Makkot 19aמכות י״ט א
The William Davidson Talmudתלמוד מהדורת ויליאם דוידסון
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19aי״ט א

מאימתי מחייבין עליהן משיראו פני הבית כמאן כי האי תנא דתניא רבי אליעזר אומר בכורים מקצתן בחוץ ומקצתן בפנים שבחוץ הרי הן כחולין לכל דבריהם שבפנים הרי הן כהקדש לכל דבריהם

from when is a non-priest who eats first fruits liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven for their consumption? One is liable from when the fruits will enter inside the Temple. The Gemara notes: In accordance with whose opinion is this halakha stated? It is in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to first fruits, some of which are outside and some of which are inside the Temple, the halakhic status of those that are outside the Temple is like that of non-sacred produce for all matters concerning them, and the halakhic status of those that are inside the Temple is like that of consecrated produce for all matters concerning them.

אמר רב ששת בכורים הנחה מעכבת בהן קרייה אין מעכבת בהן

§ Rav Sheshet says: With regard to first fruits, the lack of placement alongside the altar invalidates them; while the lack of recitation of the accompanying Torah verses does not invalidate them.

כמאן כי האי תנא דתניא רבי יוסי אומר שלשה דברים משום שלשה זקנים רבי ישמעאל אומר יכול יעלה אדם מעשר שני בזמן הזה בירושלים ויאכלנו ודין הוא בכור טעון הבאת מקום ומעשר שני טעון הבאת מקום מה בכור אינו אלא בפני הבית אף מעשר אינו אלא בפני הבית

The Gemara notes: In accordance with whose opinion is this halakha stated? It is in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, Rabbi Yishmael, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei says three statements in the name of three elders, and one of those statements is that which Rabbi Yishmael says: One might have thought that a person would bring second-tithe produce up to Jerusalem in the present, after the destruction of the Temple, and eat it. And ostensibly, it could be derived by means of a logical inference that one may not do so: A firstborn offering requires bringing it to the place, to Jerusalem, and eating it there, and second-tithe produce requires bringing it to the place; just as the firstborn offering may be eaten there only in the presence of the Temple, so too, second-tithe produce may be eaten there only in the presence of the Temple.

מה לבכור שכן טעון מתן דמים ואימורין לגבי מזבח בכורים יוכיחו מה לבכורים שכן טעונים הנחה

Rabbi Yishmael continues and counters: What is notable about a firstborn? Bringing the firstborn to Jerusalem is required only in the presence of the Temple, because it is notable in that it requires placement of its blood and its sacrificial portions upon the altar; will you say the same with regard to second-tithe produce, which requires only that it be consumed in Jerusalem? He then suggests: First fruits will prove that placement of blood upon the altar is not a factor, as they do not require placement of blood upon the altar, and yet they are brought to Jerusalem only in the presence of the Temple. Rabbi Yishmael counters: What is notable about first fruits? They are notable in that they require placement alongside the altar. Perhaps, since second-tithe produce does not require placement at all, even in the present one must bring it to Jerusalem and eat it there.

ת"ל (דברים טז, ז) ואכלת [שם] לפני ה' אלהיך וגו' מקיש מעשר לבכור מה בכור אינו אלא לפני הבית אף מעשר אינו אלא לפני הבית ואם איתא ליפרוך מה לבכורים שכן טעונין קרייה והנחה

Rabbi Yishmael concludes: Therefore, the verse states: “And you shall eat before the Lord your God…the tithe of your grain…and the firstborn of your herd and your flock” (Deuteronomy 14:23); the Torah juxtaposes second-tithe produce to the firstborn. Just as the firstborn may be eaten there only in the presence of the Temple, so too, second-tithe produce may be eaten there only in the presence of the Temple. The Gemara explains: the proof of Rav Sheshet’s opinion from the baraita is: And if it is so that the lack of recitation of the Torah verses invalidates the ritual of first fruits, let the baraita refute the derivation by saying: What is notable about first fruits? They are notable in that they require recitation of the Torah verses and placement alongside the altar.

א"ר אשי נהי דעיכובא ליכא מצוה מי ליכא ולימא מצוה וליפרוך אלא אמר רב אשי כיון דאיכא בכורי הגר דבעי למימר (דברים כו, ג) אשר נשבע [ה'] לאבותינו ולא מצי אמר לא פסיקא ליה

Rav Ashi said: There is no proof from the fact that recitation is not mentioned. Although the lack of recitation does not invalidate the first fruits, is there no mitzva? Everyone agrees that there is a mitzva to recite the Torah verses. And therefore let the tanna say that there is a mitzva to recite the portion; and refute the proof from first fruits in that manner, as in the case of second tithe there is no mitzva to recite Torah verses. Rather, Rav Ashi said that there is a different reason that recitation was omitted from the refutation: It is that there is the case of the first fruits of a convert, who needs to recite: “I have come to the land that the Lord swore unto our fathers” (Deuteronomy 26:3), and since he cannot say it, as the Lord did not swear to give the land to the ancestors of the convert, he brings the first fruits but does not read the portion. Therefore, the obligation to recite the Torah verses is not clear-cut for the tanna and he did not mention it.

וליהדר דינא ותיתי במה הצד משום דאיכא למיפרך מה להצד השוה שבהן שכן יש בהן צד מזבח

The Gemara asks: Why was it necessary for the tanna to derive that second-tithe produce is not brought to Jerusalem at present from the juxtaposition in the verse? And let the derivation revert to its starting point, and derive the halakha through an analogy derived from the common factor of first fruits and the firstborn. Each of the sources neutralizes the significance of the notable factor in the other, leaving the common factor: One must bring them to Jerusalem. From there it may be derived that second-tithe produce, which one must also bring to Jerusalem, need not be brought there when the Temple is not standing. The Gemara answers: The juxtaposition is necessary due to the fact that this analogy can be refuted: What is notable about the common factor that is true of both second tithe and the firstborn? It is notable in that they have an aspect involving the altar, which is not so in the case of second tithe.

ומאי קסבר אי קסבר קדושה ראשונה קדשה לשעתה וקדשה לעתיד לבא אפי' בכור נמי אי קסבר קדושה ראשונה קדשה לשעתה ולא קדשה לעתיד לבא אפילו בכור נמי תבעי

The Gemara asks: And what opinion does Rabbi Yishmael hold that led to his initial assumption that one is obligated to bring a firstborn animal to Jerusalem only when the Temple is standing? If he maintains in general that the initial consecration of the Temple sanctified Jerusalem for its time and sanctified Jerusalem forever, and the location of the Temple remains sacred even after the Temple was destroyed, then one should also be obligated to bring a firstborn animal to the place of the Temple and sacrifice it on an altar and eat it. If he maintains that the initial consecration of the Temple sanctified Jerusalem for its time but did not sanctify Jerusalem forever, then he should raise a dilemma even with regard to a firstborn, whether it may be eaten in Jerusalem.

אמר רבינא לעולם קסבר קדשה לשעתה ולא קדשה לעתיד לבא והכא בבכור שנזרק דמו קודם חורבן הבית וחרב הבית ועדיין בשרו קיים ומקשינן בשרו לדמו מה דמו במזבח אף בשרו במזבח ומקיש מעשר לבכור

Ravina said: Actually, Rabbi Yishmael maintains that the initial consecration of the Temple sanctified Jerusalem for its time but did not sanctify Jerusalem forever; and why is it obvious to him that the firstborn is not eaten? It is because here, he is stating the halakha with regard to the case of a firstborn whose blood was sprinkled before the destruction of the Temple, and the Temple was then destroyed, and its flesh is still intact. And based on a juxtaposition: “You shall sprinkle their blood upon the altar…and their flesh shall be for you” (Numbers 18:17–18), we compare the status of its flesh to the status of its blood; just as its blood must be sprinkled at a time when the altar is standing, so too its flesh may be eaten only at a time when the altar is standing. And he compares the status of second-tithe produce to the status of a firstborn offering, and derives that one may partake of second-tithe produce in Jerusalem only when the Temple is standing.

וכי דבר הלמד בהקש חוזר ומלמד בהקש מעשר דגן חולין הוא

The Gemara asks: And does a matter derived via juxtaposition then teach another matter via juxtaposition? The principle with regard to the halakhot of consecrated matters is that a halakha derived via one of the hermeneutical principles cannot serve as the basis for derivation of another halakha; each halakha requires its own source. The Gemara answers: Second tithe of grain is non-sacred produce, and halakhot of non-sacred matters derived via hermeneutical principles may serve as the basis for deriving other halakhot using hermeneutical principles.