דבעי למיכתב בהמה וחיה לכדרבי כתיב נמי שרץ כדתנא דבי רבי ישמעאל כל פרשה שנאמרה ונשנית לא נשנית אלא בשביל דבר שנתחדש בה
the Torah needs to write both “domesticated animal” and “undomesticated animal” in the verse “or the carcass of a non-kosher undomesticated animal, or the carcass of a non-kosher domesticated animal” to teach that halakha that the school of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught (see 7a), “creeping animal” is also written, even though there is no novel element taught by the addition of that term. This is in accordance with what was taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael: Every passage in the Torah that was stated and repeated was repeated only for the novel element introduced therein. It is the style of the Torah to repeat an entire passage to teach even one additional halakha, in this case, that which was taught by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
ורבי אליעזר האי בה מאי עביד ליה פרט למתעסק
The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Eliezer, who maintains that in general it is not necessary that the unwitting transgressor know precisely which prohibition he violated, what does he do with the words “in which he sinned,” the words from which Rabbi Yehoshua learned that there is no liability to bring an offering unless he knows precisely which sin he committed? The Gemara answers: According to Rabbi Eliezer, these words emphasize the fact that one is liable only when he intends to do the prohibited act, to the exclusion of one who acts unawares and has no intention to perform the action. That is to say, if one was preoccupied with another matter and, acting unawares, he transgressed a prohibition, he is not liable to bring a sin-offering.
ורבי יוחנן אמר משמעות דורשין איכא בינייהו וכן אמר רב ששת משמעות דורשין איכא בינייהו דרב ששת מחליף דרבי אליעזר לרבי עקיבא ודרבי עקיבא לרבי אליעזר
Until now the Gemara has discussed Ḥizkiyya’s understanding of the practical difference between the opinions of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva in the mishna. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: There is no halakhic difference between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva, as they both agree that one must know the exact source of his ritual impurity. The difference between them is limited to the interpretation of the meaning of the verses, i.e., they disagree about the source in the Torah for this halakha. And similarly, it can be reasoned that Rav Sheshet says: The difference between them is limited to the interpretation of the meaning of the verses, as Rav Sheshet would switch the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer for that of Rabbi Akiva and that of Rabbi Akiva for that of Rabbi Eliezer. He was not meticulous in his attributions of the respective opinions, as he held that there is no halakhic difference between them.
בעא מיניה רבא מרב נחמן העלם זה וזה בידו מהו אמר ליה הרי העלם טומאה בידו וחייב אדרבה הרי העלם מקדש בידו ופטור
Rava asked Rav Naḥman: According to both Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva, if one had a lapse of awareness of both this and that, his having contracted ritual impurity and his having entered the Temple, what is the halakha? Rav Naḥman said to him: He has a lapse of awareness about his impurity, and therefore he is liable. The Gemara disputes this: On the contrary, he has a lapse of awareness about the Temple, and he should therefore be exempt.
אמר רב אשי חזינן אי מטומאה קא פריש הרי העלם טומאה בידו וחייב אי ממקדש קא פריש הרי העלם מקדש בידו ופטור אמר ליה רבינא לרב אשי כלום פריש ממקדש אלא משום טומאה כלום פריש מטומאה אלא משום מקדש אלא לא שנא
Rav Ashi said: We observe his behavior. If he leaves the Temple because of the impurity, i.e., when he is told that he is impure, it is clear that the lapse of awareness that he had is about the impurity, and he is liable. And if he leaves because of the Temple, i.e., when he is told that he is in the Temple, then the lapse of awareness that he had is about the Temple, and he is exempt. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: There is no indication from here; didn’t he leave because he became aware of the Temple only because he became aware also of the impurity? Otherwise, why would he leave the Temple? And didn’t he leave because he became aware of the impurity only because he became aware also of the Temple? Otherwise, why would he leave the Temple? Rather, there is no difference, so there is no indication from here.
תנו רבנן שני שבילין אחד טמא ואחד טהור והלך בראשון ולא נכנס בשני ונכנס חייב
§ The Gemara begins a discussion about another topic related to awareness of impurity. The Sages taught in a baraita: If there were two paths in a certain place, one of them impure, as a corpse was buried there, and the other one pure, but it was not clear which of the two paths was impure, and someone walked on the first path and did not then enter the Temple, and then afterward he walked on the second path, forgot that he was ritually impure, and entered the Temple, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, since he certainly contracted impurity on one of the paths and entered the Temple in a state of impurity.
הלך בראשון ונכנס הזה ושנה וטבל ואח"כ הלך בשני ונכנס חייב ר"ש פוטר ורבי שמעון בן יהודה פוטר בכולן משום ר' שמעון:
If he walked on the first path and entered the Temple, and on the third day he was sprinkled with waters of purification to purify him from the uncertain impurity imparted by a corpse, and on the seventh day he was sprinkled upon again, and he immersed himself in a ritual bath, thereby completing his purification, and then afterward he walked on the second path and entered the Temple, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, since one of the paths was certainly impure and he entered the Temple after having walked on it. Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt in this latter case, because neither time that he entered the Temple was it certain that he was impure, the first time because he might not yet have become impure, and the second time because he might already have purified himself. And Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda, in the name of Rabbi Shimon, deems him exempt in all of these cases.
The Gemara asks: Does Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda really exempt him in all of these cases,