Organ Donation

Pikuah Nefesh

The preservation of human life takes precedence over all the other commandments in Judaism. The Talmud emphasizes this principle by citing the verse from Leviticus [18:5]: “You shall therefore keep my statutes…which if a man do, he shall live by them.” The rabbis add: “That he shall live by them, and not that he shall die by them.” (Babylonian Talmud, Yoma 85b)

Sanhedrin 73a:7

From where is it derived that one who sees another drowning in a river, or being dragged away by a wild animal, or being attacked by bandits, is obligated to save him? The verse states: “You shall not stand idly by the blood of another” (Leviticus 19:16).

Bava Metzia 62a:2

If two people were walking on a desolate path and there was a jug [kiton] of water in the possession of one of them, and the situation was such that if both drink from the jug, both will die, as there is not enough water, but if only one of them drinks, he will reach a settled area, there is a dispute as to the halakha.

Ben Petora taught: It is preferable that both of them drink and die, and let neither one of them see the death of the other.

This was the accepted opinion until Rabbi Akiva came and taught that the verse states: “And your brother shall live with you,” indicating that your life takes precedence over the life of the other.

Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 1:14

(14) Anyone who can save and does not save transgresses 'do not stand by the blood of your neighbour'. So too one who sees his friend drowning in the sea, bandits attacking him or a bad animal attacking him and he is able himself to save him or he could hire others to save him but he does not; one who hears idol worshippers or informers plotting harm for him or laying a trap for him and he doesn't tell his friend and inform him; or if he knows that an idol worshipper or a thug are on their way to his friend and he could appease them on behalf of his friend to change their intention and he doesn't appease him; and so too any similar case; One who does any of these transgresses 'do not stand idly by your neighbour's blood'.

הָרַדְבַּ"ז, חֵלֶק ה (לְשׁוֹנוֹת הָרַמְבַּ"ם), א’ תקפב
מַה שֶּׁכָּתַב הָרַב זִכְרוֹנוֹ לִבְרָכָה כָּל הַיָּכוֹל לְהַצִּיל וְכוּלֵי אָיְירֵי בְּמִי שֶׁיָּכוֹל לְהַצִּיל לְהֶדְיָא בְּלֹא שֶׁיִּסְתַּכֵּן הַמַּצִּיל כְּלָל כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָיָה יָשֵׁן תַּחַת כּוֹתֶל רָעוּעַ שֶׁהָיָה יָכוֹל לַהֲעִירוֹ מִשְּׁנָתוֹ וְלֹא הֱעִירוֹ אוֹ כְּגוֹן שֶׁיּוֹדֵעַ
לוֹ עֵדוּת לַהֲצִילוֹ עָבַר עַל לֹא תַעֲמֹד עַל דַּם רֵעֶךָ. וְלֹא זֹו בִלְבַד אֶלָּא אֲפִילוּ יֵשׁ בּוֹ קְצָת סָפֵק סַכָּנָה כְּגוֹן רָאָה אוֹתוֹ טוֹבֵעַ בַּיָּם אֹו לִסְטִים בָּאִים עָלָיו אוֹ חַיָּה רָעָה שֶׁיֵּשׁ בְּכָל אֵלּוּ סָפֵק סַכָּנָה אֲפִלּוּ הָכֵי חַיָּיב לְהַצִּיל וַאֲפִילוּ שֶּׁלֹּא הָיָה יָכוֹל לְהַצִּיל בְּגוּפוֹ לֹא נִפְטַר בִּשְׁבִיל כָּךְ אֶלָּא חַיָּיב לְהַצִּיל בְּמָמוֹנוֹ…מִכָּל מָקוֹם אִם הַסָּפֵק נוֹטֶה אֶל הַוַּדַּאי אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב לִמְסוֹר עַצְמוֹ לְהַצִּיל אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ וַאֲפִילוּ בְסָפֵק מוּכְרָע אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב לִמְסוֹר נַפְשׁוֹ דְּמַאי חֲזֵית דִּדְּמָא דִּידָךְ סוּמָק טְפֵי דִּילְמָא דְּמָא דִּידֵיהּ סוּמָק טְפֵי אֲבָל אִם הַסָּפֵק אֵינוֹ מוּכְרָע אֶלָּא נוֹטֶה אֶל הַהֲצָלָה וְהוּא לֹא יִסְתַּכֵּן וְלֹא הִצִּיל עָבַר עַל לֹא תַעֲמֹד
עַל דַּם רֵעֶךָ.

Radbaz, Responsa, Vol. 5, 1582
(Acronym for Rabbi David ben Zimra, a talmudist and kabbalist. Born in Spain (1479-1573). Chief
Rabbi of Cairo and dayan in Tsfat and Jerusalem.)

Regarding the statement of the Rabbi (Rambam), of blessed memory, "Anyone who is able to rescue...": this is referring to one who can be clearly rescued without the rescuer endangering himself in any way, such as one who is asleep under an unsteady wall who the would-be rescuer is able to wake him from his sleep but does not wake him, or one who knows of evidence to exonerate him (i.e., the other. E.g., from capital punishment and fails to come forward), he transgresses the prohibition of “Do not stand idly by the blood of your brother.”

Not only in this case, but even if [in saving him] there is a potential small risk of danger, such as the case when he sees him drowning, or bandits attacking, or wild animals [threatening] – for there exists in all of these cases a risk of danger, he is still obligated to rescue, and even if he cannot do it himself, he is not exempt for this reason, but is obligated to use his own finances [to save the victim]….

Nevertheless, if the potential risk inclines toward certainty, he is not obligated to sacrifice himself to save his fellow.

How do you determine what is an 'even risk'?

Radbaz

Similarly, if it is an "even risk" he is not obligated to risk his life because [of the rule] ‘What did you see to make you think that your blood is redder, maybe the other’s blood is redder.’ But if the risk is not "even,” and there is the probability of rescue and he chooses not to endanger himself and does not rescue, then he is in violation of the prohibition, "Do not stand idly...."

How do you understand the statement:

"What did you see to make you think that your blood is redder, maybe the other's blood is redder."

Can Jews be Organ Donors?

Concerns about organ donation after death have traditionally rested on laws concerning the handling of dead bodies and the mistaken view that bodies must be buried intact if they are to be resurrected after the Messiah comes — the traditional belief known as techiyat hameitim.

How does Judaism define death?

אמר רב פפא מחלוקת ממטה למעלה אבל ממעלה למטה כיון דבדק ליה עד חוטמו שוב אינו צריך דכתיב כל אשר נשמת רוח חיים באפיו

Rav Pappa said: The dispute with regard to how far to check for signs of life applies when the digger begins removing the rubble from below, starting with the feet, to above. In such a case it is insufficient to check until his heart; rather, one must continue removing rubble until he is able to check his nose for breath. But if one cleared the rubble from above to below, once he checked as far as the victim’s nose he is not required to check further, as it is written: “All in whose nostrils was the breath of the spirit of life” (Genesis 7:22).

אגרות משה, יו״ד

ע״י זה שע״י המכונה הוא שייך שינשום אף שהוא כברת מת דנשימה כזו הוא
לא מחשיבו כחי...אבל כשפסקה מלעבו שנחסר העקסינזען שהיה שם לא יחזירו
לפיו עוד הפעם עד עבור זמן קצר כרבע שעה, שאם אינו חי כבר יפסיק מלנשום
וידעו שהוא מת, ואם יחיה היינו שיראו שהוא נושם גם בלא המכונה אך בקושי…

Igrot Moshe, Yoreah Deah III: 132, 1976

[Halakhically,] breathing of this kind is not regarded as a sign of life. The "breath of life" test requires that the patient breathe on his own. Breathing by means of a machine does not satisfy the Halakhic definition of respiration, and therefore the patient is considered to be dead so long as the other criteria are met...But when the ventilator is being serviced or the oxygen replaced, it is possible to observe him for a period of approximately fifteen minutes [while the ventilator is off]. If there is no evidence of independent respiratory activity during this period, it is certain that [the patient] is dead.

How does Judaism define death, particularly in this modern age of life-support systems?

Though by no means unanimous, many rabbis hold that death in Jewish law occurs with the irreversible cessation of brain stem function. In brain death, a patient is unable to breathe independently without a mechanical ventilator, but his or her heart may still be beating, which creates a window for the harvest of vital organs like the heart and lungs.

The Conservative movement has endorsed an even more expansive position. In 2010, the movement’s religious authorities ruled that in situations where a person is unconscious, dependent on a ventilator and has no hope of recovery — even if he or she may show some limited brain activity — the person can, under certain conditions, be removed from life support and their organs taken for transplant after the heart stops beating.

A more restrictive opinion held by some Orthodox rabbis maintains that death occurs with the cessation of heartbeat, a criterion that makes vital organ donation much more medically difficult. Under this opinion, any harvesting of organs from a patient whose heart is beating would be absolutely prohibited.

Should one person risk his/her life to save another person?

The question of whether or not one must risk one's life in order to save the life of another is the subject of considerable disagreement. R. Joseph Karo, Kesef Mishneh, Hilkhot Rozeaḥ 1:14, and Bet Yosef, Hoshen Mishpat 426, cites Hagahot Maimuniyot who, in turn, bases himself upon a statement found in the Palestinian Talmud and declares that one is indeed obligated to assume such a risk. Bet Yosef explains that if the impending loss of life is certain, while the danger to the would-be rescuer is doubtful, the "certainty" of one's fellow takes precedence over the "doubtful" loss of one's own life. On the other hand, Issur ve-Hetter 59:38 declares that no person is obligated to place himself at risk in order to save the life of another. Sema, Hoshen Mishpat 426:2, notes that no such obligation is recorded by any early authority. A similar ruling was issued by R. David ibn Zimra, Teshuvot Radbaz, III, no. 625. The question submitted to Radbaz involved a situation in which a feudal despot demanded of a Jew that he permit one of his limbs to be cut off and threatened that, should permission to do so not be forthcoming, a fellow Jew would be put to death. Radbaz answered2This is in opposition to the view of Teshuvot Maharam Recanati, no. 480. that compliance with this cruel request would constitute an act of piety, but that there exists no obligation to do so, particularly since the amputation of a limb may lead to death. In situations where there exists a significant hazard to the life of the would-be rescuer, Radbaz speaks of one who assumes such risk as a "pious fool." In such cases the applicable consideration is, "How do you know that the blood of your fellow is sweeter than your blood?" a variation of the talmudic dictum which prohibits the taking of the life of one's fellow in order to save one's own life.

Should a person be allowed to sell their organs for a profit?

Should there be a financial incentive for donating organs?

Organs from Live Donors

Judaism prohibits placing oneself in unnecessary danger, and organ donation is never entirely risk-free. Authorities from across the denominations agree that if a live transplant would place the donor in mortal danger, it should not be undertaken.

Can you donate your organs for medical research?

Most rabbis say no, though there are exceptions. With research, the line between the donation of a specific organ and the saving of life is sufficiently indirect that most authorities do not believe it qualifies as pikuach nefesh

Can an organ donor still be buried in a Jewish cemetery?

Yes. Though there is historical precedent for those who committed certain infractions being denied a Jewish burial, or buried in a separate section of a Jewish cemetery — suicide being a common one — in the modern era, it is exceedingly rare to deny any Jew (including those who have died by suicide) a traditional burial. According to HODS, there is no known case where a person was denied burial in a Jewish cemetery because they donated their organs.

Positions of Different Movements of Judaism:

Jewish Renewal:

Rabbis and scholars across the spectrum of Jewish life have upgraded organ donation from a corpse to the status of a mitzvah chiyuvit, an obligatory mitzvah, that fulfills the mitzvah of pikuah nefesh, that of “saving a life.”

Reconstructing Judaism:

Organ donation from a living donor, so long as it will not significantly risk the donor’s life, is a mitzvah kiyumit, a praiseworthy but not obligatory mitzvah, since with all surgery there is some danger and distress to the donor.

The Reform movement’s position is to permit transplantation of organs or body parts from a corpse for any legitimate medical purpose.

Reform Judaism accepts the standard of brain death as a sufficient indicator. Thus, when clinical tests reveal that the donor is brain dead and that the function of his or her vital organs is being maintained solely through artificial means, then those organs may be used for transplantation.

Conservative

Jewish law and tradition endorse the principle of k’vod ha-Met, (honoring the deceased), including prompt burial and respectful treatment of remains. At the same time, Judaism affirms the centrality of the mitzvah of pikuah nefesh, (saving lives).

Members of The Committee on Jewish Law and Standards of the Conservative movement (CJLS) have long grappled with the tension between k’vod ha-Met and pikuah nefesh, asking whether it is possible for pikuah nefesh to override the concern with k’vod ha-Met. Their answer is that not only is it okay for a Jew to donate organs, and not only is it an act of hesed (loving kindness), it is a mitzvah, a positive command

Modern Orthodoxy

When early modern medicine showed that an autopsy could save a life by establishing causes of death and the pattern of mortality, Rabbi Yehezkel Landau (1713-1793) ruled that when there is an ill person whose life can be saved by performing an autopsy on a recently deceased individual, then the mitzvah of lifesaving overrules the prohibition of use from a dead body. The halachic authorities then followed with permission to donate organs with family approval. Rabbi Moshe Feinstein widened this permission to corneal transplants, arguing that blindness is a form of death: the handicap so reduces the quality of life that restoring sight is equivalent to lifesaving.

Organ donation is the highest mitzvah and the most religious person should perform it. The ultimate respect for the dead is to enable them to save a life; giving life is the highest form of respect for life.

7. Concerning your question why I permit organ donation when the family of the deceased is greatly anguished at the thought of the mutilation of their loved one, I would analyze the situation as follows: It is true, as mentioned by Tosafos (Shabbos 44[a, s.v mitoch]), that concern for the dignity of a deceased relative is of greater significance than loss of money. Pain and anguish at the thought of the mutilation of a relative would, indeed, exempt one from signing a donor permission card. The Torah requires us to spend money to avoid a prohibition. Therefore, to avoid the prohibition of "Thou shalt not stand idly by [thy brother's blood]," one must spend money but not suffer pain and anguish at the thought of the mutilation.

However, I must point out that the anguish a person feels at the thought of the mutilation should be counterbalanced by the knowledge that by doing so he is saving a human life. There are some who believe it is an act of great piety even to forfeit a limb to save someone else's life. Therefore, surely it is possible to explain to the family that they should not be anguished over the mutilation, since it is not a desecration of the dead, leading as it does to the saving of human life. That being so, the family should not be anguished and should permit the donation.

Lubavitch Hasidism

While you are alive, to donate an organ that you can live without in order to save another life is one of the greatest acts you could do. “To save a life is to save an entire universe,” our sages have declared.

After death too, organ donation is permitted—and constitutes an awesome mitzvah—in the case when an organ is needed for a specific, immediate transplant.

Food for Thought

If your life depended on getting a kidney that wasn’t otherwise available, would you conduct business on the black market?

Is the person still doing a mitzvah if they sell their organs on the black market?