Shabbat 154aשבת קנ״ד א
The William Davidson Talmudתלמוד מהדורת ויליאם דוידסון
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154aקנ״ד א

רב זביד מתני הכי אמר רמי בר חמא המחמר אחר בהמה בשבת בשוגג אינו חייב חטאת במזיד חייב סקילה

Rav Zevid taught this as follows. Rami bar Ḥama said: With regard to one who drives his laden animal on Shabbat, if he does so unwittingly, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, and if he does so intentionally, he is liable to be executed by stoning.

מתיב רבא המחלל את השבת בדבר שחייבין על שגגתו חטאת חייבין על זדונו סקילה הא אין חייבין על שגגתו חטאת אין חייבין על זדונו סקילה

Rava raised an objection based on that which was taught in a baraita: One who desecrates Shabbat by performing a matter that for its unwitting performance one is liable to bring a sin-offering, then for its intentional performance one is liable to be executed by stoning. The Gemara explains: By inference, for a matter that for its unwitting performance one is not liable to bring a sin-offering, for its intentional performance one is not liable to be executed by stoning. This contradicts Rami bar Ḥama’s statement.

מי קתני הא אין חייבין כו׳ הכי קאמר דבר שחייבין על שגגתו חטאת חייבין על זדונו סקילה ויש דבר שאין חייבין על שגגתו חטאת וחייבין על זדונו סקילה ומאי ניהו מחמר

The Gemara answers: Was it taught in the baraita: By inference, for a matter that for its unwitting performance one is not liable to bring a sin-offering, for its intentional performance one is not liable to be executed by stoning? The baraita can be understood differently, and this is what it is saying: With regard to a matter that for its unwitting performance one is liable to bring a sin-offering, for its intentional performance one is always liable to be executed by stoning. However, there is also a matter that for its unwitting performance one is not liable to bring a sin-offering, and nevertheless, for its intentional performance one is liable to be executed by stoning. And what is that case? It is the case of driving a laden animal.

רבא אחוה דרב מרי בר רחל ואמרי לה אבוה דרב מרי בר רחל ללישנא בתרא קשיא הא דרב אכשריה לרב מרי בר רחל ומנייה בפורסיה דבבל דילמא תרי מרי בר רחל הוו

Rava, the brother of Rav Mari bar Raḥel, cites a different opinion with regard to the halakha of driving a laden animal on Shabbat, and some say that he was the father of Rav Mari bar Raḥel and stated this halakha. As an aside, the Gemara comments: According to the latter version above, that Rava was the father of Rav Mari bar Raḥel, the fact that Rav needed to validate the status of Rav Mari bar Raḥel and only then appoint him as an official [pursei] of Babylonia is difficult. This incident teaches that Rav Mari bar Raḥel’s father was not Jewish, and before he could be appointed his status required validation through the fact that his mother was Jewish. If Rav Mari bar Raḥel’s father was a sage named Rava, why was it necessary to validate his status by means of his mother’s lineage? The Gemara answers: Perhaps there were two people named Mari bar Raḥel. One was the son of a convert and a Jewish mother, and the other was the son of a Sage named Rava.

הוה מתני לה להא שמעתיה משמיה דרבי יוחנן לפטור אמר רבי יוחנן המחמר אחר בהמתו בשבת פטור מכלום

In any event, that Sage taught his halakha in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan to exempt one who drives a laden animal, as Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who drives a laden animal on Shabbat is exempt from any punishment.

בשוגג לא מחייב חטאת דהוקשה כל התורה כולה לעבודה זרה במזיד נמי לא מיחייב דתנן המחלל את השבת בדבר שחייבין על שגגתו חטאת ועל זדונו סקילה הא אין חייבין על שגגתו חטאת אין חייבין על זדונו סקילה

The Gemara explains: For driving the animal unwittingly, he is not liable to bring a sin-offering because all of the prohibitions in the Torah were juxtaposed to the prohibition of idolatry, from which the principle is derived that one is liable only for actions that he himself performed. And for driving the animal intentionally, he is also not liable to be executed by stoning, as we learned in the mishna: One who desecrates Shabbat by performing a matter that for its unwitting performance one is liable to bring a sin-offering, and for its intentional performance one is liable to be executed by stoning. By inference, for a matter that for its unwitting performance one is not liable to bring a sin-offering, for its intentional performance one is not liable to be executed by stoning.

בלאו נמי לא מיחייב דהוה ליה לאו שניתן לאזהרת מיתת בית דין וכל לאו שניתן לאזהרת מיתת בית דין אין לוקין עליו

And similarly, he is not even liable to be flogged for violating a Torah prohibition for which the punishment is lashes. Even though the Torah explicitly warns against performing labor on Shabbat, it is a prohibition that was fundamentally given, not as a standard prohibition punishable by lashes, but rather as a warning of court-imposed capital punishment, and for any prohibition that was given as a warning of court-imposed capital punishment, if the death penalty is not imposed for any reason, one is not flogged for its violation.