רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: עֲמוּקָּה עֲשָׂרָה, וְאֵין גְּבוֹהָה עֲשָׂרָה — מִטַּלְטְלִין מִתּוֹכָהּ לַיָּם, אֲבָל לֹא מִן הַיָּם לְתוֹכָהּ. מַאי שְׁנָא מִן הַיָּם לְתוֹכָהּ דְּלָא — דְּקָא מְטַלְטְלִין מִכַּרְמְלִית לִרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד, מִתּוֹכָהּ לַיָּם — נָמֵי קָמְטַלְטֵל מֵרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד לְכַרְמְלִית! אֶלָּא לָאו אַחוּדָּהּ. וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ כֹּחוֹ בְּכַרְמְלִית לָא גְּזַרוּ. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
Rabbi Yehuda says: If the interior of the boat is ten handbreadths deep and it is not ten handbreadths above the surface of the water, one may carry from it into the sea, but not from the sea into it. The Gemara asks: What is different about carrying from the sea into the ship that one may not do so? Is it because in doing so one is carrying from a karmelit into the private domain? In carrying from the ship into the sea, one is also carrying from the private domain into a karmelit. Rather, is it not that from the ship to the sea is permitted because one throws the object onto the edge of the boat and it falls into the sea on its own, and learn from it that the Sages did not issue a decree prohibiting an action caused indirectly by one’s power in a karmelit? The Gemara summarizes: Indeed, learn from it that this is so.
אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: הָנֵי בִּיצִיָּאתָא דְמֵישָׁן אֵין מְטַלְטְלִין בָּהֶן אֶלָּא בְּאַרְבַּע [אַמּוֹת]. וְלָא אֲמַרַן אֶלָּא שֶׁאֵין בְּפָחוֹת מִשְּׁלֹשָׁה אַרְבָּעָה, אֲבָל יֵשׁ בְּפָחוֹת מִשְּׁלֹשָׁה אַרְבָּעָה — לֵית לַן בַּהּ. וְאִי מְלָנְהוּ קְנֵי וְאוּרְבָּנֵי — לֵית לַן בַּהּ.
Rav Huna said: With regard to those small boats of Meishan, which are wide on top and narrow at the bottom, one may carry in them only within four cubits. Because they are less than four handbreadths wide at the bottom, they are not a private domain. And we only said this halakha in a case where the width of the boat does not reach four handbreadths less than three handbreadths from the bottom of the boat. However, if the width of the boat reaches four handbreadths less than three handbreadths from the bottom, we do not have this halakha, as those are considered full-fledged partitions which create a private domain. And, similarly, if one fills the bottom of the boat with reeds and thin willow branches up to the point where the boat reaches four handbreadths, we do not have this halakha. If there are ten handbreadths above the point where the boat reaches four handbreadths, it is a private domain.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב נַחְמָן, וְלֵימָא גּוּד אַחֵית מְחִיצָתָא! מִי לָא תַּנְיָא, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: נָעַץ קָנֶה בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים וּבְרֹאשׁוֹ טְרַסְקָל, וְזָרַק וְנָח עַל גַּבָּיו — חַיָּיב. אַלְמָא אָמְרִינַן גּוּד אַחֵית מְחִיצָתָא. הָכָא נָמֵי נֵימָא גּוּד אַחֵית מְחִיצָתָא!
Rav Naḥman strongly objects to this: And let us say: Lower the partition. The upper part of the raft is sufficiently wide and its partitions are sufficiently high; why not consider it as if the partitions of the boat descend from the top of the raft in a straight line to the bottom? Was it not taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: One who stuck a stick into the ground in the public domain, and hung a basket atop it that is four by four handbreadths wide, and threw an object from the public domain and it landed upon it, he is liable, like one who carried an object into a private domain? Apparently, we say: Lower the partition of the basket and treat it as if it reaches the ground, creating a column that is considered a private domain. Here, too, let us say: Lower the partition.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב יוֹסֵף: וְלָא שְׁמִיעָא לְהוּ לְהָא דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב, וּמָטוּ בָּהּ מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי חִיָּיא, וְתָנֵי עֲלַהּ: וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹטְרִין. אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: וְאַתְּ לָא תִּסְבְּרָא? וְהָתַנְיָא: עַמּוּד בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים גָּבוֹהַּ עֲשָׂרָה וְרָחָב אַרְבָּעָה, וְאֵין בְּעִיקָּרוֹ אַרְבָּעָה, וְיֵשׁ בַּקָּצָר שֶׁלּוֹ שְׁלֹשָׁה, וְזָרַק וְנָח עַל גַּבָּיו — חַיָּיב. אַלְמָא אָמְרִינַן: גּוּד אַחֵית מְחִיצָתָא. הָכָא נָמֵי: גּוּד אַחֵית מְחִיצָתָא.
Rav Yosef strongly objects to this statement of Rav Naḥman: And did they not hear that which Rav Yehuda said that Rav said, and there are those who determined that this halakha was stated in the name of Rabbi Ḥiyya: And it was taught in a baraita: And the Rabbis deem one exempt in the case of a reed stuck in the ground of a public domain? Apparently, the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, is an individual opinion and was not accepted as halakha. Abaye said to him: And do you not hold the principle of extending partitions? Was it not taught in a baraita: With regard to a column in the public domain that is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, and its base is not four handbreadths wide, and its narrowest point is more than three handbreadths high; and if one threw an object from the public domain and it came to rest atop the column, he is liable? Apparently, we say: Lower the partition. Since the column’s uppermost section is sufficiently wide, its partitions are considered as if they extend to the ground. Here, too, say: Lower the partition.
מִידֵּי אִירְיָא?! הָתָם הָוְיָא לַהּ מְחִיצָה שֶׁהַגְּדָיִים בּוֹקְעִין בָּהּ. הָכָא הָוְיָא לַהּ מְחִיצָה שֶׁאֵין הַגְּדָיִים בּוֹקְעִין בָּהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אַחָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: גַּבֵּי סְפִינָה נָמֵי, הָא אִיכָּא בְּקִיעַת דָּגִים! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: בְּקִיעַת דָּגִים לֹא שְׁמָהּ בְּקִיעָה. וּמְנָא תֵּימְרָא? — דִּבְעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַבִּי טַבְלָא מֵרַב: מְחִיצָה תְּלוּיָה מַהוּ שֶׁתַּתִּיר בְּחוּרְבָּה? וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֵין מְחִיצָה תְּלוּיָה מַתֶּרֶת
The Gemara asks: Are the case of the basket and the case of the boat comparable? There, in the case of the basket, it is a partition that goats pass through. A partition that does not serve as a barrier is not considered a partition. Here, it is a partition that goats do not pass through. It is considered a partition. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Aḥa, said to Rav Ashi: In the case of a boat, too, there is the passage of fish, as they can swim through the lowered partitions of the boat. He said to him: Passage of fish is not considered passage because it is not visible. And from where do you say that this is so? As Rabbi Tavla raised a dilemma before Ravin: With regard to a hanging partition, what is the ruling in terms of it permitting one to carry in a ruin when part of the building’s walls are still intact, and they are still considered partitions? Ravin said to him: A hanging partition only permits one to carry