הא דומיא דמראות נגעים קתני מה התם כולהו לחיובא אף הכא נמי כולהו לחיובא
But the mishna teaches these cases similar to the different shades of leprous marks, which indicates that just as there, all four of them are shades for which there is liability to bring an offering, so too here, with regard to oaths and the cases of one’s awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, all four of them are cases for which there is liability to bring an offering.
לעולם ר' ישמעאל וכי לא מחייב רבי ישמעאל לשעבר קרבן אבל מלקות חיובי מחייב
The Gemara suggests a different resolution: Actually, the mishna expresses the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. And while Rabbi Yishmael does not deem one liable for oaths pertaining to the past, that is only with regard to liability to bring an offering; but he does deem one liable to be administered lashes.
וכדרבא דאמר רבא בפירוש ריבתה תורה שבועת שקר דומיא דשבועת שוא מה שוא לשעבר אף שקר נמי לשעבר
And this is in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava says: The Torah explicitly amplifies the prohibition of taking a false oath to be similar to the prohibition of an oath taken in vain, to teach that one is flogged for its violation. It follows that just as an oath taken in vain pertains to the past and renders one liable to receive lashes, so too, taking a false oath that pertains to the past renders one liable to receive lashes.
בשלמא אכלתי ולא אכלתי כדרבא שלא אוכל ואכל נמי לאו שיש בו מעשה הוא אלא אוכל ולא אכל אמאי לאו שאין בו מעשה הוא
The Gemara asks: Granted that one who stated: On my oath I ate, but in fact he did not eat, or one who stated: On my oath I did not eat, but in fact he ate, is liable to receive lashes, as this is in accordance with the statement of Rava. And also if one stated: On my oath I will not eat, and he ate in violation of his oath, he is liable to receive lashes, as it is a prohibition that involves an action, and, in general, such prohibitions are punishable by flogging. But if one stated: On my oath I will eat, and in violation of his oath he did not eat, why should he be liable to receive lashes? It is a prohibition that does not involve an action. The generally accepted principle is that one is not liable to receive lashes for violating a prohibition without performing an action.
קסבר רבי ישמעאל לאו שאין בו מעשה לוקין עליו
The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yishmael disagrees with the generally accepted principle and holds that one is flogged for the violation of a prohibition that does not involve an action.
אי הכי קשיא דר' יוחנן אדרבי יוחנן
The Gemara challenges: If so, then a difficulty arises between one statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan and another statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan.
דאמר רבי יוחנן הלכה כסתם משנה
As Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The halakha is always in accordance with the ruling of an unattributed mishna. Since the mishna here is unattributed and assumes that one is flogged for taking a false oath, Rabbi Yoḥanan should rule that this is the halakha.
ואתמר שבועה שאוכל ככר זו היום ועבר היום ולא אכלה ר' יוחנן וריש לקיש דאמרי תרוייהו אינו לוקה ר' יוחנן אמר אינו לוקה משום דהוה לאו שאין בו מעשה וכל לאו שאין בו מעשה אין לוקין עליו וריש לקיש אמר אינו לוקה התראת ספק היא והתראת ספק לא שמה התראה
And an amoraic dispute was stated with regard to one who said: On my oath I will eat this loaf today, and the day passed and he did not eat it. Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both say: He is not flogged for taking a false oath. They disagree with regard to the reason that he is not flogged. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is not flogged due to the fact that it is a prohibition that does not involve an action, as he violates the oath by failing to perform an action rather than by performing an action, and the principle is: With regard to any prohibition that does not involve an action, one is not flogged for its violation. And Reish Lakish says: He is not flogged because it is an uncertain forewarning, as one cannot forewarn him before he fails to fulfill the oath because as long as time remains in the day he can still later eat the loaf and fulfill the oath; and an uncertain forewarning is not characterized as forewarning. Evidently, Rabbi Yoḥanan does not rule in accordance with the mishna here.
רבי יוחנן סתמא אחרינא אשכח
The Gemara resolves the difficulty: Rabbi Yoḥanan found another unattributed mishna which holds that one is not flogged for a prohibition that does not involve an action, and he rules in accordance with that mishna.
הי סתמא אילימא האי סתמא דתנן אבל המותיר בטהור והשובר בטמא אינו לוקה את הארבעים
The Gemara asks: Which other unattributed mishna did he find? If we say he found this unattributed mishna, as we learned (Pesaḥim 84a): But one who leaves over some of the meat of a ritually pure Paschal offering until the morning of the fifteenth of Nisan and one who breaks a bone of a ritually impure Paschal offering are not flogged with the forty lashes, that is difficult.
בשלמא שובר בטמא דכתיב (שמות יב, מו) ועצם לא תשברו בו בכשר ולא בפסול אבל המותיר בטהור מאי טעמא לאו משום דהוי לאו שאין בו מעשה וכל לאו שאין בו מעשה אין לוקין עליו
First, the Gemara explains how this mishna demonstrates Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion: Granted that breaking a bone of a impure Paschal offering does not incur lashes, as it is written: “Nor shall you break a bone in it” (Exodus 12:46). The term “in it” indicates that the verse refers only to a valid Paschal offering, but not to a disqualified one, such as one that is impure. But in the case of one who leaves over some of the meat of a pure Paschal offering, what is the reason he is not flogged? Is it not because it is a violation of a prohibition that does not involve an action, and for a violation of any prohibition that does not involve an action one is not flogged?
וממאי דר' יעקב היא דאמר לאו שאין בו מעשה אין לוקין עליו דלמא ר' יהודה היא ומשום דבא הכתוב ליתן עשה אחר לא תעשה הא לאו הכי לקי
The Gemara now questions this explanation of the mishna: But from where is it apparent that this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ya’akov, who says that for a violation of a prohibition that does not involve an action, one is not flogged? Perhaps the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and he holds that the reason the mishna rules that one is not flogged is due to the fact that the verse comes to position the positive mitzva of burning the leftover meat after the prohibition of leaving over the meat, and one is not flogged for a prohibition whose violation obligates one in a positive mitzva. But were it not for this, one would be flogged, despite the fact it is a prohibition that does not involve an action. Since the unattributed mishna is not necessarily in accordance with Rabbi Yaakov’s opinion, it cannot be the basis of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling.
דתניא (שמות יב, י) לא תותירו ממנו עד בקר והנותר ממנו עד בקר באש תשרפו בא הכתוב ליתן עשה אחר לא תעשה לומר שאין לוקין עליו דברי ר' יהודה רבי יעקב אומר לא מן השם הוא זה אלא משום דהוה לאו שאין בו מעשה ולאו שאין בו מעשה אין לוקין עליו
The Gemara cites the source of Rabbi Yaakov’s and Rabbi Yehuda’s opinions: As it is taught in a baraita: “And you shall let nothing of it remain until the morning, and that which remains of it until the morning you shall burn in fire” (Exodus 12:10). The verse comes to position the positive mitzva of burning the leftover meat after the prohibition against leaving over the meat, to say that one is not flogged for its violation; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Ya’akov says: This is not for that reason; rather, it is due to the fact that it is a prohibition that does not involve an action, and for a violation of a prohibition that does not involve an action one is not flogged.
אלא האי סתמא אשכח שבועה שלא אוכל ככר זו שבועה שלא אוכלנה ואכלה
Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan found this unattributed mishna, which teaches (27b): If one states: On my oath I will not eat this loaf, and immediately states: On my oath I will not eat it, and then he ate it,