לא ידע במאי כתב רחמנא זאת התורה ואי כתב רחמנא זאת התורה הוה אמינא ליפסלו כתב רחמנא מוצא שפתיך
that we do not know what requirement does not disqualify the offering if not fulfilled. Therefore, the Merciful One writes the verse: This is the law, juxtaposing all offerings with a peace offering, which must be performed for its own sake. And if the Merciful One had written only the verse: This is the law, I would say that offerings sacrificed not for their sake should be disqualified. Therefore, the Merciful One writes the verse: That which is gone out of your lips, teaching that they are accepted, though they do not satisfy their owners’ obligations.
רמי ריש לקיש על מעוהי בי מדרשא ומקשי אם כשרים הם ירצו ואם אין מרצין למה באין
§ Reish Lakish raised a difficulty while lying on his stomach in the study hall: If offerings that were sacrificed for the sake of the wrong type of offering or someone other than the owner are fit, let them propitiate God, i.e., let them satisfy the obligation of their owners; and if they do not propitiate God, why are they brought as offerings at all?
אמר לו ר' אליעזר מצינו בבאין לאחר מיתה שהן כשרין ואין מרצין דתנן האשה שהביאה חטאתה ומתה יביאו יורשין עולתה עולתה ומתה לא יביאו יורשין חטאתה
Rabbi Elazar said to him: We have found a precedent for this in the case of offerings brought after the death of their owners, as they are fit, but they do not propitiate God, as they do not have owners requiring atonement. This is as we learned in a mishna (Kinnim 2:5): With regard to a woman after childbirth who brought her sin offering and then died, the heirs shall bring her burnt offering. If she brought her burnt offering and then died, the heirs shall not bring her sin offering. Evidently, a burnt offering is sacrificed even if it does not satisfy its owner’s obligation.
א"ל מודינא לך בעולה דאתיא לאחר מיתה אשם דלא אתי לאחר מיתה מנלן
Reish Lakish said to him: I concede to you with regard to a burnt offering that it is sacrificed even if it does not satisfy its owner’s obligation, since it is brought even after its owner’s death in the case of the woman who died after bringing her sin offering. But from where do we derive that a guilt offering, which is brought for atonement and therefore not brought after its owner’s death, is brought even in a case where it was slaughtered not for its sake and therefore will not satisfy its owner’s obligation?
א"ל הרי מחלוקתך בצידו רבי אליעזר אומר אף האשם
Rabbi Elazar said to him: Your side of the dispute is written in the mishna next to the opinion that you find difficult. Following the opinion in the mishna (2a) that only a sin offering and a Paschal offering are disqualified if they are slaughtered for the sake of the wrong type of offering, the mishna teaches that Rabbi Eliezer says: The guilt offering too is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake.
אמר זהו שאומרין עליו אדם גדול הוא קאמינא אנא משנה שלימה ואת אמרת לי ר' אליעזר
Reish Lakish said in reference to Rabbi Elazar: Is he the one of whom people say that he is a great man? I am referring to the entire mishna, specifically to the opinion of the first tanna, which is the accepted halakha. And you say to me that the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer resolves my difficulty?
אלא אמר ריש לקיש אפתח אנא פתחא לנפשאי (דברים כג, כד) מוצא שפתיך וגו' האי נדבה נדר הוא כו' כדלעיל
Rather, Reish Lakish said: I will introduce a solution to my own difficulty. He then recited the exegesis stated above: The verse states: “That which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do, etc.” How can this be referring to a gift offering? It is already referred to as a vow offering; and so on, as stated above. In other words, it is derived from a verse that although the offering does not satisfy the obligation of its owner, it is fit to be sacrificed as a gift offering.
יתיב רבי זירא ורבי יצחק בר אבא ויתיב אביי גבייהו ויתבי וקאמרי קשיא ליה לריש לקיש אשם דלא אתי לאחר מיתה ונסיב לה תלמודא מוצא שפתיך אימא הבא בנדר ובנדבה לייתי ולא לירצי אשם לא לייתי כלל
Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Abba were sitting, and Abaye was sitting with them. And they were sitting and saying: The case of a guilt offering was difficult for Reish Lakish, as a guilt offering is not brought after the owner’s death, and he adduced the derivation from the verse: “That which has gone out of your lips,” as a solution to it. This resolution is difficult: Why not say that only an offering that is brought for a vow or a gift is brought even in a case where it does not propitiate, since the verse mentions a vow and a gift; but a guilt offering, which is not brought voluntarily, should not be brought at all if it was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong type of offering. How does the verse resolve Reish Lakish’s difficulty?
אמר להו אביי ריש לקיש מהכא פתח (ויקרא ד, לג) ושחט אותה לחטאת אותה לשמה כשרה שלא לשמה פסולה הא שאר קדשים שלא לשמן כשירין יכול ירצו ת"ל מוצא שפתיך
Abaye said to them: Although Reish Lakish cited that verse, he actually introduced the solution to his difficulty from here: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33). It is derived from the word “it” in this verse that if a sin offering is slaughtered for its sake, it is fit; if it is slaughtered not for its sake, it is unfit. Consequently, other offerings slaughtered not for their sake, including a guilt offering, are fit. And since one might have thought that once they are fit, they also propitiate God, the verse states: “That which has gone out of your lips,” from which it is derived that such an offering does not satisfy its owner’s obligation.
ואימא הבא בנדר ונדבה לייתי ולא לירצי אשם (נמי) ארצויי נמי לירצי
Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Abba asked him: But since the phrase in the verse “that which has gone out of your lips” is referring to offerings brought for a vow or a gift, why not say that only these offerings do not propitiate God even though one must bring them if slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering, but a guilt offering slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering propitiates God as well?
אמר אביי אשם דמירצי לא מצית אמרת קל וחומר מעולה ומה עולה שאינה מכפרת אינה מרצה אשם שמכפר אינו דין שאינו מרצה
Abaye said in response: You cannot say that a guilt offering that was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering propitiates God, due to an a fortiori inference from a burnt offering: Just as a burnt offering, which does not atone for a sin as it is brought as a vow or gift offering, still does not propitiate God if it was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering, so too, with regard to a guilt offering, which atones for a sin and is therefore treated more stringently, is it not logical that it does not propitiate God?
מה לעולה שכן כליל
The Gemara challenges the inference: What is unique about a burnt offering? It is unique in that it is totally consumed on the altar. By contrast, the meat of a guilt offering is eaten by priests. Since in some ways a burnt offering is treated more stringently than a guilt offering, no a fortiori inference can be derived from one to the other.
The Gemara answers: A peace offering can prove that this aspect is not relevant, since it is not totally consumed on the altar, and still if slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering it does not satisfy its owner’s obligation. The inference can therefore be drawn from a peace offering rather than a burnt offering.
מה לשלמים שכן טעונין נסכין ותנופת חזה ושוק
The Gemara rejects this as well: What is unique about a peace offering? It is unique in that it requires libations, and the waving of the breast and the right hind leg.
עולה תוכיח וחזר הדין לא ראי זה כראי זה ולא ראי זה כראי זה הצד השוה שבהן שהן קדשים ושחטן שלא לשמן כשירין ואין מרצין אף אני אביא אשם שהוא קודש ושחטו שלא לשמו כשר ואינו מרצה
The Gemara answers: If so, a burnt offering can prove the point, since these stringencies do not apply to it. And the inference has reverted to its starting point. At this stage the halakha is derived from a combination of the two sources: The aspect of this case, a burnt offering, is not like the aspect of that case, the peace offering. And the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case. Their common element is that they are offerings and if one slaughtered them not for their sake, they are fit but they do not propitiate. So too, I shall include a guilt offering in this halakha, as it is an offering, and therefore if one slaughtered it not for its sake, it is fit but it does not propitiate.
מה להצד השוה שבהן שכן ישנו בציבור
The Gemara rejects this as well: What is unique about their common element, i.e., the common element of a burnt offering and a peace offering? These offerings are unique in that they are brought by the public. There are communal burnt offerings and peace offerings, but there are no communal guilt offerings.
The Gemara responds: A thanks offering can prove the point, since there are no communal thanks offerings, and still a thanks offering slaughtered not for its sake does not satisfy its owner’s obligation.