פרשת קרח תשכ"ג - מחלוקת קרח

GEMARA: With what are we dealing? If it is a case where the property of the visitor is forbidden to the ill person, even if he is sitting, this should also be permitted. If it is a case where the property of the ill person is forbidden to the visitor, even if he is standing, it should also not be permitted, as one derives benefit from entering the house. Shmuel said: Actually, it is a case where the property of the visitor is forbidden to the ill person, and it is in a place where one takes payment for visiting and sitting with an ill person and one does not take payment for visiting and standing with an ill person. Therefore, by sitting with the ill person the visitor provides him forbidden benefit by sparing him the expense of hiring another person to sit with him. Why was this distinction stated without qualification? There is no apparent fundamental difference between sitting and standing when visiting the ill. The Gemara answers: It teaches us this: Even in a place where one takes payment for visiting the ill, for sitting, one ought to take payment, but for standing, one ought not to take payment. And if you wish, say instead that the distinction can be explained in accordance with the statement that Rabbi Shimon ben Elyakim said elsewhere (42a), that one who is prohibited to derive benefit from another due to a rabbinic decree may not enter a field that is owned by the latter, lest he remain standing there longer than permitted. Here too, sitting is prohibited due to a rabbinic decree, lest he remain sitting there longer than is necessary to perform the mitzva of visiting the ill. Ulla said: Actually, it is a case where the property of the ill person is forbidden to the visitor, and where the ill person did not vow that his property would be forbidden in cases where its use enables the visitor to meet needs pertaining to his continued existence. The Gemara asks: If so, then even sitting should be permitted as well, since the vow did not prohibit use pertaining to his existential needs. The Gemara answers: Isn’t it possible to meet those needs and visit the ill while standing? Therefore, sitting is not an existential need. The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: If he became ill, he enters to visit him; if his son became ill, he inquires about his son’s health in the marketplace but may not enter the house to visit him. Granted, according to Ulla, who said: It is a case where the property of the ill person is forbidden to the visitor and where the ill person did not vow that the property be forbidden in cases pertaining to his continued existence, this works out well, as he excluded his own existential needs from the vow, not his son’s existential needs. However, according to Shmuel, who said: It is a case where the property of the visitor is forbidden to the ill person, what is different about him and what is different about his son? Why is it prohibited for him to visit when the son is ill? The Gemara answers: Shmuel could have said to you: The mishna is referring to a case where the property of the visitor is forbidden to the ill person; the baraita is referring to a case where the property of the ill person is forbidden to the visitor. The Gemara asks: Why was this distinction between the mishna and the baraita stated without qualification? Rava said: With regard to Shmuel,

ודתן ואבירם AND DATHAN AND ABIRAM — Because the tribe of Reuben had their place, when they encamped, in the South, thus being neighbours of Kohath and his sons, who, too, encamped in the South (cf. Numbers 3:29), they (the Reubenites) joined Korah in his quarrel. “Woe to the wicked, woe to his neighbour!” — And what induced Korah to quarrel with Moses? He was envious of the princely dignity held by Elzaphan the son of Uziel (Midrash Tanchuma, Korach 1) whom Moses had appointed prince over the sons of Kohath although this was by the express command of God (Numbers 3:30). Korah argued thus: “My father and his brothers were four in number — as it is said, (Exodus 6:18) “and the sons of Kohath were [Amram and Izhar and Hebron and Uziel]”. — “As to Amram, the eldest, his two sons have themselves assumed high dignity, one as king and the other as High Priest; who is entitled to receive the second (the rank next to it)? Is it not “I” who am the son of Izhar, who was the second to Amram amongst the brothers? And yet he has appointed as prince the son of his (Amram’s) brother who was the youngest of all of them! I hereby protest against him and will undo his decision”. — What did he do? He arose and assembled 250 men, fitted to be heads of the Sanhedrin, most of them of the tribe of Reuben who were his neighbours, viz., Elizur the son of Shedeur, (the prince of the tribe of Reuben; cf. Numbers 1:5), and his colleagues, and others of a similar standing, — for here it states (v. 2) that they were “princes of the congregation, those who were called to the assembly (קראי מועד)”, and there (in another passage) it states, (Numbers 1:16) “these were they who were called to the congregation (קרואי העדה)” (amongst whom was also Elizur the son of Shedeur; cf. Numbers 1:5 and Rashi on Numbers 1:16), — and he attired them in robes of pure purple wool. They then came and stood before Moses and said to him, “Is a garment that is entirely of purple subject to the law of Zizith or is it exempt”? He replied to them: “It is subject to that law”. Whereupon they began to jeer at him: “Is this possible? A robe of any different coloured material, one thread of purple attached to it exempts it, and this that is entirely of purple should it not exempt itself (i.e. ipso facto be exempt) from the law of “Zizith”? (Midrash Tanchuma, Korach 2).

ודתן ואבירם AND DATHAN AND ABIRAM — Because the tribe of Reuben had their place, when they encamped, in the South, thus being neighbours of Kohath and his sons, who, too, encamped in the South (cf. Numbers 3:29), they (the Reubenites) joined Korah in his quarrel. “Woe to the wicked, woe to his neighbour!” — And what induced Korah to quarrel with Moses? He was envious of the princely dignity held by Elzaphan the son of Uziel (Midrash Tanchuma, Korach 1) whom Moses had appointed prince over the sons of Kohath although this was by the express command of God (Numbers 3:30). Korah argued thus: “My father and his brothers were four in number — as it is said, (Exodus 6:18) “and the sons of Kohath were [Amram and Izhar and Hebron and Uziel]”. — “As to Amram, the eldest, his two sons have themselves assumed high dignity, one as king and the other as High Priest; who is entitled to receive the second (the rank next to it)? Is it not “I” who am the son of Izhar, who was the second to Amram amongst the brothers? And yet he has appointed as prince the son of his (Amram’s) brother who was the youngest of all of them! I hereby protest against him and will undo his decision”. — What did he do? He arose and assembled 250 men, fitted to be heads of the Sanhedrin, most of them of the tribe of Reuben who were his neighbours, viz., Elizur the son of Shedeur, (the prince of the tribe of Reuben; cf. Numbers 1:5), and his colleagues, and others of a similar standing, — for here it states (v. 2) that they were “princes of the congregation, those who were called to the assembly (קראי מועד)”, and there (in another passage) it states, (Numbers 1:16) “these were they who were called to the congregation (קרואי העדה)” (amongst whom was also Elizur the son of Shedeur; cf. Numbers 1:5 and Rashi on Numbers 1:16), — and he attired them in robes of pure purple wool. They then came and stood before Moses and said to him, “Is a garment that is entirely of purple subject to the law of Zizith or is it exempt”? He replied to them: “It is subject to that law”. Whereupon they began to jeer at him: “Is this possible? A robe of any different coloured material, one thread of purple attached to it exempts it, and this that is entirely of purple should it not exempt itself (i.e. ipso facto be exempt) from the law of “Zizith”? (Midrash Tanchuma, Korach 2).

ויקח קרח — This section is beautifully expounded in the Midrash of Rabbi Tanchuma. ויקח קרח lit., AND KORAH TOOK — He betook himself on one side with the view of separating himself from out of the community so that he might raise a protest regarding the priesthood to which Moses had appointed his brother. This is what Onkelos means when he renders it by ואתפלג — “he separated himself” from the rest of the community in order to maintain dissension. Similar is, (Job 15:12) “Why doth thy heart take thee aside (יקחך)”, meaning, it takes you aside to separate you from other people (Midrash Tanchuma, Korach 2). — Another explanation of ויקח קרח is: he attracted (won over) the chiefs of the Sanhedrin amongst them (the people) by fine words. The word is used here in a figurative sense just as in. (Leviticus 8:2) “Take (קח) Aaron”; (Hosea 14:3) “Take (קחו) words with you” (Midrash Tanchuma, Korach 1).

ויקח קרח lit., AND KORAH TOOK — He betook himself on one side with the view of separating himself from out of the community so that he might raise a protest regarding the priesthood to which Moses had appointed his brother. This is what Onkelos means when he renders it by ואתפלג — “he separated himself” from the rest of the community in order to maintain dissension. Similar is, (Job 15:12) “Why doth thy heart take thee aside (יקחך)”, meaning, it takes you aside to separate you from other people (Midrash Tanchuma, Korach 2). — Another explanation of ויקח קרח is: he attracted (won over) the chiefs of the Sanhedrin amongst them (the people) by fine words. The word is used here in a figurative sense just as in. (Leviticus 8:2) “Take (קח) Aaron”; (Hosea 14:3) “Take (קחו) words with you” (Midrash Tanchuma, Korach 1).

Korach took. Rabbi Avraham (Ibn Ezra) wrote. “This event took place in the Sinai desert when the firstborn were exchanged for the Levites. The Bnei Yisroel thought that Moshe did this on his own accord, because he wanted to uplift his bother Aharon, the sons of Kehos, his relatives, and all the sons of Levi, his family. The Levites rose up against him because they were slated to be under the authority of Aharon and his sons. Dasan and Aviram rebelled because Moshe took away the rights of the firstborn from their father Reuven and gave them to Yosef. Korach was a firstborn as well.” In this, Rabbi Avraham follows his view that the Torah was written without regard to chronological order. However, I wrote (at the beginning of Parshas Acharei Mos) that in my opinion the entire Torah is written in chronological order, except for the places in which Scripture notes explicitly that it is out of order. In those places it is because of a certain need or suitable reason. Consequentially, the correct explanation here is that this event occurred in the Paran desert, at Kodeish Barnea, after the incident of the spies. The real reason for Korach’s rebellion is as explained in Midrash Rabbah and Tanchuma — Korach was angry about the appointment of Elitzafan to leadership. He was also envious of Aharon, as it says (v. 10), “And yet you ask to be kohanim as well?” Dasan and Aviram did not join with Korach because Moshe took away the right of the firstborn from the tribe of Reuven, for it was their forefather Yaakov who took it away from Reuven and gave it to Yosef. Rather, they stated their complaint (v. 13): “To kill us in the desert” and (v. 14), “Even into a land flowing with milk and honey you have not brought us.” As long as the Bnei Yisroel were in the Sinai desert, no bad event occurred, for even the very severe Sin of the Golden Calf resulted in relatively few deaths. The rest of the people were saved through Moshe’s prayers, which lasted forty days and forty nights (Devorim 9:28). Consequentially, the nation loved Moshe with all their soul, and obeyed him. If someone would have rebelled at that time he would have been stoned by the people. Therefore, Korach bided his time and refrained from reacting to Aharon’s appointment as Kohein Gadol. In the same way, the firstborn refrained from reacting to the elevation of the Levites and all of Moshe’s actions. However, when they arrived in the Paran desert many were burnt in Taveirah (11:1) and died in Kivros Hataavoh (11:33). When they sinned with the spies, Moshe did not succeed in annulling the decree with his prayer, and the leaders of the tribes died in a plague before Hashem. It was decreed upon the entire people to die in the wilderness. As a result, the people were embittered, and they began to feel that all their failures came as a result of Moshe’s leadership. Korach saw his opportunity now to dispute with Moshe, and he reasoned the people would listen to him. Thus, this is the explanation of Dasan and Aviram’s statement: “To kill us in the desert.” They claimed: You have brought us to this place, and you have not fulfilled the promise to bring us to a land flowing with milk and honey. You have not given us any inheritance at all. We will die in this desert and be annihilated here, and even our children will never leave this desert, for just as you have not fulfilled your promise to us, you will never fulfill your promise to our children.