על מנת שישתוק אבא אימא סיפא מת הבן מלמדין את האב לומר שאינו רוצה אמאי והא שתיק אלא אמר לה על מנת שלא ימחה אבא
the phrase: On the condition that my father wants this betrothal, means: On the condition that my father will remain silent and will not object when he hears of the betrothal. But if this is the case, say the last clause of the mishna: If the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not want the betrothal. Why should this matter? After all, he remained silent when he first heard about it. Clearly his mere silence does not constitute agreement. Rather, one must say that the phrase: On the condition that my father wants this betrothal, means that he said to her: On the condition that my father will not object to this betrothal at any point in time.
רישא בחד טעמא ומציעתא וסיפא בחד טעמא א"ר ינאי אין אמר ריש לקיש ש"מ לדרבי ינאי דחקינן ומוקמינן מתני' בתרי טעמא ואליבא דחד תנא ולא מוקמינן בתרי תנאי ובחד טעמא
The Gemara asks: Wouldn’t this mean that the first clause of the mishna describes one reason, i.e., one set of circumstances, and the middle clause and last clause describe one other reason? Rabbi Yannai said: Yes, this is so. Reish Lakish said: Conclude from his statement that according to the opinion of Rabbi Yannai one forces a mishna to be explained as following two reasons, and in accordance with the opinion of one tanna, rather than establishing a mishna as following the opinions of two tanna’im and one reason. In other words, an interpretation that maintains the unified attribution of one mishna is preferable, even if one is thereby forced to say that it addresses different situations.
רב יוסף בר אמי אמר לעולם חד טעמא הוא ומאי על מנת שירצה אבא ע"מ שלא ימחה אבא מכאן ועד שלשים יום
Rav Yosef bar Ami said: Actually, the entire mishna is addressing one reason, i.e., one case, and what is the meaning of: On the condition that my father wants the betrothal? It means: On the condition that my father will not object from now and until thirty days have elapsed. His silence for thirty days indicates his acceptance of the betrothal.
מתני׳ קדשתי את בתי ואיני יודע למי קידשתיה ובא אחד ואמר אני קידשתיה נאמן זה אמר אני קידשתיה וזה אמר אני קידשתיה שניהם נותנים גט ואם רצו אחד נותן גט ואחד כונס
MISHNA: With regard to a man who said: I betrothed my minor daughter to someone but I do not know to whom I betrothed her, and one man came forward and said: I betrothed her, his claim is deemed credible. If two men stepped forward and this one said: I betrothed her, and that one said: I betrothed her, they must both give her a bill of divorce to render it permitted for her to marry anyone else. And if they so desire, one of them gives her a bill of divorce and the other one may marry her.
גמ׳ אמר רב נאמן ליתן גט ואין נאמן לכנוס נאמן ליתן גט אין אדם חוטא ולא לו ואין נאמן לכנוס אימא יצרו תוקפו
GEMARA: Rav says: When the mishna states that the claim of one who says that he betrothed this girl is deemed credible, it means that he is deemed credible to the extent that he may give her a bill of divorce, but he is not deemed credible to marry her. He is deemed credible to give her a bill of divorce, as there is a presumption that a person sins only for his own benefit. No one is suspected of sinning when he does not stand to gain from it. Since he is not allowed to marry her himself, we do not say that he lied without purpose. But he is not deemed credible to marry her, as we say that his inclination might have overcome him, leading him to falsely claim that he is the one who betrothed her.
רב אסי אמר אף נאמן לכנוס ומודה רב אסי באומרת נתקדשתי ואיני יודעת למי נתקדשתי ובא אחד ואמר קידשתיה שאין נאמן לכנוס
Rav Asi disagrees with Rav’s interpretation of the mishna and says: He is deemed credible even to marry her, as he would not dare to lie directly to the father of the girl he claims to have betrothed. And Rav Asi concedes in the case of a woman who says: I became betrothed but I do not know to whom I became betrothed, and one man came and said: I betrothed her, that he is not deemed credible to marry her. In this situation she might have agreed to collude with him, as the Gemara will explain.
תנן רצו אחד נותן גט ואחד כונס תיובתא דרב אמר לך רב שאני התם דכיון דאיכא אחר בהדיה אירתותי מירתת
The Gemara raises a difficulty: We learned in the mishna that if they so desire, one of them gives her a bill of divorce and the other one may marry her. This is apparently a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav, who says that he may not marry her. The Gemara answers: Rav could have said to you: There, in our mishna, it is different, as, since there is another person with him also claiming to have betrothed her, he is afraid to lie.
תניא כוותיה דרב אסי קידשתי את בתי ואיני יודע למי קידשתיה ובא אחד ואמר קידשתיה אף נאמן לכנוס כנסה ובא אחר ואמר אני קדשתיה לא כל הימנו לאוסרה עליו
The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Asi: If a man said: I have betrothed my daughter to someone but I do not know to whom I betrothed her, and one person came forward and said: I betrothed her, he is deemed credible even to marry her. If that person married her, and another man came forward and said: It was I who betrothed her, it is not within the second man’s power to prohibit her to her husband.
האשה שאמרה נתקדשתי ואיני יודעת למי נתקדשתי ובא אחד ואמר אני קידשתי אין נאמן לכנוס מפני שהיא מחפה עליו
The baraita cites another case: With regard to a woman who said: I became betrothed but I do not know to whom I became betrothed, and one man came and said: I betrothed her, he is not deemed credible to marry her. Why not? Because she is protecting him. Perhaps she decided only now that she wants to marry him and is therefore identifying him as the man who betrothed her, although she knows it was someone else. The same suspicions do not arise in the case of a father, who has no inclinations in this regard.
איבעיא להו מהו לסקול על ידו רב אמר אין סוקלין ורב אסי אמר סוקלין
§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In the case of the mishna, where the father claims to have betrothed his daughter to someone, what is the halakha with regard to stoning based on the father’s account? Is a father who says: I betrothed my daughter, deemed credible to the extent that she is stoned as an adulteress if she engages in sexual intercourse with someone? Rav says the court does not stone her, and Rav Asi says the court stones her.
רב אמר אין סוקלין כי הימניה רחמנא לאב לאיסורא לקטלא לא הימניה רב אסי אמר סוקלין לכולה מילתיה הימניה רחמנא לאב אמר רב אסי ומודינא באומרת נתקדשתי שאין סוקלים
The Gemara elaborates: Rav said that the court does not stone her, because when the Merciful One deems the father credible when he says he betrothed his daughter, this is referring only to the prohibition against her marrying anyone else. By contrast, with regard to killing her, the Torah did not deem him credible. Rav Asi said: The court stones her, as the Merciful One deems the father credible with regard to all matters, including the death penalty. Rav Asi says: And I concede in the case of a woman who says: I became betrothed, that the court does not stone her on the basis of her own admission.
ואמר רב אסי הני שמעתתא דידי מרפסן איגרי השתא ומה במקום שאם בא לכנוס כונס אמרת סוקלים מקום שאם בא לכנוס אין כונס אינו דין שסוקלין
And Rav Asi says: These halakhot of mine are roof breakers, i.e., they are difficult and incomprehensible. Rav Asi explains: Now, in a case where a father said: I have betrothed my daughter to someone but I do not know to whom, where if someone came to marry her he is deemed credible and may marry her, which means you say that the court then stones her on the basis of the father’s testimony if she later commits adultery, is it not logical that the court should stone her in a case where a woman said: I became betrothed but I do not know to whom, thereby prohibiting herself to everyone to the extent that if someone came to marry her he may not marry her?
ולא היא לאב הימניה רחמנא לדידה לא הימנה
But that is not so, i.e., Rav Asi’s rulings are in fact reasonable: The Merciful One deems credible a father who says that his daughter is betrothed, and therefore she can even be stoned, but the Torah did not deem her, i.e., the woman herself, credible in this regard. She does not receive a special degree of credibility, and although she can declare herself a forbidden item, i.e., she can render herself forbidden to all men, as far as punishment is concerned her claim is treated by a court in accordance with the regular rules of evidence.
ורב חסדא אמר אחד זה ואחד זה אין סוקלין ואזדא רב חסדא לטעמיה דאמר רב חסדא בני זה בן תשע שנים ויום אחד בתי זו בת ג' שנים ויום אחד נאמן לקרבן אבל לא למכות ולא לעונשין
And Rav Ḥisda said: Both in this case, when the father says: I betrothed my daughter, and in that case, when she herself says: I became betrothed, the court does not stone her. The Gemara comments: And Rav Ḥisda follows his standard line of reasoning, as Rav Ḥisda says that if a father declared: This son of mine is nine years and one day old, or: This daughter of mine is three years and one day old, and the son engaged in intercourse with a woman forbidden to him, or the daughter engaged in intercourse with a man forbidden to her, he is deemed credible concerning his children’s ages with regard to the requirement for the adult to bring an offering if they performed the act unwittingly, but not with regard to their receiving the punishment of lashes and not with regard to other punishments.
תניא כוותיה דרב חסדא בני זה בן י"ג שנה ויום אחד בתי זו בת י"ב שנה ויום אחד
The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda that if one said: This son of mine is thirteen years and one day old, or: This daughter of mine is twelve years and one day old,