Zevachim 50bזבחים נ׳ ב
The William Davidson Talmudתלמוד מהדורת ויליאם דוידסון
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50bנ׳ ב
1 א

ונאמר להלן עור ובשר ופרש מה להלן ע"י ניתוח שלא בהפשט אף כאן ע"י ניתוח שלא בהפשט.

And it is stated below, with regard to the bull sin offerings that are burned, the terms skin, flesh, and dung, in the verse: “But the skin of the bull, and all its flesh, with its head, and with its legs, and its innards, and its dung” (Leviticus 4:11). Just as below it is prepared for burning by means of cutting it into pieces but not by means of flaying, as derived by the verbal analogy, so too here it is prepared for burning by means of cutting it into pieces but not by means of flaying. Evidently, a halakha derived via a verbal analogy can then teach another halakha via a verbal analogy.

2 ב

דבר הלמד בגזירה שוה מהו שילמד בק"ו ק"ו ומה היקש שאינו מלמד בהיקש אי מדרבא אי מדרבינא מלמד בקל וחומר מדתנא דבי רבי ישמעאל גז"ש המלמדת בהיקש מדרב פפא אינו דין שתלמד בק"ו

§ The Gemara asks: What is the halakha as to whether a matter derived via a verbal analogy can teach its halakha to another matter via an a fortiori inference? The Gemara answers: That question itself can be answered with an a fortiori inference: And just as a matter derived via a juxtaposition, which cannot then teach its halakha via a juxtaposition, as proven either from the statement of Rava or from the statement of Ravina (49b), can nevertheless teach its halakha via an a fortiori inference, as proven from the statement that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught (50a), with regard to a matter derived via a verbal analogy, which can teach its halakha via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement of Rav Pappa (50a), is it not logical that it should teach its halakha via an a fortiori inference?

3 ג

הניחא למאן דאית ליה דרב פפא אלא למאן דלית ליה דרב פפא מאי איכא למימר

The Gemara clarifies: This works out well according to the one who accepts the statement of Rav Pappa. But according to the one who does not accept the statement of Rav Pappa, i.e., Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, what is there to say?

4 ד

אלא קל וחומר ומה היקש שאין מלמד בהיקש אי מדרבא אי מדרבינא מלמד בק"ו מדתנא דבי רבי ישמעאל גזירה שוה המלמדת בגז"ש חבירתה מדרמי בר חמא אינו דין שתלמד בק"ו

Rather, this can be derived through a different a fortiori inference: And just as a matter derived via a juxtaposition, which cannot then teach its halakha via a juxtaposition, as proven either from the statement of Rava or from the statement of Ravina (49b), can nevertheless teach its halakha via an a fortiori inference, as proven from the statement that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught (50a), with regard to a matter derived via a verbal analogy, which can teach its halakha via another verbal analogy, as proven from the statement of Rami bar Ḥama (50a), is it not logical that it should teach its halakha via an a fortiori inference?

5 ה

דבר הלמד בגז"ש מהו שילמד בבנין אב תיקו.

The Gemara asks: What is the halakha as to whether a matter derived via a verbal analogy can teach its halakha to another matter via a paradigm? The question shall stand unresolved.

6 ו

דבר הלמד בקל וחומר מהו שילמד בהיקש ק"ו ומה גזירה שוה שאינה למדה בהיקשא מדר' יוחנן מלמד בהיקש מדרב פפא קל וחומר הלמד מהיקש מדתנא דבי ר' ישמעאל אינו דין שילמד בהיקש

§ The Gemara asks: What is the halakha as to whether a matter derived via an a fortiori inference can teach its halakha to another matter via a juxtaposition? The Gemara answers that this itself can be derived via an a fortiori inference: And just as a halakha derived via a verbal analogy, which cannot be derived from another halakha derived via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan (49b), can nevertheless teach its halakha to another matter via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement of Rav Pappa (50a), with regard to a halakha derived via an a fortiori inference, which can be derived from another halakha derived via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught (50a), is it not logical that it should teach its halakha via a juxtaposition?

7 ז

הניחא למאן דאית ליה דרב פפא אלא למאן דלית ליה דרב פפא מאי איכא למימר תיקו.

The Gemara clarifies: This works out well according to the one who accepts the statement of Rav Pappa. But according to the one who does not accept the statement of Rav Pappa, i.e., Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, what is there to say? The Gemara comments: The question shall stand unresolved.

8 ח

דבר הלמד בקל וחומר מהו שילמד בגזירה שוה קל וחומר ומה גזירה שוה שאינה למידה בהיקשא מדרבי יוחנן מלמד בגזירה שוה מדרמי בר חמא קל וחומר הלמד בהיקש מדתנא דבי רבי ישמעאל אינו דין שתלמד בגז"ש.

The Gemara asks: What is the halakha as to whether a matter derived via an a fortiori inference can teach its halakha to another matter via a verbal analogy? The Gemara answers that this itself can be derived via an a fortiori inference. And just as a halakha derived via a verbal analogy, which cannot be derived from another halakha derived via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan (49b), can nevertheless teach its halakha to another matter via a verbal analogy, as proven from the statement of Rami bar Ḥama (50a), with regard to a halakha derived via an a fortiori inference, which can be derived from another halakha derived via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught (50a), is it not logical that it should teach its halakha via a verbal analogy?

9 ט

דבר הלמד בקל וחומר מהו שילמד בקל וחומר ק"ו ומה גזירה שוה שאינה למידה בהיקש מדר' יוחנן מלמד בק"ו כדאמרן ק"ו הלמד מהיקש מדתנא דבי רבי ישמעאל אינו דין שילמד בקל וחומר

The Gemara asks: What is the halakha as to whether a matter derived via an a fortiori inference can teach its halakha to another matter via an a fortiori inference? The Gemara answers that this itself can be derived via an a fortiori inference. And just as a halakha derived via a verbal analogy, which cannot be derived from another halakha derived via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan (49b), can nevertheless teach its halakha to another matter via an a fortiori inference, as we have said, with regard to a halakha derived via an a fortiori inference, which can be derived from another halakha derived via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught (50a), is it not logical that it should teach its halakha via an a fortiori inference?

10 י

וזהו ק"ו בן ק"ו בן בנו של ק"ו הוא

The Gemara comments: And this is an a fortiori inference that is the son of, i.e., is derived from, another a fortiori inference. The Gemara challenges this last statement: It is not the son of an a fortiori inference, but the grandson of an a fortiori inference, which cannot be used. The very fact that a matter derived via a verbal analogy can then teach its halakha via an a fortiori inference is itself derived from an a fortiori inference, as the Gemara stated.

11 יא

אלא ק"ו ומה היקש שאינו למד בהיקש אי מדרבא אי מדרבינא מלמד בק"ו מדתנא דבי רבי ישמעאל ק"ו הלמד מהיקש מדתני דבי רבי ישמעאל אינו דין שילמד בק"ו וזהו ק"ו בן קל וחומר.

Rather, the halakha as to whether a matter derived via an a fortiori inference can teach its halakha to another matter via an a fortiori inference can be derived via another a fortiori inference. And just as a matter derived via a juxtaposition, which cannot be derived via a juxtaposition, as proven either from the statement of Rava or from the statement of Ravina (49b), can nevertheless teach its halakha via an a fortiori inference, as proven from the statement that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught (50a), with regard to a halakha derived via an a fortiori inference, which can be derived from another halakha derived via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught (50a), is it not logical that it should teach its halakha via an a fortiori inference? The Gemara comments: And this is an a fortiori inference that is the son of another a fortiori inference.

12 יב

דבר הלמד בקל וחומר מהו שילמד בבנין אב אמר רבי ירמיה תא שמע מלק ונמצאת טריפה ר"מ אומר אינה מטמאה בבית הבליעה רבי יהודה אומר מטמאה בבית הבליעה

The Gemara asks: What is the halakha as to whether a matter derived via an a fortiori inference can teach its halakha to another matter via a paradigm? Rabbi Yirmeya says: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (69a–b): If a priest pinched the nape of a bird offering properly and it was then found to be a bird with a wound that would have caused it to die within twelve months [tereifa], which disqualifies it from being used as an offering and renders it prohibited for consumption by the priests, Rabbi Meir says: An olive-bulk of its meat does not render one who swallows it ritually impure when it is in the throat, as is the halakha concerning a bird carcass, as the fact that it underwent pinching means that it is not in the category of a carcass. Rabbi Yehuda says: Its status is like that of any other carcass of a kosher bird, and its meat renders one who swallows it ritually impure when it is in the throat.

13 יג

אמר ר' מאיר קל וחומר ומה נבלת בהמה שמטמאה במגע ובמשא שחיטתה מטהרת טריפתה מטומאתה נבילת עוף שאין מטמא במגע ובמשא אינו דין שתהא שחיטתה מטהרת טריפתה מטומאתה מה מצינו בשחיטה שמכשרתה באכילה

The mishna continues: Rabbi Meir said: My opinion can be proved via an a fortiori inference. And just as with regard to the carcass of an animal, which transmits impurity to a person through touching it and carrying it, its slaughter nevertheless purifies its tereifa from its impurity, with regard to the carcass of a bird, which possesses less severe impurity, as it does not transmit impurity through touching it and carrying it, but only when it is in the throat, is it not logical that its slaughter purifies its tereifa from its impurity? And once it is established that slaughter purifies a bird that is a tereifa, it can be derived: Just as we found with regard to a bird’s slaughter that it permits it for consumption