Zevachim 66bזבחים ס״ו ב
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66bס״ו ב

גמ׳ דשני במאי אילימא דשני במליקה נימא דלא כר' אלעזר בר' שמעון דאמר שמעתי שמבדילין בחטאת העוף

GEMARA: According to the mishna, a bird sin offer-ing that one sacrificed according to the procedure of a burnt offering is disqualified. The Gemara asks: With regard to what rite did the priest change the procedure? If we say that he changed the pinching by severing the head completely, as is proper for a burnt offering, shall we say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who says: I heard that the priests would sever the head completely even in the sacrifice of a bird sin offering?

ולא אוקימנא דלא כר' אלעזר בר' שמעון

The Gemara responds: And what is wrong with this conclusion? Have we not already explained that the mishna in the previous chapter (65a), with regard to pinching, is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon?

לא דשני בהזאה

The Gemara offers another explanation: No, the mishna is referring to a case where the priest changed the procedure in the rite of sprinkling by squeezing out all the blood at once, as one would do with a burnt offering, rather than first sprinkling the blood on the altar as is proper for a sin offering. Under such circumstances, Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, would also agree that the offering is disqualified.

הכי נמי מסתברא מדקתני סיפא עשאה למעלה כמעשה כולן פסולה ואפילו כמעשה חטאת לשם חטאת דשני במאי אילימא דשני במליקה האמר מר מליקה בכל מקום במזבח כשירה אלא לאו דשני בהזאה ומדסיפא בהזאה רישא נמי בהזאה

This, too, stands to reason that the mishna is referring to a change in the sprinkling. This can be inferred from the fact that the mishna teaches in the latter clause: If one sacrificed a bird sin offering above the red line according to the procedure of any of the offerings, it is disqualified, and this applies even if he sacrificed it according to the procedure of a sin offering and for the sake of a sin offering. With regard to what rite did the priest change the location of the procedure? If we say that he changed the pinching, performing it above the red line, didn’t the Master already say with regard to a bird sin offering that pinching is valid anywhere on the altar? Rather, is it not that he changed the location of the sprinkling? And since the ruling of the latter clause is stated with regard to sprinkling, by inference, the ruling of the first clause is also stated with regard to sprinkling.

מידי איריא הא כדאיתא והא כדאיתא:

The Gemara responds to this proof: Are the cases comparable? This case is as it is, and that case is as it is. Even if the ruling of the latter clause is stated with regard to a change in the location of the sprinkling, the ruling of the first clause may still be stated with regard to a change in the procedure of the pinching, in which case the mishna would not be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon.

עולת העוף כו' דשני במאי

§ According to the mishna, a bird burnt offering that one sacrificed according to the procedure of a sin offering is disqualified. The Gemara asks: With regard to what rite did the priest change the procedure?

אילימא דשני במליקה מדקתני סיפא כולן אין מטמאין בבית הבליעה ומועלין בהן נימא דלא כרבי יהושע דאי כר' יהושע האמר אין מועלין

If we say that he changed the pinching of the bird’s nape by leaving the head partially attached, as is proper for a sin offering, then from the fact that the latter clause, i.e., the first clause of the next mishna (66b), teaches: All of the offerings enumerated above do not render one who swallows their meat ritually impure when it is in the throat, and one who benefits from them is liable for misuse of consecrated property, by inference, we must say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua. As, if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, doesn’t he say later on in that mishna concerning a burnt offering whose nape was pinched according to the procedure of a sin offering: One who derives benefit from it is not liable for misusing consecrated property?

ואלא במיצוי

Rather, the mishna must be referring to a change in the procedure of squeezing out the blood. Instead of squeezing out the blood, the priest sprinkled it on the wall of the altar as if it were a sin offering. In this case, even Rabbi Yehoshua would concede that one is liable for misusing it.

אימא סיפא עולת העוף שעשאה למטה כמעשה חטאת לשם חטאת ר"א אומר מועלין בה ר' יהושע אומר אין מועלין בה דשני במאי

But say the last clause of the subsequent mishna: In the case of a bird burnt offering that one sacrificed below the red line according to the procedure of a sin offering, and for the sake of a sin offering, Rabbi Eliezer says: One who benefits from it is liable for misuse of consecrated property, as it remains a burnt offering. Rabbi Yehoshua says: One who benefits from it is not liable for misuse of consecrated property, as the bird assumes the status of a sin offering. Here, with regard to what rite did the priest change the procedure and perform it as if it were a sin offering?

אילימא במיצוי אימר דאמר ר' יהושע דשני במליקה במיצוי מי אמר

If we say that he changed the squeezing, this poses a difficulty, as it is reasonable to say that Rabbi Yehoshua says that one is not liable for misuse specifically when the priest changed the pinching, as pinching a burnt offering for a bird as though it were a sin offering changes its status; but does he say this in a case where it was pinched properly, and the priest changed the squeezing procedure alone? It is unreasonable to suggest that the offering changes its status at this later stage.

ואלא במליקה רישא וסיפא במליקה ומציעתא במיצוי

Rather, this final clause must be referring to a change with regard to the pinching. But can it be that the first clause concerning a sin offering sacrificed as a burnt offering and the last clause concerning the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua are both referring to a change with regard to the pinching, but the middle clause concerning a burnt offering sacrificed as a sin offering is referring to a change with regard to the squeezing?

אין רישא וסיפא במליקה ומציעתא במיצוי:

The Gemara answers: Indeed, the first clause and the last clause are referring to a change with regard to the pinching, and the middle clause is referring to a change with regard to the squeezing.

מתני׳ וכולן אין מטמאין בבית הבליעה ומועלים בהן חוץ מחטאת העוף שעשאה למטה כמעשה חטאת לשם חטאת

MISHNA: And all of the offerings enumerated in the previous mishna, even those that are disqualified and may not be eaten or sacrificed, still differ from carcasses of unslaughtered kosher birds in that they do not render one who swallows their meat ritually impure when the meat is in the throat. This is because the pinching of the napes of bird offerings, like the slaughter of animals, prevents them from assuming the status of a carcass. But nevertheless, since they are forbidden to the priests, one who derives benefit from any of them is liable for misusing consecrated property. This is the halakha in all cases except for the bird sin offering that one sacrificed below the red line according to the procedure of the sin offering and for the sake of a sin offering. Since it was sacrificed properly and it is permitted for priests to partake of a fit sin offering, there is no liability for misuse of consecrated property.

עולת העוף שעשאה למטה כמעשה חטאת לשם חטאת ר"א אומר מועלים בה ר' יהושע אומר אין מועלים בה

In the case of a bird burnt offering that one improperly sacrificed below the red line according to the procedure of the sin offering, and one did so for the sake of a sin offering, Rabbi Eliezer says: One who derives benefit from it is liable for misusing consecrated property, as it remains a burnt offering, whose meat is never permitted to the priests. Rabbi Yehoshua says: One who derives benefit from it is not liable for misusing consecrated property. Since the entire sacrificial process was conducted according to the procedure of a sin offering, the offering assumes the status of a sin offering in this regard.

א"ר אליעזר ומה אם חטאת שאין מועלים בה לשמה כששינה את שמה מועלים בה עולה שמועלים בה לשמה כששינה את שמה אינו דין שימעלו בה

The mishna recounts the dispute between the tanna’im. Rabbi Eliezer said: And if in the case of a sin offering that was sacrificed for its sake, one is not liable for misusing it, and nevertheless, when one changed its designation and sacrificed it not for its sake, one is liable for misusing it, then in the case of a burnt offering, where one is liable for misusing it even when it was sacrificed for its sake, when one changed its designation and sacrificed it not for its sake is it not right that he is liable for misusing it?

א"ל ר' יהושע לא אם אמרת בחטאת ששינה את שמה לשם עולה שכן שינה את שמה לדבר שיש בו מעילה תאמר בעולה ששינה את שמה לשם חטאת שכן שינה את שמה לדבר שאין בו מעילה

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No, that a fortiori inference is not correct, as if you said with regard to a sin offering for which one changed its designation and sacrificed it for the sake of a burnt offering that there is liability for misuse, this is reasonable, because he changed its designation to an item for which there is liability for misuse. Would you say in the case of a burnt offering for which one changed its designation and sacrificed it for the sake of a sin offering that there is liability for misuse, as in that case he changed its designation to an item for which there is no liability for its misuse?