שִׁכְבַת זֶרַע בִּמְעֵי אִשָּׁה מַהוּ מִי אָמְרִינַן כֵּיוָן דְּלָא אִיתְּצַר כִּי גוּפַהּ דָּמֵי אוֹ דִלְמָא כֵּיוָן דְּמֵעָלְמָא קָאָתֵי לָא with regard to semen in a dead woman’s womb. What is the halakha in this case? Does it form a mixture with respect to the woman’s body? The Gemara explains the two sides of this dilemma: Do we say that since no fetus was formed from the semen, it is considered like her body? Or, perhaps one should argue that since it comes from outside, it is not considered part of her body.
בָּעֵי רַב פָּפָּא פִּירְשָׁהּ מַהוּ כֵּיוָן דְּלָא מִקַּיְימָא בִּדְלָא אָכְלָה חַיּוּתָא הוּא אוֹ דִלְמָא הָא נָמֵי מֵעָלְמָא אָתֵי בָּעֵי רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִיקָא עוֹרוֹ מַהוּ בָּעֵי רַב הוּנָא בַּר מָנוֹחַ כִּיחוֹ וְנִיעוֹ מַהוּ Rav Pappa raised a similar dilemma: With regard to her excrement, the food waste that remains in a woman’s intestines, what is the halakha? Once again, the Gemara explains the two sides of this dilemma: Do we say that since she cannot subsist without food it is considered her life, which means that the food left inside her body is part of her and does not form a mixture with the corpse? Or perhaps this too comes from outside and is therefore not part of her body, and does form a mixture with her corpse. Similarly, Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, raised a dilemma concerning a corpse: With regard to its skin, what is the halakha? Rav Huna bar Manoaḥ likewise raised a dilemma: With regard to its phlegm and its spittle, what is the halakha?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר אַחָא לְרַב פָּפָּא וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ כׇּל הָנֵי דְּקָאָמַר הָוֵי גַּלְגַּלִּין רָקָב דִּמְטַמֵּא הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ דְּאַשְׁקְיֵיהּ מֵי דְקָלִים וְסַכְיֵא נָשָׁא וּשְׁלָקוֹ בְּמֵי טְבֶרְיָא Rav Shmuel bar Aḥa said to Rav Pappa: But if it enters your mind that all these cases of which they spoke form a mixture, under what circumstances do you find this case of dust that imparts impurity? Dust from a corpse will always include some components of the aforementioned elements. The Gemara answers: It is possible. For example, if someone was given palm water [mei dekalim], a powerful laxative, to drink before he died, and was rubbed with a depilatory agent to remove his hair, and was boiled after death in the hot waters of Tiberias until the skin came off, this would remove all matter that is not part of the corpse itself.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי נָקְטִינַן מֵת שֶׁטְּחָנוֹ אֵין לוֹ רָקָב אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ טְחָנוֹ וְחָזַר וְהִרְקִיב מַהוּ מִידֵּי הוּא טַעְמָא אֶלָּא דְּאִיכָּא בָּשָׂר וְגִידִים וַעֲצָמוֹת וְהָאִיכָּא אוֹ דִּלְמָא כִּבְרִיָּיתוֹ בָּעִינַן וְלֵיכָּא תֵּיקוּ Abaye said: We have a tradition that a corpse that was ground into small pieces has no halakha of dust. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If a corpse was ground after death and the remains later decayed, what is the halakha? The Gemara clarifies the two sides of the dilemma: Is the halakha of dust of a corpse only due to the fact that there is flesh and sinews and bones, and all these are present in this case, so it is impure? Or perhaps, we require the corpse to have decayed from its initial state, before it was ground, and this is not the situation here. As was the case with regard to the previous inquiries, no answer was found, and the Gemara says that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.
תָּנֵי עוּלָּא בַּר חֲנִינָא מֵת שֶׁחָסַר אֵין לוֹ רָקָב וְלֹא תְּפוּסָה וְלֹא שְׁכוּנַת קְבָרוֹת § Ulla bar Ḥanina teaches: A corpse that lacks a part does not have the halakha of dust, which imparts ritual impurity in the amount of a full ladle, nor the halakha of earth that is caught [tefusa] and considered part of a corpse. If a deficient corpse is moved, the surrounding earth is not considered part of it and need not be moved together with the body, as must be performed for a whole corpse. Nor does the halakha of a graveyard apply. If three corpses are discovered in close proximity and one of them is deficient in some way, one need not search for more bodies out of concern that the location might have been a cemetery, as must be done if three intact corpses are found. Rather, the bodies are considered isolated corpses.
מֵיתִיבִי לֹא אִם אָמַרְתָּ בְּמֵת שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ רוֹב וְרוֹבַע אוֹ מְלֹא תַרְווֹד רָקָב תֹּאמַר בְּחַי שֶׁאֵין לוֹ לֹא רוֹב וְלֹא רוֹבַע וְלֹא מְלֹא תַרְווֹד רָקָב The Gemara raises an objection from a mishna (Eduyyot 6:3) that addresses the question of whether an olive-bulk of flesh that came from a living person imparts ritual impurity as it would were it to come from a corpse: No, if you say that an olive-bulk of flesh imparts impurity with regard to a corpse, whose halakhot of impurity are stringent, as the majority of its structure or the majority of the number of its bones, or a quarter-kav of its bones, or even a full ladle of its dust impart impurity, shall you also say that it imparts impurity with regard to a living person, who does not have the halakha of the majority of structure or the majority of the number of its bones, nor a quarter-kav, nor a full ladle of dust?
הֵיכִי דָּמֵי דְּאַרְקִיב חַד אֵבֶר דִּכְווֹתֵיהּ גַּבֵּי מֵת אֲפִילּוּ חַד אֵבֶר אִיכָּא רָקָב מִי קָתָנֵי הָא מֵת הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן שׁוּם מֵת יֵשׁ לוֹ רָקָב שׁוּם חַי אֵין לוֹ רָקָב The Gemara analyzes this passage: What are the circumstances of that mishna that deals with a limb from a living person? If you say that one limb of a living person decayed, and the mishna is indicating that in the corresponding situation with regard to a corpse, there is dust even from one limb. This shows that the halakha of dust applies to a corpse that is missing a limb and not just to a complete corpse. The Gemara rejects this argument: Did the mishna teach that this corpse in that particular case of an isolated limb has the halakha of dust? That is merely an inference, as it is not stated explicitly in the mishna itself. Rather, the mishna teaches us this: The name, i.e., the category, of a corpse has dust. However, the name of a living person does not have dust.
בָּעֵי רָבָא הִרְקִיב כְּשֶׁהוּא חַי וְחָזַר וּמֵת מַהוּ כִּי גְּמִירִי רָקָב דְּאִירְקִיב כְּשֶׁהוּא מֵת אוֹ דִלְמָא הַשְׁתָּא מִיהָא הָא מָיֵית Rava raised a dilemma: If a limb of a body decayed when he was alive, and that individual subsequently died, what is the halakha? Do we say that when this is learned as a tradition that dust imparts ritual impurity, this applies only if the body decayed when he was dead, but not when he was alive, and therefore this corpse is considered deficient and its dust does not impart impurity? Or perhaps, now in any event he is dead, and his whole body has decomposed, and consequently its dust does impart impurity.
תָּא שְׁמַע לֹא אִם אָמַרְתָּ בְּמֵת שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ רוֹב וְרוֹבַע וּמְלֹא תַרְווֹד רָקָב תֹּאמַר בְּחַי כּוּ׳ The Gemara suggests: Come and hear the aforementioned mishna: No, if you say that an olive-bulk of flesh imparts impurity with regard to a corpse, whose halakhot of impurity are stringent, as the majority of its structure or the majority of the number of its bones, or a quarter-kav of its bones, or even a full ladle of its dust imparts impurity, shall you also say that this it imparts impurity with regard to a living person, who does not have the halakha of the majority of structure or the majority of the number of its bones, nor a quarter-kav, nor a full ladle of dust.
טַעְמָא מִשּׁוּם חַי הָא מֵת יֵשׁ לוֹ רָקָב מִי קָתָנֵי הָא מֵת הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּשׁוּם מֵת יֵשׁ לוֹ רָקָב שׁוּם חַי אֵין לוֹ רָקָב The Gemara infers from this passage: The reason the olive-bulk of flesh does not impart impurity is due to the fact that it is from a living person, from which it may be inferred that in a corresponding situation involving a corpse, the corpse has the halakha of dust, even if the limb had decomposed during the deceased’s lifetime. The Gemara rejects this contention as above: Did the mishna teach that this corpse in that particular case of an isolated limb has the halakha of dust? That is merely an inference, as it is not stated explicitly in the mishna itself. Rather, the mishna teaches us this: The name, i.e., the category, of a corpse has dust. However, the name of a living person does not have dust.
בָּעֵי רָבָא נְמָלָה שֶׁחָסְרָה מַהוּ שִׁיעוּרָא גְּמִירִין לַהּ וְהָא חֲסַר אוֹ בְּרִיָּה גְּמִירִי לַהּ וְהָאִיכָּא § In relation to the above discussion concerning a body without a limb, Rava raised a dilemma: If someone eats an entire ant, even if it is less than an olive-bulk in volume, he is liable for eating a creeping animal because it is a whole creature. Rava’s dilemma was as follows: If one eats an ant that lacks a part, e.g., a leg, what is the halakha? Is this individual liable to receive lashes? The two possibilities are as follows: Is it learned as tradition that the amount for which one is liable is a whole ant, and this one is lacking? Or did we learn that he is punished for a viable entity, and there is a viable entity here, despite the missing limb?