ודבר שאינו בא בשותפות and it must be an item that is not brought in partnership.
רבי אומר למה יצאת מעשר מעתה לידון בתמורת שמו ובתמורת גופו Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Why was the animal tithe singled out of all offerings as subject to substitution now, after the halakha of substitution was stated in general? It serves to discuss a special halakha with regard to the animal tithe, that of substitution of its name. If, when the animals emerge from the pen to be tithed, the one counting them errs and calls the tenth animal the ninth and the eleventh the tenth, they are both sanctified. The animal that actually emerges tenth is the animal tithe, while the eleventh animal is consecrated as a peace offering. And since this halakha of a substitution of its name applies only to the animal tithe, it is necessary to teach that the general halakha of the substitution of its body, i.e., regular substitution, applies to it as well.
לומר לך תמורת שמו קריבה תמורת גופו אינה קריבה תמורת שמו נגאלת תמורת גופו אינה נגאלת Furthermore, the verse tells you other halakhot unique to the animal tithe: An animal that is the substitute of the name of an animal tithe is sacrificed upon the altar as a peace offering, whereas the substitute of its body is not sacrificed at all. But for all other offerings, substitutes hold the same status as the animal for which they were substituted. Another difference is that the substitute of the name of an animal tithe is redeemed when it develops a blemish, like a peace offering, and the proceeds of the sale belong to the Temple treasury, whereas the substitute of its body is not redeemed, as it is stated with regard to the animal tithe: “Then both it and that for which it is substituted shall be sacred; it shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:33).
תמורת גופו חלה על דבר הראוי ועל דבר שאינו ראוי ותמורת שמו אינה חלה אלא על דבר הראוי בלבד Finally, the sanctity of the substitution of the body of an animal tithe takes effect upon both an item that is fit for sacrifice upon the altar and upon an item that is unfit for sacrifice, e.g., a blemished animal, as the sanctity of the animal tithe can apply even to a blemished animal, but the substitution of its name takes effect only upon an item that is fit for sacrifice. If the animal that was mistakenly called the tenth is blemished, it is not consecrated.
אמרי משום דרבי רחמנא דאית ביה תמורת שמו איגרועי איגרע אין דאמרינן מאי דרבי רבי ומאי דלא רבי לא רבי The Sages say in response to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Simply because the Merciful One includes a unique halakha with regard to the animal tithe, that it has the substitution of its name, would one assume that it is diminished, and the halakha of regular substitution does not apply to it? The Gemara answers: Yes, one can make such a claim, as we say: That which the verse included with regard to a particular halakha, it included, and that which it did not include, it did not include. Since the passage initially addresses substitution of name solely with regard to the animal tithe, one could assume that this is the only substitution that applies to it.
והא מהיכא תיתי אמר רב הונא בריה דרב יהושע משום דהוה דבר הבא לידון בדבר החדש ואין בו אלא חידושו בלבד The Gemara asks: And from where would this be derived, that in this case we should assume only that which is specifically mentioned? Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: This is derived since this is a case of a matter, i.e., the animal tithe, where the Torah comes to discuss a novel matter, i.e., substitution of name, and as a rule, in such cases the object of discussion has only its novelty, and one cannot infer the applicability of additional principles. It was therefore necessary for a verse to teach that substitution of body, which applies to all other offerings, applies to the animal tithe as well.
אמר ליה רב נחמן בר יצחק לרבא לרבי שמעון דאמר דבר הבא בחובה עולת חובה היא דעבדה תמורה הא עולת נדבה לא אמר ליה עולת נדבה נמי כיון דקבלה עליה עבדה תמורה § Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to Rava: According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said earlier that the halakha of substitution applies only to offerings that come as an obligation, should one conclude that it is only an obligatory burnt offering that renders an animal exchanged for it a substitute, but a voluntary burnt offering does not? Rava said to him: A voluntary burnt offering also falls under the category of obligatory offerings. Since he accepted upon himself to bring a voluntary burnt offering, it is considered an obligation for him, and therefore it renders an animal exchanged for it a substitute.
ולא נצרכה אלא לעולה הבאה מן המותרות Rava adds: And this qualification mentioned by Rabbi Shimon is necessary only to exclude a burnt offering that came from surplus funds. For example, if one set aside a certain sum of money for a sin offering or a guilt offering, and after purchasing his animal some of the money remained, he must purchase a burnt offering with that money. The halakha of substitution does not apply to such an animal.
מאי קסבר אי קסבר לה כמאן דאמר מותרות לנדבת צבור אזלי פשיטא דלא עבדה תמורה הא אין תמורה בצבור The Gemara raises a difficulty: The Sages disputed the use of surplus money. Some say that it must go toward the purchase of communal burnt offerings, whereas Rabbi Eliezer maintains that the owner himself must purchase a voluntary burnt offering. What does Rabbi Shimon hold in this regard? If he holds in accordance with the one who said that these surplus funds go toward communal gift offerings, then it is obvious that this offering does not render a substitute, as it is explicitly taught that there is no substitution with regard to a communal offering. Rabbi Shimon’s statement would then be redundant.
אלא רבי שמעון סבירא ליה כמאן דאמר מותרות לנדבת יחיד אזלי מאן שמעת ליה האי סברא רבי אליעזר הא שמעינן ליה בהדיא דעבדה תמורה דתניא עולה הבאה מן המותרות עושה תמורה דברי רבי אליעזר Rather, say that Rabbi Shimon holds in accordance with the one who said that these surplus funds go toward the voluntary burnt offering of an individual. But this too is problematic, as whom did you hear who holds this reasoning? It is Rabbi Eliezer, but we heard that Rabbi Eliezer explicitly stated that such an animal renders an animal exchanged for it a substitute. As it is taught in a baraita: A burnt offering that came from surplus funds renders a non-sacred animal that is exchanged for it consecrated as a substitute. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer.
רבי שמעון סבר לה כותיה בחדא ופליג עליה בחדא דרבי אליעזר סבר עולה הבאה מן המותרות עושה תמורה ואיהו סבר אין עושה תמורה The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer with regard to one matter, that surplus funds go toward an individual voluntary burnt offering, and disagrees with him with regard to another matter, as Rabbi Eliezer maintains that a burnt offering that came from surplus funds renders a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute, and he, Rabbi Shimon, maintains that it does not render it a substitute.
אי הכי דבעיא רבי אבין הפריש אשם להתכפר בו והמיר בו ונתכפר באשם אחר וניתק זה לעולה מהו שיחזור וימיר בו The Gemara objects: If so, consider that dilemma raised by Rabbi Avin: If one separated an animal as a guilt offering by which to achieve atonement, and he effected substitution for it, and then that original guilt offering developed a blemish and he redeemed it with another animal, which he subsequently lost, and the owner achieved atonement by bringing yet another animal as a guilt offering; and then this lost animal was found and consigned to be sacrificed as a burnt offering, what is the halakha as to whether he can again effect substitution for it? In this case, the animal in question is a burnt offering that came from surplus funds.
אליבא דמאן אילימא אליבא דר"ש הא אמרת רבי שמעון סבירא ליה עולה הבאה מן המותרות אין עושה תמורה In accordance with whose opinion was this dilemma raised? If we say it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, you said that Rabbi Shimon maintains that a burnt offering that came from surplus funds does not render a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute. There would therefore be no dilemma at all. This is problematic, because the dilemma assumes that one cannot effect substitution twice for the same animal, which is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
רבי אבין הכי קמיבעיא ליה אי משכחת תנא דקאי כר"ש דאמר אין ממירין וחוזרין וממירין וס"ל כרבי אליעזר דאמר עולה הבאה מן המותרות עושה תמורה מהו שיחזור וימיר בו The Gemara explains that this is the dilemma that Rabbi Avin was raising: If a tanna is found who holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said that one cannot effect substitution once and again effect substitution for the same consecrated animal, and he also holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who said that a burnt offering that came from surplus funds renders a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute, what is his opinion as to whether one can again effect substitution with the animal in question?
בשני גופין וקדושה אחת מאי As explained earlier (9b), Rabbi Avin’s dilemma was first posed with regard to two bodies, i.e., two different animals, and one type of sanctity, e.g., in a case where one separated an animal as a guilt offering, and he effected substitution for it, and the animal he separated as a guilt offering developed a blemish and he redeemed it with another animal, which assumed the same status of a guilt offering. What is the halakha as to whether one can substitute for this replacement? Do we say that since it is a different animal from the one for which he initially effected substitution, the second substitution is effective? Or perhaps, since it possesses the same sanctity as the original animal, one cannot effect substitution for it.
ואם תימצא לומר קדושה אחת (או לא) אלא שתי קדושות וגוף אחד מאי תיבעי And then Rabbi Avin further asked: If you say that in the above case one cannot effect substitution for the animal, perhaps this is only because the two animals possess one sanctity. But in a case of two sanctities and one body, what is the halakha? For example, if one consecrated a guilt offering and effected substitution for it, and he subsequently lost it and atoned using another animal, and he then found it again, such that the original animal must now be consigned to be sacrificed as a burnt offering, does one say that since the animal now possesses a different sanctity he can effect further substitution for it? The Gemara concludes: According to that tanna, the dilemma remains unresolved [tiba’ei].
הדרן עלך הכל ממירין