(7) On the tenth day of the same seventh month you shall observe a sacred occasion when you shall practice self-denial. You shall do no work. (8) You shall present to the LORD a burnt offering of pleasing odor: one bull of the herd, one ram, seven yearling lambs; see that they are without blemish. (9) The meal offering with them—of choice flour with oil mixed in—shall be: three-tenths of a measure for a bull, two-tenths for the one ram, (10) one-tenth for each of the seven lambs. (11) And there shall be one goat for a sin offering, in addition to the sin offering of expiation and the regular burnt offering with its meal offering, each with its libation.
I will begin this exploration from the perspective of a modern religious skeptic, who nonetheless is in attendance at a Yom Kippur service.
Perhaps you are that person, or perhaps you were that person in the past, or perhaps, most likely of all, that 'person' (or persona) dwells within you, along with other persona/perspectives. So, let's explore together.
Spinoza:
From Ethics, Part III, Prop. 51: Repentance is pain, accompanied by the idea of oneself as cause; Self-complacency is pleasure accompanied by the idea of oneself as cause, and these emotions are most intense because men believe themselves to be free.
Questions:
1. Do we always feel pain before we repent, or are instructed to repent? Explain your reasoning.
2. What do you think Spinoza is getting at when he qualifies the psychological perception: "these emotions are most intense" with the philosophical comment: "because men believe themselves to be free"?
3. Is there any value in repentance/atonement if we are not free agents? Why or why not? Allow me to suggest three thought experiments to aid you in exploring this problem:
1. Imagine you are imprisoned (thus, in some ways 'not free') for a crime you committed. Is atonement of value?
2.Imagine you are imprisoned for a crime you did NOT commit. Is atonement of value?
3. Imagine everything is pre-determined. Can you still commit a crime?
Spinoza:
From Ethics, Part IV, Prop. 54: Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason; but he who repents of an action is doubly wretched or infirm. Why doubly?
1. the repenter is wretched in experiencing pain/sorrow/guilt, and
2. the repenter is wretched in failing to believe in him/herself and failing overcome the weakness of shame/guilt.
Kierkegaard:
In The Concept of Anxiety: Repentance is the highest ethical expression, but also precisely as such it is the deepest ethical self-contradiction. Why? Because it delays action.
Questions:
1. Do you believe it is weak to feel shame or guilt? Can you give an example to justify your position? Can you think of a counter-example?
2. What do you think Kierkegaard is objecting to when he says, "it delays action"? Do you agree with him?
Samantha Smithstein:
From: Apologies, Forgiveness, and Serenity: a Day of Atonement
There is something crucial for our own emotional health and well-being, in addition to the sanctity of our relationships, about apologizing and asking for forgiveness. Making amends and atonement is a practice that heals ourselves and others.
There is also something crucial about forgiving. Holding on to anger hurt, and pain is just as bad for our emotional health as not apologizing. As the saying goes: Resentment is like taking poison and hoping the other person dies. It only serves to eat away at the resentful person.
As an exemplar of modern psychological thinking, Smithstein's comments above largely reject Spinoza's perspective, in which shame and guilt are expressions of psychological weakness.
What are your thoughts?
Do you think shame and/or guilt are expressions of weakness?
Do you think if a person is strong they don't feel shame or guilt?
If we are weak does that mean there is something wrong with us?
Soloveitchik, as reviewed by Pinchas Peli:
From "On Repentance": From the spiritual struggle which is the lot of “Repentant Man,” there emerges a perfection of personality “which for sheer brilliance and beauty is unequaled by any level attained by the simple, whole personality who has never been tried by the pangs of spiritual discord.”8 As Rabbi Soloveitchik asserts: “‘In accordance with the suffering is the wage’ (Avot 5:23) and in accordance with the split is the union!”
Peli postulates that Soloveitchik creates a hierarchy of ethical development:
1. Thinking humans
2. Religious humans
3. Halachic humans
4. Repentant humans
Why do you think that Soloveitchik places repentance at the pinnacle of ethical achievement? If you were to create a 4-step ladder of ethical development, what might those steps be in your way of thinking?
An after-thought:
In the questions following the first Spinoza quote, I asked if it’s possible to commit a crime if there is no free will. Consider this:
Free will is an existential fact. It is irrelevant if all our actions, and even if all our thoughts are pre-determined. It is irrelevant if God knows what we are going to think and do. As existential beings, WE don’t know what our next thought or action may be. WE are constantly choosing what to do and how to think. From our human perspective, that is, from within the constraints of our consciousness, we are free, entirely free. Even if we place constraints upon ourselves, those constraints, in some meaningful measure, are OUR choice. Even if the world around us constrains us in the most extreme ways, even then there is a measure of freedom of what to think and how to act. The philosophical debate about free will has no psychological relevance. The very nature of conscious experience determines unconditionally: We Are Free.