מִפְּנֵי הָאִיבּוּל. due to the mourning period she must observe for her deceased husband.
גְּמָ׳ בִּשְׁלָמָא לֹא תִּתְיַיבֵּם: שֶׁמָּא יִהְיֶה הַוָּלָד בֶּן קַיָּימָא, וְקָא פָגַע בְּאִיסּוּר אֵשֶׁת אָח דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא. אֶלָּא לֹא תַּחְלוֹץ, אַמַּאי? GEMARA: The Gemara questions the mishna’s opening clause: Granted, she should not enter into levirate marriage, as she might already be pregnant, which would still not be noticeable during the first three months, and perhaps the baby will be viable. In that case it would emerge that she was never subject to the mitzva of levirate marriage, and therefore, if the yavam consummates a levirate marriage he will have encountered the Torah prohibition against engaging in relations with one’s brother’s wife. However, why should she not perform ḥalitza?
לֵימָא תֶּיהְוֵי תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּאָמַר: חֲלִיצַת מְעוּבֶּרֶת שְׁמָהּ חֲלִיצָה. וְלָאו מִי אוֹתְבִינֵּיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן חֲדָא זִימְנָא?! לֵימָא מֵהָא נָמֵי תֶּיהְוֵי תְּיוּבְתָּא! The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this mishna, which states that a pregnant woman should not perform ḥalitza, is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said that a ḥalitza performed with a pregnant woman who later miscarries is considered a valid ḥalitza. The Gemara asks: But didn’t they already conclusively refute the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan one time previously from other sources? The Gemara rephrases the suggestion: Let us say that from this mishna as well there is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan.
לָא, הָכָא הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא: שֶׁמָּא יְהֵא וָלָד בֶּן קַיָּימָא, וְנִמְצֵאתָ אַתָּה מַצְרִיכָהּ כָּרוֹז לַכְּהוּנָּה. The Gemara deflects this suggestion: No, it is possible that in the mishna here, this is the reason that she may not perform ḥalitza: Perhaps the offspring will be viable, in which case although she performed the act of ḥalitza, it is entirely meaningless since it was completely unnecessary, and she would remain permitted to marry into the priesthood. However, this could lead to a problem: People might not realize that the ḥalitza she performed was meaningless, and they would think she is a ḥalutza who is prohibited from marrying a priest. It would therefore emerge that if you permit her to perform ḥalitza even though it is possible that she is pregnant, it could be that you will ultimately require a public announcement to be made for her to attest to the fact that the ḥalitza she performed was meaningless and she is in fact still permitted to marry into the priesthood.
וְנַצְרְכַהּ! דִּלְמָא אִיכָּא דְּהָוֵאי בַּחֲלִיצָה וְלָא הָוֵי בְּהַכְרָזָה, וּמַפְסְלוּהָ מִן הַכְּהוּנָּה. The Gemara wonders why this poses a problem: But why not let her perform ḥalitza even though it is possible she is pregnant, and then, if it becomes necessary, require a public announcement to be made for her? The Gemara explains why one should avoid having to rely on a public announcement: Perhaps there will be some people who are present at the ḥalitza but were not present at the public announcement, and those people will incorrectly disqualify her from marrying into the priesthood. To avoid this situation, the mishna rules that she should wait three months before performing ḥalitza.
תִּינַח אַלְמָנָה. גְּרוּשָׁה — מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? מִשּׁוּם דְּמַפְסֵיד לַהּ מְזוֹנוֹת. The Gemara asks: This answer works out well with regard to a widow because as a widow she is currently still permitted to marry into the priesthood, but with regard to a divorcée, who is already prohibited from marrying into the priesthood, what is there to say; why shouldn’t she perform ḥalitza immediately? The Gemara provides an alternative reason to delay the ḥalitza: The reason is because by performing ḥalitza immediately she will forfeit the sustenance payments from her deceased husband’s estate, which she otherwise would have been entitled to for the first three months. Since she is not permitted to remarry during those three months, she will have no means of support. Therefore, she should wait until after three months have passed before performing ḥalitza.
תִּינַח נְשׂוּאָה. אֲרוּסָה גְּרוּשָׁה — מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? The Gemara asks: This answer works out well with regard to a woman who was married to her previous husband and who is therefore entitled to sustenance payments, but with regard to a divorcée who was only betrothed to her previous husband, what is there to say? She is neither entitled to receive sustenance payments nor is she permitted to marry into the priesthood. Why, then, shouldn’t she perform ḥalitza immediately?
אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, דְּתַנְיָא: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּאָדָם אֶחָד שֶׁבָּא לִפְנֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי. אָמַר לוֹ: מַהוּ לַחְלוֹץ בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשָׁה? אָמַר לוֹ: לֹא תַּחְלוֹץ. וְתַחְלוֹץ, וּמָה בְּכָךְ? The Gemara therefore provides an alternative reason to delay the ḥalitza: Rather, it is due to that which Rabbi Yosei stated, as it is taught in a baraita: There was an incident involving a certain man who came before Rabbi Yosei. The man said to him: What is the halakha with regard to performing ḥalitza within three months of the husband’s death? He said to him: She may not perform ḥalitza. He asked him: Let her perform ḥalitza; what would be the problem with that? Even if she is pregnant, no prohibition will have been transgressed.
קָרָא עָלָיו מִקְרָא זֶה: ״וְאִם לֹא יַחְפֹּץ״, הָא אִם חָפֵץ — יִבֵּם. כׇּל הָעוֹלֶה לְיִבּוּם — עוֹלֶה לַחֲלִיצָה כּוּ׳. To explain his ruling, Rabbi Yosei recited this verse about him: “And if the man does not wish to take his yevama” (Deuteronomy 25:7) in levirate marriage, then he must perform ḥalitza. By inference, the possibility of performing ḥalitza exists only in a case in which if he wishes he may consummate the levirate marriage. This teaches the principle that one who is eligible for levirate marriage is eligible for ḥalitza, and one who is ineligible for levirate marriage is ineligible for ḥalitza. This includes even a woman who is temporarily prohibited from marrying, e.g., a woman in the first three months following a previous marriage.
מֵתִיב רַב חִינָּנָא: הַסְּפֵקוֹת חוֹלְצוֹת וְלֹא מִתְיַבְּמוֹת. Rav Ḥinnana raised an objection from the following baraita: Those women whose status as a yevama is uncertain perform ḥalitza but may not enter into levirate marriage. According to this baraita, there are in fact cases in which a woman is eligible for ḥalitza but may not enter into levirate marriage.
מַאי סְפֵקוֹת? אִילֵּימָא סְפֵק קִדּוּשִׁין — אַמַּאי לָא מִתְיַבְּמוֹת? תִּתְיַיבֵּם, וְאֵין בְּכָךְ כְּלוּם. The Gemara clarifies the case: What is the case of women whose status as a yevama is uncertain? If we say it is referring to a woman whose betrothal to her previous husband is uncertain, then why does she not enter into levirate marriage? Let her enter into levirate marriage, and there is no problem with that, because if the betrothal was never valid, then she is permitted to the yavam as she is not his brother’s wife; and if it was valid, then she is now obligated to enter into levirate marriage with him.
אֶלָּא לָאו, סָפֵק שֶׁקִּידֵּשׁ אַחַת מִשְׁתֵּי אֲחָיוֹת, וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ אֵיזוֹ מֵהֶן קִידֵּשׁ. וְקָתָנֵי: חוֹלֶצֶת! Rather, is it not referring to a case of uncertainty in which a man betrothed one of two sisters and he does not know which one of them he betrothed? If that man then died childless, the yavam may not consummate the levirate marriage with either sister because it is possible that he will do so with the sister who was not betrothed to his brother, who is therefore forbidden to him as the sister of a woman who is bound to him by a levirate bond. This is in fact the case of the baraita, and the baraita teaches that she performs ḥalitza, even though she is not permitted to enter into levirate marriage.
הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! הָתָם, אִם יָבֹא אֵלִיָּהוּ וְיֹאמַר דְּהָא קִידֵּשׁ — בַּת חֲלִיצָה וְיִיבּוּם הִיא, The Gemara rejects the proof: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of uncertainty, if Elijah were to come and say that the man betrothed this one of the sisters, then she would be eligible for ḥalitza and levirate marriage. It is clear, then, that fundamentally the sister who was betrothed is actually eligible for levirate marriage, and it is merely a lack of knowledge that prevents her from entering into it.
הָכָא, אִם יָבֹא אֵלִיָּהוּ וְיֹאמַר דְּהָא לָא אִיעַבַּרָה — מִי מַשְׁגְּחִ[ינַן] בֵּיהּ, וּ[מְ]יַבְּמִינַן לַהּ? הָא קְטַנָּה דְּלָאו בַּת אִיעַבּוֹרֵי הִיא, וַאֲפִילּוּ הָכִי צְרִיכָה לְהַמְתִּין שְׁלֹשָׁה חֳדָשִׁים. However, here, with regard to a woman during the first three months following her previous marriage, if Elijah were to come and say that this woman is not pregnant, would one pay heed to him and would we allow the yavam to consummate levirate marriage? Certainly not, as is evident from the fact that a minor girl, who cannot become pregnant, must also wait three months. Evidently, the requirement to wait three months applies in all situations, even those in which the reason for the requirement is irrelevant. Therefore, by virtue of that decree the yevama is considered to be fundamentally ineligible for levirate marriage and similarly is ineligible for ḥalitza.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: יְבָמָה, שְׁלֹשָׁה חֳדָשִׁים הָרִאשׁוֹנִים נִזּוֹנֶת מִשֶּׁל בַּעַל. מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ, אֵינָהּ נִזּוֹנֶת לֹא מִשֶּׁל בַּעַל וְלֹא מִשֶּׁל יָבָם. § The Gemara mentioned that a yevama is supported from her deceased husband’s estate. It now proceeds to cite a baraita that teaches this halakha: The Sages taught: A yevama during the first three months following her husband’s death receives sustenance payments from the husband’s estate. This is because her previous marriage to him is the cause of her current unmarried state, since is it due to that marriage that she must first wait three months before remarrying. From this point forward, she does not receive sustenance payments, neither from the husband’s estate nor from the yavam, as he has not yet consummated a levirate marriage with her.
עָמַד בַּדִּין וּבָרַח — נִזּוֹנֶת מָשָׁל יָבָם. The baraita continues: If the yavam was brought to judgment and it was decided that he was obligated to either consummate the levirate marriage with her or perform ḥalitza, and he ran away to avoid doing so, she receives sustenance payments from the estate of the yavam, which is his penalty for neglecting his duty.
נָפְלָה לִפְנֵי יָבָם קָטָן (מַאי)? מִיָּבָם לֵית לַהּ. מִבַּעַל מַאי? The Gemara asks: If she happened before her yavam who is a minor for levirate marriage, what is the halakha? From the yavam she does not have any right to sustenance payments because, as a minor, he is unable to consummate a levirate marriage, but as to payments from her husband’s estate, what is the halakha? Since his death placed her in a situation that forces her to remain in an unmarried state, does his estate have to take the responsibility of supporting her?
פְּלִיגִי בַּהּ רַב אַחָא וְרָבִינָא, חַד אָמַר: אִית לַהּ, וְחַד אֲמַר: לֵית לַהּ, וְהִלְכְתָא: לֵית לַהּ, מִשְּׁמַיָּא קַנְסוּהּ. Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagree with regard to this matter: One said she does have rights to sustenance payments, and the other one said she does not have any rights. And the halakha is that she does not have any rights to sustenance payments. This is because the husband is not considered to be responsible for her situation; rather, it is thought that she was penalized by Heaven.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: יְבָמָה שֶׁחָלְצוּ לָהּ אַחִים בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשָׁה — צְרִיכָה לְהַמְתִּין שְׁלֹשָׁה חֳדָשִׁים. § The Sages taught: In the case of a yevama with whom the brothers of her deceased husband performed ḥalitza within three months of her husband’s death, she still needs to wait three months before remarrying.