לָא מְחַיֵּיב רַבִּי אֶלָּא בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד מְקוֹרֶה, דְּאָמְרִינַן: בֵּיתָא כְּמַאן דְּמַלְיָא דָּמְיָא. אֲבָל שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְקוֹרֶה — לָא. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi only deemed him liable in the covered private domain, with a roof, as we say: The house is considered as one that is full? The entire house with all its space is considered one unit, and each part of it is considered as if it is filled with actual objects. Therefore, an object passing through the house is considered as if it landed on an actual surface of at least four by four handbreadths. However, in a private domain that is not covered, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not deem him liable.
וְכִי תֵּימָא הָכָא נָמֵי בִּמְקוֹרֶה — הָתִינַח בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד מְקוֹרֶה, בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים מְקוֹרֶה מִי חַיָּיב? וְהָאָמַר רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא אָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב: הַמַּעֲבִיר חֵפֶץ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים מְקוֹרֶה, פָּטוּר — לְפִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ דּוֹמֶה לְדִגְלֵי מִדְבָּר. And if you say: Here too our mishna is speaking about a covered domain, and therefore the lifting from and the placing on the hand are considered as if they were performed in a place that is four handbreadths; granted, in a covered private domain lifting from and placing in a hand are considered as if it were lifted from and placed onto an area of four by four handbreadths, but in a covered public domain is he liable at all? Didn’t Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda say that Rabbi Abba said that Rav Huna said that Rav said: One who carries an object four cubits from place to place in a covered public domain, even though transferring an object four cubits in the public domain is like carrying out from one domain to another and prohibited by Torah law, in this case, he is not liable? The reason is that since the covered public domain is not similar to the banners in the desert, i.e., the area in which the banners of the tribes of Israel passed in the desert. The labors prohibited on Shabbat are derived from the labors that were performed in the building of the Tabernacle during the encampment of Israel in the desert, and the desert was most definitely not covered. Consequently, even according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s opinion, it is impossible to explain that our mishna is referring to the case of a covered public domain.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: הָא מַנִּי? — אֲחֵרִים הִיא. דְּתַנְיָא: אֲחֵרִים אוֹמְרִים: עָמַד בִּמְקוֹמוֹ וְקִבֵּל — חַיָּיב, עָקַר מִמְּקוֹמוֹ וְקִבֵּל — פָּטוּר. עָמַד בִּמְקוֹמוֹ וְקִבֵּל — חַיָּיב, הָא בָּעֵינַן הַנָּחָה עַל גַּבֵּי מְקוֹם אַרְבָּעָה וְלֵיכָּא! אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ לָא בָּעֵינַן מְקוֹם אַרְבָּעָה. Rather, Rabbi Zeira said: There must be a different source for our mishna. Whose opinion is it in our mishna? It is the opinion of Aḥerim, as it was taught in a baraita: Aḥerim say: One who stood in his place on Shabbat and received an object thrown to him from another domain, the one who threw the object is liable for the prohibited labor of carrying out, as he both lifted and placed the object. However, if the one who received the object moved from his place, ran toward the object, and then received it in his hand, he, the one who threw it, is exempt. That is because, even though he performed an act of lifting, the placing of the object was facilitated by the action of the one who received it, and therefore the one who threw it did not perform the act of placing. In any case, according to the opinion of Aḥerim, if he stood in his place and received the object, the one who threw it is liable. Don’t we require placing upon an area of four by four handbreadths and there is none in this case? Rather, certainly conclude from this that according to Aḥerim we do not require an area of four by four.
וְדִילְמָא הַנָּחָה הוּא דְּלָא בָּעֵינַן, הָא עֲקִירָה בָּעֵינַן. וְהַנָּחָה נָמֵי, דִּילְמָא דִּפְשֵׁיט כַּנְפֵיהּ וְקַבְּלַהּ — דְּאִיכָּא נָמֵי הַנָּחָה. The Gemara rejects this: This is not a proof, and one could say: Perhaps it is specifically for placing that we do not require an area of four by four; however, for lifting we require an area of four by four in order to consider it significant. And with regard to placing as well, one could say: Perhaps it was performed in a manner in which he extended the corners of his coat and received it, so in that case there is also placing upon an area of four by four. Therefore, there is no proof from here.
אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא: מַתְנִיתִין, כְּגוֹן שֶׁקִּבֵּל בִּטְרַסְקָל וְהִנִּיחַ עַל גַּבֵּי טְרַסְקָל, דְּאִיכָּא נָמֵי הַנָּחָה. וְהָא ״יָדוֹ״ קָתָנֵי? — תְּנִי ״טְרַסְקָל שֶׁבְּיָדוֹ״. Rabbi Abba said: Our mishna is speaking about a special case where he received, i.e., lifted, the object that was in a basket [teraskal] and he placed it atop a basket. In that case, there is also placing performed upon an area of four by four handbreadths. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in the mishna: His hand? So how can you say that he received it in a basket? The Gemara answers: Emend the text of the mishna and teach: The basket in his hand.
הָתִינַח טְרַסְקָל בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד, אֶלָּא טְרַסְקָל שֶׁבִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים רְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד הוּא. The Gemara asks about this matter: Granted, when the basket was in the private domain, but if it was a basket that was placed in the public domain, doesn’t it immediately become the private domain? Presumably, the basket is ten handbreadths above the ground, and its surface is the requisite size for creating a private domain.
לֵימָא דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה. דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: נָעַץ קָנֶה בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים וּבְרֹאשׁוֹ טְרַסְקָל, זָרַק וְנָח עַל גַּבָּיו — חַיָּיב. Since that is not the explanation given, let us say that this is a proof that our mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. As it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: One who stuck a stick into the ground in the public domain, and hung a basket atop it, and threw an object from the public domain, and it landed upon it, he is liable, because he threw it from the public domain into the private domain. Since the surface of the basket is four by four handbreadths and it is ten handbreadths above the ground, it is considered a private domain. Even though the stick, which is serving as the base for this basket, is not four handbreadths wide, since the basket is that wide, we consider it as if the sides of the basket descend in a straight line. Consequently, a type of pillar of a private domain is formed in the public domain.
דְּאִי כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, פָּשַׁט בַּעַל הַבַּיִת אֶת יָדוֹ לַחוּץ וְנָתַן לְתוֹךְ יָדוֹ שֶׁל עָנִי אַמַּאי חַיָּיב? מֵרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד לִרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד קָא מַפֵּיק! Our mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, as if it were in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, in a case where the owner of the house extended his hand outside and placed an object in the basket in the hand of the poor person in the public domain, why is he liable? According to his opinion, the basket is considered a private domain and he, the owner of the house, is merely carrying out from private domain to private domain. This proves that the opinion of our mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda.
אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, הָתָם לְמַעְלָה מֵעֲשָׂרָה, הָכָא לְמַטָּה מֵעֲשָׂרָה. The Gemara answers: Even if you say that our mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, there, where we learned that a basket is considered like a private domain, was in a case in which the basket was above ten handbreadths off the ground. Here, in our mishna, the basket was below ten handbreadths off the ground. Even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, in a case where it is below ten handbreadths it is not considered a private domain, rather it is part of the public domain. Therefore, it is considered carrying out and he is liable.
קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: מִי קָתָנֵי ״טְרַסְקָל שֶׁבְּיָדוֹ״, וְהָא ״יָדוֹ״ קָתָנֵי! אֶלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: כְּגוֹן שֶׁשִּׁלְשֵׁל יָדוֹ לְמַטָּה מִשְּׁלֹשָׁה וְקִבְּלָהּ. The Gemara comments: Nevertheless, this explanation is difficult for Rabbi Abbahu: Was the language taught in the mishna: A basket in his hand? His hand, was taught. There is no reason to emend the mishna in that way. Rather, Rabbi Abbahu said: The mishna here is referring to a case where the poor person lowered his hand below three handbreadths off the ground and received that object in his hand. Below three handbreadths is considered, in all respects, to be appended to the ground and, therefore, a place of four by four handbreadths.
וְהָא ״עוֹמֵד״ קָתָנֵי? — בְּשׁוֹחֶה. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא — בְּגוּמָּא. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא — בְּנַנָּס. The Gemara asks: Didn’t the mishna teach: The poor person stands outside? If he is standing, how is it possible that his hand is within three handbreadths of the ground? Rabbi Abbahu answered: It is describing a case where he is bending down. In that case, his hand could be adjacent to the ground even though he is standing. And if you wish, say instead that it is possible in a case where the poor person is standing in a hole and his hand is adjacent to the ground. And if you wish, say instead a different depiction of the situation: The mishna is speaking about a case involving a midget [nanas], whose hands, even when standing, are within three handbreadths of the ground.
אָמַר רָבָא: אִיכְּפַל תַּנָּא לְאַשְׁמֹעִינַן כֹּל הָנֵי?! אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: יָדוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם חֲשׁוּבָה לוֹ כְּאַרְבָּעָה עַל אַרְבָּעָה. וְכֵן כִּי אֲתָא רָבִין, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: יָדוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם חֲשׁוּבָה לוֹ כְּאַרְבָּעָה עַל אַרְבָּעָה. About all of these Rava said: Did the tanna go to all that trouble in an effort to teach us all of these cases? It is difficult to accept that the tanna could not find a more conventional manner to explain the halakha. Rather, Rava said: The problem must be resolved by establishing the principle: A person’s hand is considered like four by four handbreadths for him. It is true that lifting and placing upon a significant place are required. However, even though a significant place is normally no less than four handbreadths, the hand of a person is significant enough for it to be considered a significant place as far as the halakhot of Shabbat are concerned. And, so too, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A person’s hand is considered four by four handbreadths for him.
אָמַר רַבִּי אָבִין אָמַר רַבִּי אִילְעַאי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: זָרַק חֵפֶץ וְנָח בְּתוֹךְ יָדוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ — חַיָּיב. מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? — יָדוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם חֲשׁוּבָה לוֹ כְּאַרְבָּעָה עַל אַרְבָּעָה? וְהָא אַמְרַהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן חֲדָא זִימְנָא? מַהוּ דְתֵימָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי, הֵיכָא דְּאַחְשְׁבַהּ הוּא לִידֵיהּ. אֲבָל הֵיכָא דְּלָא אַחְשְׁבַהּ הוּא לִידֵיהּ — אֵימָא לָא. קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן. Rabbi Avin said that Rabbi Elai said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who threw an object and it landed in the hand of another who is in a different domain is liable. The Gemara asks: What is he teaching us? What halakhic principle is conveyed through this statement? Is it that a person’s hand is considered four by four for him? Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan already say that one time? Why was it necessary to repeat it, albeit in a different context? The Gemara answers: It was necessary to teach the halakha cited by Rabbi Elai as well, lest you say that this, the principle that a person’s hand is significant, applies only where he himself deemed his hand significant by lifting or receiving an object with his hand. However, where he did not deem his hand significant, rather the object fell into another’s hand without his intention, perhaps the hand is not considered a significant place and he would not be liable. Therefore, he teaches us that the hand’s significance is absolute and not dependent upon the intention of the one initiating the action.
אָמַר רַבִּי אָבִין אָמַר רַבִּי אִילְעַאי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: עָמַד בִּמְקוֹמוֹ וְקִיבֵּל — חַיָּיב. עָקַר מִמְּקוֹמוֹ וְקִיבֵּל — פָּטוּר. תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי, אֲחֵרִים אוֹמְרִים: עָמַד בִּמְקוֹמוֹ וְקִיבֵּל — חַיָּיב. עָקַר מִמְּקוֹמוֹ וְקִיבֵּל — פָּטוּר. Rabbi Avin said that Rabbi Elai said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said additionally: One who stood in his place and received an object that was thrown to him from another domain, the one who threw it is liable. However, if he moved from his place and then received the object, the one who threw it is exempt. That was also taught in a baraita. Aḥerim say: If he stood in his place and received in his hand the object that was thrown from another domain, the one who threw it is liable. And if he moved from his place and received it, he is exempt.
בָּעֵי רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: זָרַק חֵפֶץ וְנֶעֱקַר הוּא מִמְּקוֹמוֹ וְחָזַר וְקִיבְּלוֹ — מַהוּ? Rabbi Yoḥanan raised a related dilemma: One who threw an object from one domain and moved from his place and ran to another domain and then received the same object in his hand in the second domain, what is his legal status?
מַאי קָמִבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ? אָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: ״שְׁנֵי כֹחוֹת בְּאָדָם אֶחָד״ קָא מִבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ. שְׁנֵי כֹחוֹת בְּאָדָם אֶחָד כְּאָדָם אֶחָד דָּמֵי, וְחַיָּיב, אוֹ דִילְמָא כִּשְׁנֵי בְנֵי אָדָם דָּמֵי, וּפָטוּר. תֵּיקוּ. To clarify the matter, the Gemara asks: What is his dilemma? Didn’t one person perform a complete act of lifting and placing? Rav Adda bar Ahava said: His dilemma was with regard to two forces in one person. Rabbi Yoḥanan raised a dilemma with regard to one who performs two separate actions rather than one continuous action. Are two forces in one person considered like one person, and he is liable? Or, perhaps they are considered like two people, and he is exempt? This dilemma remains unresolved and therefore, let it stand.
אָמַר רַבִּי אָבִין אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הִכְנִיס יָדוֹ לְתוֹךְ חֲצַר חֲבֵירוֹ וְקִיבֵּל מֵי גְשָׁמִים וְהוֹצִיא — חַיָּיב. מַתְקִיף לַהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא: מָה לִי הִטְעִינוֹ חֲבֵירוֹ, מָה לִי הִטְעִינוֹ שָׁמַיִם, אִיהוּ לָא עָבֵיד עֲקִירָה?! לָא תֵּימָא ״קִיבֵּל״ אֶלָּא ״קָלַט״. וְהָא בָּעֵינַן עֲקִירָה מֵעַל גַּבֵּי מְקוֹם אַרְבָּעָה, וְלֵיכָּא? Rabbi Avin said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If he brought his hand into the courtyard of another and received rainwater that fell at that time into his hand and carried it out to another domain, he is liable. Rabbi Zeira objects to this: What is the difference to me if his friend loaded him with an object, i.e., his friend placed an object in his hand, and what is the difference to me if Heaven loaded him with rainwater? In neither case did he perform an act of lifting. Why then should he be liable for carrying out from domain to domain? The Gemara answers: Do not say: He received rainwater, indicating that he passively received the rainwater in his hand. Rather, read: He actively gathered rainwater in his hand from the air, which is tantamount to lifting. The Gemara asks: In order to become liable, don’t we require lifting from atop an area of four handbreadths, and in this case there is none? How, therefore, would he be liable?
אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב הוּנָא: כְּגוֹן שֶׁקָּלַט מֵעַל גַּבֵּי הַכּוֹתֶל. עַל גַּבֵּי כּוֹתֶל נָמֵי, וְהָא לָא נָח! — כִּדְאָמַר רָבָא בְּכוֹתֶל מְשׁוּפָּע, הָכָא נָמֵי בְּכוֹתֶל מְשׁוּפָּע. וְהֵיכָא אִיתְּמַר דְּרָבָא — אַהָא דִּתְנַן: Rabbi Ḥiyya, son of Rav Huna, said: It is a case where he gathered the rainwater from atop and on the side of the wall, so he lifted it from a significant place. Therefore, it is considered an act of lifting, and he is liable. The Gemara questions: Atop a wall, too, the rain did not come to rest. Rather, it immediately and continuously flowed. If so, the lifting was not from the wall at all. The Gemara answers: As Rava said in another context that the case involves an inclined wall, here too the case involves an inclined wall. The Gemara asks: And where was this statement of Rava stated? It was stated with regard to that which we learned in a mishna: