אף נשחט על אותו מום רבי יהודה אומר אפילו מת אין מקיזין לו את הדם The animal may even be slaughtered on the basis of that blemish. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if the firstborn would die if its blood is not let, one may not let its blood at all.
א"ר חייא בר אבא אמר רבי יוחנן הכל מודים במחמץ אחר מחמץ שהוא חייב דכתיב (ויקרא ב, יא) לא תעשה חמץ (ויקרא ו, י) ולא תאפה חמץ The Gemara discusses similar cases, including examples involving meal offerings. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: All of the Sages who disagree as to whether one may let the blood of a firstborn animal whose blood circulation is constricted concede that one who leavens a meal offering after another had already leavened it is liable to receive lashes for the additional leavening, as it is written: “No meal offering that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven” (Leviticus 2:11), and it is also stated: “It shall not be baked with leaven” (Leviticus 6:10). This indicates that one is liable for every act of leavening performed on a meal offering.
במסרס אחר מסרס שהוא חייב דכתיב (ויקרא כב, כד) ומעוך וכתות ונתוק וכרות אם על כורת הוא חייב על נותק לא כל שכן אלא להביא נותק אחר כורת שהוא חייב Similarly, everyone agrees that one who castrates an animal after one who castrates it is liable, as it is written: “Those whose testicles are bruised, or crushed, or detached, or cut, shall not be offered to the Lord, and you shall not do this in your land” (Leviticus 22:24). If one is liable when the seminal vesicles are cut, then when the testicles are detached altogether is he not all the more so liable? Rather, this verse serves to include one who detaches the testicles after one who cuts the seminal vesicles, to indicate that he is liable. Apparently, one is liable for castrating an animal that is already sterilized.
לא נחלקו אלא במטיל מום בבעל מום ר' מאיר סבר כל מום לא יהיה בו ורבנן סברי (ויקרא כב, כא) תמים יהיה לרצון These Sages disagree only with regard to one who inflicts a blemish on an already blemished animal, such as one whose blood circulation is constricted. Rabbi Meir maintains that as the verse states: “It shall be perfect to be accepted; there shall be no blemish in it” (Leviticus 22:21), this categorical statement includes even the infliction of a blemish on an offering that is already blemished. And the Rabbis maintain that the phrase “it shall be perfect to be accepted” indicates that the prohibition against inflicting a blemish applies only to an animal that is currently perfect, i.e., unblemished, and can therefore be accepted, meaning that it is suitable to be sacrificed upon the altar. If the animal is already blemished, there is no prohibition against inflicting an additional blemish upon it.
ור' מאיר נמי הכתיב תמים יהיה לרצון ההוא למעוטי בעל מום מעיקרא The Gemara analyzes this dispute. And according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who derives the halakha from the phrase “there shall be no blemish in it,” isn’t it written also: “It shall be perfect to be accepted”? The Gemara answers: That verse serves to exclude only an animal that was blemished from the outset, i.e., an animal that was born with a blemish. In such a case, there is no prohibition to inflict an additional blemish on it. But if the animal was initially unblemished and later developed a blemish, it is prohibited to inflict another blemish upon it.
בעל מום מעיקרא דיקלא בעלמא הוא The Gemara rejects this suggestion: There is no need to exclude an animal that was blemished from the outset, as it is merely like a palm tree, i.e., it is an item that can never attain the status of an animal consecrated as an offering. Therefore, it is obvious that the prohibition against inflicting a blemish does not apply to this animal.
אלא למעוטי פסולי המוקדשים לאחר פדיונם סלקא דעתך אמינא הואיל ואסירי בגיזה ועבודה במומם נמי ליתסרי קמ"ל Rather, Rabbi Meir maintains that the phrase “it shall be perfect to be accepted” serves to exclude disqualified consecrated animals, to teach that after their redemption, when they become non-sacred, the prohibition against inflicting a blemish does not apply to them any longer. This exclusion is necessary, as it might enter your mind to say that since it is prohibited to shear disqualified consecrated animals or use them for labor even after they have been redeemed and are non-sacred, perhaps let it also be prohibited to inflict a blemish upon them. Consequently, this verse teaches us that there is no prohibition against inflicting a blemish upon these animals.
ורבנן נמי הכתיב (ויקרא כב, כא) כל מום לא יהיה בו ההוא מיבעי ליה לכדתניא וכל מום לא יהיה בו אין לי אלא שלא יהא בו מום מנין שלא יגרום לו ע"י אחרים שלא יניח בצק או דבילה על גבי האוזן כדי שיבא הכלב ויטלנו ת"ל כל מום אמר מום ואמר כל מום The Gemara analyzes the opinion of the Rabbis. And according to the opinion of the Rabbis as well, who base their opinion on the phrase: “It shall be perfect to be accepted,” isn’t it written: “There shall not be any blemish in it,” which indicates an expansion of the prohibition against inflicting a blemish? The Gemara answers: That verse is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “There shall not be any blemish in it” (Leviticus 22:21). I have derived only that it may not have a blemish caused directly by human action. From where is it derived that one may not cause a blemish to be inflicted upon it indirectly by means of other agents, e.g., that one may not place dough or pressed figs on its ear so that a dog will come and take it, thereby biting off part of the animal’s ear and leaving it blemished? The verse states: “Any blemish.” It says: “Blemish,” and it says “Any blemish”; the word “no” serves to teach that one may not cause a blemish indirectly.
אמר ר' אמי הניח שאור ע"ג עיסה והלך וישב לו ונתחמצה מאליה חייב עליה כמעשה שבת ומעשה שבת כי האי גוונא מי מיחייב והאמר רבה בר בר חנה § The Gemara returns to discuss the leavening of a meal offering. Rabbi Ami says: If one placed leaven, i.e., dough that has leavened to such an extent that it is no longer used as food but as a leavening agent for other dough, on top of the dough of a meal offering, and he went and sat himself down to wait, meaning that he performed no other action, and the dough then leavened of its own accord, he is liable to receive lashes for it. This is similar to performing a prohibited action on Shabbat. The Gemara questions this comparison: And is one liable for performing a prohibited action on Shabbat in a case like this? But doesn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say