בִּשְׁלָמָא לְדִידִי דְּאָמֵינָא מִשּׁוּם דְּהֶיתֵּר מִצְטָרֵף לְאִיסּוּר כְּגוֹן דִּנְפִישִׁי חוּלִּין אֶלָּא לְדִידָךְ דְּאָמְרַתְּ מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא כְּזַיִת בִּכְדֵי אֲכִילַת פְּרָס כִּי נְפִישִׁי חוּלִּין מַאי הָוֵי Granted, according to my opinion, as I say that this is because permitted food combines with forbidden food, I can explain that this is referring to a case where there is more non-sacred produce than teruma, and the combination is assumes the status of the forbidden item or teruma only when those are the majority. However, according to your opinion, that you say this is because there is an olive-bulk consumed in the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread, then even if there is more non-sacred produce, what of it? In any case there is an olive-bulk of teruma eaten within the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ הַנַּח לִתְרוּמָה בַּזְּמַן הַזֶּה דְּרַבָּנַן Rav Dimi said to Abaye: Leave aside teruma in the present, as it applies by rabbinic law. Since the exile of the Jewish people from Eretz Yisrael, the halakhot of teruma and tithes apply by rabbinic law, not Torah law. This is the basis for the lenient ruling with regard to this mixture.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי מִמַּאי דְּהַאי מִשְׁרַת לְהֶיתֵּר מִצְטָרֵף לְאִיסּוּר הוּא דַּאֲתָא דִּילְמָא לִיתֵּן טַעַם כְּעִיקָּר הוּא דַּאֲתָא Abaye said to him: From where do you derive that this verse: “Nor shall he drink anything soaked in grapes” (Numbers 6:3), comes to teach the principle that permitted food combines with forbidden food, as stated by Rabbi Yoḥanan (35b)? Perhaps instead it comes to establish the principle that the legal status of the flavor of a forbidden food is like that of its substance. This principle states that any food that absorbs the taste of a forbidden item assumes the status of this forbidden item itself.
וּלְאַבָּיֵי מֵעִיקָּרָא קָא קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ מַאי דְּקָאָמַר רַב דִּימִי וְקָא מוֹתֵיב לֵיהּ כׇּל הָלֵין תְּיוּבָתָא הֲדַר אֲמַר לֵיהּ לִיתֵּן טַעַם כְּעִיקָּר The Gemara expresses surprise at Abaye’s question. And according to the opinion of Abaye, initially that which Rav Dimi said was difficult for him. Rav Dimi had cited Rabbi Yoḥanan as saying that permitted food combines with forbidden foods only in the case of naziriteship (36a), due to the term “soaked,” and Abaye had objected with all these aforementioned refutations to prove that this principle applies in all areas of Torah law. And yet he then said to him that one should derive a very different principle from that same verse, that the verse establishes the principle that the legal status of the flavor of a forbidden food is like that of its substance.
בָּתַר דְּשַׁנִּי לֵיהּ אֲמַר לֵיהּ דִּילְמָא לִיתֵּן טַעַם כָּעִיקָּר הוּא דַּאֲתָא The Gemara answers: After Rav Dimi resolved Abaye’s difficulties, and Abaye had accepted his answer that the principle that permitted food combines with forbidden food does not apply to the rest of Torah law, he said to Rav Dimi that perhaps the verse comes to establish that the legal status of the flavor of a forbidden food is like that of its substance, with the following application.
לְכִדְתַנְיָא מִשְׁרַת לִיתֵּן טַעַם כְּעִיקָּר שֶׁאִם שָׁרָה עֲנָבִים בְּמַיִם וְיֵשׁ בָּהֶן טַעַם יַיִן חַיָּיב וּמִכָּאן אַתָּה דָּן כׇּל אִיסּוּרִין שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה This is relevant for that which is taught in a baraita: The term “soaked” serves to establish the principle that the legal status of the flavor of a forbidden food is like that of its substance. As, if a nazirite soaked grapes in water and the water has the taste of wine, he is liable to receive punishment for drinking this liquid, as it assumes the status of wine. And from here you derive the halakha with regard to all prohibitions of the Torah; in all cases, the legal status of the taste of a forbidden food is like that of its substance. The fact that with regard to all other prohibitions, the legal status of the flavor of a forbidden food is like that of its substance, is derived from the halakhot of naziriteship.
וּמָה נָזִיר שֶׁאֵין אִיסּוּרוֹ אִיסּוּר עוֹלָם וְאֵין אִיסּוּרוֹ אִיסּוּר הֲנָאָה וְיֵשׁ הֶיתֵּר לְאִיסּוּרוֹ עָשָׂה בּוֹ טַעַם כְּעִיקָּר כִּלְאֵי הַכֶּרֶם שֶׁאִיסּוּרָן אִיסּוּר עוֹלָם וְאִיסּוּרָן אִיסּוּר הֲנָיָיה וְאֵין הֶיתֵּר לְאִיסּוּרָן אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה בּוֹ טַעַם כְּעִיקָּר The baraita explains the derivation: And just as with regard to a nazirite, whose prohibition against eating grapes is not a permanent prohibition, as he will be permitted to eat grapes once his term of naziriteship is over, and furthermore his prohibition is not a prohibition against deriving benefit from wine, and there is a way to permit his prohibition against eating grape products by requesting from a halakhic authority to dissolve his vow, and nevertheless, in his case the Torah rendered the legal status of the flavor of food like that of its substance. With regard to a forbidden mixture of diverse kinds in a vineyard, i.e., grain seeds sown with grape seeds, whose prohibition is a permanent prohibition and whose prohibition is a prohibition against deriving benefit, and there is no way to permit their prohibition, is it not right that the Torah should render the legal status of the flavor of its forbidden food like that of its substance?
וְהוּא הַדִּין לְעׇרְלָה בִּשְׁתַּיִם The baraita adds: And the same is true for the prohibition against eating the fruit of a tree during the first three years after its planting [orla], on two of three counts: Although the prohibition of orla is not a permanent prohibition, as one may eat the fruit of this tree after three years have passed, it is prohibited to derive benefit from orla, and this prohibition cannot be permitted, as the fruits that grow during the first three years remain forbidden. Similarly, all other prohibitions in the Torah are more severe than the case of a nazirite in one of these aspects, and therefore this principle is universal. Abaye is asking Rav Dimi: In any case doesn’t this entire derivation presents a difficulty for Rabbi Yoḥanan, who derives a different halakha from the term “soaked.”
אֲמַר לֵיהּ הָהוּא מֵרַבָּנַן רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ כִּי קָאָמַר לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא הֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אִילֵימָא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא דְּהָכָא דִּתְנַן רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר אֲפִילּוּ שָׁרָה פִּיתּוֹ בְּיַיִן וְיֵשׁ בּוֹ כְּדֵי לְצָרֵף כְּזַיִת חַיָּיב וּמִמַּאי דִּילְמָא הוּא דְּאִיכָּא כְּזַיִת בָּעֵינָא One of the Sages said to Abaye: When Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the principle of permitted food combining with forbidden food is derived from the term “soaked,” he spoke in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The Gemara asks: To which statement of Rabbi Akiva is the Gemara referring? If we say it is referring to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva of this mishna, as we learned (Shevuot 21b) that Rabbi Akiva says: Even if a nazirite soaked his bread in wine, and the bread and the wine contain enough to combine to constitute an olive-bulk, he is liable; but from where do we know that Rabbi Akiva means an olive-bulk taken from the bread and the wine together? Perhaps that ruling applies only when there is an olive-bulk of wine as is, without the bread?
וְכִי תֵּימָא מַאי לְמֵימְרָא לְאַפּוֹקֵי מִתַּנָּא קַמָּא דְּאָמַר עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁתֶּה רְבִיעִית יַיִן And if you would say: In that case, what is the purpose of stating this ruling? What is the novelty of Rabbi Akiva’s statement if the mixture contains an olive-bulk of wine? One can say that it serves to exclude the opinion of the first tanna, who said that he is liable only if he drinks a quarter-log of wine. Rabbi Akiva emphasizes that one is liable even if he drinks the amount of an olive-bulk.
אֶלָּא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא דְּבָרַיְיתָא דְּתַנְיָא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר נָזִיר שֶׁשָּׁרָה פִּתּוֹ בְּיַיִן וְאָכַל כְּזַיִת מִפַּת וּמִיַּיִן חַיָּיב Rather, the reference is to the following statement of Rabbi Akiva in a baraita. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Akiva says: A nazirite who soaked his bread in wine and ate an olive-bulk of the mixture of bread and wine is liable. This baraita indicates that according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva a permitted substance combines with a forbidden substance.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אַוְיָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא דְּקָא מוֹקֵים לֵיהּ לְהַאי וְכׇל מִשְׁרַת לְהֶיתֵּר מִצְטָרֵף לְאִיסּוּר לִיתֵּן טַעַם כְּעִיקָּר מְנָא לֵיהּ יָלֵיף מִבָּשָׂר בְּחָלָב לָאו טַעַם בְּעָלְמָא הוּא וְאָסוּר הָכָא נָמֵי לָא שְׁנָא Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Ashi: According to Rabbi Akiva, who establishes the verse “neither shall he drink anything soaked” (Numbers 6:3) as referring to the principle that the permitted combines with the forbidden, from where does he derive the principle that the legal status of the flavor is like that of the substance itself? The Gemara answers: He derives this principle from the prohibition of meat cooked in milk. Is it not the case that there is no actual milk present, and it is merely the taste of the milk absorbed in the meat, and yet the mixture is prohibited? Here too, in the case of other prohibitions, it is no different, and the legal status of the flavor is like that of the substance itself.
וְרַבָּנַן מִבָּשָׂר בְּחָלָב לָא גָּמְרִינַן דְּחִידּוּשׁ הוּא The Gemara asks: And with regard to the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Akiva and derive the halakha that the legal status of the flavor is like that of the substance itself from the phrase “neither shall he drink anything soaked,” why do they not derive this principle from the case of meat cooked in milk? The Gemara answers: The Rabbis claim that we do not derive other prohibitions from meat cooked in milk, as that prohibition is a novelty, and one does not learn general halakhot from unusual cases.
מַאי חִידּוּשֵׁיהּ אִילֵּימָא דְּהַאי לְחוֹדֵיהּ וְהַאי לְחוֹדֵיהּ שְׁרֵי וּבַהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי אָסוּר כִּלְאַיִם נָמֵי הַאי לְחוֹדֵיהּ שְׁרֵי וְהַאי לְחוֹדֵיהּ שְׁרֵי וּבַהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי אָסוּר The Gemara asks: What is the novelty of that prohibition? If we say that it is unique in that this meat alone and that milk alone are each permitted, and yet together they are forbidden, that characteristic is not unique to meat cooked in milk. In the case of forbidden mixtures of diverse kinds too, this element alone and that element alone are each permitted, and yet together they are forbidden.
אֶלָּא דְּאִי תָּרוּ לֵיהּ כּוּלֵּי יוֹמָא בַּחֲלָבָא שְׁרֵי וּמְבַשֵּׁיל לֵיהּ בַּשּׁוֹלֵי אָסוּר The Gemara answers: Rather, the novelty is that if one soaks meat in milk all day, it is permitted by Torah law, despite the fact that the meat certainly absorbed some taste of the milk, whereas if one cooked meat in milk even for a short time, the mixture is forbidden by Torah law. The novelty is that it is not the fact that they are mixed together that renders meat and milk forbidden, but the act of cooking.
וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא נָמֵי בָּשָׂר בְּחָלָב חִידּוּשׁ הוּא אֶלָּא The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Akiva too, he certainly agrees that the halakha of meat cooked in milk is a novelty. How can he derive a general principle from this case? Rather,