פרשת שופטים תשכ"ז - ולא תקח שוחד

Thou shalt not wrest judgment; thou shalt not respect persons; neither shalt thou take a gift; for a gift doth blind the eyes of the wise, and pervert the words of the righteous.

ולא תקח שחד NEITHER TAKE BRIBERY — even if you mean to give a just judgment in favor of the giver (Sifrei Devarim 144:10; cf. Rashi on Exodus 23:8).

ושחד לא תקח AND THOU SHALT TAKE NO GIFT, even if you mean to give a true judgment in favour of the giver, and it is a matter of course that you must not accept one to wrest judgment, and therefore there is no need for Scripture to forbid this, for with regard to wresting judgment, whether you take a bribe or not, it is distinctly stated, (Deuteronomy 16:19) “Thou shalt not wrest judgment” (Ketubot 105a).

Thou shalt not wrest judgment; thou shalt not respect persons; neither shalt thou take a gift; for a gift doth blind the eyes of the wise, and pervert the words of the righteous.

doesn’t he have shame due to his failure to repay the debt? There too, in the case of one prohibited by a vow, he has benefit; namely, the benefit that he is ashamed before him until the loan is repaid. MISHNA: Admon states a dissenting opinion to that of the Rabbis in seven cases. The mishna elaborates: With regard to one who died and left behind both sons and daughters, when the estate is large the sons inherit the property and the daughters are provided with sustenance from it. And with regard to a small estate, which is insufficient to provide for both the sons and the daughters, the daughters are provided with sustenance and the sons have neither inheritance nor sustenance, and therefore, if they have no other means with which to support themselves, they must go round begging at the doors. Admon says: Because I am a male, will I lose out? Rabban Gamliel said: I see as correct the statement of Admon. GEMARA: With regard to Admon’s statement: Because I am a male will I lose out, the Gemara asks: What is he saying? What is the significance of the fact that one is male? Abaye said that this is what he is saying: Because I am a male and, unlike women, I am fit to engage in Torah study, should I lose out? Rava said to him: Is that to say that it is one who is engaged in Torah study who inherits, whereas one who is not engaged in Torah study does not inherit? What does the study of Torah have to do with the matter at hand? Rather, Rava said that this is what Admon is saying: Because I am a male, who has a greater right to the property by Torah law, and therefore it is fitting for me to inherit when the estate is large, will I now lose out entirely in a case of a small estate? MISHNA: The mishna cites another case involving a dispute between Admon and the Rabbis. With regard to one who claims that another owes him jugs of oil, and the other admits to the claim of pitchers but not the oil, Admon says: Since he made a partial admission to the claim, he takes an oath swearing that he owes only what he has admitted to and no more. And the Rabbis say: The partial admission in this case is not of the same type as the claim, as the claim specified oil and the admission referred to pitchers. Rabban Gamliel said: I see as correct the statement of Admon. GEMARA: One can conclude from here that according to the opinion of the Rabbis, if one claimed that another owed him wheat and barley, and the other party partially admitted that the claim was true only with regard to the barley, he is exempt, just as he is exempt in this case when the claim was for jugs of oil and the admission referred only to jugs. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that it is a conclusive refutation of the opinion that Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said. As Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said: If one claimed against another that he owed him wheat and barley, and the other admitted to owing one of the types, he is obligated to take an oath, as he partially admitted to the claim. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The mishna is not referring to a case where one claimed that another owed him oil and pitchers. Rather, he claimed that another owed him a certain measure of oil, i.e., an amount of oil that would fill a certain number of jugs, while he did not claim the jugs at all. Consequently, the admission was not of the same type as the claim at all. The Gemara asks: If so, what is the rationale for the ruling of Admon that he must take an oath? Clearly, the admission and the claim do not refer to the same objects. Rather, Rava said: Everyone agrees that in a case where he said to him: I have ten jugfuls of oil in your pit, he is claiming oil from him and he is not claiming pitchers from him at all. In this case, it is clear that admitting to owing pitchers is not a partial admission whatsoever that would lead to an obligation to take an oath. Similarly, if he said to him: I have ten full jugs of oil with you, he is claiming from him both oil and pitchers, and therefore if the other party concedes to owing pitchers, this is a partial admission to the claim and everyone agrees that he must take an oath. When they disagree in the mishna is in a case where he said to him simply: I have ten jugs of oil with you. Admon says: This expression includes a reference to the pitchers, while the Rabbis hold that this expression does not include a reference to the pitchers. The Gemara infers: Rather, the reason for the ruling of the Rabbis is specifically that the expression does not include a reference to pitchers, which indicates that if the expression includes a reference to pitchers, one is obligated to take an oath. If so, let us say that this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba. As Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said: If one claimed against another that he owed him wheat and barley, and the other admitted to one of the types, he is exempt from an oath. Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: The case of the mishna is not similar to that of wheat and barley, as those two types are not connected to one another. Rather, the case of jugs of oil is more like that of one who claimed that the other owed him a pomegranate in its peel, as the jugs are as necessary for the oil as the peel of a pomegranate protecting its fruit. Ravina strongly objects to this: The comparison between these cases does not bear close scrutiny. A pomegranate without its peel cannot be preserved, and therefore it is obvious that when one claims a pomegranate, he must be referring to the peel as well. By contrast, oil can be preserved without the pitchers, as it can be placed in another receptacle. Rather, here we are dealing with a case where one said to another: I have ten jugs of oil with you, and the other said to him: With regard to the oil, these matters never occurred; I never borrowed oil from you. Concerning the pitchers as well, you do have five of them with me and these I admit I took from you, but you do not have the other five you claim. Admon says: This expression includes a reference to pitchers, and since he takes an oath about the pitchers, as he partially admitted to owing them, he takes an oath about the oil as well, by means of an extension of the first oath. And the Rabbis hold that this expression does not include a reference to the pitchers, and therefore that which the first person claimed from him the second person did not admit to at all, and that which the second person admitted to, the first person had not claimed from him. The second individual denied owing any oil, and as for his partial admission with regard to the pitchers, there was no claim about pitchers at all. Consequently, no oath is required whatsoever. MISHNA: The mishna states another case involving a ruling of Admon. With regard to one who promises and apportions money for his son-in-law as a dowry, and he went bankrupt, and he now claims that he does not have the money to fulfill his financial obligations,

Thou shalt not wrest judgment; thou shalt not respect persons; neither shalt thou take a gift; for a gift doth blind the eyes of the wise, and pervert the words of the righteous.

The Sages taught: “For a bribe blinds the eyes of the wise” (Deuteronomy 16:19); a fortiori it will certainly blind the eyes of fools. “And perverts the words of the righteous” (Deuteronomy 16:19); a fortiori it will certainly pervert the statements of the wicked. The Gemara asks: Are fools and the wicked suitable for judgment, i.e., to be appointed as judges? Rather, this is what the tanna of the baraita said: “For a bribe blinds the eyes of the wise”; even if he were very wise but he took a bribe, he will not leave this world without suffering blindness of the heart, i.e., he will eventually turn foolish. “And perverts the words of the righteous”;

Thou shalt not wrest judgment; thou shalt not respect persons; neither shalt thou take a gift; for a gift doth blind the eyes of the wise, and pervert the words of the righteous.

Even though every individual commandment stands on its own, nevertheless conjecture may be offered concerned their ordering and juxtaposition. Accordingly, the reason for now bringing in the passage on Judges may be: Although you go three times a year to see the Kohanim who serve in the Sanctuary, there to ask them questions about our statutes and laws, you still do not fulfill your duty unless you have judges in each of your city gates. officers denotes the authorities, from “overseer, or ruler” [Proverbs 6: 7], and “its dominion in the earth” [Job 38: 33]. The judge dispenses justice, whereas the officer enforces it.

Thou shalt not wrest judgment; thou shalt not respect persons; neither shalt thou take a gift; for a gift doth blind the eyes of the wise, and pervert the words of the righteous.