וְאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ לְעוֹלָם לֹא קָנָה עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי יִרְשׁוּ שָׂדֶה פְּלוֹנִית וּפְלוֹנִית שֶׁנְּתַתִּים לָהֶם בְּמַתָּנָה וְיִרָשׁוּם Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yoḥanan dispute whether one must state that the receipt of the portions should be considered as a gift with regard to each recipient, or whether stating it with regard to one of them is enough to indicate that it is true for all. And Reish Lakish said: The inheritors will only ever acquire the portions as defined by the owner of the possessions once he says: So-and-so and so-and-so shall inherit such and such a field and such and such a field that I have given to them as a gift, and they shall inherit them, i.e., he must state explicitly for each recipient that their receipt of the portions should be considered a gift. Rava ruled that in this dispute as well, the halakha is in accordance with Reish Lakish.
וְאִידַּךְ דִּתְנַן הַכּוֹתֵב כׇּל נְכָסָיו לִבְנוֹ לְאַחַר מוֹתוֹ הָאָב אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לִמְכּוֹר מִפְּנֵי שֶׁנְּתָנָן לַבֵּן וְהַבֵּן אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לִמְכּוֹר מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן בִּרְשׁוּת הָאָב מָכַר הָאָב מְכוּרִין עַד שֶׁיָּמוּת הוּא מָכַר הַבֵּן אֵין לַלּוֹקֵחַ כְּלוּם עַד שֶׁיָּמוּת הָאָב And the other dispute concerns that which we learned in a mishna: In the case of one who writes a bill transferring ownership of all of his possessions to his son stating that the transfer should take effect immediately so that the son should gain the rights to use the possessions after his death, then although the father retained for himself the right to use the possessions until his death, he is unable to sell the possessions due to the fact that he gave them to the son, and the son is unable to sell the possessions due to the fact that they are still in the father’s possession. If the father sold the possessions, then they are sold to the extent that the purchaser may use them until the father dies. If the son sold the possessions during his father’s lifetime, the purchaser does not receive any rights to use the possessions until the father dies.
וְאִיתְּמַר מָכַר הַבֵּן בְּחַיֵּי הָאָב וּמֵת הַבֵּן בְּחַיֵּי הָאָב רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר לֹא קָנָה לוֹקֵחַ וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר קָנָה לוֹקֵחַ And an amoraic dispute was stated in the case in which the son sold the possessions during the father’s lifetime, and then the son died during the father’s lifetime, following which the father died as well. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The purchaser does not acquire anything, and Reish Lakish said: The purchaser does acquire the possessions.
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר לֹא קָנָה לוֹקֵחַ קִנְיַן פֵּירוֹת כְּקִנְיַן הַגּוּף דָּמֵי The Gemara explains their reasoning: Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the purchaser does not acquire anything, because he holds that the ownership of the rights to an item and its produce is tantamount to the ownership of the item itself, i.e., the actual title to it. Since the father retained the rights to use the possessions until his death, as long as he lives he is considered to hold the title to them. Therefore, the son’s sale can be effective only after the father’s death, at which point the son becomes the title owner. However, if the son dies first, then since he never gained the title to the items, his sale can never come to fruition.
וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר קָנָה לוֹקֵחַ קִנְיַן פֵּירוֹת לָאו כְּקִנְיַן הַגּוּף דָּמֵי And Reish Lakish said: The purchaser does acquire the possessions, as Reish Lakish holds that the ownership of the rights to an item and its produce is not tantamount to the ownership of the item itself, i.e., the actual title to it. Therefore, although the father is still alive, the son immediately gains the full title to the possessions, which he may sell to someone else. Nevertheless, since the father retains the rights to use the possessions, the purchaser may use the possessions he acquired only when the father dies.
אֵין הַוָּלָד שֶׁל קַיָּימָא כּוּ׳ תָּנָא מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אָמְרוּ יוֹצִיא בְּגֵט § The mishna states that if a yavam consummates a levirate marriage with his yevama while she is pregnant, if it emerges that the offspring is not viable then he may maintain her as his wife because his intercourse with her was a valid consummation of levirate marriage. An opposing opinion is taught in a baraita: In the name of Rabbi Eliezer they said: He must send her out with a bill of divorce. Although it emerged that the levirate marriage took effect, since at the time he consummated the levirate marriage it was prohibited to do so because the yevama was pregnant, he is therefore penalized and required to separate from her.
אָמַר רָבָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אָמְרוּ דָּבָר אֶחָד רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הָא דַּאֲמַרַן Rava said: Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Eliezer said the same thing, i.e., they both expressed the same opinion that if one marries a woman whom he is prohibited from marrying, he is penalized and required to divorce her, even if the reason for the prohibition no longer applies. Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion was expressed in this ruling we have just stated.
רַבִּי מֵאִיר דְּתַנְיָא לֹא יִשָּׂא אָדָם מְעוּבֶּרֶת חֲבֵירוֹ וּמֵינֶקֶת חֲבֵירוֹ וְאִם נָשָׂא יוֹצִיא וְלֹא יַחְזִיר עוֹלָמִית דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים יוֹצִיא וְלִכְשֶׁיַּגִּיעַ זְמַנּוֹ לִכְנוֹס יִכְנוֹס Where was Rabbi Meir’s opinion expressed? As it is taught in a baraita: A man may not marry a woman who is pregnant with the child of another man, nor a woman who is nursing the child of another man. And if he transgressed and married her, he is penalized for violating the prohibition, and he must divorce her with a bill of divorce, and he may never take her back; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: He must send her out, and when the time comes in which it is permitted to marry her, i.e., after the child is weaned, he may then marry her again.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי מִמַּאי דִּלְמָא לָא הִיא עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הָכָא אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דְּקָפָגֵע בְּאִיסּוּר אֵשֶׁת אָח דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא אֲבָל הָתָם דְּרַבָּנַן כְּרַבָּנַן סְבִירָא לֵיהּ Abaye said to him: From where do you deduce that they are of one opinion? Perhaps that is not so, as it is possible that Rabbi Eliezer states his ruling only here, in the case of a yavam who consummated a levirate marriage with his yevama while she was still pregnant, due to the fact that by doing so he risks the possibility that the offspring will be viable, in which case he encounters the Torah prohibition against engaging in relations with one’s brother’s wife. However, there, in the case where one married a woman who is pregnant with the child of another man, which is a rabbinic prohibition, it is possible that he holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis who argue with Rabbi Meir.
אִי נָמֵי עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר הָתָם אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דְּרַבָּנַן וַחֲכָמִים עָשׂוּ חִיזּוּק לְדִבְרֵיהֶם יוֹתֵר מִשֶּׁל תּוֹרָה אֲבָל הָכָא מִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא מִפְרָשׁ פָּרְשִׁי מִינַּהּ Alternatively, it is also possible that Rabbi Meir states his ruling only there, in the case where one married a woman who is pregnant with the child of another man, due to the fact that doing so is a violation of a rabbinic prohibition, and therefore it is possible that this is one of the cases in which the Sages reinforced their pronouncements with greater severity than prohibitions of Torah law so that people would not treat them lightly. However, here, in the case of a yavam who consummated a levirate marriage with his yevama while she was still pregnant, where there was a risk of transgressing a prohibition written in the Torah, since people are generally careful to distance themselves from a Torah prohibition, there is no need to further penalize someone who nevertheless transgressed.
אָמַר רָבָא וּלְדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים יוֹצִיאָהּ בְּגֵט אָמַר מָר זוּטְרָא דַּיְקָא נָמֵי דְּקָתָנֵי יוֹצִיא וְלָא קָתָנֵי יַפְרִישׁ שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ Rava said: According to the statement of the Rabbis who dispute Rabbi Meir and require one who married a pregnant woman to send her out, the intention is that he must send her out with a bill of divorce and not merely separate from her. Mar Zutra said: The language the Rabbis used is also precise, as they teach: He must send her out, and they do not teach: He must separate himself from her. Conclude from here that Rava’s claim is correct.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְרַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִידִי הָתָם תְּנַן רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר כׇּל שֶׁשָּׁהָא בְּאָדָם שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם אֵינוֹ נֵפֶל הָא לָא שְׁהָא סְפֵיקָא הָוֵי Rav Ashi said to Rav Hoshaya, son of Rav Idi: We learned in a baraita there that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Any human baby that survives for thirty days after its birth is not to be considered a stillbirth. Rather, the baby is considered to be viable, and so the wife of the baby’s father is never subject to any obligation of levirate marriage. But, by inference, were it not to survive for thirty days, there would be uncertainty whether the baby was viable or not.
וְאִיתְּמַר מֵת בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם וְעָמְדָה וְנִתְקַדְּשָׁה And an amoraic dispute was stated in the case in which the only offspring of a man died during the first thirty days of its life, and the widow, under the misconception that she was exempt from any obligation of levirate marriage, arose and was betrothed.
רָבִינָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא אָמַר אִם אֵשֶׁת יִשְׂרָאֵל הִיא חוֹלֶצֶת וְאִם אֵשֶׁת כֹּהֵן הִיא אֵינָהּ חוֹלֶצֶת Ravina said in the name of Rava: If she became the wife of an Israelite, i.e., the man who betrothed her was not a priest, then she performs ḥalitza with the yavam due to the uncertainty whether or not the offspring was viable, and then they may remain married. But if she became the wife of a priest, she does not perform ḥalitza with him because if she were to do so, she would become a ḥalutza and would therefore be prohibited from remaining married to her husband, who is a priest. Therefore, in this case, in order to allow her to remain married to her husband, the Sages did not require her to be concerned for the possibility that the offspring was not viable.
רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא אָמַר אַחַת זוֹ וְאַחַת זוֹ חוֹלֶצֶת The Gemara cites a different version of Rav’s opinion: Rav Mesharshiyya said in the name of Rava: Both this woman and that woman perform ḥalitza, even though by doing so, if she was betrothed to a priest, she would become forbidden to him.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא Ravina said to Rav Mesharshiyya: