וּלְאִשָּׁה בְּעָלְמָא — אֵין גֵּט, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאֵין בְּיָדוֹ לְגָרְשָׁהּ. בָּעֵי רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: לִיבִמְתּוֹ, מַהוּ? כֵּיוָן דַּאֲגִידָא בֵּיהּ — כַּאֲרוּסָתוֹ דָּמְיָא, אוֹ דִלְמָא: כֵּיוָן דְּלָא עֲבַד בַּהּ מַאֲמָר — לָא? תֵּיקוּ. But if he wrote a bill of divorce for a regular woman who has no connection to him, even if he later married her, it is not a valid bill of divorce. This is because at the time of the writing of the bill of divorce, it is not in his power to divorce her, and therefore the bill of divorce is of no consequence. All this is evident, but in light of the above halakhot Rami bar Ḥama inquires: If he wrote a bill of divorce for his yevama and did not give it to her immediately, but only after they were married, what is the halakha? Is it a valid bill of divorce or not? The Gemara clarifies the options: On the one hand, since she is tied to him she is considered like his betrothed; or perhaps, since he has not yet performed levirate betrothal with her, she is not even considered the equivalent of his betrothed, and the bill of divorce is not effective? The Gemara does not have a resolution for this and states that the question shall stand unresolved.
בָּעֵי רַב חֲנַנְיָה: כָּתַב גֵּט לְזִיקָּתוֹ וְלֹא לְמַאֲמָרוֹ, לְמַאֲמָרוֹ וְלֹא לְזִיקָּתוֹ, מַהוּ? מַאֲמָר עִילָּוֵי זִיקָה קָא רְמֵי, וְהָוֵה לֵיהּ כִּמְגָרֵשׁ חֲצִי אִשָּׁה, וְהַמְגָרֵשׁ חֲצִי אִשָּׁה לֹא עָשָׂה וְלֹא כְלוּם, אוֹ דִּלְמָא: הַאי לְחוֹדֵיהּ קָאֵי וְהַאי לְחוֹדֵיהּ קָאֵי. Rav Ḥananya inquires: If he wrote a bill of divorce for his levirate bond, by specifying in the bill of divorce that he is thereby severing the levirate bond between them, but not for his levirate betrothal, or if he wrote a bill of divorce for his levirate betrothal and stated that it is not for his levirate bond, what is the halakha? Is the levirate betrothal superimposed upon the levirate bond, so that they are considered a single, continuous link, and he is like one who divorces half a woman, and one who divorces half a woman has done nothing; or perhaps this stands on its own and that stands on its own, and he can therefore cancel either the levirate bond or the levirate betrothal separately.
וְתִפְשׁוֹט לֵיהּ מִדְּרָבָא, דְּאָמַר רָבָא: נָתַן גֵּט לְמַאֲמָרוֹ — הוּתְּרָה צָרָתָהּ! לְרָבָא פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ, לְרַב חֲנַנְיָה מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ, מַאי — תֵּיקוּ. The Gemara asks: And why do you not resolve the dilemma from a teaching of Rava? For Rava said: If a yavam gave a bill of divorce for his levirate betrothal, her rival wife is permitted. The levirate betrothal he had previously performed is thereby canceled, which leaves the bond intact, and the rival wife of this yevama remains available for levirate marriage. This indicates that levirate betrothal and the levirate bond are not connected. The Gemara answers: To Rava it is obvious, but to Rav Ḥananya it is a dilemma. What, then, is the halakha? Since no other proof is forthcoming, and Rav Ḥananya does not accept the teaching of Rava, the question remains undecided. The Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.
חָלַץ וְעָשָׂה מַאֲמָר. אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: זוֹ דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, דְּאָמַר: אֵין קִדּוּשִׁין תּוֹפְסִין בְּחַיָּיבֵי לָאוִין. אֲבָל חֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: יֵשׁ אַחַר חֲלִיצָה כְּלוּם. § It was taught in the mishna: If the yavam performed ḥalitza and then performed levirate betrothal, nothing is effective after ḥalitza and this levirate betrothal is not valid. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva, who says that betrothal does not take effect on those who are forbidden as they are liable for violating a prohibition. Once he has performed ḥalitza, the woman is forbidden to him due to the prohibition derived from the verse “So shall it be done to the man who does not build his brother’s house” (Deuteronomy 25:9), and betrothal is ineffective. But the Rabbis say something is effective after ḥalitza. Although the woman who performed ḥalitza is forbidden to him, if he does betroth her, his betrothal is effective, as with any regular prohibition.
וּמִי מָצֵית מוֹקְמַתְּ לַהּ כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, וְהָא קָתָנֵי רֵישָׁא: נָתַן גֵּט וְעָשָׂה מַאֲמָר — צְרִיכָה גֵּט וַחֲלִיצָה. וְאִי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, כֵּיוָן דִּיהַב לָהּ גֵּט, מִי מַהֲנֵי בַּהּ מַאֲמָר? The Gemara asks: And can you establish that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva? But doesn’t the first clause of the mishna teach: If he gave a bill of divorce and performed levirate betrothal, she requires a bill of divorce and ḥalitza. Now if this is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, once he gave her a bill of divorce, is levirate betrothal effective for her?
וְהָתַנְיָא, רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: מִנַּיִן לְנוֹתֵן גֵּט לִיבִמְתּוֹ שֶׁנֶּאֶסְרָה עָלָיו עוֹלָמִית — שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״לֹא יוּכַל בַּעְלָהּ הָרִאשׁוֹן אֲשֶׁר שִׁלְּחָהּ״ — אַחַר שִׁילּוּחַ. But isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Akiva says: From where is it derived that if one gives a bill of divorce to his yevama, she is forbidden to him forever and he no longer has the option of marrying her? As it is stated with regard to a woman who was divorced and married another man who subsequently died or divorced her: “Her former husband, who sent her away, may not take her again to be his wife” (Deuteronomy 24:4). Rabbi Akiva emphasizes the words “who sent her away,” implying that he may not remarry her after sending her away. This indicates that there is an instance where a husband may not remarry his wife even if she has not married another, merely because he has given her a bill of divorce. This applies to the case of a yevama where the bill of divorce she receives renders her permanently prohibited to him. According to Rabbi Akiva, once she is rendered prohibited to him, no further action performed by the yavam is effective, so why does the levirate betrothal performed require a bill of divorce?
אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: גֵּט יְבָמִין מִדְּרַבָּנַן, וּקְרָא אַסְמַכְתָּא בְּעָלְמָא. Rav Ashi said: This is not difficult because the bill of divorce for levirate marriage was established by the Sages and only has the force of rabbinic law, and the aforementioned verse is not a Torah prohibition, but rather a mere support. Therefore there is no Torah prohibition against marrying a yevama who received a bill of divorce, and the levirate betrothal performed afterward is effective according to Rabbi Akiva as well.
תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי, אָמַר רַבִּי: אֵין הַדְּבָרִים הַלָּלוּ אֲמוּרִים אֶלָּא לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, שֶׁהָיָה עוֹשֶׂה חֲלוּצָה כְּעֶרְוָה. אֲבָל חֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: יֵשׁ אַחַר חֲלִיצָה כְּלוּם. וַאֲנִי אוֹמֵר: אֵימָתַי — בִּזְמַן שֶׁקִּדְּשָׁהּ לְשׁוּם אִישׁוּת, אֲבָל קִדְּשָׁהּ לְשׁוּם יַבְמוּת — אֵין אַחַר חֲלִיצָה כְּלוּם. With regard to the halakha of betrothal after ḥalitza, the Gemara notes: This halakha is also taught in a baraita as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: These matters were only stated in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Akiva, who considers a yevama who underwent ḥalitza to be prohibited like a forbidden relation. Therefore, any further betrothal is not effective with her, as is the case with forbidden relations. But the Rabbis say something is effective after ḥalitza. And I say: When is betrothal effective after ḥalitza? It is effective when he betrothed for the purpose of marriage, like the regular betrothal of any ordinary woman. But if he betrothed her after ḥalitza and specified that he is doing so for the purpose of levirate marriage, in that case nothing is effective after ḥalitza.
תַּנְיָא אִידַּךְ: הַחוֹלֵץ לִיבִמְתּוֹ וְחָזַר וְקִדְּשָׁהּ, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: אִם קִדְּשָׁהּ לְשׁוּם אִישׁוּת — צְרִיכָה הֵימֶנּוּ גֵּט, לְשׁוּם יַבְמוּת — אֵין צְרִיכָה הֵימֶנּוּ גֵּט. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: בֵּין שֶׁקִּדְּשָׁהּ לְשׁוּם אִישׁוּת, בִּין שֶׁקִּדְּשָׁהּ לְשׁוּם יַבְמוּת — צְרִיכָה הֵימֶנּוּ גֵּט. It is taught in another baraita: With regard to one who performs ḥalitza with his yevama and then betroths her, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: If he betrothed her for the purpose of regular marriage she requires a bill of divorce from him; if he betrothed her for the purpose of levirate marriage she does not require a bill of divorce from him. And the Rabbis say: Whether he betrothed her for the purpose of regular marriage, or whether he betrothed her for the purpose of levirate marriage, she requires a bill of divorce from him, as this betrothal is effective.
אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי — עֲשָׂאוּהָ כְּעוֹדֵר בְּנִכְסֵי הַגֵּר וּכְסָבוּר שֶׁלּוֹ הֵן, דְּלָא קָנֵי. Rav Yosef said: What is the reason for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s distinction between one who betroths his ḥalutza for the purpose of levirate marriage and one who does so for the purpose of regular marriage? It is because the Sages considered him like one who hoes the property of a convert who died without leaving heirs. The property of such a convert is ownerless, and whoever takes possession of it acquires its title. As one of the methods of taking possession of land is hoeing, if one hoed the property of this convert with the intention of acquiring it, it belongs to him. However, if he hoed the convert’s property while mistakenly thinking that the land was his own, even though he performed an act of acquisition, since he lacked the requisite intention he has not acquired the land. Here too, since the yavam intended to betroth her for the purpose of levirate marriage, and the levirate bond no longer exists, his action is not effective.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: מִי דָּמֵי? הָתָם לָא קָא מְכַוֵּין לְמִיקְנֵי, הָכָא קָא מְכַוֵּין לְמִיקְנֵי! הָא לָא דָּמְיָא אֶלָּא לְעוֹדֵר בְּנִכְסֵי גֵּר זֶה וּכְסָבוּר שֶׁל גֵּר אַחֵר הוּא, דְּקָנֵי. Abaye said to him: Are the two situations comparable? There, in the case of hoeing, he does not intend to acquire the land as he works, as he thinks that it is already his, whereas here he does intend to acquire the woman. This case is similar only to the one who hoes the property of this deceased convert while thinking it is that of a different convert. The halakha in that case is that he acquires the land, despite his imprecise knowledge of what he is acquiring. Here too the betrothal should take effect regardless of his error.
אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, כְּגוֹן דַּאֲמַר לַהּ: הִתְקַדְּשִׁי לִי בְּמַאֲמָר יְבָמִין. רַבִּי סָבַר: מַאֲמָר עִילָּוֵי זִיקָה קָא רָמֵי, וַאֲתַאי חֲלִיצָה אַפְקַעְתַּהּ לְזִיקָּהּ. וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: הַאי לְחוֹדֵיהּ קָאֵי וְהַאי לְחוֹדֵיהּ קָאֵי. מֵעִיקָּרָא אִילּוּ אֲמַר לַהּ ״הִתְקַדְּשִׁי לִי בְּמַאֲמַר יְבָמִין״, מִי לָא מַהֲנֵי? הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי מַהֲנֵי. Rather, Abaye said that the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis cannot be explained in the above manner. Instead, he suggests: With what are we dealing here? It is a case where he said to his ḥalutza: Be betrothed to me with levirate betrothal. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that levirate betrothal is superimposed upon the levirate bond, and is therefore only possible when the bond exists, and since ḥalitza comes and releases the levirate bond, levirate betrothal is not effective for her. And the Rabbis hold: This, the levirate bond, stands on its own, and that, levirate betrothal, stands on its own. Although the bond has been canceled, the formula of: Be betrothed to me with levirate betrothal, is effective. At the outset, before ḥalitza, if he had said to her: Be betrothed to me with levirate betrothal, would this not be an effective betrothal despite the lack of connection between the levirate betrothal and the levirate bond? Now too it should be effective, even though she performed ḥalitza.
רָבָא אָמַר: אִי דְּאָמַר לַהּ ״בְּמַאֲמַר יְבָמִין״, כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּמַהְנְיָא. וְהָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — כְּגוֹן דְּאָמַר לַהּ ״הִתְקַדְּשִׁי לִי בְּזִיקַּת יְבָמִין״. רַבִּי סָבַר: Rava said: If he said to her: Be betrothed to me with levirate betrothal, everyone agrees that it is effective, and she is acquired. And with what are we dealing here? It is a case where he said to her: Be betrothed to me with the levirate bond, and the dispute is as follows: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds