לְמֵימְרָא דִּמְחַיֵּיב רַבִּי אַתּוֹלָדָה בִּמְקוֹם אָב? Is that to say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems one liable for a subcategory of prohibited labor when performed with a primary category of prohibited labor? After all, carrying out and carrying in constitute a primary category of prohibited labor and its subcategory.
וְהָתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: ״דְּבָרִים״ ״הַדְּבָרִים״ ״אֵלֶּה הַדְּבָרִים״ — אֵלּוּ שְׁלֹשִׁים וָתֵשַׁע מְלָאכוֹת שֶׁנֶּאֶמְרוּ לְמֹשֶׁה בְּסִינַי! Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that Shabbat is mentioned in the verse: “These are the things [eleh hadevarim] that God has commanded to perform them” (Exodus 35:1)? Several points are derived from the superfluous emphases in this verse. The Torah could simply have stated: This is a thing [davar]. When it states things [devarim] in the plural, it teaches at least two points. The addition of the definite article the in the term the things [hadevarim] adds at least a third point. The numerological value of letters of the word eleh, which are alef, one; lamed, thirty; and heh, five, is thirty-six. The phrase: These are the things, alludes to three plus thirty-six derivation, i.e., the thirty-nine prohibited labors that were stated to Moses at Sinai. Since Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maintains that there are a fixed number of primary categories of labor, he would certainly hold a person liable for the primary categories but not for the subcategories.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב יוֹסֵף: מָר אַהָא מַתְנֵי לַהּ, וְקַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אַדְּרַבִּי. אֲנַן אַדְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה מַתְנִינַן — וְלָא קַשְׁיָא לַן. Rav Yosef said to him: The Master taught Rav Yehuda’s statement with regard to this, and consequently, he encounters a difficulty. One statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi contradicts another statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. We learn the statement of Rav Yehuda with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and therefore there is no difficulty for us.
דְּתַנְיָא: מֵרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים וְעָבַר אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים — רַבִּי יְהוּדָה מְחַיֵּיב וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹטְרִין. As it was taught in a baraita: With regard to one who threw an object from the private domain to the public domain, and it traveled four cubits in the public domain, Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable and the Rabbis deem him exempt.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: מְחַיֵּיב הָיָה רַבִּי יְהוּדָה שְׁתַּיִם — אַחַת מִשּׁוּם הוֹצָאָה וְאַחַת מִשּׁוּם הַעֲבָרָה. דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ חֲדָא הוּא דִּמְחַיֵּיב, מִכְּלָל דְּרַבָּנַן פָּטְרִי לִגְמָרֵי? הָא אַפֵּיק לַהּ מֵרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים. מִמַּאי? דִּילְמָא לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה חֲדָא הוּא דִּמְחַיֵּיב, וְרַבָּנַן פָּטְרִי לִגְמָרֵי, וְהֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ? כְּגוֹן דְּאָמַר עַד דְּנָפְקָא לֵיהּ לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים תְּנוּח. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Rabbi Yehuda would deem him liable to bring two sin-offerings in this case, one for carrying out from the private domain into the public domain and one for carrying the object four cubits through the public domain. The Rabbis deem him exempt for carrying four cubits in the public domain. And it must be interpreted that way because if it would enter your mind to say that Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable to bring only one sin-offering, by inference, the Rabbis deem him completely exempt. How is that possible? Didn’t he carry an object out from the private domain into the public domain? This proof is rejected: And from where do you draw that conclusion? Perhaps I could actually say to you that Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable to bring one sin-offering and the Rabbis deem him completely exempt, and how do you find that circumstance? In a case where he said: My intention is that as soon it, the object, goes out into the public domain it will immediately come to rest.
וּבְהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה סָבַר: אָמְרִינַן קְלוּטָה כְּמָה שֶׁהוּנְּחָה, וְאִיתְעֲבִידָא לֵיהּ מַחְשַׁבְתּוֹ. וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: לָא אָמְרִינַן קְלוּטָה כְּמָה שֶׁהוּנְּחָה, וְלָא אִיתְעֲבִידָא לֵיהּ מַחְשַׁבְתּוֹ! אֲבָל אַתּוֹלָדָה בִּמְקוֹם אָב לָא מְחַיֵּיב רַבִּי יְהוּדָה. And they disagree with regard to this: Rabbi Yehuda maintains that we say: An object in airspace is considered at rest, and therefore his intention was fulfilled. As soon as the object enters the airspace of the public domain it is considered to have come to rest. And the Rabbis maintain that we do not say: An object in airspace is considered at rest, and therefore his intention was not fulfilled and he is exempt. However, Rabbi Yehuda does not hold one liable for a subcategory of labor performed together with a primary category of labor.
לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ, דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה מוֹסִיף אַף הַשּׁוֹבֵט וְהַמְדַקְדֵּק. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: שׁוֹבֵט הֲרֵי הוּא בִּכְלַל מֵיסֵךְ, מְדַקְדֵּק הֲרֵי הוּא בִּכְלַל אוֹרֵג. מַאי לָאו דְּעַבְדִינְהוּ לְתַרְוַויְיהוּ בַּהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי, וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ מְחַיֵּיב הָיָה רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אַתּוֹלָדָה בִּמְקוֹם אָב! The Gemara rejects this explanation: It could not enter your mind to say so, as it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda adds even lining up the threads of the warp and beating the threads of the woof to the list of primary categories of labor. The Rabbis said to him: Lining up is a subcategory subsumed under the primary category of stretching the threads of the warp within the loom, and beating is subsumed under the primary category of weaving. Is this not referring to a case where one performed both lining up and beating together, and learn from it that Rabbi Yehuda deems one liable for both a subcategory and a primary category of labor when they are performed together?
מִמַּאי? דִּילְמָא לְעוֹלָם דְּעַבְדַּהּ לְהָא לְחוּדַּהּ וְהָא לְחוּדַּהּ, וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אַתּוֹלָדָה בִּמְקוֹם אָב לָא מְחַיֵּיב, וּבְהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי: דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה סָבַר הָנֵי אָבוֹת נִינְהוּ, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי הָנֵי תּוֹלְדוֹת נִינְהוּ. The Gemara rejects this proof: And from where do you draw that conclusion? Perhaps it is actually referring to a case where one performed this action alone and this action alone, and Rabbi Yehuda does not deem one liable for a subcategory of labor performed together with a primary category of labor. And Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree with regard to this. Rabbi Yehuda maintains as follows: These actions of lining up and beating are additional primary categories of labor, and the Rabbis maintain as follows: These are subcategories.
תֵּדַע, דְּקָתָנֵי ״רַבִּי יְהוּדָה מוֹסִיף״. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא אָבוֹת, מַאי מוֹסִיף — מוֹסִיף אָבוֹת. אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ תּוֹלָדוֹת, מַאי מוֹסִיף? אִיתְּמַר נָמֵי, רַבָּה וְרַב יוֹסֵף דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: לֹא חִיֵּיב רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אֶלָּא אַחַת. Know that this is so, as the baraita teaches: Rabbi Yehuda adds. The Gemara explains this quote from the baraita: Granted, if you say that Rabbi Yehuda meant that these are primary categories of labor, what is the meaning of: He adds? It means he adds primary categories of labor. However, if you say that he meant that these are subcategories, what is the meaning of: He adds? It was also stated that it was Rabba and Rav Yosef who both said: Rabbi Yehuda deemed him liable to bring only one sin-offering.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: וּלְמַאי דִּסְלֵיק אַדַּעְתִּין מֵעִיקָּרָא דִּמְחַיֵּיב הָיָה רַבִּי יְהוּדָה שְׁתַּיִם? אִי לְהָכָא קָבָעֵי לַהּ — לְהָכָא לָא קָבָעֵי לַהּ. אִי לְהָכָא קָבָעֵי לַהּ — לְהָכָא לָא קָבָעֵי לַהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: בְּאוֹמֵר ״כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁתִּרְצֶה — תָּנוּחַ״. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: And according to what originally entered our mind that Rabbi Yehuda deemed him liable to bring two sin-offerings, how could he be liable for both carrying out from the private domain and for carrying four cubits in the public domain? If one only wanted the object to land here at the beginning of the public domain, he did not want it to land here, four cubits into the public domain. Conversely, if one only wanted the object to land here, four cubits into the public domain, he did not want it to land here, at the beginning of the public domain. Rav Ashi said to Ravina: It is possible in a case where one says: Any place that it wants to come to rest, let it come to rest. One indicated that his intention would be fulfilled wherever the thrown object lands.
פְּשִׁיטָא נִתְכַּוֵּון לִזְרוֹק שְׁמֹנֶה וְזָרַק אַרְבַּע — הֲרֵי כָּתַב ״שֵׁם״ מִשִּׁמְעוֹן. נִתְכַּוֵּון לִזְרוֹק אַרְבַּע וְזָרַק שְׁמֹנֶה — מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן: הָא אַפֵּיק לֵיהּ, אוֹ דִילְמָא: הֵיכָא דְּבָעֵי, הָא לָא נָח. וְלָאו הַיְינוּ דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי, וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ: בְּאוֹמֵר ״כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁתִּרְצֶה תָּנוּחַ״. Concerning throwing an object on Shabbat from one domain to another and within a single domain, the Gemara raises several issues with regard to intention when throwing. It is obvious that one who intended to throw an object eight cubits in a public domain and actually threw it only four cubits is liable because that case is similar to a case where one wrote the word shem, the first two letters of the name Shimon. In the case of writing shem, the individual performed the prohibited labor of writing a two-letter word, even though he did not complete the word that he originally intended to write. The question is as follows: What is the halakha if one intended to throw an object four cubits and threw it eight? Do we say he did indeed carry the object, or perhaps we say that ultimately the object did not land where he wanted it to land? But is that not precisely what Ravina said to Rav Ashi, as mentioned above? And Rav Ashi said in response that it is referring to a case where one says: Any place that it wants to come to rest, let it come to rest. In such a scenario one is liable, because he expressed the fact that he is contented with any labor that will be performed with the object.
וּדְקָאָמְרַתְּ הֲרֵי כָּתַב ״שֵׁם״ מִשִּׁמְעוֹן, מִי דָּמֵי? הָתָם כַּמָּה דְּלָא כְּתִיב ״שֵׁם״ לָא מִכְּתִיב לֵיהּ ״שִׁמְעוֹן״, הָכָא כַּמָּה דְּלָא זָרֵיק אַרְבַּע — לָא מִיזְדַּרְקִי לֵיהּ תַּמְנֵי?! Furthermore, the first case, which seems obvious, also requires clarification. And that which you said, that this is similar to a case where one wrote the word shem, the first two letters of the name Shimon, is it in fact similar? There, as long as the letters of shem, shin and mem, are not written, the name Shimon cannot be written. Here, where one intended to throw the object eight cubits and he threw it only four, is it true that as long as it was not thrown four cubits it cannot be thrown eight? An object can be thrown eight cubits without first landing after four cubits. The question remains unresolved.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַזּוֹרֵק מֵרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים וּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד בָּאֶמְצַע, אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת — חַיָּיב, The Sages taught: With regard to one who throws an object on Shabbat from the public domain to the other public domain through the private domain, he is liable if he throws an object a total of four cubits in both parts of the public domain.