Shevuot 37aשבועות ל״ז א
The William Davidson Talmudתלמוד מהדורת ויליאם דוידסון
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37aל״ז א

להו הזיד בשבועת הפקדון והתרו בו מהו כיון דחידוש הוא דבכל התורה לא אשכחן מזיד דמייתי קרבן והכא מייתי קרבן לא שנא אתרו ביה ולא שנא לא אתרו ביה או דלמא ה"מ היכא דלא אתרו ביה אבל היכא דאתרו ביה מילקא לקי קרבן לא מייתי או דלמא הא והא עבדינא

to them: If one intentionally took a false oath on a deposit and witnesses forewarned him, what is the halakha? Is it the case that since the halakha of an oath on a deposit is a novelty, as in the entire Torah we do not find another case where one who transgressed intentionally brings an offering for atonement, but here he does bring an offering for transgressing the prohibition intentionally, there is no difference whether witnesses forewarned him and there is no difference whether they did not forewarn him, and he is liable to bring a guilt-offering, though generally, there is no offering brought when there was forewarning? Or perhaps, that matter of bringing a guilt-offering when one intentionally takes a false oath applies only when they did not forewarn him; but when they forewarned him, he is flogged, as this is the standard punishment for an intentional transgression, and he does not bring an offering. Or perhaps, we impose both lashes and a guilt-offering.

א"ל תנינא חמורה הימנה שבועת הפקדון שחייבין על זדונה מכות ועל שגגתה אשם בכסף שקלים מדקאמר ליה על זדונה מכות מכלל דאתרו ביה וקאמר מכות אין קרבן לא

They said to Rav Kahana: We learn in a baraita: The halakhot of an oath on a deposit are more stringent than the halakhot of an oath of testimony, as one is liable to receive lashes for intentionally taking a false oath on a deposit, and for unwittingly taking a false oath on a deposit one is liable to bring a guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels; whereas one who takes a false oath of testimony, whether intentionally or unwittingly, brings a sin-offering. From the fact that the baraita states that for intentionally taking a false oath on a deposit one is liable to receive lashes, by inference it can be understood that the baraita is referring to a case where witnesses forewarned him, as one cannot receive lashes without forewarning, and it is stating: Yes, he is liable to receive lashes, but he is not liable to bring an offering. The baraita, then, resolves the question of Rav Kahana.

ומאי חומרא דניחא ליה לאיניש דמייתי קרבן ולא לילקי

The Gemara elaborates: And what is the stringency in the fact that one who intentionally takes a false oath on a deposit receives lashes? It is due to the fact that a person prefers to bring an offering rather than receive lashes.

אמר להו רבא בר איתי מאן תנא זדון שבועת הפקדון לא ניתן לכפרה ר"ש אבל לרבנן קרבן נמי מייתי

Rava bar Itai said to the students of Rabba: You cannot answer the question from that baraita, as who is the tanna who taught that intentionally taking a false oath on a deposit is not subject to atonement? It is Rabbi Shimon. But according to the Rabbis, he is liable to bring a guilt-offering, as well as receiving lashes. Therefore, the question remains unanswered.

אמר להו רב כהנא בר מינה דההיא דאנא תנינא לה והכי תנינא לה אחד זדונה ואחד שגגתה אשם בכסף שקלים ומאי חומרא דאילו התם חטאת בת דנקא והכא אשם בכסף שקלים

Rav Kahana said to the students: Apart from this, you cannot answer my question from this baraita, as I am the one who teaches this baraita and this is how I teach it: An oath on a deposit is more stringent than an oath of testimony, since for taking a false oath on a deposit either intentionally or unwittingly one is liable to bring a guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels. And what is the stringency in this halakha? It is that there, with regard to an oath of testimony, he is liable to bring a sin-offering that can be worth even one-sixth of one dinar, and here, the guilt-offering incurred for an oath on a deposit must be worth at least two silver shekels.

וליגמר מינה דלמא דלא אתרו ביה

The Gemara suggests: And let him derive an answer to his question from his version of the baraita, which indicates that one who intentionally takes a false oath on a deposit brings an offering and does not receive lashes. The Gemara responds: Perhaps it is referring to a case where they did not forewarn him; had he been forewarned, he would be flogged.

ל"א ת"ש אין חייבין על שגגתה מה הן חייבין על זדונה אשם בכסף שקלים מאי לאו בדאתרו ביה ה"נ דלא אתרו ביה

The Gemara presents a different version of the previous discussion: Come and hear an answer to the question of Rav Kahana from the mishna: One is not liable for taking a false oath on a deposit unwittingly. And what is he liable for when he intentionally takes a false oath? A guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels. The Gemara explains: What, is it not that the mishna is referring to a case where witnesses forewarned him, and the mishna nevertheless rules only that he must bring an offering? The Gemara rejects the proof: Here, too, the mishna is referring to a case where the witnesses did not forewarn him.

ת"ש לא אם אמרת בנזיר טמא שכן לוקה תאמר בשבועת הפקדון שאינו לוקה מדקאמר לוקה מכלל דאתרו ביה וקאמר תאמר בשבועת הפקדון שאינו לוקה אבל קרבן מייתי

The Gemara continues to seek an answer to Rav Kahana’s question: Come and hear an answer from a baraita. After comparing the case of a nazirite to one who takes an oath on a deposit, the baraita states: No, if you said that the halakha that baraita discusses is true with regard to an impure nazirite, who is indeed flogged for intentionally becoming impure, shall you also say that this is the case with regard to one who took an oath on a deposit, who is not flogged? The Gemara notes: Now, from the fact that the baraita states that a nazirite is flogged, by inference it can be understood that the baraita is referring to a case where witnesses forewarned him, as one is not liable to receive lashes without forewarning; and yet the baraita states: Shall you say that this is the case with regard to one who took an oath on a deposit, who is not flogged? One can infer: But he does bring a guilt-offering.

מאי אינו לוקה דאינו נפטר במלקות מכלל דנזיר טמא נפטר במלקות הא קרבן כתיב ביה התם דמייתי קרבן כי היכי דתיחול עליה נזירות בטהרה

The Gemara rejects the proof: What does the baraita mean when it states that he is not flogged? It means that he is not exempted through lashes alone and he must also bring an offering. The Gemara asks: By inference, does this mean that an impure nazirite is exempted through lashes alone? Isn’t it written in the Torah explicitly with regard to him that there is a requirement to bring an offering? The Gemara responds: The offering brought by an impure nazirite does not serve as an atonement. Rather, there, the nazirite brings an offering in order to purify himself so that his naziriteship can go into effect while he is in a state of purity. The offering must be brought even if the nazirite became impure unwittingly.

אמרוה רבנן קמיה דרבה אמר להו מכלל דכי לא אתרו ביה ואיכא עדים מיחייב כפירת דברים בעלמא הוא אלמא קסבר רבה הכופר בממון שיש עליו עדים פטור

The Sages said this matter before Rabba, i.e., they related the question of Rav Kahana as to whether one who intentionally takes a false oath and was forewarned by witnesses is liable to bring an offering. Rabba said to them: May one conclude by inference that in a case when they did not warn him but there are witnesses to the fact that the defendant owes money to the claimant, he is liable to bring an offering? Isn’t this case merely a verbal denial that does not have any effect with regard to liability to pay? Since there are witnesses who will testify that the defendant owes the claimant, his denial and false oath did not exempt him from payment and he therefore should not be liable to bring a guilt-offering for taking a false oath. The Gemara infers: Evidently, Rabba holds that one who denies a monetary claim to which there are witnesses is exempt from bringing a guilt-offering for taking a false oath, since the witnesses will testify to the validity of the claimant’s claim and the denial of the defendant is of no consequence.

א"ל רב חנינא לרבה תניא דמסייע לך (ויקרא ה, כב) וכחש בה פרט למודה לאחד מן האחין או לאחד מן השותפין (ויקרא ה, כב) ונשבע על שקר פרט ללוה בשטר וללוה בעדים

Rav Ḥanina said to Rabba: A baraita is taught that supports your opinion: The verse states with regard to an oath denying a monetary claim: “And deal falsely therein” (Leviticus 5:22), which serves to exclude one who admits to the truth of the claim of one of a group of brothers or to one of a group of partners, even if he denies the claim to the rest of the brothers or partners. The same verse also states: “And swear to a lie,” which serves to exclude one who borrows money with a promissory note or one who borrows money in the presence of witnesses. Evidently, one is not liable for taking a false oath concerning a monetary claim when there are witnesses who can testify to it.

אמר ליה אי משום הא לא תסייען באומר לויתי ולא לויתי בעדים לויתי ולא לויתי בשטר

Rabba said to him: If your proof is because of that baraita, you have not supported us, since that baraita is referring to a case where the defendant says: I borrowed, but I did not borrow in the presence of witnesses, or he says: I borrowed, but I did not borrow with a promissory note. Since his denial is only with regard to the circumstances of the loan and not to the actual debt, he is exempt from liability for taking the false oath.

ממאי מדקתני וכחש בה פרט למודה לאחד מן האחין או לאחד מן השותפין האי לאחד מן האחין ה"ד אילימא דאודי ליה בפלגא דידיה הא איכא כפירה דאידך אלא לאו דאמרי ליה מתרוינן יזפת ואמר להו לא מחד מינייכו יזפי דהויא ליה כפירת דברים בעלמא ומדרישא כפירת דברים סיפא נמי כפירת דברים

Rabba elaborates: From where in the baraita is this explanation apparent? From the fact that it teaches that the verse “and deal falsely therein” serves to exclude one who admits to one of the brothers or to one of the partners. What are the circumstances of that case where one admits to one of the brothers? If we say that he admitted only the portion of the debt owed to that brother, then why is he exempt? Isn’t there the denial of the claim of the other brother, which is a denial of a monetary claim? Rather, is it not that the brothers said to him: You borrowed from both of us, and he said to them: No, I borrowed all of the amount in question from only one of you, which is merely a verbal denial, as he admits that he owes the claimed amount and disputes only the circumstances of the debt. And since the first clause of the baraita is referring to a case of a verbal denial, the last clause is also referring to a verbal denial. Consequently, one cannot cite a proof from this baraita.

(סימן חובה כיתות דבעל הבית חומר נזירא) ת"ש אינו חייב על שגגתה ומהו חייב על זדונה אשם בכסף שקלים מאי לאו זדון עדים לא זדון עצמו

The Gemara attempts to prove that one who takes a false oath on a deposit is liable to bring an offering even when there are witnesses, and presents a mnemonic to remember the series of proofs: Liability, sets, of the homeowner, stringent, nazirite. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: He is not liable for unwittingly taking a false oath by itself. And what is he liable for when he intentionally takes a false oath? He must bring a guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels. The Gemara continues: What, is it not referring to a case where he intentionally denies the claim of witnesses, and the mishna nevertheless teaches that he is liable to bring a guilt-offering? The Gemara rejects the proof: No, the mishna is referring to a case where there are no witnesses and he admits on his own that he intentionally took a false oath. Had there been witnesses, he would have been exempt from bringing an offering.

ת"ש היו שתי כתי עדים כפרה הראשונה ואחר כך כפרה השניה שתיהן חייבות מפני שיכולה עדות להתקיים בשתיהן בשלמא שניה תחייב דהא כפרה לה כת ראשונה אלא ראשונה אמאי מיחייבא

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (31b) that discusses an oath of testimony: If there were two sets of witnesses who took an oath of testimony, and the first set falsely denied knowledge of the matter and then the second set falsely denied knowledge of the matter, both are liable, because the testimony can exist with either of them. The Gemara clarifies: Granted, the second set should be liable, since the first set already denied knowledge of the incident and the validity of the claimant’s monetary claim now depends upon their testimony. But why is the first set liable?