Shabbat 131aשבת קל״א א
The William Davidson Talmudתלמוד מהדורת ויליאם דוידסון
Save "Shabbat 131a"
Toggle Reader Menu Display Settings
131aקל״א א

בתים וחצרות פתוחין לתוכו והכא בתים איכא חצרות ליכא כי לא עירבו נמי ליחזינהו להני בתים כמאן דסתימי דמו וחצרות איכא ובתים ליכא

houses and courtyards open to it, and each courtyard contains at least two houses, and there are at least two courtyards. And here, there are houses but there are no courtyards, and therefore the standard halakhot of a closed alleyway do not apply. However, if that is the case, when they did not join the courtyards with the houses too, let us consider these houses as though they were sealed, because their residents may not carry from their houses into the courtyards, and the houses should be considered irrelevant. Therefore, in that case too, there are courtyards but there are no houses.

אפשר דמבטלי ליה רשותא דכולהו לגבי חד סוף סוף בית איכא בתים ליכא

The Gemara answers: In that case it is possible for them to renounce all of their property rights and transfer them to one person. Just as the residents of a courtyard can join together, thereby rendering it permitted to carry in the courtyard, they can also relinquish their property rights to a single resident. In that way, it is considered as though there is only one inhabited house in the courtyard, and it is therefore permitted to carry within the courtyard as well as between that particular house and the courtyard. The Gemara rejects this answer: Ultimately, even in that case, there is one house, yet there are not multiple houses, as it is possible to relinquish one’s privileges to only one homeowner and not to two. This would fail to meet the minimum requirement of two houses for the area to be considered a courtyard.

אפשר דמצפרא ועד פלגא דיומא לגבי חד מפלגיה דיומא ולפניא לגבי חד סוף סוף בעידנא דאיתיה להאי ליתיה להאי אלא אמר רב אשי מי גרם לחצרות שיאסרו בתים וליכא

The Gemara answers: It is possible to resolve this: From morning until midday they can relinquish their rights to one, and from midday until evening they can relinquish their rights to another, and as a result there will be two houses. The Gemara rejects this answer: Ultimately, at the time when this house has the ownership rights, that house does not have them, as at any point in time there is only one house from which it is permitted to carry into the courtyard. Rather, Rav Ashi said: The explanation that there are no houses and courtyards here is rejected, and the explanation is: What caused the courtyards to be prohibited? It is the presence of the houses. Had there been no houses, it would have been permitted to carry from the courtyards into the alleyway, since they are one domain according to Rabbi Shimon. And here, it is considered as though there are no houses. Therefore, it is permitted to carry in the alleyway.

אמר רבי חייא בר אבא אמר רבי יוחנן לא לכל אמר רבי אליעזר מכשירי מצוה דוחין את השבת שהרי שתי הלחם חובת היום הן ולא למדן רבי אליעזר אלא מגזירה שוה דתניא רבי אליעזר אומר מניין למכשירי שתי הלחם שדוחין את השבת נאמרה הבאה בעומר ונאמרה הבאה בשתי הלחם מה הבאה האמורה בעומר מכשירין דוחין את השבת אף הבאה האמורה בשתי הלחם מכשירין דוחין את השבת

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Rabbi Eliezer did not say with regard to all mitzvot that actions that facilitate performance of a mitzva override Shabbat. This is not a fixed principle with regard to preparations for all mitzvot. Rather, each case must be considered on its own merits, and proof must be cited that this principle applies to a specific mitzva. As the two loaves offered on the festival of Shavuot are an obligation of that day, and Rabbi Eliezer only learned that the activities that facilitate their sacrifice override Shabbat from a special verbal analogy. As it was taught in a baraita, Rabbi Eliezer says: From where is it derived that the actions that facilitate the offering of the two loaves override Shabbat? The term bringing is stated in the verse with regard to the omer offering, and the term bringing is stated with regard to the two loaves. Just as in the case of the bringing stated with regard to the omer, all the actions that facilitate its offering override Shabbat, as the reaping of the omer, which facilitates its offering, overrides Shabbat, so too, in the case of the bringing stated with regard to the two loaves, actions that facilitate its offering override Shabbat.

מופני דאי לא מופני איכא למיפרך מה לעומר שכן אם מצא קצור קוצר תאמר בשתי הלחם שאם מצא קצור אינו קוצר לאי אפנויי מופני מכדי כתיב והבאתם את עומר ראשית קצירכם אל הכהן ביום הביאכם למה לי שמע מינה לאפנויי

With regard to this verbal analogy the Gemara comments: It must be that those terms are free, i.e., they are superfluous in their context and therefore available for the purpose of establishing a verbal analogy. As, if they are not free, the verbal analogy can be logically refuted, as it is possible to say: What is unique to the omer? That if one found reaped barley one must nevertheless reap more barley for the sake of the mitzva. Can you say the same with regard to the halakhot of the two loaves, where it is taught that if one found reaped grain one need not reap additional grain for the sacrifice? Apparently, the halakhot of the offering of the two loaves are not parallel to those of the omer. The same might be true with regard to actions that facilitate the performance of the mitzva. In truth, the verse is free for establishing the verbal analogy. The Gemara explains: Since the verse already states: “When you come to the land that I am giving to you, and you reap its harvest, then you shall bring the sheaf [omer], the first of your harvest to the priest” (Leviticus 23:10), when the verse restates, “And you shall count for yourselves from the morrow after the day of rest, from the day you have brought the sheaf of the waving, seven whole weeks they shall be” (Leviticus 23:15), why do I need this repetition? Conclude from this that the additional statement is there to render the term “bringing” free for establishing a verbal analogy.

ואכתי מופנה מצד אחד הוא ושמעינן ליה לרבי אליעזר דאמר מופנה מצד אחד למידין ומשיבין תביאו רבויא הוא

And yet there is still a difficulty: The verbal analogy is free only from one side, as only the verse that mentions bringing in the context of the omer offering is superfluous in its context, and we heard Rabbi Eliezer, who said with regard to a verbal analogy that it is only free from one side, that one can derive from it, and one can also refute it logically. The Gemara answers: There is a superfluous usage of the term with regard to the two loaves as well, as in the verse: “From your dwelling places you shall bring the loaves of waving of two tenth parts of an ephah; they shall be of fine flour, they shall be baked with leaven for first-fruits unto the Lord” (Leviticus 23:17) the phrase: “You shall bring” is an amplification. Since it was mentioned in the previous verse it is superfluous in its context. Consequently, the verbal analogy is available from both sides.

למעוטי מאי אילימא למעוטי לולב והתניא לולב וכל מכשיריו דוחין את השבת דברי רבי אליעזר ואלא למעוטי סוכה והתניא סוכה וכל מכשיריה דוחין את השבת דברי רבי אליעזר ואלא למעוטי מצה והתניא מצה וכל מכשיריה דוחין את השבת דברי רבי אליעזר ואלא למעוטי שופר והתניא שופר וכל מכשיריו דוחין את השבת דברי רבי אליעזר

The Gemara poses a question with regard to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement: Rabbi Eliezer did not say with regard to all mitzvot that actions that facilitate performance of a mitzva override Shabbat; to exclude actions that facilitate the performance of what mitzva was he referring?
If you say that it was to exclude actions that facilitate the performance of the mitzva of taking the palm branch [lulav] and the other three species on the festival of Sukkot, wasn’t it taught in a baraita: The mitzva of lulav and all its facilitators override Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer?
Rather, say that it comes to exclude the mitzva to dwell in a sukka on Sukkot. Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: The mitzva of sukka and all its facilitators override Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer?
Rather, say that it comes to exclude the mitzva to eat matza on Passover. Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: The mitzva of matza and all its facilitators override Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer?
Rather, say that it comes to exclude the mitzva to sound the shofar on Rosh HaShana. But wasn’t it taught in a baraita: The mitzva of shofar and all its facilitators override Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer?

אמר רב אדא בר אהבה למעוטי ציצית לטליתו ומזוזה לפתחו תניא נמי הכי ושוין שאם צייץ טליתו ועשה מזוזה לפתחו שהוא חייב

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: The statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan comes to exclude attaching ritual fringes to his garment and affixing a mezuza to the doorway, which do not override Shabbat. The Gemara notes that that was also taught in a baraita: And they, Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis, agree that if one attached ritual fringes to his garment on Shabbat, and similarly, if one affixed a mezuza to his doorway on Shabbat, that he is liable.

מאי טעמא אמר רב יוסף לפי שאין קבוע להם זמן אמר ליה אביי אדרבה מדאין קבוע להם זמן

The Gemara asks: What is the reason that Rabbi Eliezer concedes that actions that facilitate the performance of these mitzvot do not override Shabbat? Rav Yosef said: Because they have no fixed time and these mitzvot need not be performed on Shabbat. Abaye said to him: On the contrary, from the fact that they have no fixed time,