Makkot 9aמכות ט׳ א
The William Davidson Talmudתלמוד מהדורת ויליאם דוידסון
Toggle Reader Menu Display Settings
9aט׳ א

שאין בה שוה פרוטה דא"ר אמי א"ר יוחנן הכהו הכאה שאין בה שוה פרוטה לוקה ולא מקשינן הכאה לקללה:

that does not have the capacity to cause damage worth one peruta, as Rabbi Ami says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Although one who strikes another pays damages and is not flogged, if he struck him with a blow that does not have the capacity to cause damage worth one peruta, since there is no payment, he is flogged for violating a Torah prohibition. The Gemara comments: And according to this opinion, contrary to those who hold that based on their virtual juxtaposition (see Exodus 21:15, 17) or on an analogy between them, the halakhot of striking and cursing are identical, we do not liken striking to cursing. Therefore, although one is flogged for cursing another only if the other comports himself as an observant, God-fearing Jew, one is liable for striking another even if the other was a sinner, e.g., a Samaritan.

חוץ מעל ידי גר תושב וכו': אלמא גר תושב עובד כוכבים הוא אימא סיפא גר תושב גולה ע"י גר תושב אמר רב כהנא לא קשיא כאן בגר תושב שהרג גר תושב כאן בגר תושב שהרג ישראל

§ The mishna teaches: Everyone is exiled due to their unintentional murder of a Jew, and a Jew is exiled due to all of them, except for when it is due to a ger toshav. And a ger toshav is exiled due to his unintentional murder of a ger toshav. The Gemara comments: Apparently, one may conclude that a ger toshav is a gentile, and therefore he is not exiled when he unintentionally kills a Jew. Say the latter clause of the mishna: A ger toshav is exiled due to his unintentional murder of a ger toshav, indicating that his halakhic status is not that of a gentile, as gentiles are not liable to be exiled. There is an apparent contradiction between the two clauses in the mishna. Rav Kahana said: This is not difficult. Here, in the latter clause of the mishna, it is in the case of a ger toshav who killed a ger toshav that he is exiled; there, in the first clause, it is in the case of a ger toshav who killed a Jew. In the case described in the first clause he is not exiled, as his halakhic status is not that of a Jew, for whom the sin of unintentional murder of a Jew can be atoned through exile.

איכא דרמי קראי אהדדי כתיב (במדבר לה, טו) לבני ישראל ולגר ולתושב בתוכם תהיינה שש הערים וכתיב (במדבר לה, יב) והיו לכם הערים למקלט לכם ולא לגרים אמר רב כהנא ל"ק כאן בגר תושב שהרג ישראל כאן בגר תושב שהרג גר תושב

There are those who raised a contradiction between two verses. It is written: “For the children of Israel and for the stranger and for the resident [velatoshav] among them, shall these six cities be for refuge” (Numbers 35:15), indicating that a ger toshav is exiled. And it is written in a previous verse: “And the cities shall be for you for refuge” (Numbers 35:12), from which it is inferred: A refuge for you but not for a ger toshav, indicating that a ger toshav is not exiled. Rav Kahana said: This is not difficult. Here, the verse that indicates that they are not exiled is concerning a ger toshav who killed a Jew; there, the verse that indicates that they are exiled is concerning a ger toshav who killed a ger toshav.

ורמינהי לפיכך גר ועובד כוכבים שהרגו נהרגין קתני גר דומיא דעובד כוכבים מה עובד כוכבים לא שנא דקטל בר מיניה ולא שנא דקטל דלאו בר מיניה נהרג אף גר לא שנא דקטל בר מיניה ולא שנא קטל דלאו בר מיניה נהרג

And the Gemara raises a contradiction to the halakha of the mishna from a baraita, which teaches: Therefore, a ger toshav and a gentile who killed a person are killed, even if they did so unintentionally. The Gemara infers based on the juxtaposition of a ger toshav and a gentile in the baraita: The tanna teaches the case of a ger toshav in a manner similar to the case of a gentile: Just as with regard to a gentile it is no different in a case where he killed one of his kind, a gentile, and it is no different in a case where he killed one not of his kind, a Jew, as in either case he is executed and is not exiled, so too, with regard to a ger toshav, it is no different in a case where he killed one of his kind, a ger toshav, and it is no different in a case where he killed one not of his kind, a Jew, as in either case he is executed and is not exiled.

אמר רב חסדא ל"ק כאן שהרגו דרך ירידה כאן שהרגו דרך עלייה דרך ירידה דישראל גלי איהו נמי סגי ליה בגלות דרך עלייה דישראל פטור הוא נהרג

Rav Ḥisda said: The contradiction between the mishna and the baraita is not difficult. Here, the mishna is referring to a case where he killed him in a downward motion; there, the baraita is referring to a case where he killed him in an upward motion. Rav Ḥisda elaborates: If one ger toshav killed another ger toshav in a downward motion, which is a case where if the perpetrator were a Jew, he would be exiled, the ger toshav also suffices with exile. But if the ger toshav killed his counterpart in an upward motion, which is a case where if the perpetrator were a Jew, he would be exempt from exile, the ger toshav is executed.

א"ל רבא ולאו ק"ו הוא ומה דרך ירידה דישראל גלי איהו נמי סגי ליה בגלות דרך עלייה דישראל פטור איהו נהרג

Rava said to him: And is it not derived by means of an a fortiori inference to the contrary? If one unintentionally kills another in a downward motion, which is a case where if the perpetrator were a Jew, he would be exiled, the ger toshav also suffices with exile and nothing more, but if he killed in an upward motion, which is a case where if the perpetrator were a Jew, he would be exempt from exile, is he killed?

אלא אמר רבא באומר מותר א"ל אביי אומר מותר אנוס הוא א"ל שאני אומר אומר מותר קרוב למזיד הוא

Rather, Rava said: The case in the baraita where a ger toshav is killed rather than exiled is where the ger toshav who killed another ger toshav says that it is permitted to kill the victim. If he killed him unintentionally he is exiled, in accordance with the ruling in the mishna. Abaye said to him: One who says that it is permitted to kill the victim is a victim of circumstances beyond his control, as he was unaware of the prohibition. Why, then, should he be executed? Rava said to him: That is not a problem, as I say that with regard to one who says that it is permitted, since he intended to kill the other, his action borders on the intentional.

ואזדו לטעמייהו דאיתמר כסבור בהמה ונמצא אדם כנעני ונמצא גר תושב רבא אומר חייב אומר מותר קרוב למזיד הוא רב חסדא אומר פטור אומר מותר אנוס הוא

The Gemara observes: And Rava and Rav Ḥisda follow their standard line of reasoning, as is indicated by the fact that it was stated that they disagree in the case of a ger toshav who killed a person. If he thought he was killing an animal and it was discovered that it was a person, or if he thought he was killing a gentile and it was discovered that he was a ger toshav, Rava says he is liable to be executed, as with regard to one who says that it is permitted, his action borders on the intentional. Rav Ḥisda says he is exempt, as one who says that it is permitted to kill the victim is a victim of circumstances beyond his control.

איתיביה רבא לרב חסדא (בראשית כ, ג) הנך מת על האשה אשר לקחת מאי לאו בידי אדם

Rava raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Ḥisda from that which is written with regard to Abimelech, king of Gerar, who took Sarah, Abraham’s wife: “And God came to Abimelech in a dream of the night and said to him: You shall die for the woman you took, as she is a man’s wife” (Genesis 20:3). When Abimelech took Sarah he was under the impression that she was unmarried, as Abraham said that she was his sister. Despite the fact that Abimelech was one who says that it is permitted, he was liable to be executed for his action. What, is it not that he was liable to be executed at the hand of a court composed of people, indicating that one who says that it is permitted is liable?

לא בידי שמים דיקא נמי דכתיב (בראשית כ, ו) מחטוא לי

The Gemara rejects that conclusion: No, it means that he was liable to be executed at the hand of Heaven, but not by a court. The Gemara adds: The language of the verses is also precise in this regard, as it is written: “And I also prevented you from sinning against Me” (Genesis 20:6), indicating that it was a sin vis-à-vis God and was not in the jurisdiction of a court of men.

ולטעמיך (בראשית לט, ט) וחטאתי לאלהים לאלהים ולא לאדם אלא דינו מסור לאדם הכא נמי דינו מסור לאדם

The Gemara asks: And according to your reasoning that based on the formulation of the verse one concludes that it was a sin exclusively vis-à-vis God, where Joseph says to Potiphar’s wife: “And how can I perform this great evil, and sin to God” (Genesis 39:9), may one also infer that it was a sin vis-à-vis God and not vis-à-vis man? Joseph is referring to adultery, which is punishable by execution according to the Noahide laws as well. Rather, in that case it means that although he performed a sin vis-à-vis God, his judgment is given over to the ruling of man; here too, in the verse about Abimelech, it can be explained that although he performed a sin vis-à-vis God, his judgment is given over to the ruling of man. There is no proof from this verse with regard to the status of one who says that it is permitted to perform a transgression.

איתיביה אביי לרבא (בראשית כ, ד) הגוי גם צדיק תהרוג התם כדקא מהדרי עלויה (בראשית כ, ז) ועתה השב אשת האיש כי נביא הוא

Abaye raised an objection to the opinion of Rava from the reply of Abimelech: “Will You even slay a righteous nation?” (Genesis 20:4). God appears to accept Abimelech’s contention, as He did not respond by calling him wicked, indicating that one who says that it is permitted to perform a transgression is a victim of circumstances beyond his control. The Gemara rejects that understanding. There, the reason for the rejection of Abimelech’s contention is as they responded to him from Heaven: “And now, restore the man’s wife, as he is a prophet” (Genesis 20:7).