Shabbat 69aשבת ס״ט א
The William Davidson Talmudתלמוד מהדורת ויליאם דוידסון
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69aס״ט א

וכי תשגו ולא תעשו את כל המצות האלה וכתיב והנפש אשר תעשה ביד רמה הוקשו כולם לעבודה זרה מה להלן דבר שחייבים על זדונו כרת ושגגתו חטאת אף כל דבר שחייבין על זדונו כרת ועל שגגתו חטאת

“And if you err, and do not perform all these commandments that God spoke to Moses” (Numbers 15:22). The Sages understood this verse as referring specifically to the laws of idolatry. And it is written: “And the person who acts with a high hand, he blasphemes God and that soul shall be cut off from the midst of his people” (Numbers 15:30), from which we learn that all the mitzvot are derived from this juxtaposition to idolatry. Just as there, with regard to idolatry, the reference is to a matter which, for its intentional violation, one is liable to be punished with karet, as it is stated: “And that soul shall be cut off,” and for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering; so too, any matter that for its intentional violation one is liable to be punished with karet, for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.

ואלא מונבז שגגה במאי כגון ששגג בקרבן ורבנן שגגת קרבן לא שמה שגגה

The Gemara asks: However, according to Munbaz, who holds that included in the category of an unwitting sinner is one who at the time of action was aware that it was prohibited; if he were fully aware, in what sense was his action unwitting? The Gemara answers: It is referring to a case where he was unwitting with regard to the sacrifice. He was aware that he was committing a transgression for which one is liable to be punished with karet when performed intentionally; however, he was unaware that he would be liable to bring a sin-offering if he performed the transgression unwittingly. Since he was not aware of all punishments and forms of atonement associated with that transgression, he is considered an unwitting sinner and is liable to bring a sin-offering. The Gemara asks: And what do the Rabbis who disagree with Munbaz hold? They hold: Unwitting with regard to a sacrifice is not considered unwitting.

ורבנן שגגה במאי רבי יוחנן אמר כיון ששגג בכרת אף על פי שהזיד בלאו וריש לקיש אמר עד שישגוג בלאו וכרת אמר רבא מאי טעמא דרבי שמעון בן לקיש אמר קרא אשר לא תעשינה (בשגגה) ואשם עד שישגוג בלאו וכרת שבה

The Gemara asks: And in the opinion of the Rabbis, lack of awareness with regard to what aspects of the prohibition renders the action unwitting? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is an unwitting transgression since he was unwitting with regard to the fact that the punishment for his transgression is karet, even though he was aware that his action was in violation of a Torah prohibition, and he performed the transgression intentionally. And Reish Lakish said that according to the Rabbis it is not considered unwitting until he was unwitting with regard to both the prohibition and karet,i.e., he was unaware that his action was prohibited by Torah law. Rava said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish? The verse said: “And if one soul shall sin by mistake from the common people, by performing one of God’s commandments that may not be done, and he becomes guilty” (Leviticus 4:27), indicating that it is not considered unwitting until he was unwitting with regard to the prohibition and its concomitant karet. The verse indicates that the individual was unaware that he violated “one of the commandments that may not be done,” i.e., that there is a Torah prohibition with regard to that action.

ורבי יוחנן האי קרא דרבי שמעון בן לקיש מאי עביד ליה מיבעי ליה לכדתניא מעם הארץ פרט למשומד רבי שמעון בן אלעזר אומר משום רבי שמעון אשר לא תעשינה (בשגגה) ואשם השב מידיעתו מביא קרבן על שגגתו לא שב מידיעתו אינו מביא קרבן על שגגתו:

The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Yoḥanan do with that verse cited as proof by Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish? The Gemara answers: He needs it for that which was taught in a baraita: The phrase: “From the common people” (Leviticus 4:27) teaches that only some sinners, not all, bring sacrifices for their unwitting sins. It comes to exclude an apostate. When an apostate sins unwittingly, he is under no obligation to bring a sin-offering even after he repents. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: This halakha is derived from the phrase in that verse: “That may not be done, and he becomes guilty.” One who repents due to his awareness, i.e., one who repents as soon as he becomes aware that he performed a transgression, brings a sacrifice for his unwitting transgression. However, one who does not repent due to his awareness that he sinned, e.g., an apostate who continues to sin even after he becomes aware that he committed a transgression, does not bring an offering for his unwitting action. Rabbi Yoḥanan understood the verse in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.

תנן אבות מלאכות ארבעים חסר אחת והוינן בה מנינא למה לי ואמר רבי יוחנן שאם עשאן כולן בהעלם אחד חייב על כל אחת ואחת היכי משכחת לה בזדון שבת ושגגת מלאכות

The Gemara cites proof from what we learned in a mishna: The number of primary categories of prohibited labors on Shabbat is forty-less-one, which the mishna proceeds to list. And we discussed this mishna: Why do I need this tally of forty-less-one? Isn’t merely listing the prohibited labors sufficient? And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The tally was included to teach that if he performed all of the prohibited labors in the course of one lapse of awareness during which he was unaware of the prohibition involved, he is liable for each and every one. Therefore, the mishna indicated that one could conceivably be liable to bring thirty-nine sin-offerings. Under what circumstances can you find a case where one would be liable for unwittingly violating all thirty-nine labors? It must be in a case where with regard to Shabbat his actions were intentional, as he was aware that it was Shabbat; and with regard to the prohibited labors his actions were unwitting, as he was unaware that these labors are prohibited on Shabbat.

בשלמא לרבי יוחנן דאמר כיון ששגג בכרת אף על פי שהזיד בלאו משכחת לה כגון דידע לה לשבת בלאו אלא לרבי שמעון בן לקיש דאמר עד שישגוג בלאו ובכרת דידע ליה לשבת במאי דידעה בתחומין ואליבא דרבי עקיבא

Granted, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: Once he was unwitting with regard to the fact that the punishment for his transgression is karet, even though he was aware that his action was in violation of a Torah prohibition, and he performed the transgression intentionally, he is considered to have sinned unwittingly, you find that possibility in a case where he was aware that performing labor on Shabbat involves violation of a Torah prohibition, but he was unaware that the punishment for violating that prohibition is karet. However, according to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who said: It is not considered unwitting until he was unwitting with regard to both the prohibition and karet, the result is that he is completely unaware of all the prohibited labors of Shabbat. If so, when Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the case where one would be liable to bring thirty-nine sin-offerings is one where with regard to Shabbat, his actions were intentional as he was aware that it was Shabbat, the question arises: With regard to what aspect of Shabbat was he aware? If he was completely unaware of all the labors prohibited on Shabbat, in what sense were his actions intentional with regard to Shabbat? The Gemara answers: He was aware of the halakhot of the prohibition of Shabbat boundaries, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. According to Rabbi Akiva, the prohibition to go beyond a certain distance outside the city limits on Shabbat is by Torah law and not merely a rabbinic decree.

מאן תנא להא דתנו רבנן שגג בזה ובזה זהו שוגג האמור בתורה הזיד בזה ובזה זו היא מזיד האמור בתורה שגג בשבת והזיד במלאכות או ששגג במלאכות והזיד בשבת או שאמר יודע אני שמלאכה זו אסורה אבל איני יודע שחייבין עליה קרבן או לא חייב כמאן כמונבז

The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught this baraita? As the Sages taught: If one acted unwittingly with regard to both this, the fact that it is Shabbat, and that, the specific prohibited labors, that is the case of unwitting transgression stated in the Torah. If one acted intentionally with regard to both this and that, that is the case of intentional transgression stated in the Torah. If one acted unwittingly with regard to Shabbat and intentionally with regard to the labors, i.e., he forgot that it was Shabbat, but he was aware that those labors are prohibited when it is Shabbat; or if one acted unwittingly with regard to the labors and intentionally with regard to Shabbat, i.e., he was unaware that these labors are prohibited, but he was aware that labor is prohibited on Shabbat, or, even if he said: I know that this labor is prohibited on Shabbat; however, I do not know whether or not one is liable to bring a sacrifice for its performance, he is liable to bring a sin-offering like anyone who sins unwittingly. In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Munbaz, who holds that one is considered an unwitting sinner even in a case where he was unwitting only with regard to the sacrifice.

אמר אביי הכל מודים בשבועת ביטוי שאין חייבין עליה קרבן עד שישגוג בלאו שבה הכל מודים מאן רבי יוחנן פשיטא כי קאמר רבי יוחנן היכא דאיכא כרת אבל הכא דליכא כרת לא

Abaye said: Everyone agrees with regard to an oath on a statement, a case where one swore to prohibit or to obligate himself to perform an action, that the halakha is as follows: If he violates his oath he is only liable to bring an offering if he was unwitting with regard to its prohibition, i.e., he was unaware that it is prohibited by Torah law to violate an oath. The Gemara asks: To whose opinion is Abaye referring in the phrase: Everyone agrees? Certainly, it is the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan with regard to the opinion of the Rabbis in their dispute with Munbaz. Even though Rabbi Yoḥanan generally holds that the fact that one is unwitting with regard to karet is sufficient to render his action unwitting, the case of an oath is different. The Gemara asks: In the case of an oath, it is obvious that he would agree. When Rabbi Yoḥanan says that one need not be unwitting with regard to the prohibition, it is in a case where there is a prohibition punishable by karet; however, here, where there is no punishment of karet, Rabbi Yoḥanan would not say so. Obviously, he agrees that one must be unwitting with regard to the prohibition. There appears to be nothing new in Abaye’s statement.

סלקא דעתך אמינא הואיל וחייב קרבן חידוש הוא דבכל התורה כולה לא אשכחן לאו דמייתי עליה קרבן והכא מייתי כי שגג בקרבן נמי ליחייב

The Gemara explains: It might enter your mind to say the following: Since the obligation to bring an offering in the case of the oath is a novel halakha, as throughout the whole Torah in its entirety we do not find a prohibition for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring an offering and for whose intentional violation is not punishable by karet; and here, one is liable to bring an offering for its unwitting violation, I might have said that if he was unwitting, i.e., unaware that he would be obligated, with regard to the offering, let him be liable also according to the Rabbis, who disagree with Munbaz.