גט פשוט עדיו מתוכו מקושר עדיו מאחוריו פשוט שכתבו עדיו מאחוריו ומקושר שכתבו עדיו מתוכו שניהם פסולים ר' חנינא בן גמליאל אומר מקושר שכתבו עדיו מתוכו כשר שיכול לעשותו פשוט רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר הכל כמנהג המדינה
In an ordinary document, its witnesses are to sign inside it, i.e., on the written side of the paper. In a folded and tied document, its witnesses are to sign on the back of it. With regard to an ordinary document whose witnesses wrote their signatures on the back of it, or a tied document whose witnesses wrote their signatures inside of it, both of these are not valid. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel says: A tied document whose witnesses wrote their signatures inside of it is valid, because one can transform it into an ordinary document by untying it. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Everything is in accordance with regional custom. If an ordinary document is generally used and one wrote a bound one, or vice versa, the document is invalid.
והוינן בה ותנא קמא לית ליה מנהג המדינה ואמר רב אשי באתרא דנהיגי בפשוט ועבד ליה מקושר א"נ באתרא דנהיגי במקושר ועבד ליה פשוט כולי עלמא לא פליגי דודאי קפידא
And we discussed it: And does the first tanna not accept that one should follow the regional custom? It is not reasonable that he should take issue with such a basic concept. And Rav Ashi says that they have a dispute in a case where one instructed a scribe to write a document for him: If they are in a place where the custom is to write an ordinary document, and he made a tied one for him; alternatively, if they are in a place where the custom is to write a tied document, and he made an ordinary one for him; in both of these cases, everyone agrees that he was certainly particular in his instructions to the agent that he should follow the regional custom, and if the latter deviated from the custom the document is invalid.
כי פליגי באתרא דנהיגי בין בפשוט בין במקושר ואמר ליה עביד לי פשוט ואזל ועבד ליה מקושר מר סבר קפידא ומר סבר מראה מקום הוא לו
The situation in which they disagree is where they are in a place where the custom is to use either an ordinary document or a tied one, and the one requesting the document said to the scribe: Make an ordinary document for me, and the scribe went and made a tied document for him. In such a case, one Sage, the first tanna, holds that the one requesting the document was particular about wanting an ordinary document, and since the scribe wrote a tied document, it is considered to have been written without his consent. And one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that the one requesting the document merely indicating his position to the scribe, stating that if the scribe wanted to save himself the trouble of writing a tied document there would no objection.
ר' אלעזר דתנן האשה שאמרה התקבל לי גיטי ממקום פלוני וקבל לה גיטה ממקום אחר פסול ורבי אלעזר מכשיר אלמא קסבר מראה מקום היא לו
Rabbi Elazar also holds that when one instructs an agent in such a manner he is merely indicating his position to him, as we learned in a mishna (Gittin 65a): If there was a woman who said to her agent: Receive my bill of divorce for me from my husband in such and such a place, and he received her bill of divorce for her elsewhere, it is invalid. And Rabbi Elazar deems it valid. Apparently, he holds that she is merely indicating a place to him where he can receive the bill of divorce, but she does not insist that he accept it in that particular spot.
אמר עולא מחלוקת בשבח ממון אבל בשבח יוחסין דברי הכל אינה מקודשת מאי טעמא מסאנא דרב מכרעאי לא בעינא תניא נמי הכי מודה ר' שמעון אם הטעה לשבח יוחסים אינה מקודשת
§ Ulla says: The dispute in the mishna between the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon is only where he misled her with enhanced monetary value, i.e., he gave her something worth more than the item he had stipulated. But where he misled her with enhanced lineage, so that she was under the impression that his genealogy was less impressive than it in fact is, everyone agrees that she is not betrothed. What is the reason for this? A woman says: I do not desire a shoe that is larger than my foot. She does not wish to marry a man whose social standing is far greater than her own. This is also taught in a baraita (Tosefta 2:6): Rabbi Shimon concedes that if he misled her with enhanced lineage, she is not betrothed.
אמר רב אשי מתניתין נמי דיקא דקתני ע"מ שאני כהן ונמצא לוי לוי ונמצא כהן נתין ונמצא ממזר ממזר ונמצא נתין ולא פליג ר"ש
Rav Ashi says: The wording of the mishna is also precise, as the following mishna (49b) teaches: If one betroths a woman and states that the betrothal is: On the condition that I am a priest, and he was found to be a Levite; or: On the condition that I am a Levite, and he was found to be a priest; or: On the condition that I am a Gibeonite, a people prohibited by rabbinic law from marrying into the congregation, i.e., from marrying a Jew of fit lineage, and he was found to be a mamzer, who is prohibited by Torah law from marrying into the congregation; or: On the condition that I am a mamzer, and he was found to be a Gibeonite, in all of these cases she is not betrothed. And Rabbi Shimon does not disagree with these rulings. This indicates that if one misled a woman with regard to his lineage, Rabbi Shimon concedes that she is not betrothed.
מתקיף לה מר בר רב אשי אלא דקתני ע"מ שיש לי בת או שפחה מגודלת ואין לו על מנת שאין לו ויש לו דשבח ממון הוא הכי נמי דלא פליג
Mar bar Rav Ashi objects to this inference: But what about that which is taught in the same mishna: If one betroths a woman and states that the betrothal is: On the condition that I have a grown daughter or maidservant, and he does not have one; or if one betroths a woman on the condition that he does not have a grown daughter or maidservant and he does have one, the latter of which is an issue of enhanced monetary value, as the difference between one who has a maidservant and one who does not impacts how hard the woman will have to work in the home; in these cases will you also say that Rabbi Shimon does not disagree simply because the mishna does not mention his opinion in that case?
אלא פליג ברישא וה"ה לסיפא הכא נמי פליג ברישא וה"ה לסיפא
Rather, it must be that he disagrees in the first clause of the mishna with regard to enhanced monetary value, and the same is true with regard to the latter clause, i.e., he also disagrees in that clause, and it was not necessary to state his dispute another time. Here too, with regard to lineage, he disagrees in the first clause, and the same is true with regard to the latter clause.
הכי השתא התם אידי ואידי דשבח ממון פליג ברישא והוא הדין בסיפא הכא דשבח יוחסים הוא אם איתא דפליג נתני
The Gemara rejects this: How can these cases be compared? There, where both this case and that case involve an inaccuracy of enhanced monetary value, it is possible that he disagreed in the first clause and the same is true in the last clause, and the mishna did not need to restate his opinion. But here, where it is a case of enhanced lineage, which is a different issue, if it is so that Rabbi Shimon disagrees, let him teach that explicitly. The fact that no dispute is recorded in the case of enhanced lineage is proof that he concedes in that case.
איבעית אימא הכא נמי שבח יוחסים מי סברת מאי מגודלת גדולה ממש מאי מגודלת גדלת דאמרה היא לא ניחא לי דשקלה מילי מינאי ואזלא נדיא קמי שיבבותיי
If you wish, say instead: Here too, the issue of a daughter or maidservant involves enhanced lineage, not enhanced monetary value. His statement should be understood differently. Do you maintain that what is the meaning of his statement that he has a grown daughter or maidservant; that she is actually grown up, so that she can be of help to his wife? That is not the meaning of his statement. Rather, what is the meaning of: Grown? That she grows and plaits hair, i.e., he has a daughter or maidservant who is a hairdresser. Why might the potential bride view this as a drawback? Because she can say: It is not satisfactory for me to live in the house with a hairdresser, as she will take words she hears from me and will go pass them before my neighbors, meaning she will gossip about me to others. This concern is more akin to a matter of lineage than a matter of monetary value.
תנו רבנן על מנת שאני קריינא כיון שקרא שלשה פסוקים בבית הכנסת הרי זו מקודשת ר' יהודה אומר עד שיקרא ויתרגם יתרגם מדעתיה והתניא ר' יהודה אומר המתרגם פסוק כצורתו הרי זה בדאי והמוסיף עליו הרי זה מחרף ומגדף אלא מאי תרגום תרגום דידן
§ The Sages taught: If one said to a woman: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I am literate with regard to the Torah, once he has read three verses in the synagogue she is betrothed. Rabbi Yehuda says that she is not betrothed until he reads and translates the verses. The Gemara asks: Does Rabbi Yehuda mean that one translates according to his own understanding? But isn’t it taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Megilla 3:21) that Rabbi Yehuda says: One who translates a verse literally is a liar, since he distorts the meaning of the text, and conversely, one who adds his own translation is tantamount to one who curses and blasphemes God? Rather, to which translation is Rabbi Yehuda referring? He is referring to our accepted translation.
והני מילי דא"ל קריינ' אבל אמר לה קרא אנא עד דקרי אורייתא נביאי וכתובי בדיוקא
And this statement applies only if he said to her: I am literate, but if he said to her: I am a reader, this indicates that he is an expert in the reading of the Torah, and she is not betrothed unless he knows how to read the Torah, the Prophets, and the Writings with precision.
על מנת שאני שונה חזקיה אמר הלכות ור' יוחנן אמר תורה
The Gemara discusses a similar case: If one said to a woman: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I study [shoneh], Ḥizkiyya says it means that he studies halakhot, and Rabbi Yoḥanan says it means that he studies Torah, i.e., the written Torah.
מיתיבי איזו היא משנה ר' מאיר אומר הלכות ר' יהודה אומר מדרש
The Gemara raises an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan from a baraita: What is the meaning of: Mishna? Rabbi Meir says halakhot, Rabbi Yehuda says homiletics. Neither of them, however, says that it refers to the written Torah.