לֹא אִם אָמַרְתָּ בְּזָכָר שֶׁכֵּן אִיסּוּר אֶחָד תֹּאמַר בִּנְקֵבָה שֶׁשְּׁנֵי אִיסּוּרִין No, you cannot make this claim, because if you say that this is true with regard to a male, when bringing his offering involves only one uncertain prohibition, i.e., that he might be bringing non-sacred animals into the Temple courtyard, shall you also say that this is the case with regard to a female, whose case includes two prohibitions? This concludes the baraita.
מַאי שְׁנֵי אִיסּוּרִין לָאו אִיסּוּר נְבֵילָה וְחוּלִּין בַּעֲזָרָה מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִיקָא וְדִילְמָא מִיחַיַּיב עֲלֵיהּ מִשּׁוּם דְּמִיתְחֲזֵי כִּתְרֵין אִיסּוּרִין מִדְּרַבָּנַן The Gemara asks: What are these two prohibitions? Are they not the prohibition against consuming an unslaughtered animal carcass by eating a bird killed by pinching, and the prohibition against bringing non-sacred animals into the Temple courtyard? This shows that the prohibition against bringing non-sacred animals into the Temple courtyard applies by Torah law according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, objects to this: And perhaps one is not liable for these prohibitions by Torah law, rather, the baraita means that one is liable for this because it appears like two Torah prohibitions, although they actually apply only by rabbinic law.
לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי עַד מָתַי מַדִּיר אֶת בְּנוֹ בְּנָזִיר עַד שֶׁיָּבִיא שְׁתֵּי שְׂעָרוֹת דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר עַד שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ לְעוֹנַת נְדָרִים § The Gemara returns to the question of whether the ruling that a man can impose naziriteship on his son is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai or whether it is part of the boy’s education. Let us say that this is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im. As it is taught: Until when can a father vow that his son should be a nazirite? It is until the son develops two pubic hairs; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: It is until he reaches the age of vows, usually approximately a year earlier, when he demonstrates an understanding of the nature of vows. If he vows at that age and comprehends the significance of his utterance, his vow is valid.
מַאי לָאו תַּנָּאֵי הִיא דְּרַבִּי סָבַר הֲלָכָה הִיא בְּנָזִיר וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּהִגִּיעַ לְעוֹנַת נְדָרִים מַדִּיר לֵיהּ וְאָזֵיל עַד דְּמַיְיתֵי שְׁתֵּי שְׂעָרוֹת וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה דְּאָמַר עַד שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ לְעוֹנַת נְדָרִים סָבַר כְּדֵי לְחַנְּכוֹ בְּמִצְוֹת וְכֵיוָן דְּנָפֵיק מֵרְשׁוּתֵיהּ תּוּ לָא מִיחַיַּיב What, is it not the case that this is a dispute between tanna’im: As Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that it is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai with regard to a nazirite, and therefore even though the son has already reached the age of vows and is capable of making his own decision with regard to the vow, this halakha states that the father continues to vow for him until he develops two pubic hairs, the sign of maturity. And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that the father can vow for the son only until he reaches the age of vows, holds that he imposes a vow on his son in order to educate him in mitzvot, and since the son has left the father’s supervision to the degree that he can utter his own vows, the father is no longer obligated to educate him in this area of halakha.
אָמְרִי לָא דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא הֲלָכָה הִיא בְּנָזִיר וְהָכָא בְּמוּפְלָא הַסָּמוּךְ לְאִישׁ קָמִיפַּלְגִי The Gemara rejects this argument. The Sages say in response: No; this is not the correct explanation of that dispute, as one can say that everyone, both Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, agrees with Rabbi Yoḥanan that it is a halakha with regard to a nazirite, and here they disagree with regard to the issue of a minor one year before he or she reaches majority. In other words, they dispute the case of a child who utters a vow when he is almost mature, on the verge of puberty. It is an accepted halakha that the vow of this child is valid if he understands its meaning. The dispute concerns the source of this halakha.
רַבִּי סָבַר מוּפְלָא הַסָּמוּךְ לְאִישׁ דְּרַבָּנַן וְאָתְיָא דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא דָּחֲיָא דְּרַבָּנַן וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה סָבַר מוּפְלָא הַסָּמוּךְ לְאִישׁ דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the status of a minor one year before he or she reaches majority applies by rabbinic law, and therefore the halakha by Torah law that a father can vow on behalf of his son comes and overrides the decree that one who is near the age of maturity is considered an independent adult with regard to vows, which is by rabbinic law. And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, holds that the status of a minor one year before he or she reaches majority applies by Torah law. Consequently, the halakha that a father can vow on behalf of his son does not apply to this case.
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא כְּדֵי לְחַנְּכוֹ בְּמִצְוֹת וּמוּפְלָא הַסָּמוּךְ לְאִישׁ דְּרַבָּנַן הִיא רַבִּי סָבַר אָתֵי חִינּוּךְ דְּרַבָּנַן וְדָחֵי מוּפְלָא הַסָּמוּךְ לְאִישׁ דְּרַבָּנַן And if you wish, say instead that everyone agrees that a father vows for his son in order to educate him in mitzvot, which means it is by rabbinic law, and likewise the status of a minor one year before he or she reaches majority is also by rabbinic law. In that case, the tanna’im dispute the following: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the mitzva of education, which applies by rabbinic law, comes and overrides the status of a minor one year before he or she reaches majority, which is also by rabbinic law.
וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה דְּאָמַר עַד שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ לְעוֹנַת נְדָרִים קָסָבַר לָא אָתֵי חִינּוּךְ דְּרַבָּנַן וְדָחֵי מוּפְלָא הַסָּמוּךְ לְאִישׁ And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who said that a father can vow for his son only until he reaches the age of vows, holds that the mitzva of education by rabbinic law does not come and override the status of a minor one year before he or she reaches majority. Consequently, there is no necessary connection between this dispute of tanna’im and the argument between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish as to whether the ruling that a father can impose naziriteship on his son is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai or an educational tool.
לֵימָא הָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי כִּי הָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי דְּתַנְיָא מַעֲשֶׂה בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא שֶׁהִדִּירוֹ אָבִיו בְּנָזִיר וֶהֱבִיאוֹ לִפְנֵי רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל וְהָיָה רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל בּוֹדְקוֹ לֵידַע אִם הֵבִיא שְׁתֵּי שְׂעָרוֹת אִם לֹא הֵבִיא With regard to the dispute concerning the time period for a father’s vow on behalf of his son, the Gemara suggests: Shall we say that the dispute between these tanna’im is like the dispute between those other tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Nidda 5:9): An incident occurred involving Rabbi Ḥanina in which his father vowed that he should be a nazirite when he was a minor, and they brought him before Rabban Gamliel, and Rabban Gamliel examined him to discern if he had already developed two pubic hairs, in which case the vow would not take effect, or if he had not developed them, which would mean that the vow was valid.
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר לֵידַע אִם הִגִּיעַ לְעוֹנַת נְדָרִים אִם לָאו אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי אַל תִּצְטַעֵר לְבוֹדְקֵנִי אִם קָטָן אֲנִי אֶהְיֶה בִּשְׁבִיל אַבָּא אִם גָּדוֹל אֲנִי אֶהְיֶה בִּשְׁבִיל עַצְמִי עָמַד רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל וּנְשָׁקוֹ עַל רֹאשׁוֹ אָמַר מוּבְטָח אֲנִי בָּזֶה שֶׁמּוֹרֶה הֲלָכָה בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל אָמְרוּ לֹא הָיוּ יָמִים מוּעָטִים עַד שֶׁהוֹרָה הוֹרָאָה בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל Rabbi Yosei says that Rabban Gamliel examined him to discern whether he had reached the age of vows or not, which he maintains is the decisive factor. The child said to Rabban Gamliel: My teacher, do not go to the trouble of examining me, since if I am a minor I shall be a nazirite due to my father’s vow, and if I am an adult, I shall be a nazirite due to my own vow. Rabban Gamliel arose and kissed the child on his head. He said: I am certain of this child that he will eventually become an authority of halakha for the Jewish people. They said: In fact, it was only a few years later that the child issued rulings for the Jewish people.
בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה דְּאָמַר עַד שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ לְעוֹנַת נְדָרִים הַיְינוּ דְּקָאָמַר אִם קָטָן אֲנִי אֶהְיֶה בִּשְׁבִיל אַבָּא אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי דְּאָמַר עַד שֶׁיָּבִיא שְׁתֵּי שְׂעָרוֹת וְאִם גָּדוֹל אֲנִי אֶהְיֶה בִּשְׁבִיל עַצְמִי The Gemara explains its suggestion: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who said that a father can vow on behalf of his son only until he reaches the age of vows, this is why the child said: If I am a minor I shall be a nazirite due to my father, as he means: If I have not yet reached the age of vows. However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said that a father can vow naziriteship for his son until he develops two pubic hairs, despite the fact that he is already mature with regard to vows, what is the meaning of: And if I am an adult, I shall be a nazirite due to my own vow?