לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּחֶזְקָתוֹ בָּדוּק, דְּקָסָבַר: הַכֹּל חֲבֵרִים הֵם אֵצֶל בְּדִיקַת חָמֵץ. דְּתַנְיָא: חָבֵר שֶׁמֵּת וְהִנִּיחַ מְגוּרָה מְלֵיאָה פֵּירוֹת, אֲפִילּוּ הֵן בְּנֵי יוֹמָן — הֲרֵי הֵן בְּחֶזְקַת מְתוּקָּנִים.
Isn’t it due to the fact that the presumptive status of the house is that it has been searched, as this tanna maintains: All are considered ḥaverim with regard to the search for leavened bread? A ḥaver is one with the presumptive status of trustworthiness with regard to a given matter, e.g., ritual purity and impurity, tithes, etc. In this case, since everyone has ḥaver status with regard to searching for leaven, everyone is deemed trustworthy to have performed the requisite action. As it was taught in a baraita: With regard to a ḥaver who died and left a storehouse filled with produce, even if the produce was there only that day, the fruit has the presumptive status of produce that was ritually prepared, i.e., tithed, as there is no doubt that the ḥaver tithed his produce before he died. The same applies to the search for leaven: All are considered ḥaverim and are believed.
וּמִמַּאי? דִּילְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָכָא, מִשּׁוּם דְּקָאָמְרִי הָנֵי. אַטּוּ אֲמִירָה דְּהָנֵי מִידֵּי מְשָׁשָׁא אִית בֵּיהּ?
The Gemara challenges this claim: And from where can this be proven? It is possible that in general a house does not have presumptive status that it was searched, and perhaps it is different here, due to the fact that these people, e.g., a woman, slave, or minor, expressly stated that they conducted the search. Perhaps that is why the house is considered to have been searched. The Gemara rejects this contention: Is that to say that there is any substance in the statement of these people? Since the testimony of all these is disqualified, they lack credibility, and their statements are not reliable. Instead, the reason that there is no need to search the rented property for leaven must be because of the presumption that it has already been searched.
אֶלָּא מַאי — דְּחָזְקָתוֹ בָּדוּק? הַאי ״הַכֹּל נֶאֱמָנִים״, ״כָּל הַבָּתִּים בְּחֶזְקַת בְּדוּקִין בְּאַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
The Gemara retorts: Rather, what is the reason that one need not search the rented property for leaven? Is it due to the fact that its presumptive status is that it has been searched? If so, this statement should not read: Everyone is believed, as women, slaves, or minors themselves have no credibility. It should have been formulated: With regard to all houses on the fourteenth, their presumptive status is that they have already been searched, as that is the actual rationale for the lenient ruling.
אֶלָּא מַאי — מִשּׁוּם אֲמִירָה דְּהָנֵי, הָא לָא אָמְרִי הָנֵי — לָא? תִּפְשׁוֹט מִינֵּיהּ דְּאֵין חֶזְקָתוֹ בָּדוּק.
The Gemara rejects this contention: Rather, what is the alternative? Is it that this halakha is due to the statement of these people, and by inference, if these people do not say that the house has been searched, then no, it cannot be assumed that it was searched? If so, resolve the original dilemma from here, as this is proof that the presumptive status of the house is not that it has been searched, unless someone explicitly states that this is the case.
לָא, לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ חֶזְקָתוֹ בָּדוּק, וְהָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — דְּמוּחְזָק לַן דְּלָא בְּדַק, וְקָאָמְרִי הָנֵי: בַּדְקִינֵּיהּ. מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: לָא לְהֵימְנִינְהוּ רַבָּנַן, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: כֵּיוָן דִּבְדִיקַת חָמֵץ מִדְּרַבָּנַן הוּא, דְּמִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא בְּבִיטּוּל בְּעָלְמָא סַגִּי לֵיהּ — הֵימְנוּהוּ רַבָּנַן בִּדְרַבָּנַן.
The Gemara rejects this conclusion: No, actually I can say to you that on the fourteenth its presumptive status is that it has been searched, and with what case are we dealing here? This halakha is referring to a situation where our presumption is that the owner did not search the house, and these women, slaves, or minors say: We searched it. Lest you say that the Sages do not believe them, as they are unfit to testify, the baraita therefore teaches us that since the search for leavened bread is an ordinance by rabbinic law, as by Torah law mere nullification of one’s ownership before the prohibition of the leaven takes effect is sufficient, the Sages believe them with regard to an ordinance instituted by rabbinic law.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: הַמַּשְׂכִּיר בַּיִת לַחֲבֵירוֹ בְּחֶזְקַת בָּדוּק, וּמְצָאוֹ שֶׁאֵינוֹ בָּדוּק, מַהוּ? מִי הָוֵי כְּמִקָּח טָעוּת, אוֹ לָא?
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to one who lets a house to another for Passover, with the presumptive status that it was searched, and the lessee discovered that it was not searched, what is the halakha? Is it considered a mistaken transaction, and the renter can abrogate the deal, claiming that he agreed on the basis of his belief that the property had already been searched? Or no, it is not considered a mistaken transaction?
תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לָא מִיבַּעְיָא בְּאַתְרָא דְּלָא יָהֲבִי אַגְרָא וּבְדַקוּ — דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ לְאִינִישׁ לְקַיּוֹמֵי מִצְוָה בְּגוּפֵיהּ. אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ בְּאַתְרָא דְּיָהֲבִי אַגְרָא וּבְדַקוּ — דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ לְאִינִישׁ לְקַיּוֹמֵי מִצְוָה בְּמָמוֹנֵיהּ.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma, as Abaye said: Needless to say, that in a place where people typically do not pay a wage and hire others to conduct the search for leaven and everyone searches himself, a person prefers to fulfill the mitzva himself. However, even in a place where people pay a wage and have others search for leaven, it is not a mistaken transaction due to the fact that a person prefers to perform the mitzva with his own money. Consequently, it is not considered a mistaken transaction, as a person does not object to having to perform a mitzva.
תְּנַן הָתָם, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: אוֹכְלִין כָּל חָמֵשׁ, וְשׂוֹרְפִין בִּתְחִלַּת שֵׁשׁ. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אוֹכְלִין כָּל אַרְבַּע, וְתוֹלִין כָּל חָמֵשׁ, וְשׂוֹרְפִין בִּתְחִלַּת שֵׁשׁ. דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא מִיהָא חָמֵץ מִשֵּׁשׁ שָׁעוֹת וּלְמַעְלָה אָסוּר, מְנָלַן?
We learned in a mishna there, that Rabbi Meir says: One may eat leaven on the fourteenth day during the entire first five hours of the day, and he burns the leaven at the beginning of the sixth hour. Rabbi Yehuda says: One may eat leaven for the entire first four hours of the day, and one leaves it in abeyance during the fifth hour, at which point eating leaven is prohibited but it need not be burned yet, and one burns the leaven at the beginning of the sixth hour. Everyone agrees, in any case, that leavened bread is prohibited by Torah law from the sixth hour and onward. From where do we derive this?
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: תְּרֵי קְרָאֵי כְּתִיבִי, כְּתִיב: ״שִׁבְעַת יָמִים שְׂאוֹר לֹא יִמָּצֵא בְּבָתֵּיכֶם״, וּכְתִיב: ״אַךְ בַּיּוֹם הָרִאשׁוֹן תַּשְׁבִּיתוּ שְּׂאוֹר מִבָּתֵּיכֶם״. הָא כֵּיצַד? לְרַבּוֹת אַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר לְבִיעוּר.
Abaye said: Two verses are written, and the halakha is derived by comparing them. It is written in one verse: “Seven days, leaven shall not be found in your houses” (Exodus 12:19), indicating that throughout these seven days it is prohibited to maintain leaven in one’s house. And it is written in another verse: “Yet on the first day you shall remove leaven from your houses” (Exodus 12:15), indicating that one must remove the leaven on the first day, after the Festival has begun. How can this apparent contradiction be resolved? The Gemara responds: The latter verse comes to include the fourteenth day of Nisan with regard to the elimination of leaven. The phrase: On the first day, does not refer to the fifteenth of Nisan or to the beginning of the festival of Passover. It is referring to the fourteenth, the day on which the Paschal lamb is slaughtered.
וְאֵימָא לְרַבּוֹת לֵילֵי חֲמִשָּׁה עָשָׂר לְבִיעוּר, דְּסָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: ״יָמִים״ כְּתִיב, יָמִים — אִין, לֵילוֹת — לָא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן אֲפִילּוּ לֵילוֹת! הָהוּא לָא אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ,
The Gemara asks: And say perhaps, that the verse comes to include the night of the fifteenth, the first night of Passover, with regard to the elimination of leaven. As, were it not for this verse, it could enter your mind to say: Seven days is written, which indicates by inference: During the days, yes, one is obligated to remove leaven, but during the nights, no, there is no requirement to do so. Therefore, the verse teaches us: On the first day, one may not be in possession of leaven even during the nights. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: That halakha was not necessary to be derived by the Sages, as it can be learned from another source.