Sanhedrin 30aסנהדרין ל׳ א
The William Davidson Talmudתלמוד מהדורת ויליאם דוידסון
Save 'Sanhedrin 30a'
Toggle Reader Menu Display Settings
30aל׳ א

וכל לישני דבי דינא ולא הוה כתב בה במותב תלתא הוינא וחד ליתוהי

and all of the formulations of an enactment of the court were written in it. But only two were signed on it, and the following statement was not written in it: We were convened in a session of three judges, and one of the judges is no longer here, as he died or left for another reason. There was therefore room for concern that perhaps there were only two witnesses, and they wrote the document of admission improperly.

סבר רבינא למימר היינו דריש לקיש א"ל רב נתן בר אמי הכי אמרינן משמיה דרבא כל כי האי גוונא חיישינן לב"ד טועין

Ravina thought to say that this is a case in which the principle of Reish Lakish, that witnesses do not sign a document unless the action was performed appropriately, applies. Rav Natan bar Ami said to him: This is what we say in the name of Rava: In any cases like this, we are concerned for the possibility of an erroneous court that thinks that two constitute a court.

אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק אי כתב בה בי דינא תו לא צריך

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: If it was written in the document: We, the members of the court, convened, it is unnecessary for the deed to further state that one of the judges is no longer there, as a standard court consists of three judges.

ודילמא בית דין חצוף הוא דאמר שמואל שנים שדנו דיניהן דין אלא שנקראו ב"ד חצוף דכתב ביה בי דינא דרבנא אשי

The Gemara asks: But perhaps it was an impudent court, as Shmuel says: With regard to two judges who convened a tribunal and judged, their verdict is a binding verdict; but because they contravened the rabbinic ordinance mandating that a court must be composed of three judges, they are called an impudent court. The Gemara answers: It was a document in which it was written: We, the members of the court of Rabbana Ashi, convened. Rav Ashi’s court presumably conformed to rabbinic protocol.

ודילמא רבנן דבי רב אשי כשמואל סבירא להו דכתיב בו (ואמרנא ליה לרבנא אשי) ואמר לן רבנא אשי

The Gemara asks: But perhaps the Sages of the court of Rav Ashi hold like Shmuel, that the verdict of two judges is binding, and they convened an impudent court. The Gemara answers: It is a document in which it is written: And we said to Rabbana Ashi, and Rabbana Ashi said to us. Rav Ashi himself certainly would not have participated in the discussions of an impudent court.

ת"ר אמר להן אחד אני ראיתי אביכם שהטמין מעות בשידה תיבה ומגדל ואמר של פלוני הן של מעשר שני הן בבית לא אמר כלום בשדה דבריו קיימין

§ The Gemara continues its discussion of when an admission is deemed credible. The Sages taught in a baraita: In a case where one said to the children of another: I saw that your father hid money in a chest, box, or cabinet, saying: This money belongs to so-and-so, or: This money is second tithe, and the money was found where he said, the halakha depends on the circumstances. If the chest, box, or cabinet was in the house, the witness has said nothing. His testimony about the status of the money is not accepted, as he is only one witness, and he could not have taken the money for himself had he wanted to. But if it was in the field, his statement stands, i.e., is accepted.

כללו של דבר כל שבידו ליטלן דבריו קיימין אין בידו ליטלן לא אמר כלום

The principle of the matter is as follows: In any case where it is in the power of the witness to take the money, his statement stands; if it is not in his power to take the money, he has said nothing.

הרי שראו את אביהן שהטמין מעות בשידה תיבה ומגדל ואמר של פלוני הן של מעשר שני הן אם כמוסר דבריו קיימין אם כמערים לא אמר כלום

In a case where the children themselves saw that their father hid money in a chest, box, or cabinet, and the father said: This money belongs to so-and-so, or: This money is second tithe, if he said so as one who relays information to his own children, his statement stands. But if he said so as one who employs artifice, i.e., he appears to have told them that the money was not his only so that they would not take it, he has said nothing, and they may spend the money.

הרי שהיה מצטער על מעות שהניח לו אביו ובא בעל החלום ואמר לו כך וכך הן במקום פלוני הן של מעשר שני הן זה היה מעשה ואמרו דברי חלומות לא מעלין ולא מורידין:

In a case where one was distressed about money that his father left him as an inheritance, because he could not find it, and the master of the dream, i.e., someone in his dream, came and said to him: It is such and such an amount of money and it is in such and such a place, but the money is second tithe, and he found this amount in the place of which he dreamed; and this was an actual incident that was brought before the Sages, and they said that he can spend the money, as matters appearing in dreams do not make a difference in determining the practical halakha.

שנים אומרים זכאי כו': מיכתב היכי כתבי

§ The mishna teaches that if two judges say the defendant is exempt and one says he is liable, he is exempt. The Gemara asks: When there is a dispute between the judges, how do they write the verdict?

ר' יוחנן אמר זכאי ריש לקיש אמר פלוני ופלוני מזכין (ופלוני ופלוני מחייבין) רבי (אליעזר) אמר מדבריהן נזדכה פלוני

Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They write that he is exempt, without mentioning the dispute. Reish Lakish says that they specify: So-and-so and so-and-so deem him exempt, and so-and-so and so-and-so deem him liable; they must mention that there was a dispute. Rabbi Eliezer says that they do not specify the names of the judges, but rather they add the phrase: From the statement of the judges so-and-so was deemed exempt, to the wording of the verdict. This indicates that not all the judges agreed that he is exempt, but does not specify which judges came to which conclusion.

מאי בינייהו איכא בינייהו לשלומי איהו מנתא בהדייהו דלמאן דאמר זכאי משלם ולמאן דאמר פלוני ופלוני מזכין ופלוני ופלוני מחייבין לא משלם

The Gemara asks: What is the difference between these opinions, besides the wording of the verdict? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is with regard to whether or not, in a case where it is discovered that the verdict was erroneous, the judge who was in the minority must pay his portion of restitution along with the judges of the majority. As according to the one who says that they write that he is exempt, the minority judge pays as well, and according to the one who says that they specify: So-and-so and so-and-so deem him exempt, and so-and-so and so-and-so deem him liable, he does not pay.

ולמ"ד זכאי משלם לימא להו אי לדידי צייתיתון אתון נמי לא שלמיתון

The Gemara asks: But according to the one who says that they write that he is exempt, why does he pay? Let him say to the other judges: If you would have listened to me you would not have paid either. Why should I have to pay for your mistake?

אלא איכא בינייהו לשלומי אינהו מנתא דידיה למ"ד זכאי משלמי למ"ד פלוני ופלוני מזכין ופלוני ופלוני מחייבין לא משלמי

Rather, he does not pay, and the practical difference between the opinions is with regard to whether or not those other judges must pay his portion of the restitution. According to the one who says that they write that he is exempt, they pay the full sum, as they did not mention that there was a dispute over the matter. But according to the one who says that they specify: So-and-so and so-and-so deem him exempt, and so-and-so and so-and-so deem him liable, they do not pay the portion of the overruled judge, and he does not pay it either.

ולמאן דאמר זכאי משלמי ולימרו ליה אי לאו את בהדן לא הוה סליק דינא מידי

The Gemara asks: But according to the one who says that they write that he is exempt, why do they pay his portion? Let them say to him: If you had not been with us the judgment would have had no verdict at all, as two judges cannot issue a verdict. Therefore, you share the responsibility with us and should participate in the payment.

אלא איכא בינייהו משום (ויקרא יט, טז) לא תלך רכיל בעמך רבי יוחנן אמר זכאי משום לא תלך רכיל

Rather, the difference between the opinions is only with regard to the wording of the verdict, and is due to the prohibition of: “You shall not go as a talebearer among your people” (Leviticus 19:16). Rabbi Yoḥanan says that they write that he is exempt due to the prohibition of gossip, as derived from the verse: “You shall not go as a talebearer.”

ריש לקיש אמר פלוני ופלוני מזכין ופלוני פלוני מחייבין משום דמיחזי כשיקרא

Reish Lakish says they specify: So-and-so and so-and-so deem him exempt, and so-and-so and so-and-so deem him liable, because otherwise the document would have the appearance of falsehood, as not all the judges deemed him exempt.

ור' אלעזר אית ליה דמר ואית ליה דמר הלכך כתבי הכי מדבריהם נזדכה פלוני:

And Rabbi Elazar accepts the opinion of this Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, and accepts the opinion of that Sage, Reish Lakish. Therefore, this is what they write: From the statement of the judges, so-and-so was deemed exempt. This wording indicates that the ruling was not based on a consensus among the judges, so that it will not have the appearance of falsehood, but it also does not specify what each judge said, to avoid gossip.

גמרו את הדבר היו מכניסין כו': למאן אילימא לבעלי דינין התם קיימי אלא לעדים

§ The mishna teaches that after the judges finished the matter and reached a decision, they would bring them in. The Gemara asks: Whom would they bring in? If we say they would bring in the litigants, this cannot be, as they were there the whole time; they never left the room. Rather, they would bring in the witnesses.

כמאן דלא כרבי נתן דתניא לעולם אין עדותן מצטרפת עד שיראו שניהן כאחד רבי יהושע בן קרחה אומר אפילו בזה אחר זה

If so, in accordance with whose opinion is the mishna? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan; as it is taught in a baraita: The testimonies of individual witnesses are never combined into a testimony of two witnesses unless the two of them saw the incident transpire together as one. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: Their testimonies are combined even in a case where they saw the incident one after the other.

ואין עדותן מתקיימת בבית דין עד שיעידו שניהן כאחד רבי נתן אומר שומעין דבריו של זה היום וכשיבא חבירו למחר שומעין את דבריו

The baraita continues: And furthermore, their testimony does not stand in court unless the two of them testify together as one. Rabbi Natan says: They need not testify together. Rather, their testimonies are combined even if the judges hear the statement of this witness today, and when the other witness comes tomorrow the judges hear his statement. The mishna, by contrast, indicates that the verdict must be given with the two witnesses present together.

לא לעולם לבעלי דינין ורבי נחמיה היא דתניא רבי נחמיה אומר כך היה מנהגן של נקיי הדעת שבירושלים מכניסין לבעלי דינין ושומעין דבריהן ומכניסין את העדים ושומעין דבריהם ומוציאין אותן לחוץ ונושאין ונותנין בדבר (גמרו את הדבר מכניסין אותן כו')

The Gemara reverses its interpretation of the mishna: No, actually it can be explained that the judges would bring in the litigants; and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Neḥemya says: This was the custom of the scrupulous people of Jerusalem: When they would judge, they would bring in the litigants and hear their statements, and then they would bring in the witnesses and hear their statements in the presence of the litigants, and then they would take them all outside of the courtroom and discuss the matter in their absence. Once they finished the matter they would bring them, i.e., the litigants, in, to hear their verdict.

והתניא גמרו את הדבר מכניסין את העדים ההיא דלא כרבי נתן

The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita explicitly: When they finished the matter they would bring in the witnesses? The Gemara answers: That baraita is certainly not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan.

גופא לעולם אין עדותן מצטרפת עד שיראו שניהם כאחד רבי יהושע בן קרחה אומר אפילו בזה אחר זה במאי קמיפלגי איבעית אימא קרא ואיבעית אימא סברא

§ The Gemara discusses the matter itself: The testimonies of individual witnesses are never combined into a testimony of two witnesses unless the two of them saw the incident transpire together as one. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: Their testimonies are combined even in a case where they saw the incident one after the other. The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree? The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that they disagree with regard to the interpretation of a verse, and if you wish, say that they disagree with regard to logical reasoning.

איבעית אימא סברא אמנה דקא מסהיד האי לא קא מסהיד האי ומנה דקא מסהיד האי לא קמסהיד האי ואידך אמנה בעלמא תרוייהו קמסהדי

The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, say that they disagree with regard to logical reasoning: The first tanna holds that the witnesses must see the incident transpire together, as otherwise, about the one hundred dinars of debt that this one is testifying, that one is not testifying, and about the one hundred dinars that that one is testifying, this one is not testifying. There is only one witness of each incident, which is not sufficient. And the other tanna, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, holds that since both witnesses are testifying about one hundred dinars in general, the defendant is liable to pay the plaintiff one hundred dinars.

ואיבעית אימא קרא דכתיב (ויקרא ה, א) והוא עד או ראה או ידע

And if you wish, say that they disagree with regard to the interpretation of a verse, as it is written: “And if anyone sins, hearing the voice of adjuration, and he is a witness, whether he has seen or known, if he does not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:1).

ותניא ממשמע שנאמר (דברים יט, טו) לא יקום עד איני יודע שהוא אחד מה תלמוד לומר אחד

The Gemara explains: And it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “One witness shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity, or for any sin, in any sin that he sins; at the mouth of two witnesses, or at the mouth of three witnesses, shall a matter be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15); by inference, from that which is stated in the verse: A witness shall not rise up against a man, even without the word “one,” do I not know that it is referring to one witness? After all, the verse is written in the singular. Therefore, what is the meaning when the verse states explicitly: “One witness”?

זה בנה אב כל מקום שנאמר עד הרי כאן שנים עד שיפרט לך הכתוב אחד

This established a paradigm, a basis for the principle that in every place in the Torah where the word “witness” is stated, it means that there are two witnesses, unless the verse specifies for you that it is referring to only one witness.

ואפקיה רחמנא בלשון חד למימר עד דחזו תרווייהו כחד ואידך והוא עד או ראה או ידע מ"מ:

And according to the first tanna, the Merciful One expresses it in the singular form, i.e., “witness” and not “witnesses,” to say that they are not combined into a testimony of two witnesses unless the two of them saw the incident transpire together as one. And the other tanna, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, derives from the phrase: “And he is a witness, whether he has seen or known,” that in any case where one testifies about what he sees and knows, his testimony is valid.

ואין עדותן מתקיימת בב"ד עד שיעידו שניהן כאחד ר' נתן אומר שומעין דבריו של זה היום וכשיבא חבירו למחר שומעין דבריו במאי קמיפלגי איבעית אימא סברא איבעית אימא קרא

The baraita cited above teaches: And furthermore, their testimony does not stand in court unless the two of them testify together as one. Rabbi Natan says: They need not testify together; rather, their testimonies are combined even if the judges hear the statement of this witness today, and when the other witness comes tomorrow the judges hear his statement. The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree? The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that they disagree with regard to logical reasoning, and if you wish, say that they disagree with regard to the interpretation of a verse.

אב"א סברא מר סבר עד אחד כי אתי לשבועה אתי לממונא לא אתי

The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, say that they disagree with regard to logical reasoning, as one Sage, the first tanna, holds that when one witness comes to testify, he comes to render the defendant liable to take an oath. This is the halakha when there is one witness against the defendant in a case of monetary law. He does not come to render the defendant liable to pay money, because for this two witnesses are necessary.

ואידך אטו כי אתו בהדי הדדי בחד פומא קא מסהדי אלא מצרפינן להו הכא נמי ליצרפינהו

And the other tanna, Rabbi Natan, responds: Is that to say that when they come together, they render the defendant financially liable because they testify with one mouth? Obviously they testify one after the other. Rather, clearly it is the judges who combine their two testimonies into one. Here too, when the witnesses come to court at different times, let the judges combine their testimonies.

ואיבעית אימא קרא (ויקרא ה, א) אם לא יגיד ונשא עונו

And if you wish, say that they disagree with regard to the interpretation of a verse: “If he does not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:1),