Shevuot 22aשבועות כ״ב א
The William Davidson Talmudתלמוד מהדורת ויליאם דוידסון
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22aכ״ב א

תיפשוט דבעי רבא שבועה שלא אוכל ואכל עפר בכמה תפשוט עד דאיכא כזית כי קאמרינן במידי דבר אכילה קאמרינן

answer that which Rava asks with regard to one who says: On my oath I will not eat, and who then ate dirt. Rava’s question is: How much must he eat in order to be liable? Based on the Rabbis’ statement, you could answer that he is not liable unless there is an olive-bulk that he has eaten. The Gemara rejects this conclusion: When we say in the mishna that there are no cases where a person who eats less than a full measure is liable, we say it with regard to items that are edible.

והרי קונמות קונמות נמי כמפרש דמי:

The Gemara asks: But aren’t konamot an example of a case where one is liable for eating even less than an olive-bulk? The Gemara answers: Konamot are also like a case where he specifies that any amount is forbidden for consumption.

אמר להן היכן מצינו במדבר ומביא קרבן שזה מדבר ומביא קרבן: ולא והרי מגדף מדבר ואוסר קאמרינן והאי מדבר וחוטא הוא

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Akiva said to the Rabbis: Where do we find one who speaks and is liable to bring an offering for it, as this oath taker merely speaks, i.e., takes an oath, and brings an offering for it? The Gemara asks: And do we not? But isn’t a blasphemer liable to bring an offering according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva (see Karetot 7a)? The Gemara answers: We are speaking of one who speaks and in doing so generates a prohibition. And this one, the blasphemer, is merely one who speaks and sins but does not bring an offering.

והרי נזיר מביא קרבנו על דבורו קאמרינן והאי מביא קרבן לאשתרויי ליה חמרא הוא דקא מייתי

The Gemara challenges: But doesn’t a nazirite render wine forbidden to himself through speech, by making a vow? And he does bring an offering. The Gemara answers: We are speaking of one who brings an offering specifically for his speaking, and this one, the nazirite, brings an offering at the end of his naziriteship in order to permit wine to himself.

והרי הקדש אוסר לעצמו קאמרינן והאי אוסר על כל העולם כולו הוא

The Gemara challenges: But isn’t consecrated property a case where one renders an item forbidden via speech alone and brings an offering for its misuse? The Gemara answers: We are speaking of one who, by speaking, generates a prohibition for himself, and nevertheless brings an offering. And this one, who consecrates an item, generates a prohibition for the whole world.

הרי קונמות קסבר אין מעילה בקונמות

The Gemara challenges: Aren’t konamot an example of a case where one renders an item forbidden to himself by speech alone and brings an offering for using it? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva holds that there is no prohibition of misuse of consecrated property with regard to konamot.

אמר רבא מחלוקת בסתם אבל במפרש דברי הכל בכל שהוא מאי טעמא מפרש נמי כבריה דמי

§ Rava says: The dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis is with regard to where one took the oath without specifying that he is liable for eating any amount. But in a case where he specifies that his oath applies to any amount, everyone agrees that he is liable for eating any amount. What is the reason for this? One who specifies this renders any amount significant like a whole entity.

ואמר רבא מחלוקת בשלא אוכל אבל בשלא אטעום דברי הכל בכל שהוא פשיטא מהו דתימא ליטעום נמי כדאמרי אינשי קמ"ל

And Rava says: The dispute is with regard to a case where one takes an oath saying: On my oath I will not eat, but in a case where one says: On my oath I will not taste, all agree that he is liable for tasting any amount. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that he is liable in that case? Tasting has no defined measure. The Gemara answers: Rava nevertheless taught it, lest you say that even if one takes an oath saying: I will not taste, he is liable only if he eats an olive-bulk, as people say: To taste, as a way of saying: To eat. Therefore, Rava teaches us that this is not the case.

אמר רב פפא מחלוקת בשבועות אבל בקונמות דברי הכל בכל שהוא מאי טעמא קונמות נמי כיון דלא קא מדכר שמא דאכילה כדמפרש דמי

§ Rav Pappa says: The dispute in the mishna is with regard to oaths, but with regard to konamot, all agree that one is liable for eating any amount. What is the reason for this? Indeed, with regard to konamot, since in the vow he did not explicitly mention eating, which has a defined measure, but only that the item is forbidden to him like an offering, it is as if he specified that he is liable for eating any amount.

מיתיבי שני קונמות מצטרפין שתי שבועות אין מצטרפות ר' מאיר אומר קונמות כשבועות ואי סלקא דעתך חייב בכל שהוא למה לי לצרף

The Gemara raises an objection from that which is taught in a baraita: Items that are forbidden by two konamot combine to produce a full measure for which one is liable; items forbidden by two oaths do not so combine. Rabbi Meir says: Items forbidden by konamot are like those forbidden by oaths. The Gemara explains the objection: And if it enters your mind that with regard to items forbidden by konamot, one is liable for eating any amount, why do I need them to combine?

דאמר אכילה מזו עלי קונם אכילה מזו עלי קונם אי הכי אמאי מצטרפות סוף סוף זיל להכא ליכא שיעורא וזיל להכא ליכא שיעורא דאמר אכילה משתיהן עלי קונם

The Gemara answers: They combine in a case where he said: Eating from this one is konam for me; eating from that one is konam for me. Since he explicitly mentions eating, he is not liable unless he eats an olive-bulk. The Gemara asks: If so, why do they combine to produce a full measure? Ultimately, since he took two separate vows, go to this item and there is not a full measure, and go to that item and there is not a full measure. The Gemara answers: They combined to produce one full measure when he said: Eating from both of them is konam for me.

דכוותה גבי שבועות דאמר שבועה שלא אוכל משתיהן אמאי אין מצטרפין אמר רב פנחס שאני שבועות מתוך שחלוקות לחטאות אין מצטרפות

The Gemara asks: In the corresponding situation with regard to oaths, where he said: On my oath I will not eat from both of them, why do they not combine? Rav Pineḥas said: Oaths are different. Since two items that are forbidden by a single oath are distinct with regard to sin-offerings, in that one is liable to bring a sin-offering for eating each one, so too eating a small amount from each does not combine in order to produce a full measure.

אי הכי ר' מאיר אומר קונמות כשבועות בשלמא שבועות הואיל וחלוקות לחטאות אלא קונמות אמאי לא איפוך רבי מאיר אומר שבועות כקונמות ולית ליה לדרב פנחס

The Gemara asks: If so, how did Rabbi Meir say that items forbidden by konamot are like those forbidden by oaths and do not combine to produce a full measure? Granted that items forbidden by oaths do not combine, since they are distinct with regard to sin-offerings, but why do items forbidden by konamot not combine? The Gemara answers: Reverse the language so that the baraita has Rabbi Meir say: Items forbidden by oaths are like items forbidden by konamot. Neither combines to produce a full measure, and Rabbi Meir does not accept the statement of Rav Pineḥas that items forbidden by oaths are different.

רבינא אמר כי קאמר רב פפא לענין מלקות כי תניא ההיא לענין קרבן דבעינן שוה פרוטה

Ravina said: When Rav Pappa says that one is liable for eating any amount of an item forbidden by konamot, that is with regard to the matter of lashes. When it is taught in the baraita that items forbidden by konamot combine to produce a full measure, that is with regard to the matter of an offering for misuse of consecrated property, where we require that one derive benefit equal to the value of one peruta from the forbidden item.

למימרא דסברי רבנן יש מעילה בקונמות והתניא ככר זו הקדש ואכלה בין הוא בין חבירו מעל לפיכך יש לה פדיון ככר זו עלי הקדש (הרי) הוא מעל חבירו לא מעל לפיכך אין לה פדיון דברי ר"מ

The Gemara asks: Is that to say that the Sages hold that the halakhot of misuse of consecrated property extend to items forbidden by konamot? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: If one said: This loaf is consecrated, and subsequently ate it, then either he or another who ate it is liable for misusing consecrated property; consequently, since the loaf is consecrated, it is subject to redemption. If one said: This loaf is forbidden to me as if it were consecrated, i.e., it is konam for me, and then he ate it, he is liable for misusing consecrated property, but another is not liable for misusing consecrated property; consequently, since the loaf is not fully consecrated, it is not subject to redemption. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.