מאי לאו בהא קמיפלגי דרבי יוסי הגלילי סבר לא תאכלו משמע בין איסור אכילה בין איסור הנאה וכי אתא קרא למישרייה לנבילה בהנאה הוא דאתא ורבי עקיבא סבר איסור אכילה משמע איסור הנאה לא משמע וכי אתא קרא לטומאה וטהרה
The Gemara asks: What, is it not that they disagree about this, the following issue? Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds: “You shall not eat” indicates both the prohibition of eating and the prohibition of deriving benefit; therefore, one may not derive benefit from an animal carcass. And when the verse came and said: “For any other service,” it came to permit one to derive benefit from an animal carcass. And Rabbi Akiva holds: “You shall not eat” indicates that there is only a prohibition of eating; it does not indicate a prohibition of deriving benefit. Therefore, no verse is necessary to learn that it is permitted to derive benefit from an animal carcass. When the verse came and said: “For any other service,” it came to teach about the halakhot of ritual purity and impurity. Apparently, there is a tannaitic dispute about the meaning of the words: “You shall not eat.”
לא דכולי עלמא לא תאכלו משמע בין איסור אכילה בין איסור הנאה והכא בהא קמיפלגי רבי יוסי הגלילי סבר כשהותרה נבילה היא הותרה חלבה וגידה לא הותרו וכי איצטריך קרא להיתר הנאה הוא דאתא ורבי עקיבא סבר כשהותרה נבילה חלבה וגידה נמי הותרו וכי איצטריך קרא לטומאה וטהרה
The Gemara rejects this assumption. No, it is possible to say that everyone holds that “You shall not eat” indicates both a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of deriving benefit. And here, they disagree about this: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that when it was permitted to derive benefit from an animal carcass, the carcass itself was permitted; however, its fat and its sinews were not permitted. And the phrase “for any other service” in the verse is necessary to permit one to derive benefit from this fat. However, Rabbi Akiva holds: When it was permitted to derive benefit from an animal carcass, it was also permitted to derive benefit from its fat and sinews. Therefore, the phrase “for any other service” in the verse is necessary for the issue of purity and impurity.
ורבי יוסי הגלילי אשכחן חלב דשרייה רחמנא בהנאה אלא גיד נימא דאסור איבעית אימא הכי נמי דאסור איבעית אימא מייתי לה בקל וחומר ומה חלב שענוש כרת מותר בהנאה גיד שאינו ענוש כרת לא כל שכן
The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, we find that the Merciful One explicitly permits one to derive benefit from fat; however, let us say that the sinew of the sciatic nerve is prohibited. The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that it is indeed so that it is prohibited to derive benefit from the sciatic nerve. And if you wish, say instead that one is permitted to derive benefit from the sciatic nerve, and Rabbi Yosei HaGelili derives that the sciatic nerve is permitted through an a fortiori inference: If with regard to forbidden fat, for which one is punished with karet if he eats it intentionally, it is permitted to derive benefit, with regard to the sciatic nerve, for which the punishment for one who eats it is not karet, all the more so is it not clear that it is permitted to derive benefit?
ורבי שמעון דאסר איכא למיפרך מה לחלב שכן הותר מכללו אצל חיה תאמר בגיד שלא הותר מכללו אצל חיה
The Gemara asks: And why does Rabbi Shimon, who prohibits deriving benefit from the sciatic nerve, not accept this a fortiori inference? The Gemara answers: This inference can be refuted, as it is possible to say: What is unique to fat? It is that it is released from its general prohibition with regard to non-domesticated animals, as the prohibition only applies to the fats of kosher domesticated animals. Can you say the same with regard to the sciatic nerve, which is not released from its general prohibition with regard to non-domesticated animals and remains prohibited? Apparently, in some ways the prohibition of the sciatic nerve is more stringent than that of fat.
ואידך בבהמה קאמרינן בבהמה מיהת לא אישתרי
The Gemara asks: And how does the other Sage, Rabbi Yosei, who permits one to derive benefit from the sciatic nerve based on this a fortiori inference, respond? The Gemara says: When we state this a fortiori inference, it is with regard to a domesticated animal; in any case, with regard to a domesticated animal its fat is not permitted. Since with regard to a domesticated animal the prohibition of fat is more stringent than that of the sciatic nerve, the a fortiori inference is valid.
מכדי אותבינהו כל הני קראי ושנינהו חזקיה ורבי אבהו במאי פליגי בחמץ בפסח ואליבא דרבנן בשור הנסקל ואליבא דדברי הכל חזקיה נפיק ליה מלא יאכל ורבי אבהו נפיק ליה מנבילה
After discussing numerous cases that involve prohibitions of eating and deriving benefit, the Gemara asks: Since we raised objections from all of these verses and answered them, and in every case it is apparent that despite the fact that the verse said: “You shall not eat” there was no dispute as to whether or not one may derive benefit from these items, then with regard to what issue do Ḥizkiya and Rabbi Abbahu disagree? The Gemara answers: They disagree with regard to leavened bread on Passover, in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who prohibit one to derive benefit from it; and they disagree with regard to an ox that is stoned, in accordance with everyone. The Gemara explains: Ḥizkiya derived that it is prohibited to derive benefit in this case from the words: “It shall not be eaten,” and Rabbi Abbahu derived that it is prohibited from the fact that the Torah explicitly had to permit one to derive benefit in the case of an animal carcass.
מכדי בין למר ובין למר אסורין בהנאה מאי בינייהו איכא בינייהו חולין שנשחטו בעזרה חזקיה סבר לא יאכל למעוטי הני אתו למעוטי חולין שנשחטו בעזרה
The Gemara asks: Now, both according to the one Master and according to the other Master, it is prohibited to derive benefit from these items. The fact that they disagree about the source of this halakha notwithstanding, what is the practical difference between them? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is with regard to non-sacrificial animals that were slaughtered in the Temple courtyard. Ḥizkiya holds: “It shall not be eaten” comes to exclude these cases of leavened bread and the ox that is stoned. Although in most cases a prohibition against eating does not extend to a prohibition against deriving benefit, the language of the verse in these cases indicates that there is a prohibition against deriving benefit as well. Furthermore, “It shall be thrown to the dog” comes to exclude non-sacrificial animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, indicating that it is prohibited to derive benefit from them.
רבי אבהו סבר אתו למעוטי הני חולין שנשחטו בעזרה לאו דאורייתא נינהו
However, Rabbi Abbahu holds that according to Rabbi Yehuda, who maintained that the prohibition against eating an animal carcass cannot be used to derive the prohibition against deriving benefit: “It shall be thrown to the dog” comes to exclude these two cases, leavened bread and an ox that is stoned, where deriving benefit is prohibited. And the prohibition to derive benefit from non-sacrificial animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard is not by Torah law, as there is no source from which to derive this prohibition. Therefore, the only practical difference between them is whether the prohibition of deriving benefit from non-sacrificial animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard is by Torah law or by rabbinic law.
יתיב ההוא מרבנן קמיה דרבי שמואל בר נחמני ויתיב וקאמר משמיה דרבי יהושע בן לוי מנין לכל איסורין שבתורה דכי היכי דאסורין באכילה הכי נמי אסורין בהנאה ומאי ניהו חמץ בפסח ושור הנסקל מנין תיפוק ליה מלא יאכל לא יאכל איסור אכילה משמע ליה איסור הנאה לא משמע ליה
The Gemara relates: One of the Sages sat before Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani, and he sat and said in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi: From where is it derived with regard to all the prohibitions in the Torah that just as it is prohibited to eat them, so too, it is prohibited to benefit from them? And what are the prohibited objects to which this statement refers? They are leavened bread on Passover and an ox that is stoned. The Gemara asks: Why ask from where? Derive the prohibition from the phrase: “It shall not be eaten.” The Gemara answers that he derived a prohibition of eating this item from: “It shall not be eaten”; however, he did not derive a prohibition of deriving benefit from this phrase.
תיפוק ליה מנבילה סבר לה כרבי יהודה דאמר דברים ככתבן
The Gemara challenges: Derive this general prohibition against deriving benefit from the fact that the Torah had to explicitly permit one to benefit from an animal carcass. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said with regard to an animal carcass: The matters are as they are written, and the words in the verse do not indicate anything beyond their simple meaning.
אי סבר לה כרבי יהודה תיפוק ליה מהיכא דנפקא ליה לרבי יהודה מלכלב תשליכון אתו
The Gemara challenges: If he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, then let him derive this halakha from where Rabbi Yehuda derives it, i.e., from the verse: “And you shall be sacred men unto Me; therefore you shall not eat any flesh that is torn of beasts in the field; you shall cast it to the dog” (Exodus 22:30). Rabbi Yehuda expounded that one may throw it to a dog, but one may not throw any of the other prohibited items mentioned in the Torah to a dog. From this he infers that it is prohibited to derive benefit from leavened bread on Passover or from other similar items.
קסבר חולין שנשחטו בעזרה דאורייתא מנין דכתיב כל חטאת אשר יובא מדמה וגו׳
The Gemara responds: This Sage holds that the prohibition to derive benefit from non-sacrificial animals that were slaughtered in the Temple courtyard is by Torah law, and that it is the word “it” in the verse that indicates they are prohibited. And from where is it derived that this prohibition against deriving benefit applies to leavened bread and to an ox that is stoned as well? As it is written: “And no sin-offering, of which any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to make atonement in the sacred place, shall be eaten; it shall be burnt with fire” (Leviticus 6:23).
שאין תלמוד לומר באש תשרף ומה תלמוד לומר באש תשרף אם אינו ענין לגופו דכתיב והנה שרף תנהו ענין לכל איסורין שבתורה
As there is no need for the verse to state: “It shall be burnt with fire”; And for what purpose then does the verse state: “It shall be burnt with fire”? If it does not apply to the subject matter itself in its context, as it is already written: “And Moshe diligently inquired about the goat of the sin-offering, and, behold, it was burnt” (Leviticus 10:16), apply it to the matter of all the prohibitions in the Torah.