Shevuot 40bשבועות מ׳ ב
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40bמ׳ ב

הודה במקצת קרקעות פטור במקצת כלים חייב

If he admitted to part of the claim about the land, he is exempt. If he admitted to part of the claim about the vessels, he is liable to take an oath.

טעמא דכלים וקרקעות דקרקע לאו בת שבועה היא הא כלים וכלים דומיא דכלים וקרקעות חייב

The Gemara infers: The reason he is exempt in the first cases is that the claim was for vessels and land, as a claim with regard to land is not subject to an oath; but if the claim was for vessels of one type and vessels of another type, or for wheat and barley, similar to the case of a claim for vessels and land in that the defendant admitted to owing one type and denied owing the other type, he is liable to take an oath.

הוא הדין דאפי' כלים וכלים נמי פטור והא דקתני כלים וקרקעות קמ"ל דכי הודה במקצת כלים חייב אף על הקרקעות

The Gemara rejects the inference: No, it is possible that the same is true, i.e., that even if the claim was for vessels of one type and vessels of another type, and the defendant admitted to owing one type and denied owing the other type, he is exempt. And the reason that the mishna teaches specifically the case where the claim is for vessels and land is that this teaches us that in a case where the defendant admitted to a part of the claim with regard to the vessels, he is liable to take an oath concerning the land as well.

מאי קמ"ל זוקקין תנינא זוקקין את הנכסים שיש להן אחריות לישבע עליהן

The Gemara asks: What is this teaching us? Does it teach the halakha that an admission to a part of the claim about vessels also binds the land to the oath? We learn this in a mishna in tractate Kiddushin (26a): When there is a claim against a person for movable property and land, and he is liable to take an oath concerning the movable property, the movable property binds the property that serves as a guarantee, i.e., land, so that he is forced to take an oath concerning it too.

הא עיקר ההיא אגב גררא נסבה

The Gemara answers: This mishna is the primary reference to this halakha, as it discusses the halakhot of oaths, whereas that mishna cites it incidentally, in the context of a broader survey of the difference between these two types of property.

ור' חייא בר אבא אמר ר' יוחנן טענו חטין ושעורין והודה לו באחת מהן פטור והאמר ר' יצחק יישר וכן אמר רבי יוחנן אמוראי נינהו אליבא דר' יוחנן

And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba disagrees with Shmuel and says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one claimed that another owes him both wheat and barley, and the latter admitted to owing him one of them, he is exempt from taking an oath. The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rabbi Yitzḥak say to Rav Naḥman: You have spoken well in the name of Shmuel, i.e., in saying that the defendant is liable to take an oath in the aforementioned case; and so also said Rabbi Yoḥanan? If so, Rabbi Yoḥanan agrees with Shmuel, and not with Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba. The Gemara answers: They are amora’im, and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan.

ת"ש טענו חטין והודה לו בשעורין פטור ורבן גמליאל מחייב טעמא דטענו חטין והודה לו בשעורין הא חטין ושעורין והודה לו באחד מהן חייב

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof against the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba from the mishna: If one claimed that another owes him wheat, and the defendant admitted to owing him barley, he is exempt; and Rabban Gamliel deems him liable to take an oath. The Gemara infers: The reason he is exempt is that he claimed that he owes him wheat and the defendant admitted to owing him barley; but if the claim was for both wheat and barley, and the defendant admitted to owing him one of them, he would be liable to take an oath.

ה"ה דאפילו חטין ושעורין נמי פטור והאי דקתני הכי להודיעך כחו דרבן גמליאל

The Gemara rejects this proof: It is possible that the same is true, i.e., that even if the claim was for both wheat and barley the defendant is exempt. And the fact that the mishna teaches specifically this case, where the claim was specifically for wheat, is in order to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, as he holds that even in this case one is liable to take an oath.

ת"ש טענו כלים וקרקעות והודה בכלים וכפר בקרקעות בקרקעות וכפר בכלים פטור הודה במקצת קרקע פטור במקצת כלים חייב טעמא דכלים וקרקעות דקרקע לאו בת שבועה היא הא כלים וכלים דומיא דכלים וקרקעות חייב

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof from the mishna: If one claimed that another owes him vessels and land, and the defendant admitted to owing him vessels but denied the claim of land, or if he admitted to owing him land but denied the claim of vessels, he is exempt from taking an oath. If he admitted to part of the claim with regard to the land, he is exempt. If he admitted to part of the claim with regard to the vessels, he is liable to take an oath. The Gemara infers: The reason he is exempt in the first cases is that the claim was for vessels and land, as a claim with regard to land is not subject to an oath; but if the claim was for vessels of one type and vessels of another type, similar to the case of a claim for vessels and land in that the defendant admitted to owing one type and denied owing the other type, he is liable to take an oath.

ה"ה דאפילו כלים וכלים נמי פטור והא קמשמע לן דהודה במקצת כלים חייב אף על הקרקעות מאי קמ"ל זוקקין תנינא זוקקין את הנכסים שיש להן אחריות לישבע עליהן הא עיקר ההיא אגב גררא נסבה

The Gemara rejects this: It is possible that the same is true, that even if the claim was for vessels of one type and vessels of another type he is exempt. And the mishna teaches specifically the case where the claim is for vessels and land because this teaches us that if the defendant admitted to a part of the claim with regard to the vessels, he is liable to take an oath concerning the land as well. The Gemara asks: What is this teaching us? Does it teach the halakha that an admission to part of the claim about vessels also binds the land to the oath? We learn this in a mishna in tractate Kiddushin (26a): The movable property binds the property that serves as a guarantee, so that he is forced to take an oath concerning it too. The Gemara answers: This mishna is the primary reference to this halakha, whereas that mishna cites it incidentally.

איתיביה ר' אבא בר ממל לר' חייא בר אבא טענו שור והודה לו בשה שה והודה לו בשור פטור טענו בשור ושה והודה לו באחד מהן חייב

Rabbi Abba bar Memel raised an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba from a baraita: If one claimed that another owes him an ox, and the latter admitted to owing him a sheep, or conversely, if the claim was for a sheep and the defendant admitted to owing him an ox, he is exempt from taking an oath. If one claimed that another owes him an ox and a sheep, and the defendant admitted to owing him one of them, he is liable to take an oath.

א"ל הא מני רבן גמליאל היא אי רבן גמליאל אפילו רישא נמי

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him in response: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, who deems the defendant liable to take an oath even if his admission was not of the same type of item as the claim. Rabbi Abba bar Memel responded: If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, the defendant should be liable to take an oath even in the first clause of the baraita, where the claim is for an ox and the admission is with regard to a sheep.

אלא הא מני אדמון היא ולא דחויי מדחינא לך אלא תלמוד ערוך הוא בפיו של ר' יוחנן הא מני אדמון היא

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba explained: Rather, in accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Admon, who holds that the admission must be of the same type as the claim, and maintains nevertheless that in a case where one claims that another owes him jugs of oil, and the latter admits that he owes him jugs, but not the oil, the defendant is liable to take an oath (see 38b). And I am not dismissing your objection insubstantially; rather, it is a set tradition in the mouth of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who would say: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Admon.

אמר רב ענן אמר שמואל טענו חטין וקדם והודה לו בשעורין אם כמערים חייב אם במתכוין פטור

§ Rav Anan says that Shmuel says: If one intended to claim from another wheat and barley, and claimed that he owes him wheat, and before he finished his claim, the defendant first admitted that he owes him barley, in this case, if the defendant did so as one who employs artifice, so that he would be exempt from taking an oath concerning the wheat, he is liable to take an oath. But if he did so as one who intends to respond to the claim, without any ulterior motive, he is exempt.

ואמר רב ענן אמר שמואל טענו שתי מחטין והודה לו באחת מהן חייב לפיכך יצאו כלים למה שהן

And Rav Anan says that Shmuel says: If one claimed that another owes him two needles, and the latter admitted to owing him one of them, he is liable to take an oath. It is for this reason that vessels were singled out in the verse, to teach that one is liable to take an oath in a case of admission to part of a claim involving vessels of any value.

אמר רב פפא טענו כלים ופרוטה והודה בכלים וכפר בפרוטה פטור הודה בפרוטה וכפר בכלים חייב

Rav Pappa says: If one claimed that another owes him vessels and also one peruta, and the latter admitted to owing him the vessels but denied the claim that he owes him the peruta, he is exempt from taking an oath. If he admitted that he owes him one peruta but denied the claim that he owes him the vessels, he is liable to take an oath.

חדא כרב וחדא כשמואל חדא כרב דאמר כפירת טענה שתי כסף חדא כשמואל דאמר טענו חטין ושעורין והודה לו באחת מהן חייב:

The Gemara comments: One of these rulings is in accordance with the opinion of Rav, and the other one is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. The former one, that if the defendant denied owing the peruta he is exempt, is in accordance with the opinion of Rav, who says that the denial of a claim must be of least the value of two silver ma’a in order to render the defendant liable to take an oath. The latter one, that if he denied owing the vessels he is liable to take an oath, is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, who says that if one claimed that another owes him both wheat and barley, and the latter admitted to owing him one of them, he is liable to take an oath.

מנה לי בידך אין לך בידי פטור: אמר רב נחמן ומשביעין אותו שבועת היסת מאי טעמא חזקה אין אדם תובע אלא אם כן יש לו עליו

§ The mishna teaches that if the claimant said: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the defendant responded: Nothing of yours is in my possession, he is exempt. Rav Naḥman says: And the court administers an oath of inducement [heisset], an oath instituted by the Sages, to him. What is the reason? There is a presumption that one does not make a claim unless he has a valid case against the other party. Therefore, even though there is no admission to part of the claim, the defendant’s denial should be examined through an oath.

אדרבה חזקה אין אדם מעיז פניו בפני בעל חובו אשתמוטי הוא דקא משתמיט ליה סבר עד דהוה לי ופרענא ליה

The Gemara objects: On the contrary; there is a presumption that a person does not exhibit insolence by lying in the presence of his creditor to deny the entire debt. Therefore, the defendant’s denial of the entire claim suggests that he is telling the truth. The Gemara answers that a debtor’s categorical denial is not necessarily out of insolence; he may be temporarily avoiding paying him. He rationalizes doing so by saying to himself: I am avoiding him only until the time that I have enough money, and then I will repay him.

תדע דאמר רב אידי בר אבין אמר רב חסדא הכופר במלוה כשר לעדות בפקדון פסול לעדות

Know that denial of a debt is not considered an outright lie, as Rav Idi bar Avin says that Rav Ḥisda says: One who denies a claim with regard to a loan is fit to bear witness even if his denial is proven untrue. By contrast, one who denies a claim with regard to a deposit and is proven to be lying is disqualified from bearing witness. The distinction is clearly based on the aforementioned reasoning: A debtor who denies the debt may be avoiding payment until he has enough money, whereas a bailee who denies having been given a deposit clearly intends to steal the item.

רב חביבא מתני אסיפא מנה לי בידך אמר לו הן למחר אמר לו תנהו לי נתתיו לך פטור ואמר רב נחמן משביעין אותו שבועת היסת

Rav Ḥaviva teaches Rav Naḥman’s statement as referring to the latter clause in the mishna: If one said to another: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the latter said to him: Yes, and the next day the claimant said to him: Give the money to me, and the defendant responded: I already gave it to you, he is exempt. And Rav Naḥman says: Nevertheless, the court administers an oath of inducement to him.

מאן דמתני ארישא כל שכן אסיפא

The Gemara explains the difference between the two versions of Rav Naḥman’s statement: With regard to the one who teaches it in reference to the former clause, where the defendant denied the existence of the debt, all the more so does this amora agree that an oath of inducement is administered in the case of the latter clause, where the defendant admitted to the existence of the debt, and merely claimed that he paid it.