בָּעֵי רַב פָּפָּא יֵשׁ יָד לְקִידּוּשִׁין אוֹ לָא הֵיכִי דָמֵי אִילֵימָא דְּאָמַר לַהּ לְאִשָּׁה הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי וְאָמַר לַחֲבֶירְתָּהּ וְאַתְּ נָמֵי פְּשִׁיטָא הַיְינוּ קִידּוּשִׁין עַצְמָן אֶלָּא כְּגוֹן דְּאָמַר לַהּ לְאִשָּׁה הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי וְאָמַר לַהּ לַחֲבֶירְתָּהּ וְאַתְּ מִי אָמְרִינַן וְאַתְּ נָמֵי אֲמַר לַהּ לַחֲבֶירְתָּהּ וְתָפְסִי בַּהּ קִידּוּשִׁין לַחֲבֶירְתָּהּ אוֹ דִּלְמָא וְאַתְּ חֲזַאי אֲמַר לַהּ לַחֲבֶירְתַּהּ וְלָא תָּפְסִי בָּהּ קִידּוּשִׁין בַּחֲבֶירְתַּהּ § Rav Pappa raised a dilemma: Is there intimation for betrothal or not? Does betrothal take effect via an incomplete statement? The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of such a case? If we say it is a case where one said to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me, and he said to another woman: And you too, isn’t it obvious that this is betrothal itself, and it takes effect? Rather, it is a case where one said to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me, and he said to another woman: And you. Do we say that he said the other woman: And you too are betrothed, and betrothal takes effect with regard to the other woman, or perhaps he said to the other woman: And you see that I am betrothing this woman, and betrothal does not take effect with regard to the other woman?
וּמִי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְרַב פָּפָּא וְהָא מִדַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְאַבָּיֵי מִי סָבַר שְׁמוּאֵל יָדַיִם שֶׁאֵין מוֹכִיחוֹת הָוְיָין יָדַיִם מִכְּלָל דִּסְבִירָא לֵיהּ לְרַב פָּפָּא דְּיֵשׁ יָד לְקִידּוּשִׁין חֲדָא מִגּוֹ מַאי דִּסְבִירָא לֵיהּ לִשְׁמוּאֵל אֲמַר לֵיהּ לְאַבָּיֵי The Gemara asks: Did Rav Pappa raise this as a dilemma? But from the fact that Rav Pappa said to Abaye in a case concerning betrothal (see Kiddushin 5b): Does Shmuel hold that ambiguous intimations are valid intimations, it can be proven by inference that Rav Pappa holds that there is intimation for betrothal. The Gemara answers: Rav Pappa spoke to Abaye about one of the opinions that Shmuel held. Shmuel had ruled that even an ambiguous intimation was sufficient in the case of betrothal, and Rav Pappa questioned this ruling without expressing his own opinion that even obvious intimations are not valid with regard to betrothal.
בָּעֵי רַב פָּפָּא יֵשׁ יָד לְפֵאָה אוֹ אֵין יָד לְפֵאָה הֵיכִי דָמֵי אִילֵימָא דְּאָמַר הָדֵין אוּגְיָא לֶיהֱוֵי פֵּאָה וְהָדֵין נָמֵי הָהִיא פֵּיאָה מְעַלַּיְיתָא הִיא כִּי קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ כְּגוֹן דְּאָמַר וְהָדֵין וְלָא אָמַר נָמֵי מַאי § Rav Pappa raised another dilemma: Is there intimation for pe’a, the produce in the corner of a field that must be left for the poor, or is there no intimation for pe’a? The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of the case? If we say it is a case where one said: This furrow [ugeya] shall be pe’a and this one too, this is a full-fledged declaration of pe’a. The Gemara explains: He raises the dilemma with regard to a case where he said: And this, and he did not say: And this one too, and therefore his statement can be interpreted to mean that this other furrow should remain his and not be included in the pe’a (Tosafot). What is the halakha in this case?
מִכְּלָל דְּכִי אָמַר שָׂדֶה כּוּלָּהּ תֶּיהְוֵי פֵּאָה הָוְיָא פֵּאָה The Gemara interrupts this train of thought and wonders: Does this prove by inference that in a case where one said: The entire field shall be pe’a, it would all be rendered pe’a? The case must be one where the first furrow was large enough to serve as pe’a for the entire field, because if that were not the case, it would be clear that he meant that the second furrow should also be pe’a. Consequently, it is clear from Rav Pappa’s question that one can designate as pe’a a larger portion of the field than one is absolutely required to designate.
אִין וְהָתַנְיָא מִנַּיִן שֶׁאִם רוֹצֶה לַעֲשׂוֹת כׇּל שָׂדֵהוּ פֵּאָה עוֹשֶׂה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר פְּאַת שָׂדְךָ The Gemara answers: Yes, and it is taught in the following baraita: From where is it derived that if one wants to render his entire field pe’a, he may do so? The verse states: “You shall not wholly reap the corner of your field” (Leviticus 19:9). This is expounded to mean that the entirety of “your field” may be designated as the “corner” that is left for the poor.
מִי אָמְרִינַן כֵּיוָן דְּאִיתַּקַּשׁ לְקׇרְבְּנוֹת מָה קׇרְבָּנוֹת יֵשׁ לָהֶם יָד אַף פֵּאָה יֵשׁ לָהּ יָד אוֹ דִלְמָא כִּי אִיתַּקַּשׁ לְבַל תְּאַחֵר הוּא דְּאִיתַּקַּשׁ וְהֵיכָא אִיתַּקַּשׁ דְּתַנְיָא The Gemara returns to its discussion of Rav Pappa’s dilemma. Do we say that since pe’a is juxtaposed to offerings, just as offerings have intimation, so too, pe’a has intimation? Or perhaps when pe’a is juxtaposed to offerings, it is juxtaposed to indicate only that it is subject to the prohibition: You shall not delay? The Gemara clarifies: And where is it juxtaposed? As it is taught in a baraita: