Shabbat 92bשבת צ״ב ב
The William Davidson Talmudתלמוד מהדורת ויליאם דוידסון
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92bצ״ב ב

ואם תמצא לומר אנשי הוצל עושין כן בטלה דעתן אצל כל אדם:

And if you say that the people of Hotzal do so and therefore they should be liable, their intention is rendered irrelevant by the opinions of all other people.

מתני׳ המתכוין להוציא לפניו ובא לו לאחריו פטור לאחריו ובא לו לפניו חייב באמת אמרו האשה החוגרת בסינר בין מלפניה ובין מלאחריה חייבת שכן ראוי להיות חוזר רבי יהודה אומר אף מקבלי פתקין:

MISHNA: One who intends to carry out an object with the object before him, and as he was walking the object came to be carried behind him, is exempt. However, if he intended to carry it out behind him and it came to be carried before him, he is liable. In truth they said: A woman who girded herself in a pants-like sinar worn beneath the outer garments, whether she placed an object before her or behind her, and it came to be carried on the other side, she is liable, as it is common for the sinar to be reversed. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even those royal couriers, who receive notes [pittakin], carry those notes in their belts, and are not particular where on their belt they carry the notes (Rav Hai Gaon), are liable for carrying out the notes whether they carried them before them or behind them.

גמ׳ מאי שנא לפניו ובא לו לאחריו דפטור דלא אתעביד מחשבתו לאחריו ובא לו לפניו נמי הא לא אתעביד מחשבתו אמר רבי אלעזר תברא מי ששנה זו לא שנה זו אמר רבא ומאי קושיא דילמא לפניו ובא לו לאחריו היינו טעמא דפטור דנתכוון לשמירה מעולה ועלתה בידו שמירה פחותה לאחריו ובא לו לפניו היינו טעמא דחייב דנתכוון לשמירה פחותה ועלתה בידו שמירה מעולה

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is different about the case of one who intended to carry an object before him and it came to be carried behind him that he is exempt? The reason is that his intention was not realized. Since he did not perform the act that he intended to perform, he is exempt. If so, then even in the case of one who intended to carry an object behind him, and it came to be carried before him, he should also be exempt because his intention was not realized. Rabbi Elazar said: This mishna is disjointed, in the sense that it cites the opinions of two different Sages. He who taught this halakha did not teach that halakha. Rava said: And what difficulty is there here? Perhaps it can be explained as follows. With regard to one who intended to carry an object before him, and it came to be carried behind him, this is the reason that he is exempt: He intended to provide the object with outstanding protection, seeing it at all times, and ultimately he managed to provide the object with reduced protection. Since that was not his intention, it is not considered a prohibited labor and he is exempt. Whereas one who intended to carry an object behind him, and it came to be carried before him, this is the reason he is liable: He intended to provide the object with reduced protection, and ultimately he managed to provide the object with outstanding protection.

אלא מאי קושיא דיוקא דמתניתין קשיא המתכוין להוציא לפניו ובא לו לאחריו פטור הא לאחריו ובא לו לאחריו חייב אימא סיפא לאחריו ובא לו לפניו הוא דחייב הא לאחריו ובא לו לאחריו פטור אמר רבי אלעזר תברא מי ששנה זו לא שנה זו

Rather, what is the difficulty here? It is the inference inferred from the mishna that is difficult. One who intends to carry out an object before him, and the object came to be carried behind him, is exempt. By inference: One who intends to carry out an object behind him, and indeed, the object came to be carried behind him, is liable. Say the latter clause of the mishna: One who intends to carry out an object behind him, and it came to be carried before him, is the case where he is liable. By inference: One who intends to carry out an object behind him, and indeed, the object came to be carried behind him, is exempt. The inference from the first clause contradicts the inference from the latter clause. Rabbi Elazar said: This mishna is disjointed. He who taught this halakha did not teach that halakha.

אמר רב אשי מאי קושיא דילמא לא מיבעיא קאמר לא מיבעיא לאחריו ובא לו לאחריו דחייב דאיתעבידא מחשבתו אלא אפילו לאחריו ובא לו לפניו איצטריכא ליה סלקא דעתך אמינא הואיל ולא איתעביד מחשבתו לא ליחייב קא משמע לן דנתכוון לשמירה פחותה ועלתה בידו שמירה מעולה דחייב

Rav Ashi said: What difficulty is there here? Perhaps the mishna is stating the halakha utilizing the following didactic style: It was not necessary, and it should be understood as follows. It was not necessary to teach that a person who intended to carry the object behind him, and it came to be carried behind him, is liable. That is obvious because his intention was realized. However, it was necessary for the mishna to teach that even in a case where he intended to carry the object behind him, and it came to be carried before him, he is liable. It would have entered your mind to say: Since his intention was not realized, he should not be liable. Therefore, the mishna teaches us: Since he intended to provide the object with reduced protection, and ultimately he managed to provide the object with outstanding protection, he is liable.

ולאחריו ובא לו לאחריו תנאי היא דתניא המוציא מעות בפונדתו ופיה למעלה חייב פיה למטה רבי יהודה מחייב וחכמים פוטרין אמר להן רבי יהודה אי אתם מודים בלאחריו ובא לו לאחריו שהוא חייב ואמרו לו ואי אתה מודה כלאחר ידו ורגלו שהוא פטור

And the case where one intended to carry out the object behind him, and it came to be carried behind him, is the subject of a dispute between the tanna’im, as it was taught in a baraita: One who carried out coins in his money belt, and its opening was facing up, is liable because this is the typical method of carrying coins. However, if one carried it out with its opening facing down, Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable, and the Rabbis deem him exempt. Rabbi Yehuda said to the Rabbis: Do you not agree that in a case where one intends to carry the object behind him, and it came to be carried behind him, that he is liable? Apparently, one who intended to provide his object with reduced protection and realized that intention is liable. And they said to him: And do you not agree that one who carries out an object in a backhanded manner or with his foot is exempt? Apparently, carrying out an object in an atypical manner is not considered carrying.

אמר רבי יהודה אני אמרתי דבר אחד והן אמרו דבר אחד אני לא מצאתי תשובה לדבריהם והן לא מצאו תשובה לדברי מדקאמר להו אי אתם מודין לאו מכלל דפטרי רבנן וליטעמיך דקאמרי ליה אי אתה מודה מכלל דמחייב רבי יהודה והתניא לאחר ידו ורגלו דברי הכל פטור

Rabbi Yehuda said: I said one thing to the Rabbis in support of my opinion, and they said one thing to me. I did not find a response to their statement, and they did not find a response to my statement. From the fact that he said to them: Do you not agree that in a case where one intends to carry the object behind him, and it came to be carried behind him, he is liable? Can it not be inferred that the Sages deem one exempt in that case? Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis dispute this matter. The Gemara asks: And according to your reasoning, from the fact that the Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: Do you not agree that one who carries out an object in a backhanded manner is exempt, can it not be inferred that Rabbi Yehuda deems one liable, even for carrying out in a backhanded manner? Wasn’t it taught explicitly in a baraita: With regard to one who carries an object out in a backhanded manner or with his foot, everyone agrees that he is exempt?

אלא לאחריו ובא לו לאחריו דברי הכל חייב לאחר ידו ורגלו דברי הכל פטור כי פליגי בפונדתו ופיה למטה מר מדמי ליה לאחריו ובא לו לאחריו ומר מדמי ליה לאחר ידו ורגלו:

Rather, the baraita should be understood as follows. With regard to one who intended to carry an object behind him, and the object came to be carried out behind him, everyone agrees that he is liable. With regard to one who carried out an object in a backhanded manner or with his foot, everyone agrees that he is exempt. Where they disagree is in a case where one carried coins in his money belt with its opening facing down. This Master, Rabbi Yehuda, likens it to the case of one who intended to carry an object behind him and the object came to be carried out behind him, and deems him liable; and this Master, the Rabbis, liken it to the case of one who carried out an object in a backhanded manner or with his foot, and deems him exempt.

באמת אמרו האשה כו׳: [תנא כל באמת הלכה היא רבי יהודה אומר אף מקבלי פתקין]: תנא שכן לבלרי מלכות עושין כן

We learned in the mishna: In truth they said: A woman who girded herself in a pants-like sinar, whether she placed an object before her or behind her, and it came to be carried on the other side, she is liable. It was taught in the Tosefta: In every instance that the mishna employs the phrase: In truth, that is the undisputed halakha. And we learned in the mishna: Rabbi Yehuda says that even those who receive notes, i.e., royal couriers who transmit messages, place notes in their belts, and are not particular about which side the note is on (Rav Hai Gaon), are liable for carrying out notes, whether they carry the notes out in front of them or behind them. We learned a different explanation: Because the royal scribes do this, they place their notes on all sides of their belts.

מתני׳ המוציא ככר לרשות הרבים חייב הוציאוהו שנים פטורין לא יכול אחד להוציאו והוציאוהו שנים חייבין ורבי שמעון פוטר:

MISHNA: One who carries a large mass out to the public domain on Shabbat is liable. If two carried it out together, they are exempt because neither performed a complete prohibited labor. However, if one person is unable to carry it out alone, and therefore two people carried it out, they are liable. And Rabbi Shimon deems them exempt even in that case.

גמ׳ אמר רב יהודה אמר רב ואמרי לה אמר אביי ואמרי לה במתניתא תנא זה יכול וזה יכול רבי מאיר מחייב ורבי יהודה ורבי שמעון פוטרים זה אינו יכול וזה אינו יכול רבי יהודה ורבי מאיר מחייבים ורבי שמעון פוטר זה יכול וזה אינו יכול דברי הכל חייב

GEMARA: Rav Yehuda said that Rav said, and some say that Abaye said this, and some say that it was taught in a baraita: With regard to an action performed by two people, when this person is capable of performing it alone, and that person is capable of performing it alone, Rabbi Meir deems them liable, and Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon deem them exempt. If both this person is incapable and that person is incapable of performing the action alone, and therefore they performed it together, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir deem them liable, and Rabbi Shimon deems them exempt. If this person is capable, and that person is incapable, and they performed it together, everyone agrees that he is liable.

תניא נמי הכי המוציא ככר לרשות הרבים חייב הוציאו שנים רבי מאיר מחייב ורבי יהודה אומר אם לא יכול אחד להוציאו והוציאו שנים חייבין ואם לאו פטורים ורבי שמעון פוטר מנא הני מילי דתנו רבנן בעשתה העושה את כולה ולא העושה את מקצתה כיצד שנים שהיו אוחזין במלגז ולוגזין בכרכר ושובטין בקולמוס וכותבין בקנה והוציאו לרשות הרבים יכול יהו חייבין תלמוד לומר בעשתה העושה את כולה ולא העושה מקצתה

That was also taught in a baraita: One who carries a large mass out to the public domain on Shabbat is liable. If two carried it out together, Rabbi Meir deems them liable, and Rabbi Yehuda says: If one is incapable of carrying it out, and two carried it out, they are liable. And if not, if each person is capable of carrying it out himself, and nevertheless they carried it out together, they are exempt. And Rabbi Shimon deems them exempt even if neither was capable of performing the action alone. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? What is the biblical source of these halakhot? The Gemara answers that the source is as our Sages taught in Torat Kohanim, the halakhic midrash on Leviticus. It is written: “And if one person among the common people sins unwittingly by performing it, any one of God’s commandments not to be done, and be guilty” (Leviticus 4:27). The Gemara interpreted: “By performing it,” means that one who performs a transgression in its entirety is liable, and not one who performs part of it. How so? If two people were holding a pitchfork and gathering the stalks, or holding a shuttle and weaving the threads of the warp, or holding a quill and writing, or holding a reed and carrying it out to the public domain, I might have thought they are liable, therefore the verse states: “By performing it.” One who performs a transgression in its entirety is liable, and not one who performs only part of it.