Outline:
- Status of Sleeping Person vis-a-vis Mitzvos
- Minyan - S'A O'C 55:6
- Basis: Beis Yosef
- Haghos Maimonis quoting Mahara"m Ruttenberg, based on Berachos 47b, that just there's an opinion like a baby in his crib can be the 10th for benching, so too if 9 have finished davening and on is still davening, he can be combined for the minyan - "vnikdashti b'soch Bnei Yisrael"
- The Mahari Bei Rav (the Rebbi of the Beis Yosef) extends this concept to also include someone sleeping to be included with the minyan since he's also a "bnei kedusha" that would allow the shechina to rest on these 10 men.
- The Agur cites from the Mahari"l that although generally speaking we'd need 10 people paying attention, the minhag haolam is to count even those talking during davening as part of the minyan, so the sleeper can't be any worse!
- How far does it extend:
- More than one sleeping person? (M'A; Be'er Heitev; M'B);
- Zimun, Kreias HaTorah/Nesias Kapayim, Megilla? (M'B quoting Pri Megadim)
- Why Kreias HaTorah may be different:
- R' Reuven Ungar in the name of R' Daniel Feldman, based on idea from the Rav: Kerias HaTorah is a re-enactment of Har Sinai, and while we may not have all the pomp and circumstance, at the very least need to be awake!
- Kerias HaTorah is quintessential Talmud Torah b'rabim, and to be mekayem T'T need to understand what you're learning; so if sleeping, no way you can understand.
- [There are those, however, who only think the requirement to understand your learning applies to Torah Shebaal Peh, while Biksav may not have same requirement]
- Opinion of the Taz
- Disagrees with comparison to 10th person still davening, since there the person can combine with the minyan through shomeah k'oneh, unlike the sleeping person
- Disagrees with comparison to the sleeping baby because:
- We don't hold like that shittah
- Sleeping person is worse than a baby because the sleeping person has no kedusha, based on Zohar that ones neshama departs while sleeping and there's also a ruach tumah
- Even R' Yehoshua ben Levi would agree here to not include the sleeping person because, ultimately, can just wake him up!
- Mahar"i Asad: On these points, he argues that ruach tumah only comes when sleeping alone, but when amongst 9 others, then shechina still present; also, the ruach tumah that a sleeping person has can't be any worse than the tumah a choteh has, and yet we would include a choteh in a minyan, "af al pi she'chata Yisrael hu"
- Can't bring a proof from these "shotim" who talk during davening, as the Taz holds you can't include them in the minyan, but even if you could, we can't learn a halacha from these reshaim!
- But there are halachos that we learn from questionable sources, even non-Jews:
- 100 blasts of the Shofar from Sisera's mother
- Bnei Ashkenaz standing for devarim shebikdusha from Eglon Melech Moav (Shoftim 3:20)
- 10 for a minyan from Korach and Meraglim (Megilla 23b)
- Marrying older before younger from Lavan
- But there are halachos that we learn from questionable sources, even non-Jews:
- Finally, this psak in the S'A (O'C 124) appears to contradict another psak where he holds that if 9 people are not paying close attention to the chazaras hashatz it is "karov lehiyos bracha levatala"
- Rabbi Rudinsky:
- Psak (Mishna Berura and Biur Halacha)
- Basis: Beis Yosef
- Minyan - S'A O'C 55:6
- Status of Sleeping Person vis-a-vis Aveiros
- Damage - adam mu'ed l'olam
- vs.
- Arayos - sleeping person is patur
- Sleeping person embarassing someone else
- Sleeping Person Generally
- Tosfos in Sanhedrin - yashen can fulfill mitzvos
- Yad Rama in Sanhedrin & Rashi in Yevamos - yashen like a shoteh who has no daas and therefore cannot fulfill mitzvos
(ו) ואם התחיל אחד מעשרה להתפלל לבדו ואינו יכול לענות עמה' או שהוא ישן אפ"ה מצטרף עמה':
(6) If one of the 10 started to pray and [being in a section where he] could not answer with them or he is sleeping, even this one is included with them.
נָשִׁים וַעֲבָדִים וּקְטַנִּים אֵין מְזַמְּנִין עֲלֵיהֶן אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי קָטָן הַמּוּטָּל בַּעֲרִיסָה מְזַמְּנִין עָלָיו וְהָא תְּנַן נָשִׁים וַעֲבָדִים וּקְטַנִּים אֵין מְזַמְּנִין עֲלֵיהֶם הוּא דְּאָמַר כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאָמְרוּ קָטָן הַמּוּטָּל בַּעֲרִיסָה אֵין מְזַמְּנִין עָלָיו אֲבָל עוֹשִׂין אוֹתוֹ סְנִיף לַעֲשָׂרָה
We also learned in the mishna that women, slaves, and minors are not included in a zimmun. Rabbi Yosei said: A minor lying in a cradle is included in a zimmun. The Gemara objects: Didn’t we learn in the mishna that women, slaves, and minors are not included in a zimmun? The Gemara responds: Rabbi Yosei stated his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: Although a minor lying in a cradle is not included in a zimmun, one may make him an adjunct to complete an assembly of ten people, enabling them to invoke God’s name in a zimmun.
כתוב בהגהת מיימון בפ"ח בשם הר"ם שאם התחיל א' להתפלל לבדו ואינו יכול לענות עמהם ואין כאן אלא ט' שיוכלו לענות אפ"ה מצטרף עמהם דכתיב ונקדשתי בתוך בני ישראל אכל י' דבני קדושה נינהו שכינה שריא ותדע מקטן המוטל בעריסה דמצטרף לריב"ל ואפי' למאן דפליג זהו משום דלא ידע למי מברכין ולאו בר קדושה הוא אמנם טוב והגון להמתין עד שיגמור תפלתו כדי שיזכה גם הוא לענות עמהם ואפי' יש שם י' בלא הוא נכון להמתינו כדי שיזכה גם הוא כדפירש"י ובלבד שיהא שהות להתפלל עכ"ל ומכאן למד מורי הרב הגדול מה"ר יעקב בי רב זללה"ה שאם היה א' ישן מצטרף עם ט' לקדיש ולקדושה דכיון דאיכא י' דבני קדושה נינהו שפיר שריא שכינתא עלייהו. ואח"כ מצאתי שכתב האגור בסי' רס"ז וז"ל נשאל גדול הדור מהר"י מולין על עשרה שהיו בב"ה וישן אחד מהם אם יכולים להתפלל אע"פ שהוא ישן והשיב הא ר"ת צירף עם תינוק המוטל בעריסה ונהי דכתב הרא"ש דצריכי י' דצייתי מ"מ חזינן דנהגו עלמא לצרף אע"פ שמשיחין שיחת חולין אע"ג דלבי מגמגם דשמא [לשון הגמרא ביבמות קד.] כל הראוי לבילה אין בילה מעכבת בו עכ"ל וכדאי הוא מורי ז"ל לסמוך עליו:
(ח) מצטרף עמהם. דכל בי עשרה שכינתא שריא, וכתב הר"ל חביב סי' ט"ו ואולי לפ"ז ה"ה ג' או ד' ונשאר הרוב עכ"ל ול"נ דאין להקל כ"כ דהא עיקר ראיית מהרי"ל מאחר דאיכא מ"ד דקטן המוטל בעריסה מצטרף אף על פי שאינו יכול לענות ואף דלא קי"ל הכי היינו שאין השכינה שורה אלא על גדולים וכו' ע"ש וא"כ דיו לבא מן הדין להיות כנדון מה גבי קטן דוקא א' ולא ב' אף גבי ישן דוקא א' ולא ב', וכתב מהרי"ל אף על גב דכתב הרא"ש דבעינן שיכוונו ט' לברכת הש"ץ כמ"ש סי' קכ"ד ס"ד לא נהיגין הכי דהא חזי' דאפי' מי שמשיח ואינו שומע מצטרף:
(ט) לבדו. דוקא א' ולא שנים דלא כהרלנ''ח. וכן גבי ישן דוקא אחד ולא שנים או ג' עמ''א וט''ז חולק וס''ל דישן אפי' אחד אינו מצרף ע''ש וכ''כ הפר''ח שדבדי הט''ז עיקר ע''ש. ובהלק''ט ח''א סי' ע''ר כתב הא דישן עולה למנין היינו כשפניו מגולה ע''ש והיד אהרן חולק עליו ע''ש ועסי' קכ''ד ס''ד:
(לב) (לב) אחד מהעשרה - ה"ה יותר מאחד ובלבד שישארו רובם שאין מתפללים ש"ע ויכולין לענות עמהם ויש מחמירין ביותר מאחד ובישן בודאי אין לצרף אפילו במקום הדחק ביותר מאחד כי בלא"ה יש הרבה פוסקים המחמירי' בישן וכדלקמיה:
(לג) (לג) או שהוא ישן - עיין בפמ"ג שכתב דה"ה לענין זימון עשרה ג"כ ישן מצטרף לדעת הש"ע כמו לענין תפלה ולענין קריאת התורה ונשיאת כפים צ"ע אך לענין קריאת המגילה בודאי אין הישן מצטרף לעשרה לכו"ע דבמגילה בעי עשרה לפרסומי ניסא ובישן ליכא פרסום:
(ד) או שהוא ישן. בב"י כתב שמהר"י בי רב רבו של הב"י המציא דין זה ויליף לי' מהך רישא דהכא דאינו יכול להתפלל עמהם ואפ"ה מצטרף ותמיה לי' דשאני ברישא דאע"פ שהוא מתפלל ואינו יכול להפסיק ולענו' עם הצבור מ"מ יכול לשתוק ושומע כעונ' כמש"ל סי' ק"ד ס"ז משא"כ בישן ובב"י הביא עוד בשם האגו' בשם מהרי"ל דרצ' מתחל' ללמד דמצטרף הישן עמהם כיון דלריב"ל בגמ' מצטרף אפילו קטן המוטל בעריסה והוא ביותר תמוה דהא אנן לא קי"ל כריב"ל כמבואר לעיל מזה בב"י ואפי' ר"ת שפוסק כריב"ל מ"מ לא רצה לעשות מעשה כדברי עצמו ואנן ניקום ונעשה מעשה. ויותר מזה שנדמ' מילתא למילתא מה שי"ל עליו דלמא שאני ישן שהוא גרע מקטן דאין בו קדושה כמ"ש ב"י בסי' ד' בשם הזוהר דסלקא מיני' נשמתא ולא הוה בכלל קדושה דטעי' טעמא דמות' ורוח מסאבתא שריי' עלוהי. ותו נלע"ד דאפי' ריב"ל מודה דלא יצטרף כיון דאפשר להעיר אותו משנתו למה נצרף אותו כשהוא ישן לכתחלה ול"ד לקטן שא"א לעשותו גדול ול"ד למ"ש כל הראוי לבילה וכו' דשם מיירי לענין עיכוב אם כבר עשה כן משא"כ דנעשה כן לכתחלה במילת' דאית בה ריעותא ויש לפנינו לתקנו אין זה אלא תימה ועוד כתוב באגור שם בב"י נהי דכת' הרא"ש דצריכי י' דצייתי מ"מ חזינן דנהגו עלמא לצרף אע"פ שמשיחים שיחת חולין אע"ג דלבי מגמגם דשמא כל הראוי לביל' וכו' עכ"ל יש להפליג ע"ז דהיאך מביא ראיה מן השוטים האלו שעושים איסור בהפסקת שיחה בטילה אשר גדול עונם מאוד ובאמת אני אומר שחלילה להצטרף עם אנשים פושעים כאלה כשאין מנין זולתם ק"ו שלא ללמוד מזה היתר לישן כלל וכללותו דהא כבר קבע בש"ע הלכה בסי' קכ"ה דאם אין ט' שמכווני' לדברי ש"ץ בשעת חזרת התפילה דקרוב להיות ברכה לבטלה כ"ש כשהוא ישן דאין להקל לכתחלה כנ"ל:
(ד) כשש"צ חוזר התפלה הקהל יש להם לשתוק ולכוין לברכות שמברך החזן ולענות אמן ואם אין ט' מכוונים לברכותיו קרוב להיות ברכותיו לבטלה לכן כל אדם יעשה עצמו כאלו אין ט' זולתו ויכוין לברכת החזן: [י"א שכל העם יעמדו כשחוזר הש"ץ התפלה] [הגהות מנהגים]:
(4) . When the Shaliach Tzibor (prayer leader) repeats the tefillah (of the Amidah), the community must be quiet, and to focus (have kavanah) on the blessings from the Hazan - [the community] responds "amen". And if there is not 9 people with intention for his blessings, this is similar to a blessing in vain. Therefore, each person his will do for himself as if there are not nine others, and he will have intention for the blessings of the Hazan.
(ב) ואם אין ט' מכוונים. מזה נראה שאין מצרפים למנין מי שאינו שומע אע"ג שהוא פקח:
(לד) (לד) מצטרף עמהם - דבכל עשרה שהם גדולים שכינה שריא ביניהם דונקדשתי בתוך בני ישראל קרינן בהו ולא דמי לקטן דלאו בר קדושה הוא. ועיין בט"ז שחולק לענין ישן וס"ל דאין מצטרף והסכים עמו הפר"ח דישן חשיב כשוטה עי"ש ע"כ לכתחילה בודאי צריך להקיצו ועכ"פ לעוררו שיהיה מתנמנם ועיין בבה"ל:
או שהוא ישן - עיין במ"ב מה שכתבנו דלכתחלה יש עכ"פ לעוררו. ואם אי אפשר ג"כ בזה צ"ע למעשה כי אף דבפמ"ג כתב דאם א"א הסומך על ש"ע לא הפסיד וכן משמע מהח"א הלא הברכי יוסף וכן הדה"ח הסכימו עם הט"ז והפר"ח. ואפשר דבמקום שמתפללין קדיש וקדושה בקול רם והשאר בלחש יש להקל במקום הדחק בישן דלית בזה חשש ברכה לבטלה וכן משמע מפמ"ג דזה קיל יותר:
מתני׳ אדם מועד לעולם בין שוגג בין מזיד בין ער בין ישן סימא את עין חבירו ושיבר את הכלים משלם נזק שלם:
MISHNA: The legal status of a person is always that of one forewarned. Therefore, whether the damage was unintentional or intentional, whether he was awake while he caused the damage or asleep, whether he blinded another’s eye or broke vessels, he must pay the full cost of the damage.
(ג) יש אומרים דצער ריפוי ושבת חייב אפי' שלא בכוונה ובלבד שלא יהא אנוס אלא שוגג קרוב למזיד אבל בנזק חייב אפי' אנוס דאדם מועד לעול' בין שוגג בין במזיד בין ער בין ישן:
מתני׳ כל עריות אחד גדול ואחד קטן קטן פטור אחד ער ואחד ישן ישן פטור אחד שוגג ואחד מזיד שוגג בחטאת ומזיד בהכרת:
MISHNA: This mishna cites an additional difference between the status of an espoused maidservant and the status of forbidden relatives. In all cases of intercourse with those with whom relations are forbidden, if one is an adult and one is a minor, the minor is exempt; if one is awake and one is sleeping, the sleeping one is exempt; if one commits the act unwittingly and one does so intentionally, the one who did so unwittingly is liable to bring a sin offering and the one who did so intentionally is liable to be punished with karet. By contrast, in a case of intercourse with an espoused maidservant, the man is liable to bring a guilt offering only if the woman is flogged, and that is the case only if she was an adult, awake, and committed the sin intentionally.
(יח) וְכֵן הַשּׁוֹכֵב עִם הַבְּהֵמָה בִּשְׁגָגָה וְהָאִשָּׁה שֶׁהֵבִיאָה אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה עָלֶיהָ בִּשְׁגָגָה אֵין הַבְּהֵמָה נִסְקֶלֶת עַל יָדָן וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהֵן גְּדוֹלִים. כָּל הָעֲרָיוֹת כֻּלָּן שֶׁהָיָה אֶחָד גָּדוֹל וְאֶחָד קָטָן הַקָּטָן פָּטוּר וְהַגָּדוֹל חַיָּב כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ. אֶחָד עֵר וְאֶחָד יָשֵׁן הַיָּשֵׁן פָּטוּר. אֶחָד מֵזִיד וְאֶחָד שׁוֹגֵג הַמֵּזִיד חַיָּב וְהַשּׁוֹגֵג מֵבִיא קָרְבָּן. אֶחָד אָנוּס וְאֶחָד בְּרָצוֹן הָאָנוּס פָּטוּר כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ:
מתני׳ המבייש את הערום המבייש את הסומא והמבייש את הישן חייב וישן שבייש פטור נפל מן הגג והזיק ובייש חייב על הנזק ופטור על הבושת עד שיהא מתכוין:
MISHNA: One who humiliates a naked person, or one who humiliates a blind person, or one who humiliates a sleeping person is liable, but a sleeping person who humiliates another is exempt. If one fell from the roof onto another person, and thereby caused him damage and humiliated him, then the one who fell is liable for the indemnity of damage, since a person is always considered forewarned, and exempt from the indemnity of humiliation, since a person is not liable for humiliation unless he intends to humiliate the other person.
הַמְבַיֵּשׁ אֵינוֹ חַיָּב עַל הַבּשֶׁת עַד שֶׁיִּהְיֶה מִתְכַּוֵּן שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים כה יא) "וְשָׁלְחָה יָדָהּ". אֲבָל הַמְבַיֵּשׁ חֲבֵרוֹ בְּלֹא כַּוָּנָה פָּטוּר. לְפִיכָךְ יָשֵׁן וְכַיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ שֶׁבִּיֵּשׁ פָּטוּר:
The man who humiliated someone does not have to compensate for the humiliation unless he acted intentionally, as it is written: "If she put out her hand." If, however, he humiliated another unintentionally, he is exempt. Accordingly, if one caused humiliation while asleep, or the like, he is exempt.
אמר עולא א"ר יוחנן אכל חלב והפריש קרבן והמיר דתו וחזר בו הואיל ונדחה ידחה איתמר נמי א"ר ירמיה אמר ר' אבהו א"ר יוחנן אכל חלב והפריש קרבן ונשתטה וחזר ונשתפה הואיל ונדחה ידחה וצריכא דאי אשמעינן קמייתא משום דאיהו דחה נפשיה בידים אבל האי דממילא קא דחי אימא כישן דמי ואי אשמעינן הכא משום דאין בידו לחזור אבל התם דבידו לחזור אימא לא צריכא
§ Ulla says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one unwittingly ate forbidden fat and separated an offering for this sin, and he then became an apostate and subsequently retracted his apostasy, despite his retraction, since the offering was rejected from being sacrificed while he was an apostate, it shall remain rejected. It was also stated that Rabbi Yirmeya says that Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one unwittingly ate forbidden fat and separated an offering for this sin, and he then became insane, and later he regained his sanity, the animal that he had dedicated as a sin-offering may not be sacrificed. Since the offering was rejected from being sacrificed while he was insane, it shall remain rejected. The Gemara explains: And it was necessary for Rabbi Yoḥanan to teach us this halakha in both cases. As, had he taught us only the first halakha, with regard to the apostate, I would say that only in that case is the animal rejected forever, because the owner actively rejected himself when he became an apostate. But in this case of insanity, where the owner was rejected automatically, not of his own choice, I would say that he is considered as one who is asleep, so that as soon as he regains his sanity, his offering is once again fit. And had he taught us the halakha only in this second case of insanity, I would say that only in that case is the animal rejected forever, because it was not in the owner’s power to regain his sanity, as one who is insane cannot cure himself. But there, with regard to an apostate, who has the power to retract his apostasy, I would say that his animal is not permanently rejected. It was therefore necessary to teach us the halakha in both cases.
אימא כישן דמי - לאו לגמרי כישן דישן חזי אפי' בשעה שהוא ישן כדתנן בפרק כל הגט (גיטין דף כח.) השולח חטאתו ממדינת הים מקריבין אותו בחזקת שהוא קיים ולא חיישינן שמא ישן בשעת הקרבה אלא כלומר כישן דמי דאפי' דלא הוי חזי אין ראוי להיות דחוי משום דממילא מיתער והא נמי ממילא מישתפי:
וצריכא דאי אשמועינן המיר משום דאיהו דחה נפשיה אבל נשתטה דממילא מידחי אימא כישן דמי שאין ראוי להקריב לו קרבן עד שיעור דלרצונו כתיב ואפ"ה כי מיתער מיהת לא מידחי ואי אשמועינן נשתטה דאידחי ליה לגמרי שהרי אין בידו לחזור אבל המיר דיש בידו לחזור אימא לא דחוי לגמרי צריכא.
אנוס דמתניתין היכי דמי . . . אלא בישן והאמר רב יהודה ישן לא קנה ביבמתו
§ It was taught in the mishna: If he performed ḥalitza and then proceeded to either perform levirate betrothal, or give a bill of divorce, or engage in intercourse with a second woman, nothing is effective after ḥalitza. The Gemara asks: Granted, it was necessary to teach that in the case of one who performed ḥalitza and then performed levirate betrothal the levirate betrothal is not effective. For it might enter your mind to say that we should issue a decree with regard to levirate betrothal that takes place after ḥalitza due to levirate betrothal that takes place before ḥalitza, and rule that all levirate betrothal is effective. The mishna therefore teaches us that we do not issue a decree in this case. However, the case of one who performed ḥalitza and gave a bill of divorce, why do I need this case? What novelty is there in the teaching that a bill of divorce after ḥalitza is not effective? The Gemara answers: And according to your reasoning, that each new case must teach something new, say the latter clause of the mishna: If he engaged in intercourse and then proceeded to perform levirate betrothal, or give a bill of divorce, or perform ḥalitza with a second woman, nothing is effective. In this case the same question can be asked: Granted, it was necessary to teach the case of one who engaged in intercourse and gave a bill of divorce. This is because it might enter your mind to say that we should issue a decree with regard to a bill of divorce that is given after intercourse, due to a bill of divorce that is given before intercourse, and decree that this bill of divorce alone is insufficient and she requires ḥalitza as well. The mishna therefore teaches us that we do not issue such a decree. But the case of a yavam who engaged in intercourse and performed levirate betrothal, why do I need to state it? Once he has engaged in intercourse with her she is his wife in all regards; what difference does levirate betrothal make? Rather, one must say that since the tanna taught the case of one who performed ḥalitza and then performed levirate betrothal, he also taught the case of one who engaged in intercourse and then performed levirate betrothal, due to the similarity between them. And since he wished to teach the case of one who engaged in intercourse and then gave a bill of divorce, he also taught the case of one who performed ḥalitza and then gave a bill of divorce. We should therefore not infer anything from these superfluous cases, as they are merely stated for stylistic reasons. § The mishna taught: With regard to intercourse, when it is at the beginning nothing is effective after it, but if it was in the middle or at the end, something is effective after it. The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of this tanna. As it is taught in a baraita: Abba Yosei ben Yoḥanan, a man of Jerusalem, says in the name of Rabbi Meir: With regard to both intercourse and ḥalitza, if one of them were performed at the beginning, nothing is effective after it, but if they were done in the middle or at the end, i.e., they were preceded by some other action, something is effective after it. According to the mishna, however, nothing is effective after ḥalitza regardless of when it was performed. And therefore it can be concluded that there are three disputes with regard to this matter, i.e., three opinions on this issue. The first tanna holds: In the case of intercourse that is preceded by a disqualifying action, where there is a reason to issue a decree, lest one violate a prohibition by engaging in intercourse after ḥalitza or intercourse was performed, we issue a decree establishing that invalid intercourse should not be as effective as valid intercourse. With regard to ḥalitza, however, where there is no reason to issue a decree as there is no concern of a prohibition even if an action is performed after ḥalitza, we do not issue a decree. And Rabbi Neḥemya holds that with regard to intercourse there is also no reason to issue a decree. And as for what you said in justification of your ruling, that we should issue a decree in a case of intercourse after a bill of divorce due to intercourse after ḥalitza, there is no cause for such a concern. Since ḥalitza is effective by Torah law, people know that it is fully effective and cannot be followed by anything, and they will not confuse it with laws instituted by the Sages. And as for what you said that we should issue a decree with regard to intercourse after levirate betrothal due to intercourse after intercourse, since the acquisition of intercourse is by Torah law, this matter is known by people, and they will not err in this regard. And Abba Yosei ben Ḥanan holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who issue a decree with regard to intercourse, but he adds and issues a decree with regard to ḥalitza due to intercourse. He therefore does not differentiate between ḥalitza and intercourse at all. MISHNA: One who had intercourse with his yevama, whether unwittingly, i.e., he thought he was having intercourse with someone else, or intentionally, i.e., he knew she was his yevama and nevertheless had intercourse with her without intent to perform levirate marriage; whether due to coercion or willingly; even if he was unwitting and her participation was intentional, his participation was intentional and she was unwitting, he was coerced and she was not coerced, or she was coerced and he was not coerced; both one who merely engages in the initial stage of intercourse and one who completes the act of intercourse has thereby acquired his yevama. And similarly, the Torah did not distinguish between an act of intercourse in an atypical manner, i.e., anal intercourse, and intercourse in a typical manner. And so too, with regard to a man who had intercourse with any one of those with whom relations are forbidden [arayot] by the Torah or with those who are unfit for him even though they are not in the category of arayot, for example, a widow with a High Priest; a divorcée and a yevama who performed ḥalitza [ḥalutza] with a common priest; a mamzeret, i.e., a woman born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship, or a Gibeonite woman with an Israelite; the daughter of an Israelite with a mamzer or a Gibeonite; he has disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood through this act no matter how it was performed, and the Torah did not distinguish between the act of intercourse in an atypical manner, i.e., anal intercourse, and intercourse in a typical manner. GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the significance of the word even in the statement that begins with: Even if he was unwitting and her participation was intentional? Since the mishna has already said that there is no halakhic difference whether the act of intercourse was performed intentionally, what is added by that statement? The Gemara answers: The mishna is stated in the style of: Needless to say. It is needless to say that if he was unwitting and she intended to fulfill the mitzva, or alternatively, he acted intentionally without intent to fulfill the mitzva and she intended to fulfill the mitzva, he has acquired her. However, even if he was unwitting and she acted intentionally, where both of them did not intend to act for the sake of the mitzva, he nevertheless acquires her. Similarly, Rabbi Ḥiyya taught: Even if both of them acted unwittingly, intentionally, or were coerced, he acquires the yevama through the act of intercourse. § The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances the mishna is referring to when it mentions a man who was coerced? If we say that it is when gentiles coerced him by threatening to kill him if he did not have intercourse with her and he therefore had intercourse with her, didn’t Rava say that there is no such thing as coercion of a man to have intercourse with a woman with whom relations are forbidden, because there is no erection of the male organ without intent? Consequently, even if he acted due to the threat, his action is considered intentional. Rather, the mishna must be referring to one who was sleeping and became erect, and his yevama drew him onto herself. However, didn’t Rav Yehuda say that a sleeping man has not acquired his yevama, as he did not intend to perform the act of intercourse at all? Rather, the mishna was referring to one who was inserted into his yevama by accident. But didn’t Rabba say: One who fell from a roof and was inserted into a woman due to the force of his fall is liable to pay four of the five types of indemnity that must be paid by one who damaged another: Injury, pain, medical costs, and loss of livelihood. However, he is not liable to pay for the shame he caused her, as he did not intend to perform the act, and if she is his yevama, he has not acquired her in this manner. Rather, it is a case where he intended to have intercourse with his wife and became erect, and his yevama forcefully grabbed hold of him and he had intercourse with her. The Gemara further asks: If so, what are the circumstances of the case when both of them were coerced that was mentioned by the school of Rabbi Ḥiyya? The Gemara answers: It is a case where he intended to have intercourse with his wife, and gentiles grabbed hold of him and pressed him and his yevama against each other, and he thereby had intercourse with her. § The Gemara inquires as to the source of these halakhot: From where are these matters derived? As the Sages taught with regard to the verse “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her” (Deuteronomy 25:5), that this indicates that the act of intercourse in this circumstance is a mitzva, i.e., it is preferable to the alternative, which is ḥalitza. Alternatively, the verse “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her,” indicates that it does not matter how he had intercourse with her, whether unwittingly or intentionally, whether due to coercion or willingly. The Gemara asks: Didn’t you derive from this phrase that the act of intercourse in this case is a mitzva? How can the same phrase also indicate that it does not matter what the intentions of the two parties were during the act of intercourse? The Gemara answers: The fact that it is a mitzva is derived from the verse: “And if the man does not wish to take his yevama” (Deuteronomy 25:7), which indicates that if he wishes, he performs levirate marriage, which is preferable to ḥalitza. Therefore, when the verse cited above came, it indicated that levirate marriage has occurred whether the parties acted unwittingly or intentionally, whether due to coercion or willingly. It is taught in another baraita that the phrase: “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her” indicates that levirate marriage has been performed if they engage in typical sexual intercourse. The next phrase, “and take her,” includes even atypical, i.e., anal, sexual intercourse. The concluding phrase of the verse, “and consummate the levirate marriage,” indicates that sexual intercourse completes her acquisition, but money and a marriage document do not complete her acquisition to him as his fully betrothed wife, in contrast to the regular halakhot of marriage. By emphasizing “and consummate the levirate marriage with her,” the verse teaches that he acquires her even if he acted against her will. Alternatively: “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her” indicates that levirate marriage has occurred whether the parties acted unwittingly or intentionally, whether due to coercion or willingly. The Gemara asks: Didn’t you derive from this phrase that levirate marriage has been performed if they engage in typical sexual intercourse? How can it also indicate that it does not matter what the intentions of the two parties were during the act of intercourse? The Gemara answers: That halakha is derived from a different verse: “To establish a name for his brother” (Deuteronomy 25:7), which indicates that intercourse must occur in the place where he establishes a name, i.e., where it can lead to childbirth. Therefore, when the verse cited above came, it indicated that levirate marriage has occurred whether the parties acted unwittingly or intentionally, whether due to coercion or willingly. § The Gemara addresses the matter itself cited in the previous discussion. Rav Yehuda said: A sleeping man has not acquired his yevama, as the verse states: “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her” (Deuteronomy 25:5), which indicates that he does not acquire her unless he intends to act for the sake of sexual intercourse. Since a sleeping man does not intend to engage in sexual intercourse, he does not acquire his yevama. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it taught in a baraita that one acquires his yevama through sexual intercourse regardless of whether he was awake or asleep? The Gemara answers: Say the baraita in the following emended form: Whether she was awake or asleep. The woman’s awareness is not a necessary component in order to perform levirate marriage. The Gemara asks further: Wasn’t it taught in another baraita that one acquires his yevama through sexual intercourse regardless of whether he was awake or he was asleep and regardless of whether she was awake or she was asleep? The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here when the baraita says that a sleeping man acquires his yevama? It is referring to a man who is dozing. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of dozing? Rav Ashi said: One is asleep but not asleep, awake but not awake, when, if they call him, he will answer, but he is unable to provide a reasonable answer. And when they later inform him of what happened, he remembers it. The Gemara returns to the statement of Rabba cited earlier in order to discuss the matter itself that Rabba addressed. Rabba said: One who fell from a roof and was inserted into a woman due to the force of his fall is liable to pay four of the five types of indemnity that must be paid by one who damaged another, and if she is his yevama he has not acquired her in this manner. He is liable to pay for injury, pain, loss of livelihood, and medical costs. However, he is not liable to pay for the shame he caused her, as the Master said: One is not liable to pay for shame unless he intends to humiliate his victim. Consequently, one who fell from a roof accidentally is not liable to pay for the shame he caused the woman. Rava said: If he intended to press his sexual organ into a wall, and he accidentally pressed it into his yevama, he has not acquired her, as he did not intend to engage in an act of sexual intercourse. However, if he intended to press his sexual organ into an animal, and he pressed it into his yevama, he has acquired her, as he at least intended to act for the purpose of sexual intercourse in general, i.e., for some form of sexual intercourse. § We learned in the mishna that both one who merely begins the act of intercourse and one who completes it has acquired the yevama through this act. Ulla said: From where is it derived that the initial stage of intercourse is considered an act of sexual intercourse by Torah law? As it is stated: “And if a man shall lie with a woman having her sickness and shall uncover her nakedness, he has made naked [he’era] her fountain” (Leviticus 20:18). The verse is referring to the first stage of intercourse, and from here it is derived that the initial stage of intercourse [ha’ara’a] is considered sexual intercourse by Torah law. The Gemara asks: We have found a source for this halakha in the case of a menstruating woman, the subject of the verse cited above. From where is it derived that the initial stage of intercourse is considered sexual intercourse with regard to the rest of those with whom relations are forbidden? And if you say we should derive it from the halakha with regard to a menstruating woman, what comparison can be made to a menstruating woman, concerning whom the halakha is more stringent than others with whom relations are forbidden, in that she causes one who has intercourse with her to become ritually impure? Rather, the halakha in other cases comes from a verse about a brother’s wife, as it is written: “And if a man shall take his brother’s wife, it is impurity [nidda]” (Leviticus 20:21). The word nidda generally refers to a menstruating woman, and so the Gemara asks: Is his brother’s wife always menstruating? Rather, it means that the halakha with regard to her is like that of a menstruating woman: Just as one is liable to receive punishment for violating the prohibition against engaging in sexual intercourse with a menstruating woman through the initial stage of intercourse, so too, one is liable to receive punishment for violating the prohibition against engaging in sexual intercourse with a brother’s wife through the initial stage of intercourse. The Gemara asks: What comparison can be made between a brother’s wife and other women with whom relations are forbidden? The prohibition with regard to a brother’s wife is more stringent in that it is within his power to increase the number of women forbidden by this prohibition, as, if he wishes, he can go on betrothing a thousand women, all of whom would be forbidden to his brother. Consequently, the prohibition with regard to a brother’s wife cannot serve as a model for other prohibitions. Rather, the halakha in other cases comes from a verse with regard to a father’s sister and a mother’s sister, as it is written: “And you shall not uncover the nakedness of your mother’s sister nor of your father’s sister; for he has made naked [he’era] his kin” (Leviticus 20:19). The Gemara asks: It is possible to refute this source as follows: What comparison can be made between other women with whom relations are forbidden and a father’s sister and a mother’s sister, which are unique in that they are prohibited due to a prohibition that comes on its own? The prohibition with regard to a father’s sister and a mother’s sister does not stem from marriage, but from the biological fact that she is his father’s or mother’s sister. It is therefore dissimilar to prohibitions that result from marriage. The Gemara states: The principle that the initial stage of intercourse is considered sexual intercourse does not come from any one of the sources cited above. Let it come by deriving the halakha in any one other case from the common denominator of two of the sources mentioned above. The Gemara asks: From which two sources could this principle come to be derived? If you say it can comes to be derived from the combination of the source with regard to a brother’s wife and the source with regard to a father’s sister and a mother’s sister, what comparison may be drawn from these cases, which are unique in that they are prohibited because they are kin? Rather, let it come from the prohibition proscribing a menstruating woman and the prohibition with regard to a father’s sister and a mother’s sister, as a menstruating woman is not prohibited as a family relative. The Gemara raises a difficulty: What comparison may be drawn from these cases, which are each a prohibition that comes of its own accord, as neither one is created through marriage? Rather, let it come from the prohibition proscribing a menstruating woman and the prohibition proscribing a brother’s wife. As, what can you say to refute this teaching? These two cases do not share any unique features that might be cause for stringency. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, strongly objects to this: What comparison may be drawn based upon the precedent of a menstruating woman and a brother’s wife, which are stringent in that they cannot be permitted to others for the duration of the existence of the factor that renders them prohibited? A menstruating woman is forbidden as long as she experiences a flow of menstrual blood, while a brother’s wife is forbidden for the duration of the brother’s lifetime. Can you say the same with regard to a married woman, who can become permitted during the lifetime of the one who renders her prohibited, i.e., if her husband divorces her? Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: Is that to say that it is only during the existence of the factor that renders them prohibited that a menstruating woman and a brother’s wife cannot be permitted to others, but afterward, when the prohibiting factor has been resolved, they can be permitted? In the case of a menstruating woman,
ישן לא קנה - דישן לאו בר דעת ולא הוה קנינו קנין:
Shiurim on this Topic
Rabbi Shalom Rosner - https://outorah.org/p/10673
Rabbi Aryeh Lebowitz - https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/735393/rabbi-aryeh-lebowitz/sleep-in-halacha/
- https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/928389/rabbi-aryeh-lebowitz/ten-minute-halacha-halachic-status-of-a-sleeping-person/
- https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/928469/rabbi-aryeh-lebowitz/ten-minute-halacha-rav-shlomo-zalman-s-chiddush-about-sleeping-people/
Rav Reuven Ungar - https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/800140/rabbi-reuven-ungar/the-holy-shluf-sleep-in-halacha/
Rav Shay Schachter - https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/902173/rabbi-shay-schachter/can-i-really-sleep-through-davening-shabbos-other-mitzvos-/
Rabbi Shalom Rosner - https://outorah.org/p/10673
Rabbi Aryeh Lebowitz - https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/735393/rabbi-aryeh-lebowitz/sleep-in-halacha/
- https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/928389/rabbi-aryeh-lebowitz/ten-minute-halacha-halachic-status-of-a-sleeping-person/
- https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/928469/rabbi-aryeh-lebowitz/ten-minute-halacha-rav-shlomo-zalman-s-chiddush-about-sleeping-people/
Rav Reuven Ungar - https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/800140/rabbi-reuven-ungar/the-holy-shluf-sleep-in-halacha/
Rav Shay Schachter - https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/902173/rabbi-shay-schachter/can-i-really-sleep-through-davening-shabbos-other-mitzvos-/