Kiddushin 35aקידושין ל״ה א
The William Davidson Talmudתלמוד מהדורת ויליאם דוידסון
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35aל״ה א

ולרבי יוחנן בן ברוקא דאמר על שניהם הוא אומר (בראשית א, כב) ויברך אותם אלהים פרו ורבו מאי איכא למימר משום דהוה ת"ת ופדיון הבן שני כתובים הבאים כאחד וכל שני כתובים הבאים כאחד אין מלמדין

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, who says that with regard to both of them, men and women, the verse states: “And God blessed them, and God said to them: Be fruitful and multiply, replenish the earth and conquer it” (Genesis 1:28), what can be said? According to his opinion, women are exempt from only one positive mitzva that is not time bound, Torah study; why not derive other mitzvot from this case? The Gemara answers: The reason this is not a difficulty is because Torah study and the redemption of the firstborn son, from which women are also exempt, are two verses that come as one, and any two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent.

ולרבי יוחנן בן ברוקא נמי ניהוו פריה ורביה ומורא שני כתובים הבאים כאחד ואין מלמדין צריכי דאי כתב רחמנא מורא ולא כתב פריה ורביה הוה אמינא וכבשוה אמר רחמנא איש דדרכו לכבש אין אשה דאין דרכה לכבש לא

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka as well, let procreation, which he maintains applies to women, and fear of one’s mother and father be considered two verses that come as one and they should not teach a precedent. The Gemara answers: Both cases are necessary. As, if the Merciful One had written only that women are obligated in fear of their parents, and had not written that they are obligated in procreation, I would say that as the Merciful One states: “Be fruitful and multiply, replenish the earth and conquer it” (Genesis 1:28), this leads to the conclusion that women are exempt from procreation, by the following reasoning: As it is the manner of a man to go to war and to conquer, yes, he is obligated in procreation, but as it is not the manner of a woman to conquer, she is not obligated in procreation.

ואי כתב פריה ורביה ולא כתב מורא ה"א איש דסיפק בידו לעשות אין אשה דאין סיפק בידה לעשות לא וכיון דאין סיפק בידה לעשות לא תתחייב כלל צריכא

And if the Merciful One had written only that women are obligated in the mitzva of procreation, and had not written that they are obligated to fear their parents, I would say: With regard to a man, as it is in his power to perform this mitzva, yes, he is obligated to fear his mother and father, but with regard to a woman, as it is not in her power to perform this mitzva when she is married, since her obligations to her husband may prevent her from doing so, she is not obligated. And as it is not in her power to perform this mitzva when she is married, perhaps women should not be obligated at all and there should be no difference between a married and an unmarried woman. Therefore, it is necessary for the Torah to state that women are obligated in both procreation and the fear of parents, and these are not considered two verses that come as one.

הניחא למ"ד שני כתובים הבאים כאחד אין מלמדין אלא למ"ד מלמדין מאי איכא למימר אמר רבא פפונאי ידעי לה לטעמא דהא מילתא

The Gemara notes that the earlier question remains difficult: This works out well according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent. But according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do teach a precedent, what can be said? According to this opinion it can be derived that women are obligated in positive, time-bound mitzvot from matza and assembly, and that they are exempt from positive mitzvot that are not time bound, from Torah study and the redemption of the firstborn son. Rava said: The Sages of Pafunya know the reason for this matter.

ומנו רב אחא בר יעקב אמר קרא (שמות יג, ט) והיה לך לאות על ידך ולזכרון בין עיניך למען תהיה תורת ה' בפיך הוקשה כל התורה כולה לתפילין מה תפילין מ"ע שהזמן גרמא ונשים פטורות אף כל מ"ע שהזמן גרמא נשים פטורות ומדמצות עשה שהזמן גרמא נשים פטורות מכלל דמ"ע שלא הזמן גרמא נשים חייבות

The Gemara comments: And who is the scholar called by the nickname: The Sages of Paphunya? It is Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov, who said as follows: The verse states with regard to phylacteries: “And it shall be a sign for you on your arm and for a memorial between your eyes, that the Torah of the Lord may be in your mouth” (Exodus 13:9). In this manner the entire Torah is juxtaposed to phylacteries: Just as donning phylacteries is a positive, time-bound mitzva and women are exempt from it, so too are women exempt from every positive, time-bound mitzva in the Torah. And from the fact that women are exempt from every positive, time-bound mitzva, one can learn by inference that women are obligated in every positive mitzva that is not time bound.

הניחא למ"ד תפילין מ"ע שהזמן גרמא אלא למ"ד תפילין מ"ע שלא הזמן גרמא מאי איכא למימר מאן שמעת ליה דאמר תפילין מ"ע שלא הזמן גרמא ר' מאיר וסבר לה שני כתובים הבאים כאחד וכל שני כתובים הבאים כאחד אין מלמדין

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that the mitzva of donning phylacteries is a positive, time-bound mitzva. But according to the one who says that donning phylacteries is a positive mitzva that is not time bound, as it is applicable the entire year, day and night, what can be said? The Gemara answers: Who did you hear who said that donning phylacteries is a positive mitzva that is not time bound? It is Rabbi Meir, and he holds that matza and assembly are verses that come as one, and he further maintains that any two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent.

ולר' יהודה דאמר שני כתובים הבאים כאחד מלמדין ותפילין מ"ע שלא הזמן גרמא מא"ל משום דהואי מצה שמחה והקהל שלשה כתובים הבאים כאחד ושלשה כתובים הבאים כאחד אין מלמדין

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that two verses that come as one do teach a precedent, and who also says that donning phylacteries is a positive mitzva that is not time bound, what can be said? The Gemara answers: It is not derived from here that women are obligated in positive, time-bound mitzvot because the verses that mention matza, rejoicing, and assembly are three verses that come as one, and everyone agrees three verses that come as one do not teach a precedent.

וכל מצות לא תעשה וכו' מנהני מילי אמר רב יהודה אמר רב וכן תנא דבי ר' ישמעאל אמר קרא (במדבר ה, ו) איש או אשה כי יעשו מכל חטאת האדם השוה הכתוב אשה לאיש לכל עונשים שבתורה

§ The mishna further teaches: And with regard to all prohibitions, whether or not they are time bound, both men and women are obligated to observe them. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says, and likewise the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The verse states with regard to a guilt-offering: “When a man or woman shall commit any sin that a person commits” (Numbers 5:6). The verse equates a woman to a man with regard to all punishments in the Torah, as a woman is also required to bring an offering for atonement.

דבי רבי אליעזר תנא אמר קרא (שמות כא, א) אשר תשים לפניהם השוה הכתוב אשה לאיש לכל דינים שבתורה דבי חזקיה תנא אמר קרא (שמות כא, כט) והמית איש או אשה השוה הכתוב אשה לאיש לכל מיתות שבתורה

The school of Rabbi Eliezer taught as follows. The verse states: “Now these are the ordinances which you shall set before them” (Exodus 21:1), stating “them” in the plural. This verse equates a woman to a man with regard to all judgments in the Torah, i.e., monetary cases and damages. The school of Ḥizkiyya taught: The verse states, with regard to the ransom one pays if his animal killed a person: “And killed a man or woman” (Exodus 21:29). Here too, the verse equates a woman to a man, with regard to all deaths in the Torah, i.e., the same halakha applies to an animal that kills either a man or a woman.

וצריכא דאי אשמעינן הך קמייתא משום כפרה חס רחמנא עלה אבל דינין אימא איש דבר משא ומתן אין אשה לא

The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to state all three of these verses. As, if the Torah had taught us only this first case, with regard to a woman’s obligation to sacrifice guilt-offerings, I would say that the Merciful One has pity on her due to atonement, i.e., God gave her the possibility to atone for her sin through an offering. But with regard to monetary judgments, I would say that with regard to a man, who generally conducts business negotiations, yes, these halakhot apply to him, but in the case of a woman, who generally does not conduct business negotiations, no, the halakhot of monetary judgments do not apply to her.

ואי אשמועינן הא משום דחיותה היא אבל כופר אימא

And similarly if the Torah had taught us only this case of monetary judgments, I would say that these judgments apply to a woman, because there are circumstances where engaging in business is her livelihood. But with regard to the ransom that is paid when one’s animal killed someone, I would say: