בְּטוּמְאַת בָּשָׂר — הֵיכָא הוּתְּרָה? אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא בְּטוּמְאַת גַּבְרֵי, וְהֵיכָא הוּתְּרָה מִכְּלָלָהּ — בְּצִיבּוּר. impurity of the meat, where is it permitted to eat impure sacrificial meat? Rather, it is obvious that the baraita is talking here about impurity of the people. And where is an allowance made from its rule? It is made in the community; when the majority of the community is ritually impure, it is permitted to offer the Paschal lamb and eat it while impure.
רֵישָׁא בְּטוּמְאַת בָּשָׂר, סֵיפָא בְּטוּמְאַת גַּבְרֵי! אִין — שֵׁם טוּמְאָה קָפָרֵיךְ. The Gemara expresses surprise again: It turns out then that the first clause of the baraita is referring to impurity of the meat, while the latter clause relates to impurity of the people. The Gemara answers: Yes, and there is no difficulty, as the baraita argues from the general category of impurity without necessarily relating to the same type of impurity.
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: כּוּלַּהּ בְּטוּמְאַת בָּשָׂר, וְהֵיכָא הוּתְּרָה — בְּטוּמְאַת פֶּסַח, דִּתְנַן: פֶּסַח הַבָּא בְּטוּמְאָה — נֶאֱכָל בְּטוּמְאָה, שֶׁלֹּא בָּא מִתְּחִילָּתוֹ אֶלָּא לַאֲכִילָה. And if you wish, say a different answer: The entire baraita is referring to impurity of the meat, and where is it permitted to eat impure sacrificial meat? It is permitted in a case of the impurity of the Paschal lamb, as we learned in a mishna: A Paschal lamb that comes in impurity, e.g., when the majority of the community is ritually impure and the offering may be brought in impurity, may also be eaten in impurity, as from the very outset it came only to be eaten. This is unlike the law with regard to other offerings that are brought in impurity; their blood is sprinkled on the altar, but their meat may not be eaten. Consequently, even the prohibition to consume impure sacrificial meat is permitted under certain circumstances.
מֵתִיב רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: הַפֶּסַח שֶׁעָבְרָה שְׁנָתוֹ, וּשְׁחָטוֹ בִּזְמַנּוֹ לִשְׁמוֹ, וְכֵן הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֲחֵרִים לְשֵׁם פֶּסַח בִּזְמַנּוֹ — רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל, וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ מַכְשִׁיר. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, raised an objection from a baraita that teaches: The Paschal sacrifice may be a young lamb or goat less than one year old. In the case of a Paschal lamb that has passed its first year, so that it has automatically become a peace-offering, if he slaughtered it at its appointed time on Passover eve for its own purpose as a Paschal lamb, and similarly, if he slaughtered another offering, e.g., a lamb that had been sanctified as a peace-offering, for the purpose of a Paschal lamb at its set time, the tanna’im disagree with regard to the status of the offering. Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies the offering; and Rabbi Yehoshua validates it, based on the principle that offerings brought for the purpose of other offerings are valid. The only exception is the Paschal lamb, which when brought for another purpose is invalid. According to Rabbi Yehoshua, in both of these cases the animal is not truly a Paschal lamb; rather, it is a peace-offering brought with the intent that it serve as a Paschal lamb.
טַעְמָא בִּזְמַנּוֹ, הָא שֶׁלֹּא בִּזְמַנּוֹ — כָּשֵׁר. וְאַמַּאי? נֵימָא: הוֹאִיל וּבִזְמַנּוֹ פּוֹסֵל, שֶׁלֹּא בִּזְמַנּוֹ נָמֵי פּוֹסֵל! The Gemara infers: The reason that the sacrifice is disqualified is that it was brought at its proper time; it is in this case that the tanna’im disagree. But if it was not brought at its proper time, it is valid according to everyone, as it is like any other peace-offering that was slaughtered for a different purpose. But why is this so? Let us say: Since slaughtering another sacrifice for the purpose of a Paschal lamb disqualifies it at its proper time, this should also disqualify it not at its proper time. Consequently, the ruling quoted above is difficult according to the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, who accepts the principle of since for the sake of stringency.
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: שָׁאנֵי הָתָם דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״וַאֲמַרְתֶּם זֶבַח פֶּסַח הוּא״ — הוּא בַּהֲוָיָיתוֹ: לֹא הוּא לְשׁוּם אֲחֵרִים, וְלֹא אֲחֵרִים לִשְׁמוֹ. Rav Pappa said: It is different there in the case of another sacrifice slaughtered for the purpose of a Paschal lamb, as the verse said: “And you shall say: It is a Passover sacrifice to the Lord, Who passed over the houses of the children of Israel in Egypt when He smote Egypt, and delivered our houses. And the people bowed the head and prostrated themselves” (Exodus 12:27). The word “it” indicates that the Paschal lamb must be brought as it is, according to its details, without any change. It, the Paschal lamb, must not be offered for the purpose of other sacrifices; and other sacrifices must not be offered for its purpose, i.e., as a Paschal lamb. In both of these cases, the offering is disqualified.
בִּזְמַנּוֹ, שֶׁהוּא פָּסוּל לְשׁוּם אֲחֵרִים — אֲחֵרִים פְּסוּלִין לִשְׁמוֹ. שֶׁלֹּא בִּזְמַנּוֹ, שֶׁהוּא כָּשֵׁר לְשׁוּם אֲחֵרִים — אֲחֵרִים כְּשֵׁרִים לִשְׁמוֹ. It may now be inferred: At its proper time, on Passover eve, when the Paschal lamb is disqualified if it is brought for the purpose of other sacrifices, other sacrifices are disqualified according to Rabbi Eliezer if they are brought for its purpose, i.e., as a Paschal lamb. But not at its proper time, when a Paschal lamb offered for the purpose of other sacrifices is valid, other sacrifices offered for its purpose as a Paschal lamb are also valid. Since the verse’s use of the word “it” links the disqualifications of a Paschal lamb offered as a different sacrifice and any other sacrifice offered for the purpose of a Paschal lamb, the principle of since does not apply.
רַבִּי שִׂמְלַאי אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: נִיתְנֵי לִי מָר סֵפֶר יוּחֲסִין. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מֵהֵיכָן אַתְּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִלּוֹד. וְהֵיכָן מוֹתְבָךְ? בִּנְהַרְדְּעָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֵין נִידּוֹנִין לֹא לְלוּדִּים וְלֹא לִנְהַרְדְּעִים, וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן דְּאַתְּ מִלּוֹד וּמוֹתְבָךְ בִּנְהַרְדְּעָא. כַּפְיֵיהּ וְאִרַצִּי. There is a fundamental problem in the mishna that was clarified during the course of a particular incident: Rabbi Simlai came before Rabbi Yoḥanan. He said to him: Would the Master teach me the Book of Genealogies? The Book of Genealogies was a collection of tannaitic teachings that formed a midrash on the book of Chronicles. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Where are you from? He said to him: From Lod. Rabbi Yoḥanan further asked: And where is your present place of residence? He said to him: In Neharde’a. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: I have a tradition that we teach these subjects neither to Lodites nor to Neharde’ans, and certainly not to you who comes from Lod and your residence is in Neharde’a, such that you have both shortcomings. Rabbi Simlai pressured Rabbi Yoḥanan until he agreed to teach him.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: נִיתְנְיֵיהּ בִּתְלָתָא יַרְחֵי. שְׁקַל קָלָא פְּתַק בֵּיהּ, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וּמָה בְּרוּרְיָה דְּבֵיתְהוּ דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר בְּרַתֵּיה דְּרַבִּי חֲנַנְיָה בֶּן תְּרַדְיוֹן, דְּתָנְיָא תְּלָת מְאָה שְׁמַעְתָּתָא בְּיוֹמָא מִתְּלָת מְאָה רַבְּווֹתָא, וַאֲפִילּוּ הָכִי לֹא יָצְתָה יְדֵי חוֹבָתָהּ בִּתְלָת שְׁנִין, וְאַתְּ אָמְרַתְּ בִּתְלָתָא יַרְחֵי?! Rabbi Simlai said to him: Teach me the Book of Genealogies in three months. Rabbi Yoḥanan took a clod of dirt, threw it at him, and said to him: Berurya, wife of Rabbi Meir and daughter of Rabbi Ḥananya ben Teradyon, was so sharp and had such a good memory that she learned three hundred halakhot in one day from three hundred Sages, and nonetheless she did not fulfill her responsibility to properly learn the Book of Genealogies in three years because it is especially long and difficult. And you say that I should teach it to you in three months? After your inappropriate request, I am not inclined to teach you at all.
כִּי שָׁקֵיל וְאָזֵיל אֲמַר לֵיהּ: רַבִּי, מָה בֵּין לִשְׁמוֹ וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ, לְאוֹכְלָיו וְשֶׁלֹּא לְאוֹכְלָיו? When Rabbi Simlai was taking leave to go, he said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: Even so, my teacher, as I have already come, let me ask you a question: What is the difference between one who offers a Paschal lamb both for its own purpose and for a different purpose, in which case the offering is disqualified, and one who offers the sacrifice with the intent that it be both for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, in which case the offering is not disqualified?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הוֹאִיל וְצוּרְבָּא מֵרַבָּנַן אַתְּ, תָּא וְאֵימָא לְךָ: לִשְׁמוֹ וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ — פְּסוּלוֹ בְּגוּפוֹ, לְאוֹכְלָיו וְשֶׁלֹּא לְאוֹכְלָיו — אֵין פְּסוּלוֹ בְּגוּפוֹ. He said to him: Since I understand from your question that you are a Torah scholar, come and I will tell you the answer: When one sacrifices an offering for its own purpose and for a different purpose, the disqualification is in the offering itself; that is, the disqualifying intention relates to the sacrifice itself. In contrast, when one sacrifices an offering for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, the disqualification is not in the offering itself, as the disqualifying intent relates to the people who are to eat from it.
לִשְׁמוֹ וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ — אִי אֶפְשָׁר לְבָרֵר אִיסּוּרוֹ, לְאוֹכְלָיו וְשֶׁלֹּא לְאוֹכְלָיו — אֶפְשָׁר לְבָרֵר אִיסּוּרוֹ. Furthermore, when one sacrifices an offering for its own purpose and for a different purpose, it is impossible to identify its prohibition; that is, there is no way to differentiate between valid and invalid parts of the offering. In contrast, when one sacrifices an offering for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, it is possible to identify its prohibition. If some of the people may eat it and some may not, it is possible to distribute the offering to each group and thereby determine which part of the offering is invalid.
לִשְׁמוֹ וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ — יֶשְׁנוֹ בְּאַרְבַּע עֲבוֹדוֹת, לְאוֹכְלָיו וְשֶׁלֹּא לְאוֹכְלָיו — אֵינוֹ בְּאַרְבַּע עֲבוֹדוֹת. לִשְׁמוֹ וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ — יֶשְׁנוֹ בְּצִיבּוּר כִּבְיָחִיד, לְאוֹכְלָיו וְשֶׁלֹּא לְאוֹכְלָיו — אֵינוֹ בְּצִיבּוּר כִּבְיָחִיד. Furthermore, the intent that the offering be for its own purpose and for a different purpose applies and can disqualify the offering in all four rites, namely: Slaughtering, receiving the blood, carrying the blood to the altar, and sprinkling it on the altar; however, the intent that it be for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it does not apply during all four rites, as it has no effect during the time of the sprinkling. Moreover, the intent that the offering be for its own purpose and for a different purpose is a disqualification that applies to communal sacrifices as it does to individual sacrifices; in contrast, the intent that it be for those who can eat it and those who cannot eat it does not apply to the community as it does to an individual.
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: פְּסוּלוֹ בְּגוּפוֹ וְאִי אֶפְשָׁר לְבָרֵר אִיסּוּרוֹ — חֲדָא מִילְּתָא הִיא, דְּמָה טַעַם אָמַר פְּסוּלוֹ בְּגוּפוֹ? מִשּׁוּם דְּאִי אֶפְשָׁר לְבָרֵר אִיסּוּרוֹ. Rav Ashi said that careful analysis of these answers demonstrates the following: The argument that its disqualification is in the offering itself and the argument that it is impossible to identify its prohibition are one and the same thing; they are not two separate reasons. As, what is the reason that Rabbi Yoḥanan says that when one brings an offering for a different purpose, its disqualification is in the offering itself? It is because it is impossible to identify its prohibition, and therefore the prohibition applies to the offering itself.
אָמַר רָמֵי בַּר רַב יוּדָא אָמַר רַב: מִיּוֹם שֶׁנִּגְנַז סֵפֶר יוּחֲסִין תָּשַׁשׁ כֹּחָן שֶׁל חֲכָמִים וְכָהָה מְאוֹר עֵינֵיהֶם. Having mentioned the Book of Genealogies, the Gemara notes that Rami bar Rav Yuda said that Rav said the following about it: From the day the Book of Genealogies was hidden and no longer available to the Sages, the strength of the Sages has been weakened, and the light of their eyes has been dimmed, as the book contained the reasons for many Torah laws and lists of genealogies that are now lost.
אָמַר מָר זוּטְרָא: בֵּין ״אָצֵל״ לְ״אָצַל״ טְעִינוּ אַרְבַּע מְאָה גַּמְלֵי דִּדְרָשָׁא. Mar Zutra said: The Book of Genealogies’ exposition of Chronicles was so extensive that it was said, in exaggeration, that the verses from the word Azel mentioned in the verse: “And Azel had six sons and these are their names: Azrikam, Bocru, and Ishmael and Sheariah and Obadia and Hanan; all these were the sons of Azel” (I Chronicles 8:38), to the word Azel mentioned in a different verse with the identical wording: “And Azel had six sons and these are their names: Azrikam, Bocru, and Ishmael and Sheariah and Obadia and Hanan; these were the sons of Azel” (I Chronicles 9:44), bore four hundred camels of expositions written about these verses.
תַּנְיָא, אֲחֵרִים אוֹמְרִים: הִקְדִּים מוּלִים לַעֲרֵלִים — כָּשֵׁר, עֲרֵלִים לְמוּלִים — פָּסוּל. מַאי שְׁנָא מוּלִין לַעֲרֵלִים דְּכָשֵׁר — דְּכוּלַּהּ עׇרְלָה בָּעֵינַן, וְלֵיכָּא? עֲרֵלִים לְמוּלִין נָמֵי, כּוּלַּהּ עׇרְלָה בָּעֵינַן, וְלֵיכָּא! It was taught in a baraita that Aḥerim say: If one sacrifices a Paschal lamb for both circumcised and uncircumcised people and had in mind first the circumcised people and then the uncircumcised people, the offering is valid. But if he had in mind first the uncircumcised people and then the circumcised people, it is disqualified. The Gemara asks: What is different about having in mind first the circumcised people and then the uncircumcised people, such that the offering is valid? One might say that in order to disqualify the sacrifice, we require that all the people he has in mind be uncircumcised, and this is not the case here, as some of them are circumcised. But if this is so, when he has in mind first the uncircumcised people and then the circumcised people, we should also say that in order to disqualify the sacrifice we require that all the people he has in mind be uncircumcised, and this is not the case here. What, then, is the difference between the two cases?