השירים והנזמים והטבעות הרי הן ככל הכלים הנטלים בחצר ואמר עולא מה טעם הואיל ואיכא תורת כלי עליה הכא נמי הואיל ואיכא תורת כלי עליה אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק בריך רחמנא דלא כסיפיה רבא לרב אויא
bracelets, nose-rings and rings, although it is prohibited to go out into the public domain wearing them on Shabbat, they are like all the vessels that may be moved in the courtyard; in the private domain, one may move them and they are not set-aside. And Ulla said: What is the reason that it is permitted to move nose-rings in the yard? It is because the status of a vessel applies to it. Apparently, vessel status is sufficient to permit moving it on Shabbat. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Thank God that Rava did not embarrass Rav Avya and Rav Avya managed to successfully answer Rava’s questions.
רמי ליה אביי לרבה תניא מותר השמן שבנר ושבקערה אסור ורבי שמעון מתיר אלמא לרבי שמעון לית ליה מוקצה ורמינהו רבי שמעון אומר כל שאין מומו ניכר מערב יום טוב אין זה מן המוכן
Abaye raised a contradiction before Rabba citing two sources with regard to set-aside on Shabbat. It was taught in a baraita: With regard to the remaining oil that is in an oil lamp and in a bowl in which a wick was lit, it is prohibited to use it on Shabbat and Rabbi Shimon permits using it. Apparently, Rabbi Shimon is not of the opinion that there is a prohibition of set-aside. And a contradiction is raised from a parallel source, in which the Sages discussed the halakha of the firstborn of a kosher animal that developed a blemish on a Festival. The firstborn must be examinedto determine whether or not that type of blemish disqualifies the animal from being sacrificed as an offering. If it is disqualified, it may be redeemed, slaughtered, and eaten as non-sacred meat on the Festival. Rabbi Shimon says: Any firstborn animal whose blemish is not perceptible before the Festival is not among the animals prepared prior to the Festival for use on the Festival, and it is prohibited to slaughter it. Apparently, an item not prepared in advance has set-aside status according to Rabbi Shimon.
הכי השתא התם אדם יושב ומצפה אימתי תכבה נרו הכא אדם יושב ומצפה מתי יפול בו מום מימר אמר מי יימר דנפיל ביה מומא ואם תמצי לומר דנפיל ביה מומא מי יימר דנפיל ביה מום קבוע ואם תמצי לומר דנפל ביה מום קבוע מי יימר דמזדקק ליה חכם
Rabba said to him: How can you compare these cases? There, in the case of the lamp, a person sits and anticipates when his candle will be extinguished. It is clear to him that it will be extinguished, and he can safely assume that a certain amount of oil will remain in the lamp or the bowl. Here, does a person sit and anticipate when a blemish will befall his animal? The owner of the animal says: Who says that a blemish will befall his animal? And even if you say that a blemish will befall it, who says that a permanent blemish that would enable it to be slaughtered will befall it? And even if you say that a permanent blemish will befall it, who says that a Sage will agree to engage in examining the blemish? Since there are so many uncertainties involved, if the blemish is not perceptible before the Festival, the possibility of the firstborn animal becoming available does not enter a person’s mind at all.
מתיב רמי בר חמא מפירין נדרים בשבת [ונשאלין לנדרים שהן] לצורך השבת ואמאי לימא מי יימר דמיזדקק לה בעל
Rami bar Ḥama raised an objection to this last point from that which we learned in a mishna: One may nullify vows on Shabbat. A woman who vowed that certain food is prohibited to her, her husband can nullify her vow on Shabbat. And likewise one may request that a Sage find an opening to dissolve his vows, i.e., a factor that the one taking the vow failed to take into account or an element of regret, if that nullification or dissolution is for the purpose of Shabbat. The question arises: And why, after a man has nullified his wife’s vow, should she be permitted to eat that food? When the woman vowed not to eat that food, she consciously set it aside. Even if some way to dissolve the vow is found, the food should remain set-aside. On the basis of the same uncertainty that was raised above, say: Who says that her husband will agree to engage in nullifying her oath? Perhaps he will refuse to nullify it.
התם כדרב פנחס משמיה דרבא דאמר רב פנחס משמיה דרבא כל הנודרת על דעת בעלה היא נודרת
The Gemara answers: There, in the case of vows, it can be explained in accordance with that which Rav Pineḥas said in the name of Rava, who came to explain some of the fundamentals of the halakhot of vows, as Rav Pineḥas said in the name of Rava: Every woman who takes a vow, it is from the outset contingent on her husband’s consent that she takes the vow. Since she knows that her husband has the ability to nullify it, her vows are not absolute and their final validation comes only through her husband’s agreement. When a woman vows, she does not set aside the food absolutely from potential use.
תא שמע נשאלין לנדרים של צורך השבת בשבת ואמאי לימא מי יימר דמזדקק ליה חכם התם אי לא מיזדקק ליה חכם סגיא ליה בשלשה הדיוטות הכא מי יימר דמיזדקק ליה חכם
Moreover, the Gemara cites proof for this from that which was taught: Come and hear: One may request that a Sage dissolve his vows for the purpose of Shabbat on Shabbat, i.e., one who vowed on Shabbat that eating on that day is prohibited for him. And why is he permitted to eat something that was prohibited to him by his vow? Say again: Who says that the Sage will agree to engage in dissolution of his vow? Consequently, one has certainly diverted his attention from the food, set it aside, and it should be prohibited to eat it. The Gemara answers: Nevertheless, there is a difference, as there, in the halakhot of vows, even if the Sage does not agree to engage in dissolution of his vow, he can suffice with renouncing the vow before three common people. Even though it is preferable to have a Sage dissolve his vow, in exigent circumstances one may turn to a court of three common people to dissolve it. He will certainly find a way to dissolve his vow. However, here, in the case of the firstborn animal, who says that the Sage will agree to engage in examination of the blemish? In the halakhot of firstborn animals only an ordained Sage, who received special license to do so, is authorized to verify that it is a permanent blemish and permit redemption and slaughter of the animal as a non-sacred animal.
רמי ליה אביי לרב יוסף מי אמר רבי שמעון כבתה מותר לטלטלה כבתה אין לא כבתה לא מאי טעמא דילמא בהדי דנקיט לה כבתה הא שמעינן ליה לרבי שמעון דאמר דבר שאין מתכוין מותר דתניא רבי שמעון אומר גורר אדם כסא מטה וספסל ובלבד שלא יתכוין לעשות חריץ
Abaye raised a contradiction before Rav Yosef: Did Rabbi Shimon actually say that when a lamp is extinguished, it is permitted to move it on Shabbat? By inference: After it is extinguished, yes, moving it is permitted; so long as it is not extinguished, no, moving it is prohibited. What is the reason that it is prohibited to move a burning candle? It is due to concern that perhaps, as he moves the lamp, the flame will be extinguished. However, is Rabbi Shimon really concerned that a flame will be extinguished under those circumstances? Didn’t we learn that Rabbi Shimon stated a principle: An unintentional act, a permitted action from which an unintended prohibited labor ensues on Shabbat, since he did not intend to perform the prohibited action, is permitted? As it was taught in a baraita, Rabbi Shimon says: A person may drag a bed, chair, and bench on the ground, as long as he does not intend to make a furrow in the ground. Even if a furrow is formed inadvertently, one need not be concerned. Since that was not his intention, there is no prohibition according to Rabbi Shimon. Consequently, according to Rabbi Shimon there should be no prohibition in moving a burning candle, even though it may be extinguished. Since that is not the intention of the one moving it, no prohibition would be violated.
כל היכא דכי מיכוין איכא איסורא דאורייתא כי לא מיכוין גזר רבי שמעון מדרבנן כל היכא דכי מיכוין איכא איסורא דרבנן כי לא מיכוין שרי רבי שמעון לכתחילה
The Gemara answers that there is a distinction between the cases: In every case where if he intends to perform the action, there is a prohibition by Torah law, e.g. extinguishing a candle; even when he does not intend to do so, Rabbi Shimon issued a decree prohibiting it by rabbinic law. However, in every case where even if he intends to perform the action, there is merely a prohibition by rabbinic law, e.g., digging a furrow which is not a full-fledged act of plowing that is prohibited by Torah law, but is prohibited only by rabbinic law, when he does not intend to perform the action, Rabbi Shimon even permits performing this action ab initio.
מתיב רבא מוכרי כסות מוכרין כדרכן ובלבד שלא יתכוין בחמה מפני החמה ובגשמים מפני הגשמים והצנועין מפשילין במקל לאחוריהן והא הכא דכי מיכוין איסורא דאורייתא איכא כי לא מיכוין שרי רבי שמעון לכתחילה
Rava raised an objection to this distinction from that which we learned in a mishna: Clothing merchants who sell garments made of diverse kinds, a prohibited mixture of wool and linen, may sell them as they normally would to gentiles. A merchant may place the garments he is selling on his shoulders and need not be concerned about the prohibition against wearing diverse kinds, as long as the merchant does not intend to benefit from the garments in the sun as protection from the sun, or in the rain as protection from the rain. However, the modest people, those who are particularly meticulous in their performance of mitzvot, would suspend the wool and linen garments on a stick behind them. And here, isn’t it a case where if one intends to wear the clothing, there is a prohibition by Torah law, and even so when he does not intend to wear it, Rabbi Shimon permits it ab initio. Apparently, Rabbi Shimon does not distinguish between cases on that basis.
אלא אמר רבא
Rather, Rava said a different explanation for Rabbi Shimon’s prohibition in the case of an oil lamp: