דִּלְמָא מִיַּיִן דְּאִית לַהּ צַעֲרָא הֵפֵר לָהּ מִטּוּמְאַת מֵת דְּלֵית לַהּ צַעֲרָא לֹא הֵפֵר לָהּ Perhaps the husband nullified for her the vow that rendered wine forbidden to her, as she suffers pain when she refrains from drinking it. But as for her vow that impurity imparted by the dead is forbidden to her, he did not nullify it for her, as she suffers no pain by not becoming impure through contact with the dead. Why, then, does she not bring the offerings that must be brought by a nazirite who became ritually impure through contact with the dead? This implies that since the husband can nullify a vow with regard to a matter that would cause her to deprive herself, he can also nullify a vow with regard to a matter that would not cause her to deprive herself.
אָמְרִי מִטּוּמְאַת מֵת נָמֵי אִית לַהּ צַעֲרָא דִּכְתִיב וְהַחַי יִתֵּן אֶל לִבּוֹ וְתַנְיָא הָיָה רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר מַאי דִּכְתִיב וְהַחַי יִתֵּן אֶל לִבּוֹ דְּיִסְפּוֹד יִסְפְּדוּן לֵיהּ דְּיִבְכּוּן יִבְכּוּן לֵיהּ דְּיִקְבַּר יִקְבְּרוּנֵיהּ The Gemara rejects this argument: The Sages say in response that a woman who vows that impurity imparted by the dead is forbidden to her also suffers pain as a result. How so? As it is written: “And the living shall lay it to his heart” (Ecclesiastes 7:2), and it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Meir would say: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And the living shall lay it to his heart”? This means that one who eulogizes others when they die will in turn be eulogized when he himself dies; one who weeps for others will be wept for when he himself passes away; and one who buries others will himself be buried upon his passing. A woman who cannot participate in the funerals of others because she is barred from contracting impurity through contact with a corpse is distressed by the thought that she will receive similar treatment when she dies. Therefore, her vow involves affliction and can be nullified by her husband. The conclusion is that this case does not present a difficulty for Rabbi Yoḥanan.
מַתְנִי׳ קוּנָּם שֶׁאֲנִי נֶהֱנֶה לַבְּרִיּוֹת אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר וִיכוֹלָה הִיא לֵיהָנוֹת בְּלֶקֶט שִׁכְחָה וּבְפֵאָה MISHNA: If a woman vowed: The property of other people is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, her husband cannot nullify her vow, but nevertheless, if she is poor, she may benefit from the agricultural gifts that must be left for the poor: Gleanings, i.e., isolated stalks that fell during the harvest; forgotten sheaves; and produce of the corners [pe’a] of the field that the owner is obligated to leave for the poor. Enjoyment of these gifts is not considered as benefit derived from people, as these gifts are not given voluntarily out of the kindness of the donors, but in the performance of a mitzva.
קוּנָּם כֹּהֲנִים לְוִיִּם נֶהֱנִים לִי יִטְּלוּ עַל כׇּרְחוֹ כֹּהֲנִים אֵלּוּ וּלְוִיִּם אֵלּוּ נֶהֱנִים לִי יִטְּלוּ אֲחֵרִים If one said: I will not let priests and Levites benefit from me, as that is konam for me, they can take the priestly and Levitical gifts from him against his will. If, however, he said: I will not let these specific priests and these specific Levites benefit from me, as that is konam for me, they are taken by others.
גְּמָ׳ אַלְמָא אֶפְשָׁר דְּמִתַּזְנָה מִדִּילֵיהּ מִכְּלָל דְּבַעַל לָאו בִּכְלַל בְּרִיּוֹת הוּא אֵימָא סֵיפָא יְכוֹלָה לֵיהָנוֹת בְּלֶקֶט שִׁכְחָה וּפֵאָה אֲבָל מִדְּבַעַל לָא אָכְלָה אַלְמָא בַּעַל בִּכְלַל בְּרִיּוֹת הוּא GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if a woman vowed not to derive benefit from people, her husband cannot nullify her vow. The Gemara infers from this halakha: Apparently, this is because the woman can be sustained from his, i.e., her husband’s, property, without having to take from others. This proves by inference that in this context a husband is not included in her reference to people, as, although she mentioned people in her vow, she did not mean to prohibit herself from deriving benefit from her husband. The Gemara asks: But say the latter clause of that same part of the mishna, which states: But she may benefit from gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and pe’a. This implies that she may derive benefit from the gifts given to the poor, but she may not eat from property belonging to her husband. Apparently, a husband is in fact included in her reference to people, and she may not benefit from him either.
אָמַר עוּלָּא לְעוֹלָם לָאו בִּכְלַל בְּרִיּוֹת הוּא וְעוֹד אֵין יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר מִפְּנֵי שֶׁיְּכוֹלָה לֵיהָנוֹת בְּלֶקֶט שִׁכְחָה וּפֵאָה Ulla said: Actually, a husband is not included in her reference to people, and there is no contradiction. Rather, the mishna provides two reasons why he cannot nullify his wife’s vow. The first reason, which is merely implied by the mishna, is that she can be sustained by her husband. And furthermore there is the stated reason, that he cannot nullify the vow because she may benefit from gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and pe’a.
רָבָא אָמַר לְעוֹלָם בַּעַל בִּכְלַל בְּרִיּוֹת הוּא וּמָה טַעַם קָאָמַר מָה טַעַם אֵין יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר מִפְּנֵי שֶׁיְּכוֹלָה לֵיהָנוֹת בְּלֶקֶט שִׁכְחָה וּפֵאָה Rava said the opposite: Actually, a husband is included in her reference to people, and therefore his wife may not benefit from him. And when the mishna states the halakha, it employs the style known as: What is the reason, and it should be understood as follows: What is the reason that the husband cannot nullify his wife’s vow? Because she may benefit from gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and pe’a.
רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר לְעוֹלָם בַּעַל לָאו בִּכְלַל בְּרִיּוֹת הוּא וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי נִתְגָּרְשָׁה יְכוֹלָה לֵיהָנוֹת בְּלֶקֶט שִׁכְחָה וּפֵאָה Rav Naḥman said: Actually, a husband is not included in her reference to people, and her vow not to derive benefit from all people does not include him, which is why he cannot nullify it. And this is what the mishna is teaching: The husband cannot nullify his wife’s vow, because even if she becomes divorced and can no longer derive benefit from her husband, as he is now included in her reference to people, she may still benefit from gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and pe’a.