אינו חייב אלא אחת זו היא שבועת ביטוי שחייבין על זדונה מכות ועל שגגתה קרבן עולה ויורד
he is liable for only one violation. Since the second oath did not prohibit any act in addition to the first oath, he is not liable for violating it. The mishna concludes: This is an oath on an utterance for which one is liable to receive lashes for its intentional violation, and to bring a sliding-scale offering for its unwitting violation.
זו היא דחייבין על זדונה מכות אבל אוכל ולא אכל לא לקי
The Gemara infers from the formulation of the mishna: It is specifically this case of an oath on an utterance for which one is liable to receive lashes for its intentional violation. But if a person stated: On my oath I will eat, and then he did not eat, he is not flogged. Presumably this is because the violation does not involve any action. This mishna, then, can provide a basis for Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling.
מכדי האי סתמא והאי סתמא מאי חזי דעביד כי האי סתמא לעביד כי האי סתמא
The Gemara asks: Now, this mishna (27b) is unattributed and that mishna (2a) is unattributed. What did Rabbi Yoḥanan see that he practiced in accordance with this unattributed mishna? Let him instead practice in accordance with that unattributed mishna.
ולטעמיך רבי גופיה היכי סתם לן הכא הכי והכא הכי
The Gemara adds another question: And according to your reasoning that both mishnayot carry equal weight, then with regard to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi himself, when he redacted the Mishna, how could he teach us as unattributed both this opinion in the mishna here and that opinion in the mishna there? This would result in a contradiction.
אלא מעיקרא סבר לאו שאין בו מעשה לוקין עליו וסתמה והדר סבר אין לוקין עליו וסתמה ומשנה לא זזה ממקומה
Rather, it is apparent that initially Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi held that for a violation of a prohibition that does not involve an action one is flogged, and so he taught it as an unattributed mishna, and later he retracted his opinion and held that one is not flogged for a violation of such a prohibition, and so he taught that opinion as an unattributed mishna. And he left the first mishna (2a) as it was because a mishna does not move from its place, i.e., since the students had already learned that mishna it was deemed inappropriate to remove it. Based on this logic, Rabbi Yoḥanan ruled in accordance with the later mishna (27b).
במאי אוקימתא כר' ישמעאל ולמלקות מראות נגעים מאי מלקות איכא בקוצץ בהרתו וכרבי אבין א"ר אילעא דא"ר אבין א"ר אילעא כל מקום שנאמר השמר פן ואל אינו אלא לא תעשה
The Gemara clarifies: In accordance with which opinion did you interpret the mishna? In accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and it is referring to liability to receive lashes. The Gemara questions this: But in the parallel case of shades of leprous marks, what punishment of lashes is there? The Gemara answers: There is a punishment of lashes in a case where one cuts off his snow-white leprous mark [baheret], and in accordance with the principle that Rabbi Avin says that Rabbi Ile’a says, as Rabbi Avin says that Rabbi Ile’a says: Wherever it is stated: Observe, or: Lest, or: Do not, it is nothing other than a prohibition. So too, with regard to leprosy, the verse states: “Observe the leprous mark” (Deuteronomy 24:8), which according to Rabbi Ile’a’s principle teaches a prohibition, namely that it is prohibited to remove the mark. Accordingly, one who violates this prohibition is liable to receive lashes.
יציאות שבת מאי מלקות איכא לאו שניתן לאזהרת מיתת ב"ד הוא וכל לאו שניתן לאזהרת מיתת ב"ד אין לוקין עליו משום הכי קא מוקמינא כר' ישמעאל דאמר לאו שניתן לאזהרת מיתת ב"ד לוקין עליו
The Gemara asks further: But in the parallel clause of acts of carrying out that are prohibited on Shabbat, what punishment of lashes is there? The prohibition against doing so is a prohibition in the Torah that potentially serves as a mandate for court-imposed capital punishment, and the generally accepted principle is that with regard to a violation of any prohibition in the Torah that potentially serves as a mandate for court-imposed capital punishment, one is not flogged for its violation even if no death penalty is imposed, as that prohibition is punishable only by death. The Gemara answers: It is due to that reason that we interpreted the mishna to be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, as he says that with regard to a prohibition in the Torah that potentially serves as a mandate for court-imposed capital punishment, one is flogged for its violation in a case where there is no actual death penalty.
הא לאו הכי קיימא כר"ע קשיא ידיעות לאו אמרת רבי ישמעאל היא ולמלקות ר"ע נמי ולמלקות
The Gemara asks: Is that to say that were it not for this reason, the mishna could be interpreted in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who holds that one is not flogged for violating such prohibitions? But then the question raised above with regard to the mishna’s detailing of the cases of one’s awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods poses a difficulty, as Rabbi Akiva holds that one is not liable if he entered the Temple during a lapse of awareness of the fact that the place he entered was actually the Temple, whereas the mishna indicates one is liable in such a case. The Gemara answers: Didn’t you say above that it is possible to conclude that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael and the liability referred to in the mishna is for liability to receive lashes? Similarly, it is also possible to say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva and the liability referred to in the mishna is for liability to receive lashes.
אי הכי ידיעות התראות מיבעי ליה הא לא קשיא תני ידיעות דהתראות
The Gemara asks: If so, why did the tanna use the term: Cases of awareness, which is generally used for cases in which the transgression was performed during a lack of awareness and then subsequent awareness is necessary in order for the person to be liable to bring an offering? The tanna should have instead said: Forewarnings, as the forewarning is a necessary condition to be able to give lashes for an intentional transgression. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult; emend and teach the mishna as saying: Cases of awareness of forewarnings.
אי הכי שתים שהן ארבע תרתי הוא דהויין ותו את שיש בה ידיעה בתחלה וידיעה בסוף והעלם בינתים העלמה למלקות מאי עבידתיה ותו הרי זה בעולה ויורד
The Gemara rejects the suggestion that the mishna is referring to liability to receive lashes: If so, if the mishna is referring to liability to receive lashes, why does it state that there are two types that are four? There are only two types. Since the person was forewarned he is certainly fully aware of all aspects of his transgression. Accordingly, there are only two cases of liability: For a ritually impure person who enters the Temple and for a ritually impure person who partakes of sacrificial foods. And furthermore, the continuation of the mishna states the case: In which one had awareness at the beginning and awareness at the end, but had a lapse of awareness in between, when he actually transgressed. The Gemara asks: What is the relevance of lapses of awareness to one’s liability to receive lashes? And furthermore, that clause explicitly concludes: This person is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. Clearly then, the mishna is not referring to liability to receive lashes.
אלא אמר רב יוסף רבי היא ונסיב לה אליבא דתנאי בידיעות נסיב לה כרבי ישמעאל בשבועות נסיב לה כר"ע
Having rejected the suggestion that the mishna is referring to liability to be punished with lashes, it addresses the difficulty raised above that the mishna’s ruling with regard to oaths does not accord with Rabbi Yishmael’s opinion and its ruling with regard to cases of one’s awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods does not accord with Rabbi Akiva’s opinion. If so, whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? Rather, Rav Yosef said: The mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and he formulates the mishna according to different tanna’im, as follows: With regard to cases of one’s awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, he formulates it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and with regard to oaths, he formulates it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.
אמר רב אשי אמריתא לשמעתא קמיה דרב כהנא ואמר לי לא תימא רבי נסיב לה אליבא דתנאי וליה לא ס"ל
Rav Ashi said: I said this statement of Rav Yosef before Rav Kahana, and he said to me: Do not say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi formulates the mishna according to different tanna’im but he himself does not hold accordingly.
אלא רבי טעמיה דנפשיה מפרש דתניא מנין שאינו חייב אלא על שיש בה ידיעה בתחלה וידיעה בסוף והעלם בינתים ת"ל (ויקרא ה, ב) ונעלם ונעלם שני פעמים דברי ר"ע
Rav Kahana continued: Rather, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is explicating his own reasoning, as it is taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering only for cases in which one had awareness at the beginning and awareness at the end and had a lapse of awareness only in between, when he actually transgressed? The verses state with regard to a person’s awareness of the fact that he was impure: “And it was concealed,” “and it was concealed” (Leviticus 5:2–3), mentioning concealment twice. The first mention is necessary to teach that one is liable to bring an offering only where he was unaware of his status at the time of the transgression. The second mention is superfluous and serves to teach an additional condition for liability, that one must have had awareness of his status before the transgression. This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.
רבי אומר אינו צריך הרי הוא אומר
The baraita continues: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: This proof is not necessary, as it says in the verse: