Siman 11י״א
1 א

כיצד מזמינים לדין ועל פי מי. ובו ו סעיפים.
כיצד מזמינים בעל דין לדין שולחים לו ב"ד שלוחם שיבא ליום המזומן לדין לא בא מזמינים אותו פעם שנית לא בא מזמינים אותו פעם שלישית לא בא ממתינים לו כל היום לא בא מנדין אותו למחרתו בד"א במי שהיה בכפרים ויוצא ונכנס אבל מי שהוא מצוי בעיר אין קובעים לו זמן אלא פעם אחת ואם לא בא כל אותו יום מנדין אותו למחרתו: הגה הלך הב"ד למקום אחר צריך לילך אחריהם ואם לא הלך מנדין אותו (ב"י) והשליח ב"ד נאמן לומר הקלני או הקלה הדיין או לא רצה לבוא לדין ומשמתין (פי' הנדוי או החרם שם מיתה) אותו על פיו אבל אין כותבין עליו פתיחא של שמתא עד שיבואו שנים ויעידו שנמנע לבוא ואין שליח ב"ד חייב באמירת דברים משום לשון הרע: הגה מי שאומר שאינו חושש על גזירת ב"ד או חכם אע"פ שבא לב"ד מנדין אותו הואיל ואומר שלא בא מחמת גזירתו הוי אפקירותא וע' בי"ד סי' של"ד ואם אמר לא אדון לפניכם אלא לפני ב"ד אחר ע' לקמן סי' י"ד מי שלא יוכל לבא לב"ד כי צריך לילך למרחקים יש להודיע לב"ד ולשום התנצלותו ולבקש זמן אחר ואם לא עשה מנדין אותו אע"פ שלא היה יכול לבא (מהרי"ק שורש י"א) מי שקבל עליו ב"ד של שנים (בקנין) והזמינוהו ולא בא מנדין אותו בב"ד של שלשה (ב"י בשם תשו' הרשב"א):

In which manner is a defendant summoned to appear in Court? — The [members of the] Court send their messenger to him in order that he come on the appointed day to Court. [If] he did not appear [on the appointed day], they summon him a second time; [if] he did not appear [after the second summons], they summon him a third time; [if] he [still] did not appear, they wait for him all day, and if he did not appear, they place him under the ban on the morrow.1M.K. 16a: ‘Raba said: Whence do we derive that we send a Court messenger (in a legal summons) ? — For it is written, And Moses sent to call Dathan and Abiram, the sons of Eliab (Num. XVI, 12). Whence do we derive that we summon him to appear (in person) ? — For it is written, And Moses said to Korah, Be thou and all thy congregation before the Lord, thou and Aaron (tomorrow) (ibid. v. 16). (Whence that one is to appear) before a distinguished personage? — For it is written, Before the Lord (ibid. v. 16). (That both parties should be named) thou and So-and-so? — For it is written, Thou and they (that are with them) and Aaron (ibid. v. 16). That we appoint a time? — For it is written, Tomorrow (ibid.). One term and then another term (after one more term) ? — They called there, Pharaoh the king of Egypt, (the cause of) commotion; he hath let the appointed time pass by; (As I live, saith the King, the Lord of Hosts, surely like Tabor among the mountains and like Carmel by the sea, so shall he come) (Jer. XLVI, 17-18. , Rashi and Targum a.l.)’ That he is placed under the ban only after the third summons is derived from Tosaf. a.l., s.v. מתרינן in accord with the opinion of ‘some explain.’ Thus also Tur. Cf. also B.K. 113a: ‘R. Ḥisda said: (In a legal summons) we appoint a time for the person to appear) on Monday, (then) on Thursday, and (then) on (the following) Monday (The Beth Din held its sessions on Mondays and Thursdays — B.K. 82a), (i.e.,) one term and then another term after one more term (in case of failing to appear) and on the morrow (of the last fixed) we write (the Pethiḥa).’ , supra § 8, 5, n. 45. The defendant has a right to say to the claimant before appearing in Court, ‘Tell me the nature of your claim,’ and if the claimant refuses to comply with his request, the defendant can say, ‘I will not go to Court with you until you tell me, for it is quite possible that when I hear your claim I will settle with you and indemnify you’ — ShaK contra Be’er Sheba. In the latter case, the defendant should report the claimant’s refusal to disclose the nature of his claim to the Court messenger — A.H. The expenses for the summons should be defrayed by the claimant and not by the defendant — ShaK. The claimant can summon the defendant to appear only on the days that Court sessions are held according to the adopted custom of the community unless the local usage is to hold a Court session whenever the need arises. The writ of summons, however, may be sent to the defendant at any time for it has no fixed time — M.E. When does this apply? — In [the case of one] who was in country towns and departs from and returns to [the city],2For there may have been unavoidable circumstances which prevented the defendant from appearing after the first two summonses were sent. Where, however, he does not habitually depart from and return to the city, only that he spends a week or two away from home in the country towns or villages, it seems that he does not come under this ruling, and they appoint a time for him to appear for trial in accordance with his preoccupation — M.E. but [in the case of one] who is usually in the city, only one date is fixed for him [in a legal summons],3Thus Tur and Yad, Sanhedrin XXV, 8, derived from B.K. 113a: ‘R. Assi happened to be at R. Kahana’s and saw that a certain woman was summoned to appear before the Court on the preceding evening (and when she failed to appear) he wrote a Pethiḥa against her on the following morning. He then said to R. Kahana: Does not the Master hold the opinion of R. Ḥisda (v. supra n. 1)… He replied: This has reference only to a man who might be prevented by an unavoidable interference, through being out of town, but a woman who is (always) in town and if she fails to appear, is regarded contumacious (after the first act of refusal).’ The adopted custom nowadays is to send three summonses even for one who is in town (Tummim, Nethiboth) — P.Tesh. and if he did not appear on that entire day, they place him under the ban on the morrow.4Yad ibid. has לערב ‘in the evening.’ , infra par. 3. Gloss: [If] the [members of the] Court went to another place, he [the defendant] is required to go after them [in order to be tried before them], and if he did not go, they place him under the ban.5B.Yos.G. Tur and Yad do not state this law and on the basis of the Mishna in R.H. 31b [‘should the Head of the Court be in another place, the witnesses (who give evidence for the New Moon) should still go only to the place of Assembly (and the Court declares the sanctification of the New Moon without the Head’)], R. Moses Ibn Ḥabib in his Shamoth ba-Areẓ rejects the present ruling of Isserles. For the law (R.H. ibid.) rests with R. Ashi that all laws are comparable in this respect to the sanctification of the New Moon, contra Amemar (ibid.) who distinguishes between the sanctification of the New Moon and other laws, because in the former case, the witnesses would refrain from giving evidence were we to insist that they go to the place of the Head, but in other cases, the borrower is a servant to the lender (Prov. XXII, 7). Hence, since the law rests with R. Ashi, Isserles’ ruling must be rejected. Other authorities defend IsserlesP.Tesh. According to A.H., Isserles’ ruling would apply only in a case where the defendant does not live in the same locality as the Judge, and if the Judge or the Court are in a different locality now, and the defendant, who was originally summoned to appear for trial in the first place, is not any further away from the second place, he must appear, otherwise he is placed under the ban. The Court messenger is relied upon to state,6 supra § 8, 5, nn. 44-45. In all the following cases we place the recalcitrant defendant under the ban. '[The defendant] behaved insolently towards me7Kid. 70b. , supra § 8, 5, nn. 44-45. or towards the Judge8Kid. 70a., and Rashi s.v. שמתיה. Cf. supra § 7, n. 32. or refused to appear for trial,'6 supra § 8, 5, nn. 44-45. In all the following cases we place the recalcitrant defendant under the ban. and they decree the Shammeta,9Heb. שמתא i.e., ‘an imprecation,’ used loosely as the equivalent of the Heb. נידוי ,חרם or the Aram. אחרמתא. Niddui and Ḥerem are Mishnaic terms while Shammeta was used in Babylon. The legal signification of these terms is discussed in Ned. 7a-b and later in Geonic literature. According to Rashi, Shammeta is less severe than Niddui. Maim. Yad, Talmud Torah VII, 2 maintains that they are identical. N in Mishpat ha-Ḥerem claims that Shammeta is a general term for Niddui and Ḥerem. Cf. Lewin B.M. in Oẓar ha-Geonim IV, on Mashkin, Responsa § 29ff, pp. 17-19. (i.e., the ban or excommunication,9Heb. שמתא i.e., ‘an imprecation,’ used loosely as the equivalent of the Heb. נידוי ,חרם or the Aram. אחרמתא. Niddui and Ḥerem are Mishnaic terms while Shammeta was used in Babylon. The legal signification of these terms is discussed in Ned. 7a-b and later in Geonic literature. According to Rashi, Shammeta is less severe than Niddui. Maim. Yad, Talmud Torah VII, 2 maintains that they are identical. N in Mishpat ha-Ḥerem claims that Shammeta is a general term for Niddui and Ḥerem. Cf. Lewin B.M. in Oẓar ha-Geonim IV, on Mashkin, Responsa § 29ff, pp. 17-19. [the etymology of Shammeta being], 'there is death'),10M.K. 17a: ‘What is (the etymology of) Shammeta? — Rab said, שם מיתה “there is death;” Samuel said, שממה יהיה (MS.M. שמה; ‘Ar. שם תהא read שמה תהא), He shall be (be thou) a desolation.’ , Jastrow. against him on his [the Court messenger's] testimony, but we do not write a warrant of excommunication on his [the messenger's testimony] until two witnesses appear and testify that he [the defendant] refused to come.11 supra § 8, 5, n. 45. The messenger of Court is not held responsible in reporting [this] information on grounds of slander.12 supra § 8, 5, n. 46. Gloss: One who states that he is not afraid of the Court order or the Sage, — [the law is that] although he does appear in Court [for trial], they place him under the ban, for since he states that he comes not on account of the [Court] order, it is regarded as contempt of the law.13M.K. 16a: ‘This (viz., that warning is given three times) applies only if he disregards a monetary case, but for contempt of the law (אפקרותא) the ban is pronounced forthwith.’ , Y.D. § 334, [par. 43]. If he stated, 'I do not wish to be tried before you, only before another Court,' v., infra § 14.14Cf. supra § 3. One who is not able to come to Court because he is required to go to distant countries, should inform the Court thereof, and make excuses [for the postponement of the trial] and request another date [for the hearing], and if he did not do [this] they place him under the ban, although he was not able to come.15MaHaRIK Rt. 11 — G. Derived from B.K. 112b: ‘Raba said: The law is that we may authenticate a document (either by oral evidence or by comparing the signatures) even not in the presence of one of the litigants… and even if he complains aloud before us (that the document was forged). But if he says: Give me time until I produce witnesses and invalidate the document, we give him time. If he comes (with witnesses), then he comes; but if he does not come we wait for him (the following) Monday and Thursday and Monday. If he still does not come we write a Pethiḥa against him (that goes into effect after) ninety days. For the first thirty days we do not go down (to take possession of his property) since we say that he is busy trying to borrow money; during the following thirty days we likewise do not go down to take possession of his property, as we say perhaps he was unable to raise a loan and is trying to sell his property; the last thirty days we likewise do not go down to take possession of his property since we may still say that the purchaser (of his property) is busy himself trying to raise money. If he still does not come (after all this), we write an Adrakta (legal permission to a creditor to trace the debtor’s property for the purpose or having it seized, assessed, offered for public sale and eventually delivered to him) on his property.’ Hence, we see that although he is unavoidably prevented from producing witnesses in which case we give him time to bring proof, yet, he must appear before Court to justify the delay; otherwise, the ban is decreed against him. Cf. also ibid. 113a: ‘Raba said: If a Pethiḥa was written against a recalcitrant offender for not coming before Court, we do not destroy it so long as he does not come before the Court… this however, is not so; for as soon as he states his intention to obey, we must destroy the Pethiḥa.’ One who accepted [to be tried before] a Court of two by making an agreement by means of a Kinyan,16Heb. קנין. Symbolical for making an agreement binding by handing over an object from one to the other of the contracting parties. In the present ruling should there be no agreement by symbol, the defendant may retract. , infra § 22, and they summoned him and he did not appear, — [the law is that] they [have the power to] place him under the ban as17Thus reading of M.E. (Cur edd. have בבײד ‘in a Court of etc.’). e., although the agreement by symbol was made only before two Judges, nevertheless, they have the right to decree the ban against him as a Court of three — M.E. a Court of three.18B.Yos. on the authority of RaShBA Resp.G.

2 ב

שליח שאמר פלוני שלחני בשם א' מהדיינים ולא רצה לבוא אין כותבין עליו פתיחא של שמתא עד שיאמר בשם שלשתן ואם יש בהם מומחה חולקין לו כבוד ומזכירין לו שם המומחה (נ"י פ' אלו מגלחין) בד"א שהלך השליח ביום שאינו ידוע לישיבת הדיינים אבל ביום הידוע שהדיינים יושבים בו לדין הכל יודעים שכל הדיינים מקובצים ואע"פ שבא השליח בשם אחד כאלו בא בשם שלשתן:

A [Court] messenger who stated, 'So-and-so has sent me [to summon you to Court]' in the name of one of the Judges,19e., So-and-so in whose name the Court messenger summoned the defendant is one of the Judges — M.E. Cf. source of this ruling in n. 23 infra. and [the defendant] refused to come, — [the law is that] they do not write against him a warrant of excommunication20 supra par. 1 and notes. Actually even without writing the warrant of excommunication we do not place the defendant under the ban unless the statements conflict, i.e., if the Court messenger says that he summoned the defendant in the name of the three Judges and the latter denies this in which case we place the defendant under the ban but do not write a warrant (Pethiḥa). , supra § 8, 5, n. 45. until he [the messenger] states [this] in the name of the three [Judges]. And if there is among them an expert [Judge], they accord him honour and one [the Court messenger] mentions to him [only] the name of the expert [Judge].21N.Yos. to M.K. III — G. , M.K. 16a and supra par. 1, n. 1. This has reference even where he summoned the defendant on a day which is not fixed for holding judicial sessions — M.E. and Nethiboth although the matter still requires further elucidation. , Be’er Eliyahu. This ruling, furthermore, applies even if the Judge is not a recognized authority (מומחה לרבים) — Nethiboth. When does this apply? — Where the [Court] messenger went [to summon the defendant] on an [ordinary] day that is not known [to be appointed] for a judicial session, but [if] on the day that is known [to be appointed as a Court-day] when the Judges sit in judgment, everyone knows that all the Judges are assembled [at their meeting place] and although the [Court] messenger came [to summon the defendant] in the name of one [Judge],22Provided he was equal and not inferior to the other two Judges in learning — ShaK on the authority of RaShaL. it is as though he came in the name of the three [Judges].23Yad, Sanhedrin XXV, 7. Derived from San. 8a: ‘For Raba said: When three Judges sit in judgment and the Court messenger went and served the summons in the name of one only, his statement is void, until he stated it in the name of all the (three Judges). This, however, has reference only to an ordinary day; but on a Court-day (i.e., Mondays and Thursdays. , B.K. 82a) it is not necessary.’ A.H. writes that it is only when the Court has fixed days during which judicial sessions are held that it is not necessary to summon the defendant in the name of all the Judges, for since there is a set time for the Judges to sit in judgment, the defendant knows that all the Judges are in session; but if judicial sessions are conducted every day, the Court messenger must summon him in the name of all the Judges (or in the name of the recognized authority). Otherwise the defendant may state that ‘since the Court messenger summoned me in the name of one Judge, I thought that the other Judges were not in session today.’ A.H. also states that there are some localities where the Court messenger summons the defendant in the name of the litigant as follows : ‘So-and-so summons you to appear in Court.’

3 ג

מי שהוא במדינה והלך שליח ב"ד ולא מצאו אין קובעים לו זמן עד שימצאנו השליח ויאמר לו היה בכפר אם דרכו לבא באותו היום אומר השליח אפי' לאחד מהשכנים אפי' אשה אם יבוא פלו' הודיעוהו שב"ד קבעו לו זמן שיבא היום לב"ד ואם לא בא מנדין אותו לערב (וכ"ש ע"פ שליח ב"ד אע"פ שלא חזר ואמר עשיתי שליחותי) (טור) בד"א כשאין בדרך שדרכו לילך בה על מקום ב"ד אבל אם דרכו עליהם אין מנדין אותו עד שיודיעו השליח בעצמו שמא לא אמרו לו השכנים שהרי הם אומרים דרכו על פתח ב"ד וכבר הלך (אליהם) ונפטר וכן אם לא בא במדינה עד למחר אין סומכים על השכנים שמא שכחו ולא אמרו לו: הגה וכן אם היה בעיר אין סומכים על השכנים שיאמרו שמא השליח ב"ד מצאו ואמר לו (טור):

One who is [a resident] in a city24Heb. מדינה. Lit. ‘a province.’ However, Maim., on the basis of numerous Talmudic references employs this term in the sense of ‘a large city’ — M.E. and the Court messenger went [to convey to him a legal summons] and did not find him [at home] — [the law is that] they do not fix for him a time [to appear in Court] until the [Court] messenger finds him and informs him thereof.25For even if the neighbours were informed thereof they will think that perhaps the messenger met him and informed him himself. , Gloss at the end of this ruling which has reference to this law, and cf. infra n. 30. [If] he was in a country town [away from home], — [then] if it is customary for him to come [home] on that very same day, the [Court] messenger may say even to one of the neighbours [of the defendant], even [if it be] a woman, 'If So-and-so comes [home today] inform him that the Court of Law has fixed a time for him, [viz.,] that he appear today in the Court of Law;'26For we presume that they carried out their commission — Nethiboth. and if he does not come [to Court] they place him under the ban in the evening.27Thus Yad, Sanhedrin XXV, 10. However, in Yad ibid., par. 8, Maim. in stating the law, a) of one who was in the city (בעיר) and did not appear in Court after receiving a legal summons, has ‘לערב,’ i.e., he is placed under the ban the very same day in the evening; yet, in the same par., when stating the law of one who was in a country town (בכפרים) and did not appear in Court even after the third summons, Maim., has ‘עד למחר,’ i.e., he is placed under the ban only on the morrow. On the other hand, Caro has both in a) and b) למחרתו, i.e., on the morrow and in the present ruling has לערב in the evening. The following explanation is advanced in order to remove the apparent discrepancy. In Yad ibid., par. 8, both in a) and b), we are informed that the party is not placed under the ban before the end of the day. In a) לערב (in the evening) is used, i.e., the beginning of the following day; in b) עד לערב (on the morrow) is used, i.e., the morrow of the following day. The reason why Maim. uses both terms is in order to teach us the remarkable feature of this law, viz., in a) where only one day is given to him to appear in Court, since he is in the city, consequently, we adopt a stringency and pronounce the ban at the beginning of the following day, i.e., ‘in the evening;’ in b) where he departs from and returns to the city in which case we give the defendant three terms, we adopt a leniency and give him time until the morning of the following day. Hence, the term עד למחר (until the morrow). Since, therefore, legally there is no difference, for both terms refer to the next day, Tur has only למחרתו ‘on the morrow,’ and he is followed by Caro in rulings a) and b), who also has למחרתו. It is quite possible however, that in par. 1 supra, Caro also holds that the ban is pronounced in the evening, but the reason he mentions למחרתו (on the morrow) is merely to inform us that on the morrow they publicize the fact that the defendant had been placed under the ban on the preceding evening, and in our present ruling, Caro simply states the law of decreeing the ban in the evening following Maim.M.E. , however, W.G. and Be’er Eliyahu a.l. for further comments. And so much the more [if he was summoned] by the Court messenger [himself], although he [the Court messenger] did not return [to Court] and state, 'I have carried out my commission.'28TurG. For we might have thought that if he does not return to the Court of Law to inform them that he had carried out their commission there is the possibility that the party was not informed thereof — M.E. When does this apply [viz., that we place him under the ban]? — Where [it is known that] he [the defendant on returning home] via the route that he is accustomed to take, does not [pass] by the locality of the Court of Law; but if his route [goes] by them [viz., the members of the Court of Law], they do not place him under the ban until the [Court] messenger himself conveys [the summons] to him, for fear that the neighbours had not informed him thereof, for they might think [that since] his route [passes] by the door of the Court of Law, he had already passed by them29Thus Yad. [and the summons was conveyed to him] and [then] he left. Likewise, if he did not arrive in the city until the next day, we do not rely upon the neighbours, for fear that they forgot and did not inform him thereof. Gloss: So too, if he was in the city, we do not rely upon the neighbours, since they might think that perhaps the Court messenger found him and had [already] conveyed [the summons] to him.30TurG. The entire ruling here is found in Yad, Sanhedrin XXV, 10, derived from B.K. 112b-113a: ‘Rabina said: We may serve a legal summons through the mouth of a woman or through the mouth of neighbours; this applies only to a case where the (defendant) was then not in town, but if he was at that time in town, it is not so, for it is possible that they (i.e., the woman or the neighbours or according to A.H. this has reference even to the defendant’s wife and children) might not convey the summons to him, thinking that the Court messenger will find him and transmit it to him. Furthermore, this ruling applies only when the party would not be passing by the Court of Law, but if he should have to pass by the door of the Court of Law, this is not so, since they (i.e., the woman or the neighbours) might think that at the Court of Law they will find him first and convey the summons to him. Again, this applies only if the party was due home on the very same day, but if he does not come home on the same day, it is not so, because we say that they surely forgot it completely.’ IsserlesGloss here is merely stated for the purpose of adducing the Talmudic reason for not relying on the neighbours in the case where the defendant was a resident in a city, and refers to the first part of Caro’s ruling. Otherwise, this Gloss would be redundant since the term מדינה employed in Yad (and followed here by Caro) also means עיר (i.e., a city) — M.E. Cf. supra n. 25.

4 ד

מי שכתבו עליו נידוי על שלא בא ואמר אבוא אין קורעין כתב הנדוי עד שיבא אבל מי שכתבו עליו נידוי על שהיה מסרב לעשות ציווי ב"ד מיד כשאומר הריני מקבל עלי לעשות ציווי ב"ד קורעים כתב הנידוי והוא נותן שכר הסופר: הגה מי שכתבו עליו סרבנות וטען אח"כ שלא שמע אינו נאמן דמעשה ב"ד יש לו קול (מרדכי ר"פ שני ד"ג):

One against whom a [warrant of] excommunication had been written for failure to appear [before Court]31Which is considered contempt of the Law. and [subsequently the defaulter] stated, 'I will appear,' — we do not destroy the writ of excommunication until he [actually] appears. However, one against whom a [warrant of] excommunication had been written for having refused to obey a Court order,32e., he did appear in Court when originally summoned, but had not as yet complied with the legal decision of the Court. — [then] as soon as [the defaulter] states, 'I hereby obligate myself to obey the Court order,' we destroy the warrant of excommunication,33Yad, Sanhedrin XXV, 8. Derived from B.K. 113a: ‘Raba said: One who makes default against whom a Pethiḥa was written for failure to appear before the Court, — so long as he does not appear before the Court, we do not destroy it (even if he promises to come). (Likewise,) if (the Pethiḥa was written) for not having complied with the Law, — (then) until he complies with the Law, we do not destroy it. This, however, is not so: for as soon as he states, “I intend to obey,” we destroy the Pethiḥa (forthwith, because he might not have had money now, but failure to appear in Court is considered contumacious).’ and [the defaulter] pays the expense of the Scribe [for drafting the writ of excommunication].34B.K. 112b in accord with Rabina. Cf. supra § 8, n. 45. Gloss: One against whom they [the members of the Court] wrote a [document of] refusal, and subsequently he pleaded that he did not hear [about it], is not relied upon, because the action of the Court ensures publicity.35Mord. to Ket. XIII beg. — G. We deal with a case where the Court gave the claimant written evidence that the defendant refuses to obey the Court order, and subsequently, the claimant, on the strength of this document demands that the defendant comply with the legal decision of the Court, e.g., a woman claimed support from her husband and the Court ruled that he give her a fixed weekly allowance, and upon the husband’s refusal the Court gave her a document of refusal (סרבנות), and after the lapse of a certain period she put in a claim for support corresponding to the entire period during which he did not maintain her, and now the husband contends that since she was silent until now, he was under the impression that she had renounced her claim, to which she responds that having the Court’s document of refusal she was assured of her claim, but the husband pleads that he knew nothing about the written evidence of Court, — the law is that his plea is invalid because an act of the Court becomes known — Mord. Cf. also B.M. 15a and Rashi s.v. כשעמד, according to which mortgaged property is seizable by the seller’s creditor who has written evidence for his claim from Court (we deal with a case where the robber of a field after having been tried in Court sold the field), because the written evidence given to the creditor becomes known, and the buyer should have refrained from advancing money on such a field. Hence, in the present case too, one is not relied upon to state that he was unaware of the action of the Court.

5 ה

נשים יקרות (או ת"ח שתורתו אומנתו) אם מזמנים אותם לבא לב"ד וכן אם הנתבע יכול למנות שליח שיהא במקומו לב"ד יתבאר בסי' צ"ו ובסי' קכ"ד:

[With regards to] noble women or a scholar whose sole occupation is the study of the Torah,36For whom it is undignified to appear in Court. — whether they are summoned to appear [in person] in Court, and likewise, whether the defendant can appoint a deputy to take his place before the Court, — will be explained in § 96 and in § 124.

6 ו

הדיין יכול לחתום בשטר הזמנה מן הצד:

The Judge can sign on a document containing a summons at the side.37Git. 88a where it is stated that Rab would sign at the side on official letters, e.g., in a summons for one to appear in Court. In the case of witnesses, however, who affix their signatures sideways it is invalid. , infra § 45, 1.