (derived)? From (Leviticus 18:23) "And you shall not cohabit with any beast." This tells me only of the punishment and the exhortation for the active agent. Whence do we derive the punishment for the passive agent? From (our verse) "Whoever lies with a beast shall be put to death." Scripture (hereby) equated the passive agent with the active one. Just as the second is to be stoned, so, the first. We have heard the punishment. Whence the exhortation (for the passive agent)? It is, therefore, written (Devarim 23:18) "and there shall not be a (male) harlot among the children of Israel," and (I Kings 14:24) "And there was also a (male) harlot in the land. They did according to all the abominations of the nations which the L rd drove out." (Exodus 22:19) "One who sacrifices to idolatry shall be put to death": We have heard the punishment. Whence the exhortation? It is written (Exodus 20:5) "You shall not bow down to them and you shall not serve them." Sacrifice was included (in serving), and it was singled out to teach that just as sacrificing is distinctive in that it is an inner Temple service and one is liable for it (if done for an idol) whether or not it is its conventional mode of worship, so, one is liable for all such modes of service (in the worship of idolatry.) All modes of service which are not inner Temple services — If one performs them in the worship of idolatry, he is liable; if not in the worship of idolatry, he is not liable. "only to the L rd alone": Because others say: If the Israelites had not joined the name of the Holy One Blessed be He, with that of idolatry (i.e., the golden calf), they would have gone lost from the world, it is written "One who sacrifices to idolatry shall be put to death — only to the L rd alone!" R. Shimon b. Yochai says: Are not all who join the name of the Holy One Blessed be He to the name of idolatry liable to destruction! As it is written (II Kings 17:33) "They feared the L rd and served their (the nations') gods, according to the custom of the nations that exiled them from there." Others say: Torah was given with its signs (i.e., with its warnings), so that Israel not say: Though we are commanded against idolatry, it will not be held against us if we secrete the idols in the recesses of the earth. It is, therefore, written (Isaiah 2:14) "On all the high mountains and on all the lofty hills" (and in the recesses of the earth) — whether revealed or hidden, (idolatry is forbidden) — "only to the L rd alone" (with no admixtures of idolatry)! (Exodus 22:20) "And a stranger you shall not afflict and you shall not oppress him": You shall not afflict him with words and you shall not oppress him in money matters. Do not say to him: "Yesterday you worshipped the deity of Nevo, and (the flesh of) swine is still between your teeth, and you would dare contend with me!" And whence is it derived that if you taunt him he can taunt you in return? From "And a stranger you shall not afflict … for you were strangers in the land of Egypt" — whence R. Nathan derived "Do not attribute a blemish of your own to your neighbor." Beloved are the strangers, for in many places you are exhorted concerning them: "And a stranger you shall not afflict", (Devarim 10:19) "And you shall love the stranger", (Exodus 23:9) "And you have known the soul of the stranger." R. Eliezer says: Because a stranger's past is to his disadvantage, Scripture exhorts concerning him in many places. R. Shimon b. Yochai says: It is written (Judges 5:31) "And His lovers are like the rising of the sun in its might", and it is written (Devarim 10:18) "And He loves the stranger, etc." Now who is greater? One who loves the King or one whom the King loves? Certainly, one whom the King loves. Beloved are the strangers, for by every epithet that Israel is called, the strangers are called. Israelites are called "servants," as it is written (Leviticus 25:55) "For unto Me the children of Israel are servants." And the strangers are called "servants," as it is written (Isaiah 56:6) "… to love the name of the L rd and to be servants unto Him." Israelites are called "ministers," as it is written (Ibid. 6:6) "And you, 'priests of the L rd' shall you be called; 'ministers of our G d' will it be said of you." And the strangers are called "ministers," as it is written (Ibid. 56:6) "… and the strangers who join the L rd to minister unto Him." Israelites are called "lovers," as it is written (Ibid. 41:8) "the seed of Abraham, My lover." And the strangers are called "lovers" (i.e., beloved), as it is written (Devarim 10:18) "And He loves the stranger." "Covenant" is written of Israel, viz. (Genesis 17:13) "And My covenant (i.e., circumcision) shall be in your flesh." And it is also written of strangers, viz. (Isaiah 56:4) "and they hold fast to My covenant." "Acceptance" is written of Israel, viz. (Exodus 28:38) "for acceptance for them before the L rd." And "acceptance" is written of strangers, viz. (Isaiah 56:7) "their burnt-offerings and their sacrifices for acceptance upon My altar." "Watching" is written of Israel, viz. (Psalms 121:4) "He neither slumbers nor sleeps, the Watcher of Israel." And "watchers" is written of the strangers, viz. (Ibid. 146:9) "The L rd watches the strangers." Abraham called himself a stranger, viz. (Genesis 23:4) "A stranger and a sojourner am I with you." David called himself a stranger, viz. (Psalms 119:19) "I am a stranger in the land," and (I Chronicles 29:15) "For we are strangers before You and sojourners as all of our ancestors. As a shadow are our days upon the earth, without a prospect." And it is written (Psalms 39:13) "For a stranger am I with You, a sojourner as all of my ancestors." Beloved are the strangers (i.e., the proselytes), as witness Abraham's not being circumcised until the age of ninety-nine. For if he were circumcised at twenty or thirty, a stranger could become a proselyte only if he were younger than thirty — wherefore the L rd prolonged commanding him until he was ninety-nine, so as not to bar the door to future proselytes. And thus do you find (the L rd's esteem for the stranger-proselyte) in the four classes who respond before Him who spoke and brought the world into being, (Isaiah 44:5) "One shall say: 'I am the L rd's'; another shall call in the name of Yaakov; another shall mark his arm 'of the L rd'; and in the name of Israel he shall be called": "I am the L rd's" — these are the fearers of Heaven, untainted by sin. "another shall call in the name of Yaakov" — these are the minors (who died in childhood), the sons of the wicked in Israel. "another shall mark his arm 'of the L rd'" — these are the penitents. "and in the name of Israel he shall be called — these are the righteous strangers (i.e., the proselytes). (Exodus 22:21) "Every widow and orphan you shall not afflict": This tells me only of widow and orphan. Whence do I derive (the same for) all men? It is, therefore, written "lo ta'anun", (the additional "nun" implying an extension of plurality). These are the words of R. Yishmael. R. Akiva says: Widow and orphan are more vulnerable to affliction. Scripture speaks of the common instance. (Exodus 22:22) "If afflict you afflict him": whether greater or lesser affliction. Variantly: Rebbi says: "If afflict you afflict": There is no liability unless the affliction is repeated. R. Yishmael and R. Shimon were going out to be executed when R. Shimon said to R. Yishmael: Rebbi, my heart is faint, for I do not know why I am going to be killed. R. Yishmael: Did anyone ever come to you for judgment or ruling and you kept him waiting until you had finished your cup or taken your sandal or donned your garment? Scripture states" If afflict you afflict" — whether greater or lesser affliction. R. Shimon: "You have consoled me, Rebbi. And when R. Shimon and R. Yishmael were executed, R. Akiva said to his disciples: Prepare yourselves for calamity. For if good were destined to come in our generation, only R. Shimon and R. Yishmael would receive it. But it is revealed and known before Him who spoke and brought the world into being that great calamity is destined to come in our generation wherefore these were taken from among us (so as not to witness it.) As it is written (Isaiah 57:1) "the tzaddik perishes and no one takes it to heart. And men of lovingkindness are taken off and none understand (why). It is before the evil (that is destined to befall them) that the tzaddik was taken off. (2) Peace will come (to him). They will rest on their couches — those who walk in uprightness." And, in the end, (3) "As for you, come closer, you sons of a sorceress, (to hear of your impending doom), seed of an adulterer and a harlot, etc." "For if cry out, shall he cry out to Me, hear will I hear his outcry." If he cries out, I hear, and if he does not cry out I do not hear? What is the intent of hear will I hear? I am quicker to exact punishment for one who cries out than for one who does not. Now does this not follow a fortiori, viz.: If when an individual cries out against an individual, "hear will I hear his outcry," how much more so when many cry out! Now if within the framework of the lesser measure (of the Holy One Blessed be He, that of punishment), if an individual cries out against the many, this ("hear will I hear") is the result, then within the framework of His greater measure, (that of mercy), if the many pray (i.e., cry out for) the individual, how much more so (will He be quick to hear!) "and my wrath shall burn": R. Yishmael says: Burning of wrath is mentioned here, and elsewhere (Devarim 11:17) "And the wrath of the L rd shall burn in you." Just as there, withholding of rain and exile are indicated, here, too, these (are understood). And just as here "by the sword," so, there by the sword. "and your wives will be widows, and your children, orphans": From "and I shall kill you by the sword," do I not know that your wives will be widows, and your children, orphans? Why need this be written? (They will be widows) as in (II Samuel 20:3) "And they were bound up in living widowhood (never to remarry) until the day they died." Now does this not follow a fortiori, viz.: If when you do not do what is just, your wives will be widows, then, if you do what is just, how much more so will you not be widows, etc.! As it is written (Zechariah 7:9) "Judge a true judgment," (Ibid. 8:16) "Truth and a judgment of peace shall you judge in your gates," (Isaiah 56:1) "Thus said the L rd: Guard justice and do righteousness, for My salvation is sure to come" — how much more so (if you do this,) your wives will not be widows, and your children, orphans! And thus is it written (Devarim 6:2) "So that you fear the L rd your G d, etc.", and (Ibid. 11:19) "And you shall teach them to your sons," followed by (21) "so that your days be prolonged," and (Isaiah 65:22) "For as the days of the tree (of life) will be the days of My people", (Ibid. 23) "they will not labor in vain; they will not give birth for panic (i.e., to have their children die in their lifetime). For they (their children) will be seed blessed of the L rd, and their children (will always be) with them", and (Ibid. 48:19) "and your seed will be as the sand, and your offspring as its (the sea's) offspring (in its abundance)", (Ibid. 66:22) "for just as the new heavens and the new earth which I will create (in those days) will endure before Me … so will endure (eternally) your children and your name (Israel)", and (Ibid. 59:20) "And the redeemer (the Messiah) will come to Zion, and to those who repent of sin in Yaakov", and (Ibid. 21) "And now, this is My covenant with them, says the L rd: My spirit which is upon you, etc." How much more so will your days be prolonged in this world and you will see children and children of children, and you will merit life in the world to come! (Exodus 22:24) "Im you lend money to My people": R. Yishmael says: Every "im" (generally "if") in the Torah connotes optionality, with the exception of this and two others; (Leviticus 2:14) "And im ("when") you offer a meal-offering of first-fruits," where it is mandatory. You say it is mandatory, but perhaps it is optional? It is, therefore, written (Ibid. 14) "You shall bring the meal-offering of your first-fruits." It is mandatory and not optional. Similarly, (Exodus 20:22) "And im ("when") an altar of stones you make unto Me." It is mandatory. You say it is mandatory, but perhaps it is optional? (Devarim 27:6) "Of whole stones shall you build the altar of your G d" indicates that it is mandatory and not optional. Here, too, "Im ("when") you lend money." It is mandatory and not optional. You say it is mandatory, but perhaps it is optional? (Devarim 15:8) "Lend shall you lend" indicates that it is mandatory and not optional. "When you lend money": You lend money for money (i.e., you lend money to receive money), and not fruit for fruit. (this is relevant to the laws of interest.) "My people": If an Israelite and a gentile stand before you to borrow, "My people" take precedence. A poor man and a rich man — the poor man takes precedence. Your poor (i.e., the poor of your family) and the poor of your city" — your poor take precedence. The poor of your city and the poor of a different city — the poor of your city take precedence. Thus, "the poor man with you" (i.e., closest to you). "Do not be as a creditor to him": Do not appear to him, (obviously, to collect the money) at all times. "Do not impose interest upon him": What is the intent of this? (Leviticus 25:37) "Your money you shall not give him on interest" is an exhortation to the lender. Whence do we derive (the same for) the borrower? From (Ibid. 36) "You shall not take from him interest." This tells me only of an exhortation to the borrower and to the lender. Whence do we derive (the same for) the witnesses, the guarantors, and the scribe? From "Do not impose" — in any manner. From here they adduced: One who lends on interest is guilty of five transgressions: "You shall not give," "You shall not take," "You shall not impose interest upon him," "You shall not be as a creditor to him," (Leviticus 19:14) "You shall not place a stumbling block before the blind man." Just as the lender and the borrower transgress, so, the guarantor, the witnesses, and the scribe. R. Meir excludes the scribe. R. Yossi says: One who lends on interest and says to the scribe "Come and write," and to the witnesses "Sign" has no portion with Him who commanded against interest. (Exodus 22:25) "Im chavol (lit., "bundle") tachbol": R. Yishmael says: Scripture here comes to teach you that if you do mitzvoth, you will take (the reward) that is yours, (midrashically: "If you 'bundle' (mitzvoth), you will have 'bundles.'") "Before the sun goes down, you shall return it to him": This refers to a day-garment, that you can return the entire day. This tells me only of a day-garment. Whence do you derive of a night-garment that it can be returned the entire night? From (Devarim 24:13) "Return shall you return the pledge to him when the sun goes down." From here they ruled: A day-garment is taken as a pledge during the night, and a night-garment, during the day. A day-garment is returned during the day, and a night-garment, during the night. (Exodus 22:26) "for it is his solitary covering": This is his cloak. "it is his garment for his skin" — this is his undergarment. "On what shall he lie?": to include his mat-skin. "and it shall be, if he cries out to Me, I shall hear; for I am gracious." R. Nathan says: If one left beth-din owing his neighbor a hundred and wearing a garment worth two hundred, he (the creditor) should not say to him: "Sell your garment for two hundred, cover yourself with one of one hundred, and give me the hundred (that you owe me.") This is the intent of "For it is his solitary covering" — You are not permitted to deprive him of a garment which is "familiar" to his body. "I shall hear; for I am gracious": I created My world with mercy. (Exodus 22:27) "Elokim you shall not curse": What is the intent of this? From (Leviticus 24:16) "One who utters blasphemously the name of the L rd shall be put to death" we hear the punishment. Whence the exhortation? "Elokim you shall not curse." Variantly: This tells me only of the distinctive Name (the Tetragrammaton [i.e., "Yod-keh-vov-keh"]). Whence do we derive (the same for cursing Him with) one of His epithets? From "Elokim you shall not curse" — in any event. These are the words of R. Yishmael. R. Akiva says: Scripture (in "elohim") speaks of judges, as in (Exodus 22:8) "Until the judges ("elohim") shall come the matter of both." "elohim you shall not curse": This tells me only of a judge. Whence do I derive the same for a prince? From (Ibid.) "and a prince in your people you shall not revile." In "and a prince in your people you shall not revile," I hear both a prince and a judge. Why, then, is it written "elohim you shall not curse"? To impose liability for each in itself. From here they derived: One may speak one thing and be liable for four. (How so?) If the son of a prince curses his father, he is liable for "prince," "father," "judge," and "in your people you shall not curse." R. Yehudah b. Bethira says: From "elohim you shall not curse and a prince in your people you shall not revile," I hear that he is not liable unless he is both a judge and a prince. It is, therefore, written "elohim you shall not curse" — to impose liability (for cursing) a judge; "and a prince in your people" — to impose liability (for cursing) a prince. What is the intent of "in your people"? (You are liable for cursing them) when they conduct themselves as becomes your people (and not when they are renegades.) "elohim you shall not curse, etc.": This tells me only of a judge and a prince. Whence do I derive (the same for cursing) all men? From "in your people you shall not revile." (Exodus 22:28) "Your fullness and your dema (terumah) you shall not delay": "Your fullness" — bikkurim (first-fruits, which are taken from fully ripened grain). "you shall not delay": You shall not give second-tithe before first-tithe, first-tithe before terumah, or terumah before bikkurim. __ But I do not know which takes precedence — terumah to bikkurim or bikkurim to terumah? Would you say that? Bikkurim takes precedence because they are called by four names — "first," "bikkurim," "terumah," and "dema." (They take precedence) to terumah, which is called by only three names — "first," "terumah," and "ma'aser," which, in turn, takes precedence to ma'aser, which is called by only two names. And first-tithe, which is called by two names — "first" and "ma'aser" — takes precedence to second-tithe, which is called by only one name ("ma'aser"). From here they ruled: If one gives terumah before bikkurim or first-tithe before terumah or second-tithe before first-tithe — even though he transgresses the negative commandment "Your fullness and your dema you shall not delay," what is done is done (i.e., he has fulfilled his obligation.) (Exodus 22:29) "Thus shall you do with your ox": Just as with the first-born of an ox, miscarriages exempt (the next birth) from (the laws of) the first-born, so, with the first-born of a human being. Just as with the first-born of a human being you are permitted to redeem the first-born through any Cohein, wherever you wish, so, with the first-born of a beast, you are permitted to give it to any Cohein wherever you wish. Because it is written (Devarim 12:6) "And you shall bring there your burnt-offerings and your sacrifices … and the first-born of your herds and flocks," I might think that he must bring them (the first-born) to the Temple; it is, therefore, written (Exodus 13:2) "in man and beast, he (the first-born) is mine." The first-born of a beast is likened to the first-born of a human being, and the first-born of a human being, to the first-born of a beast. Just as with the first-born of a human being, you look after it for thirty days (before redeeming it), so, with the first-born of a beast, you look after it for thirty days (before giving it to the Cohein.) "Seven days shall it be with its mother': What is the intent of this? Because it is written (Leviticus 22:27) "then it shall stay seven days under its mother" — with its mother (i.e., while its mother is living). __ But perhaps, "under," literally, (i.e., instead of its mother, [when its mother has died]). It is, therefore, written (here) "Seven days shall it be with its mother." Just as here, with its mother, so, there, with its mother. R. Nathan says: The verse "under its mother" comes to be expounded, viz.: "under its mother" — after its mother has died. You say "under its mother" — after its mother, but perhaps it is to be understood literally, (i.e., near its mother)? __ You reason thus: It is written here "its mother," and elsewhere, "its mother" ([Devarim 14:21] "You shall not cook a kid in its mother's milk.") Just as there, (the meaning is "(milk) of the same kind" (as it is, i.e., both it and the milk being of the same source), so, here, "of the same kind." [This has a specific halachic implication.] What is the intent of "Seven days shall it be with its mother"? Just as a consecrated first-born nurses only from a non-consecrated animal, so, all of them. From here they ruled: All consecrated animals do not nurse their young, and a tithed animal does not nurse its young. And all are derived from the (instance of the) first-born. What is done (to nurse them)? Money is taken from Temple funds, with which a non-consecrated animal is bought, which (is placed before them and) "pities" them and nurses them — even though there are some who donate (an animal) with this intent (that if they are consecrated, their milk will be non-consecrated.) "On the eighth day shall you give it to Me": This tells me (that it is acceptable) only on the eighth day itself. Whence do I derive (that it is acceptable) from the eighth day onward? It follows, viz.: It is written here "eighth," and elsewhere (Leviticus 22:27) "eighth." Just as there, from the eighth day on, so, here, from the eighth day on. Just as here (it is acceptable) on the eighth day itself, so, there. (Exodus 22:30) "And men of holiness shall you be to me": R. Yishmael says: When you are holy, you are Mine. Issi b. Yehudah says: When the Holy One Blessed be He originates a mitzvah for Israel, He adds holiness to them. Issi b. Guriah says: It is written here (Devarim 14:21) "holy" ("for a holy people are you … You shall not cook a kid in its mother's milk"), and, elsewhere (Exodus, Ibid.) "holiness." Just as here ("a kid, etc.") the prohibition is eating, so, there, ("treifah") the prohibition is eating. "and flesh in the field, treifah ("torn"): This tells me only of the field. Whence do I derive (that a treifah is forbidden also) in the house? From (Leviticus 22:8) "Neveilah (carrion) and treifah he shall not eat." Treifah is likened to neveilah. Just as neveilah is forbidden both in the house and in the field, so, treifah. If so, why is "field" (specifically) written here? Scripture speaks of the common instance. Similarly, (in respect to a ravished maiden) (Devarim 22:27) "For in the field he found her" — Scripture speaks of the common instance. Similarly (Ibid. 20:6) "Who is the man who has planted a vineyard?" This tells me only of a vineyard. Whence do I derive (the same for) all trees? Scripture speaks of the common instance. Here, too, "in the field treifah" — Scripture speaks of the common instance. "to the dog shall you throw it": "to the dog" — as to the dog (i.e., anything like a dog.) You say this, but perhaps it is to be taken literally? It is, therefore, written (Ibid. 14:21)"You shall not eat any neveilah, etc." (but you may derive benefit from it). Now does this not follow a fortiori, viz.: If it is permitted to derive benefit from neveilah, which causes "carrying uncleanliness," how much more so, from treifah, which does not cause "carrying uncleanliness!" Why, then, is it written "to the dog shall you throw it"? To teach that a dog is of higher station than a slave, a treifah being relegated to a dog, but only neveilah, to a slave, and to teach that the Holy One Blessed be He does not withhold the reward of any creature, viz.: It is written (Exodus 11:7) "And against all the children of Israel (during the exodus) a dog will not sharpen its tongue." The Holy One Blessed be He says, as it were, "Give it its reward (treifah)" (for holding its tongue.) Now does this not follow a fortiori? If it is so — that He does not withhold "reward" — from animals, how much more so (does He not withhold it) from men! As it is written (Jeremiah 18:10) "… to repay every man according to his ways …" and (Ibid. 12) "the Throne of Glory … (13) the hope of Israel, the L rd!"

אבינך — from the root אבה “to long for”, “to desire” — one who is poverty-stricken and longs for all the good things which he lacks.

אפס כי לא יהיה בך אביון HOWBEIT THERE SHALL BE NO NEEDY AMONG YOU — But further on (v. 11) it states, “For the needy shall never cease out of the land”! But the explanation is: When you do the will of the Omnipresent the needy will be amongst the others and not amongst you, if, however, you do not the will of the Omnipresent, the needy will be amongst you (Sifrei Devarim 114:1). אביון denotes a person who is more destitute than an עני. The term אביון (from the root אבה “to long for”, “to desire”; cf. Rashi on Exodus 23:6) denotes one who longs for everything (because he lacks everything) (Leviticus Rabbah 34:6).

Thou shalt not wrest the judgment of thy poor in his cause.

Thou shalt not wrest the judgment of thy poor in his cause.

לא תטה משפט אביונך בריבו, an example of being lenient with one category of person and harsh with another. When litigants are facing you, you must not take account of any differences in their social standing. Not only this, if one of the litigants is standing during the proceedings whereas the other one is seated, this is already a form of inadmissible discrimination.

Keep thee far from a false matter; and the innocent and righteous slay thou not; for I will not justify the wicked.

וביום השביעי תשבת [SIX DAYS SHALT THOU DO THY WORK] AND ON THE SEVENTH DAY THOU SHALT LEAVE OFF — Even in the Sabbatical year you shall not abrogate the weekly Sabbath: you shall not say, “Since the whole year bears the name of ‘Sabbath’, the weekly Sabbath need not to be observed” (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 23:12:1).

ולא תענה על רב לנטת וגו׳, and if the defendant asks you about that judgment do not give him as a reply concerning the dispute any statement which will incline after that majority, thereby wresting judgment from the truth, but pronounce the decision just as it should be and let the collar hang around the neck of the majority (i. e. if you be outvoted let them bear the responsibility).

From where is it derived with regard to a student whose teacher said to him: You know concerning me that even if one were to give me one hundred times one hundred dinars, I would not fabricate a claim. Now, I have one hundred dinars in the possession of so-and-so, to whom I lent money, but I have only one witness of the two required to testify about the loan and enable me to collect payment; from where is it derived that the student shall not join with the other witness and testify? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter” (Exodus 23:7).

From where is it derived with regard to a student whose teacher said to him: You know concerning me that even if one were to give me one hundred times one hundred dinars, I would not fabricate a claim. Now, I have one hundred dinars in the possession of so-and-so, to whom I lent money, but I have only one witness of the two required to testify about the loan and enable me to collect payment; from where is it derived that the student shall not join with the other witness and testify? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter” (Exodus 23:7).

The Gemara asks: Is it from the verse “Distance yourself from a false matter” that this matter is derived? But isn’t he certainly lying in that case, and this is already stated, as the Merciful One states: “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor” (Exodus 20:13)? Rather, the reference is to a case where the teacher said to him: It is certain that I have one witness, and you come and stand there beside him and do not say anything, as in that manner you do not express a lie from your mouth. Your silent presence will create the impression that I have two witnesses and lead the debtor to admit his debt. Even so, it is prohibited to do this, due to that which is stated: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”

From where is it derived with regard to three who are seeking repayment from one individual for a total of one hundred dinars, that one of the three should not assume the role of a sole litigant and claim one hundred dinars, and the other two will assume the role of witnesses so that they will exact payment of one hundred dinars from the debtor and divide it among them? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”

מדבר שקר תרחק, [these words are addressed to the judges Ed.] if you feel that that a perversion of justice is about to take place, aided and abetted by witnesses who perjure themselves, disqualify yourself from participating or presiding in such proceedings unless you know that you can convincingly prove the perversion of justice about to take place.
ונקי וצדיק, if the guilty party has been exonerated at his trial you cannot subsequently “kill him,” i. e. reopen the proceedings seeing that you had accepted the testimony of the witnesses at the trial and brought the trial to a close. The reason is that if you mistakenly exonerated a guilty party, I. G’d, am the last recourse and will see to it that the guilty party will not remain perceived as righteous. We have had Exodus 21,13 והאלוהים אנה לידו as an example of G’d taking corrective action, causing someone who had been wrongly exonerated to be killed by his fellow man (though inadvertently).

ונקי וצדיק אל תהרג AND THE GUILTLESS AND RIGHTEOUS SLAY THOU NOT — Whence may we infer that in the case that one who left the court after being found guilty and one says, “I have something to plead in his favour”, he has to be brought back in order that the court may listen to this? From what Scripture states, “and the נקי thou shalt not slay”. Although he is not a צדיק — for he has not been acquitted by the court — he is however “free” (נקי) from the death penalty, for it is your duty to plead — as far as possible — in his favour. And whence mar we infer, on the other hand, that in the case of one who left the court after having been acquitted and one says, “I have something to say against him” he is not to be brought back that the judges may hear this? From what Scripture states: “and the צדיק slay thou not” — and this man is a צדיק since he has been acquitted by the court (Sanhedrin 33b).

כי לא אצדיק רשע FOR “I” WILL NOT JUSTIFY THE WICKED — It is not your duty, in the latter case, to bring the man back to the court, for if he is really guilty, “I” will not acquit him in My court. Altough he has left your hands as innocent “I” have many agents (many means) to inflict upon him the death to which he has made himself liable (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 23:7:2).