A Case Study
You work at a Jewish non-profit that has just received a large contribution of $10,000 earmarked to help assist opponents of ICE.
Unfortunately, Federal tax law mandates that you provide the names of large donors. You are worried this person might be targeted by the government.
Morality and law | Moral | Immoral |
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Legal | ||
Not legal |
Morality and halacha | Moral | Immoral |
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Halachic | ||
Not halachic |
Make a diagram to illustrate how you see the relationship of the following terms: halacha, politics, morality.
Do they intersect? Are they independent? Does one contain the other?
"Lex injusta non est lex." (Latin)
An unjust law is not a law.
Attributed to St. Augustine.
(י) שְׁמַעְיָה וְאַבְטַלְיוֹן קִבְּלוּ מֵהֶם. שְׁמַעְיָה אוֹמֵר, אֱהֹב אֶת הַמְּלָאכָה, וּשְׂנָא אֶת הָרַבָּנוּת, וְאַל תִּתְוַדַּע לָרָשׁוּת:
(10) Shemayah and Avtalyon received from them. Shemayah says, "Love work, hate lordship and do not become familiar with the government."
(ד) נוֹדְרִין לָהֳרָגִין וְלָחֳרָמִין וְלַמּוֹכְסִין שֶׁהִיא תְרוּמָה אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינָהּ תְּרוּמָה, שֶׁהֵן שֶׁל בֵּית הַמֶּלֶךְ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינָן שֶׁל בֵּית הַמֶּלֶךְ. בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים, בַּכֹּל נוֹדְרִין, חוּץ מִבִּשְׁבוּעָה. וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים, אַף בִּשְׁבוּעָה. בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים, לֹא יִפְתַּח לוֹ בְנֶדֶר. וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים, אַף יִפְתַּח לוֹ. בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים, בְּמַה שֶּׁהוּא מַדִּירוֹ. וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים, אַף בְּמַה שֶּׁאֵינוֹ מַדִּירוֹ. כֵּיצַד, אָמְרוּ לוֹ, אֱמוֹר קוֹנָם אִשְׁתִּי נֶהֱנֵית לִי, וְאָמַר קוֹנָם אִשְׁתִּי וּבָנַי נֶהֱנִין לִי, בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים, אִשְׁתּוֹ מֻתֶּרֶת וּבָנָיו אֲסוּרִין. וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים, אֵלּוּ וָאֵלּוּ מֻתָּרִין:
(4) One may vow [in front of] murderers and thieves and [royal] tax collectors that [something] is terumah, even if it isn't terumah; [or] that they are property of the king, even if they aren't property of the king. Beit Shammai says: [this is true] regarding all vows except for oaths, and Beit Hillel says: even regarding oaths. Beit Shammai says: he [the victim] may not offer to make the vow. And Beit Hillel says: he may even offer [to make the vow]. Beit Shammai says: [he may only vow] regarding what he is asked to vow, and Beit Hillel says: even regarding that which he wasn't asked to vow. How so? If they [the murderers, thieves or tax collectors] order him to say: "konam that my wife may not benefit from me [if this is not terumah, etc.],"' but he says "konam that neither my wife nor my children may benefit from me" - Beit Shammai says: his wife is permitted to him but his children are forbidden, and Beit Hillel says: both are permitted.
אם השלטון הזה יש בו כח לעשות חקים בעירו דינו דין דקיימא לן דינא דמלוכתא דינא. ומי שמענשין המקלקלים כגון הגזלנים והגנבים והרצחנים וכיוצא בזה ממשפטי המלוכה והאדנות הוא זה ודינן בכל אלו וכיוצא באלו דין.
If the government has the power to enforce laws in its locale, then its laws are law, for the principle is that the law of the land is law. Thus, it is the role of sovereign government to punish criminals like robbers, thieves and murderers, and its laws in such matters are law [Rashba Responsa 1.612]
(ג) אבל בעיני פשט הכתוב כך הוא. ידוע הוא כי המין האנושי צריך לשופט שישפוט בין פרטיו, שאם לא כן איש את רעהו חיים בלעו ויהיה העולם נשחת, וכל אומה צריכה לזה ישוב מדיני, עד שאמר החכם שכת הלסטים הסכימו ביניהם היושר, וישראל צריכין זה כיתר האומות, ומלבד זה צריכין אליהם עוד לסבה אחרת והוא להעמיד חוקי התורה על תלם, ולהעמיד חייבי מלקיות וחייבי מיתות ב"ד העוברים על חוקי התורה, עם היות שאין באותה עבירה הפסד ישוב מדיני כלל. ואין ספק כי בכל אחד מהצדדים יזדמנו שני ענינים, האחד יחייב להעניש איזה איש כפי משפט אמיתי. והשני שאין ראוי להענישו כפי משפט צודק אמיתי אבל יחוייב להענישו כפי תקון סדר מדיני וכפי צורך השעה, וה' ית' ייחד כל אחד מהענינים האלו לכת מיוחדת, וצוה שיתמנו השופטים לשפוט המשפט הצודק האמיתית, והוא אמרו ושפטו את העם וגו', כלומר בא לבאר השופטים האלה לאיזה דבר יתמנו ובמה כחם גדול, ואמר שתכלית מנויים הוא כדי לשפוט את העם במשפט צדק אמיתי בעצמו ואין יכלתם עובר ביותר מזה. ומפני שהסדור המדיני לא ישלם בזה לבדו השלים האל תיקונו במצות המלך.
(3) I understand the plain meaning of the verse as follows: It is accepted that men need judges to judge between them, for in their absence (Avoth 3:2) "One man would swallow the other alive" and the world would become corrupt. And every people requires some form of government, the sage going so far as to say: "Even thieves recognize the necessity of justice within their society." And Israel needs this just as the other nations do. But they also need judges for an additional reason — to enforce the laws of the Torah and to punish those liable to stripes or to judicial death penalties, whether or not their transgression is detrimental to society. And, certainly, these two considerations entail two functions, respectively: one, punishing a man in accordance with true justice; the other (though he not be liable to punishment in terms of true justice), punishing him for the benefit of society and the exigencies of the hour. The Blessed One assigned each of these functions to distinct functionaries. He commanded that judges be appointed to administer true, righteous judgment. This is the intent of "and let them judge the people a righteous judgment." That is, the verse indicates the function and jurisdiction of these judges, saying that the purpose of their appointment is to judge the people with a judgment that is true and righteous in itself, and that their jurisdiction does not extend beyond this function. And because the needs of society are not completely served with this alone, G-d provides for the appointment of a king.
(יד) כְּלָלוֹ שֶׁל דָּבָר כָּל דִּין שֶׁיַּחְקֹק אוֹתוֹ הַמֶּלֶךְ לַכּל וְלֹא יִהְיֶה לְאָדָם אֶחָד בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ אֵינוֹ גֵּזֶל. וְכָל שֶׁיִּקַּח מֵאִישׁ זֶה בִּלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא כַּדָּת הַיְדוּעָה לַכּל אֶלָּא חָמַס אֶת זֶה הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּזֶל. לְפִיכָךְ גַּבָּאֵי הַמֶּלֶךְ וְשׁוֹטְרָיו שֶׁמּוֹכְרִים הַשָּׂדוֹת בְּמַס הַקָּצוּב עַל הַשָּׂדוֹת מִמְכָּרָן מִמְכָּר. אֲבָל מַס שֶׁעַל כָּל אִישׁ וְאִישׁ אֵינוֹ גּוֹבֶה אֶלָּא מִן הָאָדָם עַצְמוֹ וְאִם מָכְרוּ הַשָּׂדֶה בְּמַס שֶׁעַל הָרֹאשׁ הֲרֵי זֶה אֵינוֹ מִמְכָּר אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן הָיָה דִּין הַמֶּלֶךְ כָּךְ:
(14) The general principle is: Any law that a king decrees to be universally applicable, and not merely applying to one person, is not considered robbery. But whenever he takes from one person alone in a manner that does not conform to a known law, but rather seizes the property from the person arbitrarily, it is considered to be robbery. Therefore, the king's dues collectors and his officers that sell fields with a defined tax on the fields, their sale is valid. But a personal tax is only collected from the person himself, and if they sold the field with a personal tax, behold this is not a valid sale unless the king has decreed that it is.
(א) בית דין מכין ועונשין לצורך שעה ובו סעיף א:
כל ב"ד אפילו אינם סמוכים בא"י אם רואים שהעם פרוצים בעבירות (ושהוא צורך שעה) (טור) דנין בין מיתה בין ממון בין כל דיני עונש ואפילו אין בדבר עדות גמורה ואם הוא אלם חובטים אותו ע"י עכו"ם (ויש להם כח להפקיר ממונו ולאבדו כפי מה שרואים לגדור פרצת הדור) (טור בשם הרמב"ם בפרק כ"ד מסנהדרין) וכל מעשיהם יהיו לשם שמים ודוקא גדול הדור או טובי העיר שהמחום ב"ד עליהם: הגה וכן נוהגין בכל מקום שטובי העיר בעירן כב"ד הגדול ומכין ועונשין והפקרן הפקר כפי המנהג אע"פ שיש חולקין וס"ל דאין כח ביד טובי העיר באלה רק להכריח הציבור במה שהיה מנהג מקדם או שקבלו עליהם מדעת כולם אבל אינן רשאין לשנות דבר במידי דאיכא רווחא להאי ופסידא להאי או להפקיע ממון שלא מדעת כולם (מרדכי פרק הגוזל בתרא) מ"מ הולכין אחר מנהג העיר וכ"ש אם קבלום עליהם לכל דבר כן נ"ל (וע' בי"ד סי' רכ"ח דיני תקנות וחרמי צבור) כתבו האחרונים בתשובותיהם דמי שנתחייב מלקות יתן ארבעים זהובים במקום מלקות (מהרי"ו סי' קמ"ז ומהר"ם מריזבורג) ולאו דינא קאמר אלא שהם פסקו כך לפי שעה אבל ביד הב"ד להלקותו או ליטול ממון כפי ראות עיניהם לפי הענין למיגדר מלתא (וע"ל ריש סי' תכ"ה בהג"ה):
(1) Every Court of Law,2Even a Court of Law outside the Land of Israel — M.E. even [one whose members] are not duly ordained in the Land of Israel,3 supra § 1, n. 14. — if they see that the people are unrestrained in [committing] sins,4Even if there is one individual who is in the habit of violating the law, he may be penalized by the Court of Law, although the punishment meted out is not in accordance with Biblical law, only that when the people as a whole are unrestrained in transgressing laws, they may enact measures as a safeguard and they may inflict penalties on any one person for the infringement of their rules even if they did not see that person committing sins unrestrainably — M.E. and [provided] that the exigencies of the hour demand it,5Tur — G. It may, however, be asked (in accordance with the interpretation of M.E.), why should an individual transgressor be considered as falling under the category of ‘exigencies of the hour?’ This should, therefore, be understood as follows: If we withhold punishment from an habitual individual sinner, others will learn from his evil ways and will likewise become unrestrained in the commission of sins. Hence, the exigencies of the hour apply here too (Tummim). Others, however, maintain that the individual may be penalized even when the foregoing reason is not applicable (Shebuth Ya‘akob) — P.Tesh. may pass judgment both [with respect to] death6Derived from San. 46a, Yeb. 90b: ‘It was taught, R. Eliezer b. Jacob stated: I heard that the Court of Law may (whenever necessary) administer punishment by lashes and impose (capital) sentences, even though not (warranted) by Biblical law; not for the purpose of disregarding the Torah but in order to make a fence around the Torah. It once happened that a man rode on horseback on the Sabbath during the Greek period and was brought before the Court of Law and was stoned, not because he was liable to this penalty, but because the needs of the hour demanded it. It also happened that a man had intercourse with his wife under a fig tree and was brought before the Court of Law and was flogged, not because he deserved it, but because the needs of the hour demanded it.’ N.Yos., however, writes that the above penalties were imposed by the Great Sanhedrin but any other Court of Law does not have the authority to administer such punishment. He adduces the following text to prove his point: San. 52b: ‘Immarta, the daughter of Tali, a Kohen, committed adultery. In consequence of that, R. Ḥama b. Tobiah had her surrounded by faggots and burnt. R. Joseph said: He (R. Ḥama) was unaware of two laws. He was unaware of R. Mathna’s statement (that burning was executed by pouring molten lead down the culprit’s throat) and was ignorant of the following Baraitha: And thou shalt come unto the priests, the Levites, and unto the judge that shall be in those days (Deut. XVII, 9). This teaches that when the priesthood operates (in the Temple), the Judge operates (with respect to capital punishment) ; but when the priesthood does not operate, the Judge may not function.’ Hence, R. Ḥama, who flourished after the destruction of the Temple had no authority to impose capital punishment. N.Yos. cites additional cases to corroborate his viewpoint: Nid. 13b, San. 58b: ‘R. Ḥama had the hand of one who was accustomed to strike other people cut off.’ San. 27a: ‘The Exilarch (Resh Galutha) said to R. Abba b. Jacob, Go and investigate the matter; if he is definitely the murderer, dim his eyes.’ In these latter cases only partial punishment was administered but not full punishment in accordance with Biblical law. However, N.Yos. is opposed by the Codifiers (v. also D.M.) who hold that if the needs of the hour demand it even full punishment may be meted out including capital sentences although it would not be in accordance with Biblical law where legal warning and valid witnesses are required which would be difficult to obtain nowadays as a result of which the world would become full of violence and ultimately destroyed. Cf. ‘Jerusalem was destroyed because judgments were rendered in accordance with strict Biblical law’ (B.M. 30b). Thus RaShBA, N, and Asheri in Resp. Hence, Caro’s ruling here. , also the case of Simeon b. Shetaḥ in Mishna San. 45b who hanged eighty women at Ashkelon. and monetary [penalties]7M.K. 16a; B.K. 96b. as well as [to administer] all laws of punishment,8Ibid. even if in the case [in question] there is no valid evidence [available].9Kid. 81a; San. 26b and Tosaf. s.v. החשוד; Tur citing Yad, Sanhedrin XXIV, 4. This means that there was no legal warning given by witnesses to the offender immediately before committing the offense. For witnesses and legal warning are required only when adjudicating a Biblical law, but one who disobeys the ordinances of the country may be penalized according to the needs of the hour (N in Resp.) — M.E., ShaK. In capital cases the consent of the town Elders is required after due deliberation (B.Yos. citing RaShBA) — M.E. And if he is a stern individual, they may flog him by means of heathen authorities.10Derived from Mishna Git. 88b: ‘A heathen court may impose flogging upon a man and say to him, Do whatever the Israelite (authorities) tell you.’ Since Caro does not record here the latter statement of the Mishna (as found in Tur), viz., ‘and say to him, Do whatver the Israelite (authorities) tell you,’ it follows that even the final legal proceedings may be carried out by the heathen authorities since the offender is a very harsh person and the penalty is not in accordance with Biblical law — M.E. For only in the case of a Get (as in Git. ibid.) must the final legal proceedings be executed by Israelite authorities in order that it be considered valid — Nethiboth. , also infra § 26. And they have authority to expropriate his property and to forfeit it according to whatever they see fit in order to fence in the lawlessness of the generation.11Tur on the authority of Yad, Sanhedrin XXIV, 4-10 — G. Derived from M.K. 16a where Scriptural verses are adduced whence we derive that we have the authority to excommunicate persons refusing to obey the summons of the Court, to pronounce the Ḥerem (v. Glos.), to forfeit property, to curse, to smite, to pluck one’s hair, to adjure (so that one desists from malpractices), to fetter, to arrest and to prosecute. ‘We administer flogging on account of an evil rumour, because it is said, Nay (al), my sons; for it is no good report that I hear’ (I Sam. II, 24) — Kid. 81a. This has reference to an uninterrupted rumour not due to intimidation and where no enemies are about who might have published the rumour — Yeb. 25a. Cf. Tur. O.Ḥ. § 1 , also Git. 36b on the Rabbis’ power to expropriate one’s property; also Meg. 25b where it is stated that it is permissible to abuse a person of ill fame. The latter statement refers to an ordinary person but not to a scholar (RaN). Cf. Men. 99b: ‘Resh Lakish said, A scholar-disciple who has committed a misdeed should not be reproached in public because it is said, Therefore shalt thou stumble in the day and the prophet also shall stumble with thee in the night (Hos. IV, 5), that is to say, Keep it dark like night.’ The par. passage in M.K. 17a reads that ‘they do not place him under the ban.’ Some Later Authorities rule that the Court of Law has the power only to declare a debt cancelled but they cannot take possession of the money or the like on behalf of a person before it reaches the latter’s hand (Birke Yosef). Others (on the basis of Git. 36b) hold that the Court of Law does have this authority even before it reaches the latter’s hand — P.Tesh. All their acts, however, should be [done] for the sake of Heaven.12Cf. San. 46a: ‘Not with the purpose of disregarding the Torah, but in order to safeguard it.’ And [this should be executed] only [by] a great personage of the generation13Derived from B.K. 96b regarding the man who misappropriated a pair of oxen and was penalized by R. Naḥman, whence we see that only a distinguished personage like R. Naḥman who was the son-in-law of the Nasi’s house had the power to impose penalties. or [by] the representatives of the town14 B.B. 8b. whom they [i.e., the people] have recognized as the Court of Law over them.15Tur has שהמחום רבים עליהם ‘whom the public recognized as authorities over themselves.’ Gloss: And thus is the accepted practice everywhere, [viz.,] that the representatives of the town are regarded in their [own] town [as authoritative] as the [former] Great Sanhedrin.16Mord. (B.M. II beg.) on the authority of R. Gershon states: ‘Whosoever is appointed a leader of the community is regarded like the mightiest of the mighty and Jepthah in his generation is like Samuel in his generation (R.H. 25b) and whatever he does is considered binding.’ Thus also RaShBA — M.E. They may administer flogging and impose [death] penalties and their expropriation [of one's property] is considered valid according to the adopted custom,17MaHaRIK (Rt. I, XIV) writes that even according to the opinion that the representatives of the town have the power to enact measures as they see fit, it applies only to communal needs but not with respect to cancelling a debt of one individual for the benefit of another which does not fall under the category of communal needs. Thus also Isserlein in his Decisions. Furthermore, only one who is a distinguished personage in his generation may expropriate property — M.E. Cf. supra n. 13. If the custom in the community is to submit the matter to arbitration by one litigant choosing one person and the other litigant choosing another person and the Head of the Court of Law acting as the third, — this practice should not be altered — P.Tesh. although there are some who differ and are of the opinion that the representatives of the town have no power in these [matters] save that they [have the authority] to compel the community in [observing] whatever was an adopted practice heretofore,18B.B. 8b: ‘The townspeople have a right to stipulate meassures, prices of food and wages of labourers and to remove (place outside of the protection of the law — Rashi) those who disregard the terms fixed by the authorities (ולהסיע על קיצתן). The dissenting opinion takes ולהסיע as referring to ‘measures etc.,’ i.e., just as in the latter case it must be with the consent of all, so too in the case of ‘terms fixed by the authorities,’ the consent of all is required. The first opinion takes ולהסיע as a separate measure. Hence, the consent of all is not required — W.G. Cf. also Y. Meg. III, 2(74a) : ‘The seven representatives of the town are regarded as the (entire) town. What are we treating of? If they (the townspeople) accepted them, then even if one (was appointed his decision should be binding upon all the townspeople) ; if they did not accept them, then even many (i.e., more than seven cannot enforce their rulings upon the townspeople). We, therefore, deal here with an undefined case (i.e., the townspeople appointed them to look after the communal matters, without specifying which matter they delegated to them, and the town representatives sold aught without consulting the people, we are therefore, informed that their transaction is binding).’ or they accepted upon themselves [a new measure] with the consent of all [the townspeople],19e., by mere speech the matter becomes binding even in a matter concerning which no adopted practice existed formerly — M.E. but they may change naught in any matter that would involve a gain for one person and a loss for another20For this does not come under the category of safeguarding a cause — M.E. , also Ḥid. Hag. P. Tesh cites the case of the controversy around the Sulzbach edition of the Talmud. The latter was forbidden to be printed until a certain period would elapse after the Amsterdam edition of the Talmud was published. Certain authorities ruled that the purchasers of the Sulzbach ed. were prohibited to study in it. Zikron Ya‘akob, however, on the basis of the present ruling, held that since this prohibition would involve a gain for one (i.e., the Amsterdam publisher) and a loss for the other (i.e., the Sulzbach publisher), the law is that those who had already bought the Sulzbach edition were permitted to use it. , also P.Tesh. to Y.D. § 208, 5; § 236, or to declare a debt cancelled without the consent of all [the townspeople].21Mord. to B.K. X — G. Nevertheless, [in these matters] we follow the adopted custom of the town, especially if the [townspeople] accepted them [to render decisions] in every matter.22 infra § 23 Thus seems to me [to be the correct view].23 Y.D. § 228 on the laws pertaining to ordinances and Ḥerem for the sake of the public welfare — G. The later authorities state in their Responsa that one who has been sentenced to flogging may give forty gold coins instead of the flogging.24MaHaRIW s. 147 and R. Menaḥem of Merseburg — G. , Ket. 46a where a monetary fine is designated as flogging. This is, however, not stated as a law, only that they decided thus because [of the needs of the] hour, but [in reality] the Court of Law has the authority to flog him or to confiscate [his] property as they see fit according to the matter [in hand] in order to safeguard a cause.25 infra § 425 Gloss — G. On the significance of the principle ‘to safeguard a cause’ (למיגדר מילתא), v. Yeb. 90b.
Yeshayahu Leibowitz, Tradition Volume 12, No.3-4 (Winter/Spring 1972) - translated by David Landau
The state has no intrinsic value; only an instrumental value. This principle is common to both the religious (theocentric) approach and the humanist (anthropocentric) approach. Attributing to the state an intrinsic value is the essence of the fascist approach.
The state itself is the enemy of the individual, since it is—by its very nature—an apparatus of power and coercion. Being an apparatus of this kind, it can neither realize nor embody "values" (in every sense of the term "value"): things of value are only achieved by men and not by the "state" (i.e. the governmental apparatus), and to achieve them men struggle among themselves within the framework of the state. There is not—nor can there be—unanimity among men concerning "values": thus the state serves as an arena for internal struggles.
We have no right to connect the establishment of this State of Israel with religious concepts of Messianic redemption, which entail the idea of the religious salvation of the world, or at least of the Jewish People. One must not affix a religious halo to a politico-historical event, and one must not view the very existence of this state as a religious phenomenon.
Yael Tamir, "A Jewish Democratic State." In Walzer et al., ed., The Jewish Political Tradition, vol 1. Authority. Yale UP: 2000.
[...] Israel can be a Jewish democratic state as long as this dual nature expresses the preferences of the majority of its citizens. Its non-Jewish citizens must be given a due place in public life, but this will not redeem their sense of estrangement. The Palestinian citizens of Israel are bound to feel excluded. [...]
Like other states Israel cannot avoid adopting a set of particularistic features. [...] There is then no reason wy Israel should not establish the cultural preferences of its citizens by law, as it establishes by law their economic or distributive preferences. Yet Israel ought not adopt a law that would prevent future majorities from changing the character of the state in accordance with their preferences. This implies that the present election law banning political parties that question the Jewish nature of the state is antidemocratic and should therefore be repealed.
Israel can retain its Jewish character only so long as Jewishness enjoys democratic support. Hence democratic values take precedence over Jewish ones.
Alternate Political Models?
(א) עָלֵינוּ לְשַׁבֵּחַ לַאֲדון הַכּל. לָתֵת גְּדֻלָּה לְיוצֵר בְּרֵאשִׁית. שֶׁלּא עָשנוּ כְּגויֵי הָאֲרָצות. וְלא שמָנוּ כְּמִשְׁפְּחות הָאֲדָמָה. שֶׁלּא שם חֶלְקֵנוּ כָּהֶם וְגורָלֵנוּ כְּכָל הֲמונָם: שֶׁהֵם מִשְׁתַּחֲוִים לְהֶבֶל וְרִיק וּמִתְפַּלְלִים אֶל אֵל לא יושִׁיעַ: וַאֲנַחְנוּ כּורְעִים וּמִשְׁתַּחֲוִים וּמודִים לִפְנֵי מֶלֶךְ מַלְכֵי הַמְּלָכִים הַקָּדושׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא: שֶׁהוּא נוטֶה שָׁמַיִם וְיוסֵד אָרֶץ. וּמושַׁב יְקָרו בַּשָּׁמַיִם מִמַּעַל. וּשְׁכִינַת עֻזּו בְּגָבְהֵי מְרומִים: הוּא אֱלהֵינוּ אֵין עוד. אֱמֶת מַלְכֵּנוּ. אֶפֶס זוּלָתו. כַּכָּתוּב בְּתורָתו. וְיָדַעְתָּ הַיּום וַהֲשֵׁבתָ אֶל לְבָבֶךָ. כִּי ה' הוּא הָאֱלהִים בַּשָּׁמַיִם
(ב) מִמַּעַל וְעַל הָאָרֶץ מִתָּחַת. אֵין עוד:
(ג) עַל כֵּן נְקַוֶּה לְּךָ ה' אֱלהֵינוּ לִרְאות מְהֵרָה בְּתִפְאֶרֶת עֻזֶּךָ. לְהַעֲבִיר גִּלּוּלִים מִן הָאָרֶץ. וְהָאֱלִילִים כָּרות יִכָּרֵתוּן. לְתַקֵּן עולָם בְּמַלְכוּת שַׁדַּי. וְכָל בְּנֵי בָשר יִקְרְאוּ בִשְׁמֶךָ לְהַפְנות אֵלֶיךָ כָּל רִשְׁעֵי אָרֶץ. יַכִּירוּ וְיֵדְעוּ כָּל יושְׁבֵי תֵבֵל. כִּי לְךָ תִּכְרַע כָּל בֶּרֶךְ. תִּשָּׁבַע כָּל לָשׁון. לְפָנֶיךָ ה' אֱלהֵינוּ יִכְרְעוּ וְיִפּלוּ. וְלִכְבוד שִׁמְךָ יְקָר יִתֵּנוּ. וִיקַבְּלוּ כֻלָּם אֶת על מַלְכוּתֶךָ. וְתִמְלךְ עֲלֵיהֶם מְהֵרָה לְעולָם וָעֶד. כִּי הַמַּלְכוּת שֶׁלְּךָ הִיא וּלְעולְמֵי עַד תִּמְלךְ בְּכָבוד. כַּכָּתוּב בְּתורָתֶךָ. ה' יִמְלךְ לְעולָם וָעֶד: וְנֶאֱמַר. וְהָיָה ה' לְמֶלֶךְ עַל כָּל הָאָרֶץ. בַּיּום הַהוּא יִהְיֶה ה' אֶחָד וּשְׁמו אֶחָד:
(ב) דָּבָר אַחֵר, וַיַּרְא אֱלֹהִים אֶת כָּל אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה וְהִנֵּה טוֹב מְאֹד, רַבִּי תַּנְחוּמָא פָּתַח (קהלת ג, יא): אֶת הַכֹּל עָשָׂה יָפֶה בְּעִתּוֹ, אָמַר רַבִּי תַּנְחוּמָא בְּעוֹנָתוֹ נִבְרָא הָעוֹלָם, לֹא הָיָה הָעוֹלָם רָאוּי לִבָּרֹאת קֹדֶם לָכֵן. אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּהוּ מִכָּאן שֶׁהַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא הָיָה בּוֹרֵא עוֹלָמוֹת וּמַחֲרִיבָן בּוֹרֵא עוֹלָמוֹת וּמַחֲרִיבָן, עַד שֶׁבָּרָא אֶת אֵלּוּ אָמַר דֵּין הַנְיָין לִי יָתְהוֹן לָא הַנְיָין לִי. אָמַר רַבִּי פִּינְחָס טַעֲמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אַבָּהוּ, וַיַּרְא אֱלֹהִים אֶת כָּל אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה וְהִנֵּה טוֹב מְאֹד, דֵּין הַנְיָין לִי, יָתְהוֹן לָא הַנְיָין לִי.
...Rabbi Abbahu said that God created and destroyed worlds continuously; till he made these he said "These I like, these I don't like"...