כיון שפירש טליתו עליה שוב אין רשאי למוכרה דברי ר"ע ר"א אומר בבגדו בה כיון שבגד בה שוב אין רשאי למוכרה
This verse indicates that once the master has spread his garment over her, thereby designating her as his wife, her father may no longer sell her. This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva, who interprets bevigdo as related to beged, meaning garment. Rabbi Eliezer says: “Bevigdo vah” means that since the father dealt deceitfully [bagad] with her and sold her once, he cannot sell her again.
במאי קמיפלגי ר"א סבר יש אם למסורת ור"ע סבר יש אם למקרא ור"ש סבר יש אם למקרא ולמסורת :
The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? Rabbi Eliezer maintains that the tradition of the manner in which the verses in the Torah are written is authoritative, and one derives halakhot based on the spelling of the words. One relies on the way a word is written, without the traditional vocalization, and therefore it is read as though it were vocalized as bevagdo, which refers to betrayal, not a garment. And Rabbi Akiva maintains that the vocalization of the Torah is authoritative, meaning that one derives halakhot based on the pronunciation of the words, although it diverges from the spelling, and since one pronounces the term as bevigdo, it is related to the word beged, meaning garment. And Rabbi Shimon maintains that both the vocalization of the Torah and the tradition of the manner in which the verses in the Torah are written are authoritative. Consequently, she cannot be sold as a slave after she has been taken as a wife, nor can she be sold again after she has already been sold once.
בעי רבה בר אבוה יעוד נישואין עושה או אירוסין עושה נפקא מינה ליורשה וליטמא לה ולהפר נדריה מאי
Rabba bar Avuh raises a dilemma: Does designation of a Hebrew maidservant for betrothal by her master effect marriage or does it effect only betrothal? The practical difference of the outcome of this dilemma is whether he inherits her property, i.e., does her husband inherit her property if she dies as he would if she were married to him; and whether he is obligated to become impure to bury her when she dies, if he is a priest; and whether he can nullify her vows on his own without her father, as is the case with a married woman. What is the halakha?
תא שמע בבגדו בה כיון שפירש טליתו עליה שוב אינו רשאי למוכרה זבוני הוא דלא מזבין לה הא יעודי מייעד לה ואי אמרת נישואין עושה כיון דנישאת שוב אין לאביה רשות בה אלא לאו שמע מינה אירוסין עושה
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a solution to this dilemma. “Bevigdo vah” means: Once her master has spread his garment over her, the father may no longer sell her. The Gemara analyzes this statement: This indicates that her father cannot sell her afterward, but he can designate her for another man if the master dies or divorces her. And if you say that designation effects marriage, once she is married her father no longer has authority over her. Rather, is it not correct to learn from this that designation effects only betrothal?
אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק הכא בקידושין דעלמא קאי וה"ק כיון שמסרה אביה למי שנתחייב בשארה כסותה ועונתה שוב אין יכול למוכרה
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that this argument can be refuted. Here, the baraita is dealing with the ordinary betrothal of one’s daughter, not to one who sells his daughter as a maidservant. And this is what the baraita is saying: Since her father gave her, i.e., betrothed her, to one who is obligated to provide her food, her clothing, and fulfill her conjugal rights, he can no longer sell her. Therefore, this baraita proves nothing with regard to the issue of whether or not designation effects marriage.
ת"ש אין מוכרה לקרובים משום רבי אליעזר אמרו מוכרה לקרובים ושוין שמוכרה אלמנה לכהן גדול גרושה וחלוצה לכהן הדיוט
The Gemara cites another relevant source. Come and hear: A father cannot sell his daughter as a maidservant to relatives with whom she is prohibited from engaging in sexual intercourse, as they cannot fulfill the mitzva of designation. They said in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: He can sell her to relatives, because designation is merely an option and its inapplicability does not negate the possibility of a sale. And they agree that he can sell her to a High Priest if she is a widow, or to a common priest if she is a divorcée or a yevama who performed ḥalitza [ḥalutza]. Although it is prohibited for her to marry these men, their betrothal is effective, and therefore designation is not entirely impossible in these cases.
האי אלמנה היכי דמי אילימא דקדיש נפשה אלמנה קרי לה ואלא דקדשה אביה מי מצי מזבין לה והא אין אדם מוכר את בתו לשפחות אחר אישות
The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances of this widow? If we say that she betrothed herself when she was a minor and her husband died, is she called a widow? Since the initial betrothal was entirely ineffective, as a minor cannot accept betrothal independently, she would not be considered his wife. Rather, one must say that her father betrothed her and she was subsequently widowed. But if that is the case, can he sell her? But it was taught that a person cannot sell his daughter into slavery after marriage.
ואמר רב עמרם א"ר יצחק הכא בקדושי יעוד ואליבא דרבי יוסי ברבי יהודה דאמר מעות הראשונות לאו לקידושין ניתנו ואי אמרת נישואין עושה כיון שנישאת שוב אין לאביה רשות בה
And Rav Amram says that Rabbi Yitzḥak says: Here, it is referring to a woman widowed from betrothal of designation, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: The original money of the sale of the maidservant was not given for the purpose of betrothal but as payment for her work, and if the master wishes to designate her he must give her additional money for that purpose. The relevance of this assertion will be clarified below. The Gemara explains the proof from this baraita: And if you say that designation effects marriage, once she is married her father no longer has authority over her. How can he sell her a second time after the death of her first husband?
ואלא מאי אירוסין עושה ושוין שמוכרה הא אין אדם מוכר את בתו לשפחות אחר אישות אלא מאי אית לך למימר שאני אירוסין דידה מאירוסין דאביה אפילו תימא נישואין עושה שאני נישואין דידה מנישואין דאביה
The Gemara asks from the other perspective: Rather, what will you say, that designation effects only betrothal? If so, why does the baraita state: And they agree that he can sell her? After all, a person cannot sell his daughter into slavery after matrimony. This baraita also refers to a case where a woman was betrothed but the marriage was not consummated. Rather, what have you to say? Betrothal effected by her is different from betrothal effected by her father. Since the marriage was not performed through her father but by the master giving her additional money, as held by Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, the principle that one cannot sell his daughter into slavery after betrothal does not apply. But by the same reasoning, even if you say that designation effects marriage, you can argue that marriage effected by her is different from marriage effected by her father.
האי מאי בשלמא אירוסין מאירוסין שאני אלא נישואין מנישואין
This challenge is rejected: What is this comparison? Granted, one form of betrothal is different from the other betrothal, i.e., there is a difference between standard betrothal with the father’s consent and betrothal through designation, which is performed upon the master’s initiative. After that type of betrothal the father can, in fact, sell her a second time. But with regard to one mode of effecting marriage in relation to another mode of effecting marriage,