מה לתודה שכן טעונה לחם
The Gemara rejects this as well: What is unique about a thanks offering? It is unique in that it requires a meal offering of forty loaves of bread.
עולה ושלמים יוכיחו וחזר הדין לא ראי זה כראי זה ולא ראי זה כראי זה הצד השוה שבהן שהן קדשים ושחטן שלא לשמן כשר ואינו מרצה אף אני אביא אשם שהוא קדש ושחטו שלא לשמו כשר ואינו מרצה
The Gemara answers: If so, a burnt offering and a peace offering can prove the point, as loaves are not brought with them. And the inference has reverted to its starting point. The halakha is derived from a combination of the two sources: The aspect of this case, a burnt offering and a peace offering, is not like the aspect of that case, a thanks offering, and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case. Their common element is that they are offerings, and if one slaughtered them not for their sake, they are fit but do not propitiate God. So too, I shall include a guilt offering in this halakha, as it is an offering, and therefore if one slaughtered it not for its sake, it is fit but does not propitiate God.
מה להצד השוה שבהן שהן באין בנדר ובנדבה
The Gemara rejects this as well: What is unique about the common element of a thanks offering, a burnt offering, and a peace offering? It is unique in that these offerings are brought either as a vow offering or as a gift offering, whereas a guilt offering is brought only to fulfill an obligation.
אלא אמר רבא זאת התורה וגו' הקישו הכתוב לשלמים מה שלמים שהן קדשים ושחטן שלא לשמן כשרים ואין מרצין אף אני אביא אשם שהוא קודש כו'
Rather, Rava says: The verse: “This is the law of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the consecration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:37), juxtaposes a guilt offering with a peace offering, indicating that just as peace offerings are offerings and if one slaughtered them not for their sake, they are fit but do not propitiate, so too, I shall include a guilt offering, as it is an offering, and therefore if it is slaughtered not for its sake, although it is fit, it does not satisfy the obligation of its owner.
מאי חזית דאקשת לשלמים אקיש לחטאת
The Gemara asks: What did you see, i.e., why do you think it is reasonable, that you compared a guilt offering to a peace offering? Why not compare it to a sin offering, which is disqualified in such a case?
הא מיעט רחמנא אותה
The Gemara answers: The Merciful One excluded all other offerings from the halakha concerning a sin offering in this matter, as derived from the verse: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33).
(סימן הנ"ש בש"ר)
The Gemara provides a mnemonic for the amora’im who participated in the two following discussions: Heh, nun, shin; beit, shin, reish.
יתיב רב הונא ורב נחמן ויתיב רב ששת גבייהו ויתבי וקאמרי קשיא ליה לריש לקיש אשם דלא אתי לאחר מיתה לימא ליה ר"א אשם נמי אתי לאחר מיתה
Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman were sitting, and Rav Sheshet was sitting with them. And they were sitting and saying: Reish Lakish raised his difficulty with regard to a guilt offering, since it is not brought after its owner’s death. Let Rabbi Elazar say to him that a guilt offering is also essentially brought after its owner’s death, since it is sold once it develops a blemish, and the proceeds are used to buy a burnt offering.
אמר להו רב ששת אשם למאי קרב למותרו חטאת נמי מיקרב קרבה מותרה
Rav Sheshet said to them: This claim can be refuted: What element of a guilt offering is sacrificed after its owner’s death? Only its remainder, i.e., the money from its sale that is used to purchase an animal to be sacrificed. And if so, it is no different from a sin offering, the remainder of which is also sacrificed, and a sin offering itself is entirely disqualified if slaughtered not for its sake.
חטאת אף ע"ג דקרבה מותרה מיעט רחמנא הוא
Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman explained: A sin offering that was slaughtered not for its sake is disqualified even though its remainder is sacrificed, because the Merciful One specifically excludes a sin offering from being a fit offering if sacrificed not for its own sake, as derived from the verse: “And he shall lay his hand upon the head of the goat, and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). The redundant phrase “it is a sin offering” teaches that a sin offering is disqualified if sacrificed not for its own sake.
אשם נמי כתיב ביה הוא
The Gemara asks: Isn’t it also written with regard to a guilt offering: “And the priest shall make them smoke upon the altar for an offering made by fire unto the Lord; it is a guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:5)? Why is a guilt offering not disqualified when it is slaughtered not for its sake?
ההוא לאחר הקטרת אימורים הוא דכתיב כדתניא אבל אשם לא נאמר בו הוא אלא לאחר הקטרת אימורין והוא עצמו אם לא הקטירו אימורין כשר
The Gemara answers: That verse is written not with regard to the main sacrificial rites, but with regard to the stage after the burning of the offering’s sacrificial portions on the altar, as it is taught in a baraita: But with regard to a guilt offering, the term “It is a guilt offering” is stated only after the burning of the sacrificial portions. And since the guilt offering itself is fit even if the sacrificial portions were not burned at all, it is certainly fit if they were burned not for the sake of a guilt offering.
ואלא הוא למה לי לכדרב הונא אמר רב דאמר רב הונא אמר רב אשם שניתק לרעיה ושחטו סתם כשר
The Gemara asks: But if so, why do I need the term “It is a guilt offering” to be stated at all? The Gemara answers: It is necessary for that which Rav Huna says that Rav says. As Rav Huna says that Rav says: With regard to a guilt offering whose owner died or whose transgression was otherwise atoned for, and that was therefore consigned by the court to grazing until it develops a blemish so that it can be sold and the proceeds used to purchase a burnt offering, if, before it developed a blemish, someone slaughtered it without specification of its purpose, it is fit as a burnt offering.
ניתק אין לא ניתק לא מאי טעמא אמר קרא הוא בהווייתו יהא
The Gemara infers: If it was consigned to grazing, yes, it is fit as a burnt offering if slaughtered. By inference, if it was not consigned to grazing, it is not fit. What is the reason for this? The verse states: “It is a guilt offering,” indicating that it shall remain as it is, i.e., as a guilt offering, unless it is consigned by the court to fulfill another purpose.
יתבי רב נחמן ורב ששת ויתיב רב אדא בר מתנה גבייהו ויתבי וקאמרי הא דקאמר רבי אלעזר מצינו בבאין לאחר מיתה שהן כשרין ואין מרצין לימא ליה ריש לקיש הנהו נמי לייתו ולירצו
§ Rav Naḥman and Rav Sheshet were sitting, and Rav Adda bar Mattana was sitting with them. And they were sitting and saying: In response to that which Rabbi Elazar said to Reish Lakish: We have found a precedent for this situation in the case of offerings that are brought after their owners’ death, as they are fit but they do not propitiate God, let Reish Lakish say to him: These offerings should also be brought and propitiate God with regard to the heirs. Why did Reish Lakish not challenge Rabbi Elazar’s assumption?
אמר להן רב אדא בר מתנה יולדת אם היא ילדה בניה מי ילדו
Rav Adda bar Mattana said to them: How can the offering of a woman after childbirth propitiate God after her death? If she gave birth, did her children give birth?
מתקיף לה רב אסי ומאן לימא לן דאי איכא כמה עשה גבה לא מיתכפרא וכיון דכי איכא כמה עשה גבה מיכפרא יורשיה נמי מיכפר
Rav Asi objects to this reasoning: And who shall say to us that if a woman has several violations of positive mitzvot for which to atone, she does not atone by means of the burnt offering she brings after childbirth for her purification? Clearly, such offerings can atone for transgressions other than those for which they are brought. And since, when she has several violations of positive mitzvot she atones by means of the offering, so too, if she dies, her heirs atone by this offering for their own violations of positive mitzvot.
למימרא דקניא להו והאמר רבי יוחנן הניח מנחה לשני בניו ומת קריבה ואין בו שותפות ואי ס"ד קניא להו (ויקרא ב, א) נפש אמר רחמנא
The Gemara asks: Is this to say that the offering is acquired by the heirs, and this is why it atones for their transgressions? But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say that if one left his two sons a meal offering and then died, the offering must be sacrificed, and it does not have the status of a meal offering brought in partnership? And if it enters your mind that the offering is acquired by the heirs, it should be considered a meal offering brought in partnership, which is unfit, as the Merciful One states in the Torah: “And when one brings a meal offering unto the Lord” (Leviticus 2:1). The word “one” teaches that two people cannot bring a meal offering together. Clearly, the heirs do not inherit the offering, and if so, it should not atone for their transgressions.
ולא קניא להו והאמר ר' יוחנן הניח בהמה לשני בניו ומת קריבה ואין ממירין בה אי אמרת בשלמא קניא להו היינו דאין ממירין בה דהויא להו כשותפין
The Gemara asks: And is the offering not acquired by them? But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan himself say that if one left his two sons an animal offering and then died, the offering must be sacrificed, and they cannot effect substitution of another animal for it? Even if they declare another animal to be a substitute for it, that animal is not consecrated. Granted, if you say that the offering is acquired by them, this is the reason that they cannot effect substitution of another animal for it: It is because they are like partners,