דְּאִי בָּעֵי מְפַקַּע לֵיהּ וְשָׁקֵיל! בְּנִסְכָּא. וְכֵיוָן דְּאִיכָּא שְׁנָצִין, מַפֵּיק לֵיהּ עַד פּוּמֵּיהּ וְשָׁרֵי וְשָׁקֵיל, וּשְׁנָצִין אֲגִידִי מִגַּוַּאי! דְּלֵיכָּא שְׁנָצִין. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא דְּאִית לֵיהּ, וּמְכָרְכִי עִילָּוֵיהּ.
for if he wishes, he can tear the seam and take the money. The Gemara answers: Here, it is referring to long metal strips. As long as the entire purse is not in the public domain, he did not acquire any of the long strips, and he is not liable for theft. The Gemara asks: And since the purse has laces to close its opening, to be liable for theft it is sufficient that he carry it out so that its mouth is in the public domain, as he can untie the straps and remove the contents of the purse. And since the laces remain bound inside the private domain, he is not yet liable for violating the prohibition of Shabbat. The Gemara answers: This is referring to a case where the purse does not have laces. And if you wish, say instead that it is referring to a case where it has laces, and the laces are wound around the purse.
וְכֵן אָמַר רָבָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא בְּקוּפָּה מְלֵאָה קִישּׁוּאִין וְדִלּוּעִין, אֲבָל מְלֵאָה חַרְדָּל — חַיָּיב. אַלְמָא קָסָבַר אֶגֶד כְּלִי לָא שְׁמֵיהּ אֶגֶד. אַבָּיֵי אֲמַר: אֲפִילּוּ מְלֵאָה חַרְדָּל — פָּטוּר, אַלְמָא קָסָבַר אֶגֶד כְּלִי שְׁמֵיהּ אֶגֶד. קָם אַבָּיֵי בְּשִׁיטְתֵיהּ דְּרָבָא, קָם רָבָא בְּשִׁיטְתֵיהּ דְּאַבָּיֵי, וְרָמֵי דְּאַבָּיֵי אַדְּאַבָּיֵי, וְרָמֵי דְּרָבָא אַדְּרָבָא.
There is a dispute between Abaye and Rava that parallels the dispute between Ḥizkiya and Rabbi Yoḥanan. And, so too, Rava said: They only taught in the mishna that one is exempt with regard to carrying out a basket full of cucumbers and gourds. However, for carrying out a basket full of mustard seeds, he is liable. Apparently, Rava holds: fusion of several objects in a single vessel is not considered fusion. Abaye said: Even if the basket is full of mustard seeds, he is exempt. Apparently, Abaye holds: Fusion of several objects in a single vessel is considered fusion. The Gemara comments: Abaye later assumed the opinion of Rava, and Rava assumed the opinion of Abaye. And a contradiction is raised between one statement of Abaye and another statement of Abaye; and a contradiction is raised between one statement of Rava and another statement of Rava.
דְּאִיתְּמַר: הַמּוֹצִיא פֵּירוֹת לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: בַּיָּד — חַיָּיב, בִּכְלִי — פָּטוּר. וְרָבָא אָמַר: בַּיָּד — פָּטוּר, בִּכְלִי — חַיָּיב!
As it was stated that they disputed the matter of one who carries out fruit into the public domain. Abaye said: If he carried them out in his hand, he is liable even if the rest of his body remained in the private domain because fusion of several objects in his hand is not considered fusion. However, if he carried them out in a vessel, and part of the vessel remained in the private domain, he is exempt. And Rava said: If he carried them out in his hand, he is exempt because the legal status of his hand is determined by the status of the rest of the body. However, if he carried them out in a vessel, he is liable.
אֵיפוֹךְ: בַּיָּד — חַיָּיב. וְהָתְנַן: פָּשַׁט בַּעַל הַבַּיִת אֶת יָדוֹ לַחוּץ, וְנָטַל הֶעָנִי מִתּוֹכָהּ אוֹ שֶׁנָּתַן לְתוֹכָהּ וְהִכְנִיס — שְׁנֵיהֶן פְּטוּרִין. הָתָם — לְמַעְלָה מִשְּׁלֹשָׁה, הָכָא — לְמַטָּה מִשְּׁלֹשָׁה.
These are contrary to their opinions stated above. The Gemara answers: Reverse the opinions, and say that Rava was the one who said: If he carried it out in his hand, he is liable. The Gemara raises an objection. Didn’t we learn in the mishna: In a case where the homeowner extended his hand into the public domain, and either the poor person took an object from the homeowner’s hand and placed it in the public domain, or the poor person placed an object into the homeowner’s hand and the homeowner carried the object into the private domain, both are exempt. Apparently, one is not liable if he merely moved an object in his hand into the public domain. The Gemara answers: There, in the mishna, it is referring to a case where his hand was above three handbreadths from the ground. The object in his hand, therefore, does not have the legal status of having been placed on the ground, and he is exempt. Here, it is referring to a case where his hand was below three handbreadths off the ground. Anything that is within three handbreadths off the ground has the legal status of having been placed on the ground.
מַתְנִי׳ הַמּוֹצִיא, בֵּין בִּימִינוֹ בֵּין בִּשְׂמֹאלוֹ, בְּתוֹךְ חֵיקוֹ אוֹ עַל כְּתֵיפָיו — חַיָּיב, שֶׁכֵּן מַשָּׂא בְּנֵי קְהָת. כִּלְאַחַר יָדוֹ, בְּרַגְלוֹ, בְּפִיו וּבְמַרְפְּקוֹ, בְּאׇזְנוֹ וּבִשְׂעָרוֹ, וּבְפוּנְדָּתוֹ וּפִיהָ לְמַטָּה, בֵּין פּוּנְדָּתוֹ לַחֲלוּקוֹ, וּבִשְׂפַת חֲלוּקוֹ, בְּמִנְעָלוֹ, בְּסַנְדָּלוֹ — פָּטוּר, שֶׁלֹּא הוֹצִיא כְּדֶרֶךְ הַמּוֹצִיאִין.
MISHNA: One who carries out an object into the public domain on Shabbat, whether he carried it out in his right hand or in his left hand, whether he carried it in his lap or on his shoulders, he is liable. All of these are typical methods of carrying out an object, as this was the method of carrying the sacred vessels of the Tabernacle employed by the sons of Kehat in the desert. All labors prohibited on Shabbat are derived from the Tabernacle, including the prohibited labor of carrying out from domain to domain. But one who carries an object out in an unusual, backhanded manner, or with his foot, or with his mouth, or with his elbow, with his ear, or with his hair, or with his belt [punda] whose opening faced downward, or between his belt and his cloak, or with the hem of his cloak, or with his shoe, or with his sandal, he is exempt because he did not carry it out in a manner typical of those who carry.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: הַמּוֹצִיא מַשּׂאוֹי לְמַעְלָה מֵעֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים — חַיָּיב, שֶׁכֵּן מַשָּׂא בְּנֵי קְהָת. וּמַשָּׂא בְּנֵי קְהָת מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״עַל הַמִּשְׁכָּן וְעַל הַמִּזְבֵּחַ סָבִיב״ — מַקִּישׁ מִזְבֵּחַ לְמִשְׁכָּן: מָה מִשְׁכָּן עֶשֶׂר אַמּוֹת, אַף מִזְבֵּחַ עֶשֶׂר אַמּוֹת.
GEMARA: Rabbi Elazar said: One who carries out a load from the private domain to the public domain, even if he does so at a height above ten handbreadths, which is beyond the parameters of the public domain, he is liable, as this was the method of carrying utilized by the sons of Kehat. The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that the method of carrying utilized by the sons of Kehat was above ten handbreadths? The Gemara answers: For it is written about the Levites’ carrying: “And the hangings of the courtyard, and the screen for the courtyard entrance which surrounds the Tabernacle, and the altar, and its cords for all of its service” (Numbers 3:26). This verse juxtaposes the altar to the Tabernacle. It is derived that just as the Tabernacle was ten cubits high, so too, the altar was ten cubits high. The verse that indicates otherwise: “And you shall make the altar…and its height should be three cubits” (Exodus 27:1), must be understood differently.
וּמִשְׁכָּן גּוּפֵיהּ מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״עֶשֶׂר אַמּוֹת אֹרֶךְ הַקָּרֶשׁ״, וּכְתִיב: ״וַיִּפְרֹשׂ אֶת הָאֹהֶל עַל הַמִּשְׁכָּן״, וְאָמַר רַב: מֹשֶׁה רַבֵּינוּ פְּרָשׂוֹ. מִכָּאן אַתָּה לָמֵד גּוֹבְהָן שֶׁל לְוִיִּים עֶשֶׂר אַמּוֹת. וּגְמִירִי דְּכֹל טוּנָא דְּמִידְּלֵי בְּמוֹטוֹת — תִּילְתָּא מִלְּעֵיל וּתְרֵי תִּילְתֵי מִלְּתַחַת, אִישְׁתְּכַח דַּהֲוָה מִידְּלֵי טוּבָא.
The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that the Tabernacle itself was carried above ten handbreadths? The Gemara answers: As it is written: “And you shall make the boards for the Tabernacle out of acacia wood standing upright, the length of a board shall be ten cubits” (Exodus 26:15–16). And it is written with regard to the construction of the Tabernacle: “And he spread the tent over the Tabernacle, and he placed the cover for the tent on top of it as God commanded Moses” (Exodus 40:19). And Rav said: Moses, our teacher, spread it himself. From here you can derive that the height of the Levites was ten cubits. If Moses was capable of standing and spreading the cover over the tent by himself, he must have been at least ten cubits tall. Presumably, that was the height of the rest of the Levites as well. And they learned through tradition that every burden that is carried with poles, one-third of the burden is above the porter’s height, and two-thirds are below his height. It is found, then, that the altar was very high, as if they carried the altar on poles, the bottom of the altar was at least one-third of ten cubits, twenty handbreadths, off the ground.
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: מֵאָרוֹן. דְּאָמַר מָר: אָרוֹן תִּשְׁעָה וְכַפּוֹרֶת טֶפַח. הֲרֵי כָּאן עֲשָׂרָה, וּגְמִירִי דְּכֹל טוּנָא דְּמִידְּלֵי בְּמוֹטוֹת — תִּילְתָּא מִלְּעֵיל וּתְרֵי תִּילְתֵי מִלְּרַע, אִישְׁתְּכַח דְּמִלְּמַעְלָה מֵעֲשָׂרָה הֲוָה קָאֵי. וְלִיגְמַר מִמֹּשֶׁה? דִּילְמָא מֹשֶׁה שָׁאנֵי, דְּאָמַר מָר: אֵין הַשְּׁכִינָה שׁוֹרָה אֶלָּא עַל חָכָם גִּבּוֹר וְעָשִׁיר וּבַעַל קוֹמָה.
And if you wish, say instead that the Levites were not extraordinarily tall, and this can be derived from the Ark of the Covenant, as the Master said: The Ark itself was nine handbreadths tall as stated in the Torah, and the Ark-cover was one handbreadth, for a total of ten. And they learned through tradition that every burden that is carried with poles, one-third of the burden is above the porter’s height and two-thirds are below his height. It is found, then, that the bottom of the Ark stood ten handbreadths above the ground. The Gemara asks: And let us derive it from Moses, and why was the first proof insufficient? The Gemara answers: Perhaps Moses was different from the other Levites and taller than they were, as the Master said: The Divine Presence only rests upon a person who is wise, mighty, wealthy, and tall. Since the Divine Presence rested on Moses, he had to be tall.
אָמַר רַב מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי חִיָּיא: הַמּוֹצִיא מַשּׂאוֹי בְּשַׁבָּת עַל רֹאשׁוֹ — חַיָּיב חַטָּאת, שֶׁכֵּן אַנְשֵׁי הוּצָל עוֹשִׂין כֵּן. וְאַנְשֵׁי הוּצָל רוּבָּא דְעָלְמָא?! אֶלָּא, אִי אִיתְּמַר הָכִי אִיתְּמַר: אָמַר רַב מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי חִיָּיא: אֶחָד מִבְּנֵי הוּצָל שֶׁהוֹצִיא מַשּׂוֹי עַל רֹאשׁוֹ בְּשַׁבָּת — חַיָּיב, שֶׁכֵּן בְּנֵי עִירוֹ עוֹשִׂין כֵּן. וְתִיבְטַל דַּעְתּוֹ אֵצֶל כׇּל אָדָם! אֶלָּא, אִי אִיתְּמַר הָכִי אִיתְּמַר: הַמּוֹצִיא מַשּׂוֹי עַל רֹאשׁוֹ — פָּטוּר,
Rav said in the name of Rabbi Ḥiyya: One who carries out a burden on his head on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering, as the people of Hotzal do so. They would typically carry burdens on their heads. The Gemara asks: And do the people of Hotzal constitute the majority of the world? Even if in one place it is a typical method of carrying a burden, it remains an atypical method of carrying in the rest of the world. Rather, if this ruling was stated, it was stated as follows. Rav said in the name of Rabbi Ḥiyya: If a resident of Hotzal carried out a burden on his head on Shabbat he is liable, as the people of his city do so. The Gemara asks again: Even if the inhabitants of his city do this, let his intention be rendered irrelevant by the opinions of all other people. If an individual or small group of people conduct themselves in an atypical manner, their conduct is not rendered typical. Typical conduct is determined by the majority of people. Rather, if this was stated, it was stated as follows. One who carries out a burden on his head is exempt.