ג' זקנים וזה אחד מהן רבי ישמעאל אומר יכול יעלה אדם מעשר שני לירושלים ויאכלנו בזמן הזה ודין הוא בכור טעון הבאת מקום ומעשר טעון הבאת מקום מה בכור אינו אלא בפני הבית אף מעשר אינו אלא בפני הבית three elders, and this is one of them: Rabbi Yishmael says: One might have thought that a person would bring second-tithe produce up to Jerusalem in the present, after the destruction of the Temple, and eat it. And ostensibly, it could be derived by means of a logical inference that one may not do so: A firstborn offering requires bringing it to the place, to Jerusalem, and eating it there, and second-tithe produce requires bringing it to the place (see Deuteronomy 12:17–18); just as the firstborn offering may be eaten there only in the presence of the Temple, so too, second-tithe produce may be eaten there only in the presence of the Temple.
מה לבכור שכן טעון מתן דמים ואימורים לגבי מזבח Rabbi Yishmael notes that this derivation can be challenged: What is notable about a firstborn? Bringing the firstborn to Jerusalem is required only in the presence of the Temple, because it is notable in that it requires placement of its blood and its sacrificial portions upon the altar; will you say the same with regard to second-tithe produce, which requires only that it be consumed in Jerusalem?
ביכורים יוכיחו מה לביכורים שכן טעונין הנחה He continues: First fruits will prove that placement of blood upon the altar is not a factor, as they do not require placement of blood upon the altar, and yet they are brought to Jerusalem only in the presence of the Temple. Rabbi Yishmael counters: What is notable about first fruits? They are notable in that they require placement alongside the altar. Perhaps, since second-tithe produce does not require placement at all, even in the present one must bring it to Jerusalem and eat it there.
ת"ל (דברים יב, ו) והבאתם שמה עולותיכם וגו' מקיש מעשר לבכור מה בכור אינו אלא בפני הבית אף מעשר אינו אלא בפני הבית Rabbi Yishmael concludes: Therefore, the verse states: “And there you shall bring your burnt offerings, and your sacrifices, and your tithes…and the firstborns of your herd and of your flock” (Deuteronomy 12:6); the Torah juxtaposes second-tithe produce with the firstborn. Just as the firstborn offering may be eaten there only in the presence of the Temple, so too, second-tithe produce may be eaten there only in the presence of the Temple.
וניהדר דינא וניתי במה הצד The Gemara questions why a verse was needed to teach that second-tithe produce may not be consumed nowadays: But let the logical derivation return and the halakha will be derived from the common element between the halakhot of firstborn animals and first fruits. Although each has a unique factor, they share a common element: They must be brought to Jerusalem and that they may be eaten only in the presence of the Temple. So too, second-tithe produce, which also must be brought to Jerusalem, should be permitted for consumption only in the presence of the Temple.
משום דאיכא למיפרך מה להצד השוה שבהן שכן יש בהן צד מזבח The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yishmael did not present this derivation because it can be refuted in the following manner: What is notable about the two sources that share a common element? Both firstborn animals and first fruits are notable in that they possess an aspect of being offered upon the altar. Since second-tithe produce does not share this characteristic, its halakhot cannot be derived from those pertaining to firstborn animals and first fruits.
מאי קסבר אי קסבר קדושה ראשונה קידשה לשעתה וקידשה לעתיד לבא אפילו בכור נמי ואי קסבר לא קידשה לעתיד לבא אפילו בכור נמי תיבעי The Gemara asks: What does Rabbi Yishmael hold? If he holds that the initial consecration of the Temple sanctified it for its time and sanctified it forever, then it should be permitted to build an altar and sacrifice offerings even nowadays, and therefore even a firstborn animal may be eaten. And if he holds that the initial consecration of the Temple area did not sanctify it forever, let the dilemma be raised with regard to a firstborn as well.
אמר רבינא לעולם קסבר לא קידשה והכא במאי עסקינן בבכור שנזרק דמו קודם חורבן הבית וחרב הבית ועדיין בשרו קיים Ravina said: Actually, Rabbi Yishmael holds that that the initial consecration of the Temple did not sanctify it forever. And al-though one cannot slaughter the firstborn to begin with, here we are dealing with a firstborn that was slaughtered and whose blood was sprinkled on the altar before the destruction of the Temple, and then the Temple was destroyed, and the meat of the firstborn still exists.
ואיתקש בשרו לדמו מה דמו במזבח אף בשרו במזבח ואתי מעשר ויליף מבכור It is prohibited to eat the meat of the firstborn in this case because its meat was juxtaposed with its blood, which is mentioned in the previous verse, as it is stated: “You shall sprinkle their blood…and you shall burn their fats…and their flesh shall be yours” (Numbers 18:17–18). The juxtaposition teaches that just as its blood is sprinkled only on the altar, so too, its meat may be consumed only in a time when there is an altar. And the case of second-tithe produce comes and is derived from the case of a firstborn. Consequently, second-tithe produce may not be consumed unless there is an altar.
וכי דבר הלמד בהיקש חוזר ומלמד בהיקש מעשר דגן חולין הוא The Gemara asks: But does a matter derived via a juxtaposition with another case then teach that the halakha applies to a third case via a juxtaposition between the second and third cases? There is a principle that this is not a valid method of deriving halakhot pertaining to consecrated matters. Since the halakha with regard to the meat of the firstborn offering is derived from the juxtaposition of the meat with the blood of the firstborn, one cannot then prove that the same halakha applies to second-tithe produce simply because it is juxtaposed in a verse with the meat of the firstborn. The Gemara answers: Second-tithe grain is non-sacred, and therefore the acceptable methods for deriving its halakhot are not limited in this manner.
הניחא למ"ד בתר למד אזלינן אלא למ"ד בתר מלמד אזלינן מאי איכא למימר The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says: In determining whether the derivation involves consecrated matters or whether it involves non-sacred matters, we follow the matter that is derived from a matter derived from a juxtaposition. Since in this case the matter derived is second-tithe produce, which for these purposes is non-sacred, its legal status may be derived from juxtaposition with the halakhot of sacrificial matters. But according to the one who says: We follow the matter that teaches, i.e., from which the halakha is derived, what is there to say? The status of second-tithe produce may not be derived by means of juxtaposition with the status of the firstborn offering, which itself was derived from the blood of the offering, because the firstborn offering is a sacrificial matter.
דם ובשר חדא מילתא היא The Gemara answers: This is not a matter derived from a matter derived from a juxtaposition, as the status of the firstborn offering is not derived from the status of blood; blood and meat are one matter. There is only one derivation in this case, which is that the status of second-tithe produce is derived from the status of the blood and the meat of the firstborn. In any event, Abaye has proven, quoting Rabbi Yishmael’s statement cited by Rabbi Yosei, that even sacrificial items of lesser sanctity may not be eaten if the altar is missing or damaged.
כי סליק רבין אמרה לשמעתא קמיה דרבי ירמיה אמר בבלאי טפשאי אמטול דיתבי בארעא חשוכא אמרי שמעתא דמחשכא לא שמיע להו הא דתניא בשעת סילוק מסעות קדשים נפסלין וזבים ומצורעים משתלחים חוץ למחיצה The Gemara relates: When Ravin ascended from Babylonia to Eretz Yisrael, he stated this halakha, that even items of lesser sanctity are disqualified if the altar is damaged or missing, in the presence of Rabbi Yirmeya. Rabbi Yirmeya said: Foolish Babylonians! Because they dwell in a dark land, they state halakhot that are dim. Have they not heard that which is taught in a baraita: At the time when the Jewish people would dismantle the Tabernacle in order to depart on their journeys in the wilderness, sacrificial food was disqualified from being consumed, since the altar was not in place. Nevertheless, zavim and lepers were sent out of the relevant partition; a zav was sent out of the Levite camp and a leper was sent out of the Israelite camp.
ותניא אידך בשני מקומות קדשים נאכלים מאי לאו הא בקדשי קדשים הא בקדשים קלים And it is taught in another baraita: Sacrificial food could be consumed in two locations, i.e., one could eat it while the Tabernacle was in place and one could continue eating it after the Tabernacle had been disassembled and transported. What, is it not that this first baraita is referring to offerings of the most sacred order, and that second baraita is referring to offerings of lesser sanctity? Accordingly, Abaye’s statement that offerings of lesser sanctity may not be consumed if the altar is damaged is incorrect.
אמר רבינא אידי ואידי בקדשים קלים ולא קשיא Ravina said that there is an alternative reconciliation of the two baraitot: Both this baraita and that baraita are referring to offerings of lesser sanctity, and it is not difficult: