מִזְבֵּחַ הַחִיצוֹן דִּכְתִיב בֵּיהּ וְשָׂמוֹ אֵצֶל הַמִּזְבֵּחַ מִזְבֵּחַ הַפְּנִימִי מְנָלַן that the ashes of the external altar are subject to misuse, as it is written in the context of those ashes: “And he shall put it beside the altar” (Leviticus 6:3). This teaches that these ashes must be interred, despite the fact that their mitzva has been performed by its removal, and therefore they are subject to misuse. But from where do we derive that the ashes of the inner altar are also subject to misuse?
אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר דְּאָמַר קְרָא וְהֵסִיר אֶת מֻרְאָתוֹ בְּנֹצָתָהּ אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְמִזְבֵּחַ הַחִיצוֹן תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לְמִזְבֵּחַ הַפְּנִימִי Rabbi Elazar said in response: It is derived from the fact that the verse states with regard to a bird sacrificed as a burnt offering: “And he shall take away its crop with its feathers, and cast it beside the altar on the east part, in the place of the ashes” (Leviticus 1:16), referring to the location for the placement of the removed ashes. If this verse is not needed for the matter of the external altar, as that halakha is already derived from the phrase: “And he shall put them beside the altar” (Leviticus 6:3), apply it to the matter of the ashes of the inner altar, teaching that these ashes must also be placed there.
אֵימָא אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי בְּמִזְבֵּחַ הַחִיצוֹן וְלִקְבּוֹעַ לוֹ מָקוֹם The Gemara questions this conclusion: One can say that this and that, i.e., both verses cited above, are stated with regard to the ashes that are on the external altar, and the additional verse is necessary to fix its place, i.e., that it should be put on the east part, which is mentioned only in Leviticus 1:16. If so, there is no source for the placement of the ashes of the inner altar.
אִם כֵּן לֵימָא קְרָא אֵצֶל הַמִּזְבֵּחַ מַאי הַדָּשֶׁן דַּאֲפִילּוּ מִזְבֵּחַ הַפְּנִימִי The Gemara answers: If so, that both verses are referring to the external altar, and the sole purpose of Leviticus 1:16 is to fix its place, let that verse merely state: “And he shall take away its crop with its feathers and cast it beside the altar,” and it would be understood that the two verses are referring to the same place, as the identical phrase “beside the altar” appears in the other verse. What is the reason for the additional phrase “in the place of the ashes”? It teaches that even the ashes of the inner altar are placed there.
מְנוֹרָה מְנָלַן דָּשֶׁן הַדָּשֶׁן: The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that the ashes of the Candelabrum are also placed to the east of the altar? The Gemara answers: It is derived from the definite article in: “The ashes,” as the verse could have said “ashes” and instead it said “the ashes.” This addition serves to include the ashes of the Candelabrum.
מַתְנִי׳ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר תּוֹרִין שֶׁלֹּא הִגִּיעַ זְמַנָּן מוֹעֲלִין בָּהֶן בְּנֵי יוֹנָה שֶׁעָבַר זְמַנָּן לֹא נֶהֱנִין וְלֹא מוֹעֲלִין בָּהֶן: mishna The previous mishna teaches that one may not derive benefit from doves whose time of fitness for sacrifice has not arrived and from pigeons whose time of fitness for sacrifice has passed, but one who derived benefit from them is not liable for their misuse. Rabbi Shimon disagrees with this ruling and says: With regard to doves whose time of fitness for sacrifice has not arrived, one is liable for misusing them. With regard to pigeons whose time of fitness for sacrifice has passed, one may not derive benefit ab initio, but if one derived benefit from them he is not liable for their misuse.
גְּמָ׳ בִּשְׁלָמָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן כִּדְקָתָנֵי טַעְמָא שֶׁהָיָה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר כׇּל הָרָאוּי לְאַחַר זְמַן וְהִקְדִּישׁוֹ בְּתוֹךְ זְמַנּוֹ הֲרֵי הוּא בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה וְאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת gemara This and the preceding mishna indicate that the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon disagree as to whether or not doves whose time of fitness for sacrifice has not arrived are subject to misuse. The Gemara clarifies their opinions: Granted, one can understand the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as he himself teaches his reason in a mishna (Zevaḥim 112b). As Rabbi Shimon would say: In the case of any sacrificial animal that is fit to be sacrificed after the passage of time, e.g., doves that will be fit for sacrifice when they mature, if one consecrated it before its time of fitness and slaughtered it outside the Temple courtyard, that person is in violation of a prohibition but there is no liability to receive karet for it.
אֶלָּא רַבָּנַן מַאי שְׁנָא מִמְּחוּסַּר זְמַן But according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that doves whose time of fitness for sacrifice has not arrived are not subject to misuse, in what way is this case different from an animal whose time has not yet arrived, and yet it can be consecrated? An animal whose time has not yet arrived enters the pen to be tithed together with the other animals (see Bekhorot 56a). Why is the case of the young doves any different?
אָמְרִי מְחוּסַּר זְמַן מִידֵּי דְּהָוֵה אַבַּעַל מוּם דְּבַר פִּדְיוֹן הוּא אֲבָל הָנֵי עוֹפוֹת כֵּיוָן דְּאֵין מוּם פּוֹסֵל בְּעוֹפוֹת אֵין לָעוֹפוֹת פִּדְיוֹן The Rabbis would say in response that the cases are not comparable. An animal whose time has not yet arrived can indeed be consecrated, just as is the halakha with regard to a blemished animal, which can be consecrated, although only to the degree that it is subject to redemption. But in the case of these birds, since a blemish does not render birds unfit, there is no possibility of redemption for blemished birds. Therefore, one cannot compare the case of animal, which is subject to redemption, to the case of a bird whose time has not yet arrived.
אָמַר עוּלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן קָדָשִׁים שֶׁמֵּתוּ יָצְאוּ מִידֵי מְעִילָה דְּבַר תּוֹרָה § Ulla says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Sacrificial animals that died without being sacrificed are excluded from the halakhot of misuse by Torah law. This is because they are no longer fit to be sacrificed, and therefore are no longer in the category of: “The sacred items of the Lord” (Leviticus 5:15). They cannot be redeemed either, since one may not redeem sacrificial animals merely in order to feed them to the dogs.
יָתֵיב עוּלָּא וְקָאָמַר לְהָא שְׁמַעְתָּא אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב חִסְדָּא מַאן שָׁמַע לָךְ וּלְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן רַבָּךְ וְכִי קְדוּשָּׁה שֶׁבָּהֶן לְהֵיכָן הָלְכָה The Gemara relates that Ulla was sitting in the study hall and he recited this halakha in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan. Rav Ḥisda said to him: Who will listen to you and Rabbi Yoḥanan, your teacher, with regard to this opinion, that such offerings are not subject to the halakhot of misuse by Torah law? After all, to where has the sanctity that was inherent in them until they died gone?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ תִּיקְשֵׁי מַתְנִיתִין תּוֹרִין שֶׁלֹּא הִגִּיעַ זְמַנָּן וּבְנֵי יוֹנָה שֶׁעָבַר זְמַנָּן לֹא נֶהֱנִין וְלֹא מוֹעֲלִין הָכָא נָמֵי נֵימָא קְדוּשָּׁה שֶׁבָּהֶן לְהֵיכָן הָלְכָה Ulla said to Rav Ḥisda: According to your reasoning, the mishna itself should present a difficulty, as it teaches: With regard to doves whose time of fitness for sacrifice has not arrived, as they are too young, and pigeons whose time of fitness for sacrifice has passed, as they are too old, one may not derive benefit from them ab initio, but if one derived benefit from them he is not liable for their misuse. Here too, one can say: To where has the sanctity that was inherent in the pigeons whose time of fitness for sacrifice has passed gone? Why are they no longer subject to the halakhot of misuse?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ מוֹדֵינָא לָךְ דְּאִיכָּא מְעִילָה מִדְּרַבָּנַן וְקַשְׁיָא לִי מִי אִיכָּא מִידֵּי דְּמֵעִיקָּרָא לָא אִית בֵּיהּ מְעִילָה וּלְבַסּוֹף אִית בֵּיהּ מְעִילָה Rav Ḥisda said to Ulla in response: I agree that both the sacrificial animals that died and the pigeons whose time of fitness for sacrifice has passed are not subject to the halakhot of misuse by Torah law. I also concede to you that in in the case of sacrificial animals that died and doves whose time of fitness for sacrifice has not arrived there is a prohibition of misuse of consecrated property by rabbinic law. Accordingly, I am no longer troubled by the question of where the sanctity has gone. But there is another matter that is difficult for me: Is there anything where initially, when it was consecrated, it is not subject to the halakhot of misuse, and ultimately it is subject to the halakhot of misuse by rabbinic law, such as these doves whose time of fitness for sacrifice has not arrived?
וְלָא וְהָא אִיכָּא דָּם דְּמֵעִיקָּרָא לֵית בַּהּ מְעִילָה וּלְבַסּוֹף אִית בַּהּ מְעִילָה דִּתְנַן דָּם בַּתְּחִלָּה אֵין מוֹעֲלִין בּוֹ יָצָא לְנַחַל קִדְרוֹן מוֹעֲלִין בּוֹ The Gemara asks: And is it so that there is no instance of an item that is initially not subject to the halakhot of misuse, and in the end is subject to the halakhot of misuse? But there is the case of blood, which initially is not subject to the halakhot of misuse, and ultimately it is subject to the halakhot of misuse. As we learned in the mishna (11a): With regard to blood, at its outset, before it is sprinkled on the altar, one is not liable for misusing it, but once it emerges via the canal that runs through the Temple to the Kidron Valley at the foot of the Temple Mount, one is liable for misusing it.
אָמְרִי הָתָם נָמֵי אִיכָּא מְעִילָה מֵעִיקָּרָא The Sages say in response: This is not a proof, as there too, in the case of blood it is subject to the halakhot of misuse initially.