וְשֶׁל עִיר הַנִּדַּחַת וְשֶׁל זָקֵן הֶעָשׂוּי לִכְבוֹדוֹ לֹא תַּחְלוֹץ וְאִם חָלְצָה חֲלִיצָתָהּ פְּסוּלָה or a sandal belonging to an inhabitant of an idolatrous city, a city the majority of whose inhabitants committed idolatry, which stands to be destroyed with all of the city’s property; and likewise, the sandal of an Elder made in accordance with his dignity to be worn upon his death as part of his shroud, i.e., it is not meant for walking as a normal shoe, the yevama may not perform ḥalitza using any of these shoes. And if she did perform ḥalitza, her ḥalitza is invalid even after the fact, as these are not halakhically considered shoes.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי מַאי שְׁנָא זָקֵן הֶעָשׂוּי לִכְבוֹדוֹ דְּלָאו לְהִילּוּכָא עֲבִיד דְּבֵי דִּינָא נָמֵי לָאו לְהִילּוּכָא עֲבִיד Ravina said to Rav Ashi: What is different about the sandal of an Elder that is made in accordance with his dignity that one should say that even though it is the proper size for his foot, it is not valid because it was not made for walking, but merely for him to wear after his death. But the court’s sandal also was not made for walking, as the court kept a sandal that met all the other necessary qualifications for a sandal for ḥalitza and gave it to the yavam to be worn during the ḥalitza procedure. Since the yavam would return the ḥalitza sandal after the conclusion of the ḥalitza, therefore, the sandal was never used for walking and should be invalidated for ḥalitza just as the sandal made for the dignity of an Elder?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אִילּוּ מְסַגֵּי בֵּיהּ שְׁלוּחָא דְּבֵי דִּינָא מִי קָפֵיד עֲלֵיהּ דַּיָּינָא He said to him: If a messenger of the court had walked in the ḥalitza shoe used by the court, would the judge reprimand him? Although the court’s sandal was designed for the express purpose of ḥalitza, it may also be used for walking. A shoe designed for a dead person, on the other hand, is forbidden for any other use and is not made for walking at all, and it is consequently disqualified.
מַתְנִי׳ חָלְצָה בַּלַּיְלָה חֲלִיצָתָהּ כְּשֵׁרָה וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר פּוֹסֵל בִּשְׂמֹאל חֲלִיצָתָהּ פְּסוּלָה וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר מַכְשִׁיר MISHNA: If a woman performed ḥalitza at night, her ḥalitza is valid, but Rabbi Elazar invalidates it. If she performed ḥalitza on the left foot, her ḥalitza is invalid, but Rabbi Elazar validates it.
גְּמָ׳ לֵימָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי דְּמָר סָבַר מַקְּשִׁינַן רִיבִים לִנְגָעִים וּמָר סָבַר לָא מַקְּשִׁינַן רִיבִים לִנְגָעִים GEMARA: Let us say that they disagree about this issue: One Sage, Rabbi Elazar, holds that we compare the halakhot governing monetary disputes, which category includes ḥalitza, as ḥalitza carries with it monetary ramifications and requires payment of the marriage contract to the yevama, with the halakhot of leprosy. Just as leprosy cases are judged only during the day (see Leviticus 13:14), likewise, monetary cases may take place only during the day. And one Sage, the first tanna, holds that we do not compare monetary disputes with leprosy.
לָא דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא מַקְּשִׁינַן רִיבִים לִנְגָעִים דְּאִי מַקְּשִׁינַן אֲפִילּוּ גְּמַר דִּין בַּלַּיְלָה נָמֵי לָא וְהָכָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי מָר סָבַר חֲלִיצָה כִּתְחִלַּת דִּין דָּמְיָא וּמָר סָבַר חֲלִיצָה כִּגְמַר דִּין דָּמְיָא The Gemara responds: No, everyone holds that we do not compare monetary disputes with leprosy, for if we would compare them fully, then even delivering the verdict of the court case could not be done at night, but it is permitted to complete monetary judgments and deliver the verdict at night, provided the proceedings began during the day. And here, with respect to performing ḥalitza at night they disagree about this issue: One Sage, Rabbi Elazar, holds that ḥalitza is considered like the commencement of judgment of monetary cases, and one Sage, the first tanna, holds that ḥalitza is considered like the verdict of a monetary judgment, and therefore it may also be conducted at night.
רַבָּה בַּר חִיָּיא קְטוֹסְפָאָה עֲבַד עוֹבָדָא בְּמוּק וּבִיחִידִי וּבַלַּיְלָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל כַּמָּה רַב גּוּבְרֵיהּ דְּעָבֵיד כִּיחִידָאָה It is told: Rabba bar Ḥiyya Ketosfa’a, from Ctesiphon, conducted ḥalitza using a slipper that was not made of leather, and he did so in private, as he was the only judge, and by night. Shmuel said disparagingly: How great is the power of this master who follows an individual opinion, as in his practice he relied on individual opinions that are not accepted as halakha.
מַאי קַשְׁיָא אִי מוּק סְתָמָא תַּנְיָא אִי לַיְלָה סְתָמָא תַּנְיָא The Gemara asks: What is difficult for Shmuel about Rabba bar Ḥiyya’s actions? If it was the fact that he conducted ḥalitza using a slipper, an unattributed opinion is taught in a baraita stating that this is valid. As the opinion is unattributed, this indicates that it is not the view of one individual, but rather the opinion of the majority. If it was the fact that he performed ḥalitza at night, an unattributed opinion is taught in the mishna stating that it is valid as well.
אֶלָּא יְחִידִי קָא קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ הֵיכִי עָבֵיד בִּיחִידִי דִּיחִידָאָה קָתָנֵי לַהּ דִּתְנַן חָלְצָה בִּשְׁנַיִם אוֹ בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה וְנִמְצָא אֶחָד מֵהֶן קָרוֹב אוֹ פָּסוּל חֲלִיצָתָהּ פְּסוּלָה וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הַסַּנְדְּלָר מַכְשִׁירִים וּמַעֲשֶׂה בְּאֶחָד שֶׁחָלַץ בֵּינוֹ לְבֵינָהּ בְּבֵית הָאֲסוּרִים וּבָא מַעֲשֶׂה לִפְנֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא וְהִכְשִׁיר Rather, it was difficult for him that Rabba bar Ḥiyya conducted ḥalitza in private, as the sole judge: How could he do so in private, as that is taught only in accordance with an individual opinion, as we learned in a mishna: If she performed ḥalitza before two or three judges and one of them is found to be a relative or disqualified, her ḥalitza is invalid. And Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yoḥanan the Cobbler validate the judge who is not a relative or disqualified. If there are two judges who are not relatives, then they hold that the ḥalitza is valid, as they validate a ḥalitza performed before two judges. And an incident occurred involving one who performed ḥalitza between him and her alone in prison, as there was no judge present at all, and the incident came before Rabbi Akiva and he validated it.
וְאָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף בַּר מִנְיוֹמֵי [אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן] אֵין הֲלָכָה כְּאוֹתוֹ הַזּוּג וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא כּוּלְּהוּ נָמֵי יְחִידָאָה קָתָנֵי לְהוּ דְּתַנְיָא אָמַר רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי אֲנִי רָאִיתִי אֶת רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בֶּן אֱלִישָׁע שֶׁחָלַץ בְּמוּק בִּיחִידִי וּבַלַּיְלָה And Rav Yosef bar Minyumi said that Rav Naḥman said: The halakha does not follow that pair, i.e., Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yoḥanan the Cobbler. Evidently, Rabba bar Ḥiyya relied on the individual opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who permitted ḥalitza in private, and therefore Shmuel commented regarding Rabbi bar Ḥiyya’s power to rule based on an individual’s opinion. And if you wish, say that not only does this detail follow an individual opinion, but rather all of these details are taught by an individual opinion. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: I saw that Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha performed a ḥalitza using a slipper, in private, and at night. This statement implies that these details are all according to his individual opinion, contrary to the opinion of the rest of the Sages.
בִּשְׂמֹאל חֲלִיצָתָהּ כּוּ׳ מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבָּנַן אָמַר עוּלָּא יָלְפִינַן רֶגֶל רֶגֶל מִמְּצוֹרָע מָה לְהַלָּן דְּיָמִין אַף כָּאן דְּיָמִין It was taught in the mishna that if ḥalitza was performed using his left foot, her ḥalitza is invalid, while Rabbi Elazar validates it. The Gemara asks: What is the reason of the Rabbis’ opinion? Ulla said: We derive a verbal analogy from the word “foot” stated here, and the word “foot” stated regarding the leper. Just as there, with respect to the leper, it is the right foot (Leviticus 14:14), so too here, with respect to ḥalitza, it is the right foot that must be used.
וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר לָא יָלֵיף רֶגֶל רֶגֶל מִמְּצוֹרָע וְהָתַנְיָא רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר מִנַּיִן לִרְצִיעָה שֶׁהִיא בְּאֹזֶן הַיְמָנִית נֶאֱמַר כָּאן אֹזֶן וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן אֹזֶן מָה לְהַלָּן יָמִין אַף כָּאן יָמִין The Gemara notes: And this would seem to indicate that Rabbi Elazar does not derive “foot” with regard to ḥalitza from the word “foot” from the leper. But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Elazar says: From where is it derived that piercing a Hebrew slave’s ear with an awl when the slave chooses to remain in servitude is done specifically on the right ear? “Ear” is stated here in the halakhot pertaining to a pierced slave, and “ear” is stated there in the halakhot of the leper. Just as there, with regard to leprosy, it is the right ear, as it is stated explicitly there, so too here, with regard to piercing the ear, it is the right ear. This statement of Rabbi Elazar implies that he does learn a verbal analogy about the word “right.”
אָמַר רַב יִצְחָק בַּר יוֹסֵף אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מוּחְלֶפֶת הַשִּׁיטָה Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The attribution of the opinions is reversed, meaning that it is Rabbi Elazar who invalidates ḥalitza on the left foot, as he learns an analogy from the halakha with regard to piercing the ear that the right must be used.
רָבָא אָמַר לְעוֹלָם לָא תֵּיפוֹךְ אֹזֶן אֹזֶן מוּפְנֵי רֶגֶל רֶגֶל לָא מוּפְנֵי Rava said: Actually, do not reverse the opinions. The words “ear” and “ear” are free terms, i.e., they are superfluous in their context and therefore it is clear that the Torah included those terms for the express purpose of establishing the verbal analogy. A verbal analogy that is based on otherwise extraneous terms cannot be logically refuted. Therefore, the superfluous “ear” teaches that piercing is done on the right ear. However, the words “foot” and “foot” are not free, because the word “foot,” written with regard to the yavam, is necessary in its context and is not superfluous. Therefore, the verbal analogy of the word “foot” is incomplete.
וְכִי לָא מוּפְנֵי מַאי פִּירְכָא אִיכָּא אִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ מָה לִמְצוֹרָע שֶׁכֵּן טָעוּן עֵץ אֶרֶז וְאֵזוֹב וּשְׁנִי תוֹלָעַת The Gemara asks: And even if they are not both free to be used for exposition, what refutation is there? A verbal analogy that is free to be used for exposition in only one place is still valid, provided there is no reason to refute the comparison. The Gemara explains: It can be refuted, as the leper is unique in that there is a very specific process necessary for his purification: He requires that the blood of the offering be sprinkled upon him, and he requires cedarwood, hyssop, and scarlet thread. Therefore, it is possible to say that the Torah also specified the use of the right foot in the case of the leper. However, this would not necessarily be required with respect to ḥalitza, which lacks such specific halakhot. Consequently, ḥalitza performed using the left foot could be valid.
מַתְנִי׳ חָלְצָה וְרָקְקָה אֲבָל לֹא קָרְאָה חֲלִיצָתָהּ כְּשֵׁרָה קָרְאָה וְרָקְקָה אֲבָל לֹא חָלְצָה חֲלִיצָתָהּ פְּסוּלָה חָלְצָה וְקָרְאָה אֲבָל לֹא רָקְקָה רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר חֲלִיצָתָהּ פְּסוּלָה רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר חֲלִיצָתָהּ כְּשֵׁרָה MISHNA: If she, i.e., the yevama, removed the shoe and spat in accordance with the halakha but did not recite the necessary text, her ḥalitza is valid. If she recited the text and spat but did not remove the shoe, her ḥalitza is disqualified. If she removed the shoe and recited the text but did not spit, Rabbi Elazar says: Her ḥalitza is disqualified, while Rabbi Akiva says: Her ḥalitza is valid.